

ETHOS

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TO THE ENGLISH READER

With this issue of “Ethos” the English reader is invited to join a remarkable discourse about the future of the Church and of society in the Third Millennium. Its locus has been the John Paul II Institute, established at the Catholic University of Lublin in 1982 as an inter-disciplinary, scientific centre devoted to the study of the work of John Paul II with particular emphasis on its implications for anthropology and ethics.

This dialogue has become all the more urgent as events of the past several decades reflect the collapse in Western Culture’s understanding and respect for the nature of the human person. This crisis of personal identity, among so many in contemporary society, has led to all-too-familiar crises in relationships between persons – in marriages, families, neighbourhoods, communities, and even nations. These developments accent what Aristotle, and Heraclitus before him, suggested by their use of the term *ethos*: that there is an inherent link between human character and moral action.

As the Holy Father stated at the beginning of his papal ministry in *Redemptor hominis*, “The Redeemer of man, Jesus Christ, is the centre of the universe and of history” (No. 1). The event of the Incarnation in history has become the authentic *ethos*, the centre of human existence and the true home for each human person. As John Paul II reminds us, the defining characteristic, the *ethos*, of not only every Christian, but every human being, is the event of Jesus Christ. This *ethos* incorporates all genuine systems of human values and at the same time transcends all value systems in seeking to relate the life of each human person to the fundamental truth of the Incarnation.

The urgency of this task for the Church was brought forth eloquently by John Paul II during his address to the United Nations when he said: “It is one of the great paradoxes of our time that man, who began this period we call

«modernity» with the self-confident assertion of his «coming of age» and «autonomy,» approaches the end of the Twentieth Century fearful of himself, fearful of what he might be capable of, fearful for the future.”

Since 1987, “Ethos” has dedicated itself to the exploration of how an authentic Christian *ethos* articulated in the work of John Paul II may provide a new home for man in the face of this uncertainty. This effort deserves the attention of wider audience. It is one which will undoubtedly be welcomed in many quarters.

Carl A. Anderson, Dean
Pontifical John Paul II Institute
for Studies on Marriage and Family
Washington, D.C.

FROM THE EDITOR

DISCOVERING THE BORDERS OF EUROPE

In the history of individuals, families, communities, or societies one comes across events which are landmarks for them, which are – as a contemporary thinker says – “foundational” (P. Ricoeur). Every such event confronts us with something which did not exist before, and which makes us look at things in a new light. For a family, the conception and birth of a child is such an event. A man and a woman who until then were only husband and wife, from that moment on are mother and father; they look at their lives through the prism of this fact which is the coming into the world of their child. From this point on, they see their life as divided into “before” and “after” this event. The event gives meaning to their life, in a certain way – defines it.

The case of the life of a nation is similar. And although in the history of any community it is more difficult to point to the one and only event which would prove decisive for its lot, when we look back at the history of the Polish nation and ask about its identity, we are inclined to think about Gniezno and the year AD 966 (i.e. the date of the baptism of Poland). Is it possible to point to such a decisive event within the history of Europe – this subcontinent, not too large but containing many nations with similar cultures and languages as well as a common religion – an event without which Europe would no longer be itself, even though it remained the same continent?

The origins of the history of Europe are hidden deep in the past and the multitude of its threads makes it difficult to select such an event. And yet the author of the *Acts of the Apostles* succeeded, perhaps, in doing this. What event was this and where did St. Luke describe it? Here – during St. Paul’s second apostolic journey in Asia Minor: “One night Paul had a vision: a Macedonian appeared and kept urging him with these words, «Come across to Macedonia and help us.» Once he had seen this vision he lost no time in arranging

a passage to Macedonia, convinced that God had called him to bring them the good news.” (Ac 16 : 9-10)

What happened that night? Not much – Paul prayed. What happened after this prayer? Paul crossed the sea, from Asia Minor to Macedonia. Let us have a look at the map. Where is Macedonia? – In the Balkans. In Europe, the proclamation of the Gospel, of the Good News about the redemption of man by God, began from the Balkan Peninsula.

Is not the history of Europe divided into two epochs: “before” and “after” this night? Is it not divided into the period before Paul’s prayer – and after Paul’s prayer?

The night of St. Paul’s prayer takes us Europeans to two other nights, because of which – and thanks to which – St. Paul could have prayed at all. The first is the night of Bethlehem, the night of the God-Man. The second – Easter, the great night of redemption. In the light of events which took place during these three nights, let us attempt to look at the history of Europe. This is the history of man in Europe because the events of these nights tell us about man. They tell us about the extraordinary identification of God with every individual man. It is because of man that God became Man, and the God-Man gave His life also for man. “For this is how God loved the world: he gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not perish but may have eternal life” (Jn 3 : 16) – in this way Jesus Himself explained the essence of the Gift from the Father to a Jewish scholar, Nicodemus, during their long nocturnal conversation. Equally, Paul – also a Jewish man of learning – understood that even if he had been the only sinner in the world, God, Jesus Christ, would still have given his life for him. This is why he also knew that even if there was only one Macedonian calling him, he had to change all his hitherto conceived plans and hurry to help those people to whom the Macedonian had been calling him, bringing them the same Gift from the Father about which Christ spoke to Nicodemus. The discovery of the priceless value, the uniqueness of every man, was at the same time the discovery of Europe.

“Paul, «Come across to Macedonia and help us!» Do we still hear in the Europe of today this call for help, for spiritual bread and light in the search for what is essential, for the pure water of truth and justice? Can this call really have faded away owing to the apparent «self-sufficiency» of many of today’s Europeans in their constant temptation to live as if there were no God” (John Paul II, Homily in Speyer, 4 May 1987).

In the course of time, the reverse of “Pascal’s wager” – “let us live as if God did not exist” – was to become the “measure” of being European. Whole social, political and economic systems were conceived and implemented in European countries according to this “wager”. Similarly, efforts were made to solve religious conflicts in the same way. The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 with its *Cuius regio eius religio* was to be the rational, temporary compromise on

the way to the restoration of the broken unity among Christians. When a hundred years later the Peace of Westphalia (1648) was signed in Münster, Europe was drained of blood, an economically and socially ruined continent. We would spare the readers descriptions of the subsequent “reasonable” compromises – and the consequences thereof – so often made by Europeans in Europe in order to save or establish peace. It is enough only to recall the name of Yalta.

And it is enough to note: these same Balkans which witnessed the first evangelization of Europe became, at the threshold of 20th century, the witness of the outbreak of World War I, and today they are again the arena of a tragedy in which, under our eyes, the descendants of this man from Macedonia who asked Paul for help lose their homes, families and their very lives. Cannot other Europeans hear the desperate cry coming from there: “Help us”? Yet, is it only from there that the cry can be heard? Can it not also be heard within the “satiated” and “self-sufficient” societies of well-off Europe?

However, when we hear the cries of the many injured and those deprived of their rights, we must also look carefully for those most wronged, those who do not cry only because they are devoid of any power. Do they not live among us, in Europe? They do, but they do not cry: the unborn. Also the old people, left to themselves, to whom society ever more often and ever more boldly extends the “death by choice.”

Solidarity with every man who calls “Help me!” – even if (or rather – especially) it were the “silent scream” – is the proper name of Europe. Therefore, there is only one proper border of Europe – and one criterion of being European – as the common home of all its inhabitants. This border is marked by the difference between the attitude of solidarity with every man, and the attitude of rejecting his call. This border was pointed out to Europeans by Paul from Tarsus through his response to the call and the need manifested by one of their representatives; because Paul cared for the good of the latter, he undertook the hardship of crossing the sea. But the boundary of radical solidarity with every man was demarcated by the Son of God, Jesus Christ, at Golgotha, where he offered His life for the life of His neighbour. You are a European if you “help most the one who can least help himself.” You are a human and a European...

If this is so, is the attitude of solidarity obligatory for us only in relation to every man in Europe? Let us remember: St. Paul showed this attitude to Europeans, but – let us stress this – it is the Lord Christ who, by dying for every single man who lives anywhere in the world, made it binding for everyone towards everyone else. You are a human if you “help most the one who can least help himself.” You are a human and a European...

Today, when Europe considers itself to be democratic, and the European countries are democratic states of law, democracy itself is understood as the rule of the majority respecting the rights of the minority. If we take into ac-

count the criterion of solidarity with every man, it is necessary to make here an essential correction: democracy is the rule of the majority respecting the rights of every individual man. Even more so: democracy is the participation in the rule of all in the service of each individual. Only solidarity may save the sense of democracy in Europe and at the same time Europe itself – for Europe and for the whole world.

Simultaneously, this is John Paul II's vision of Europe; Europe which discovers and affirms itself when it serves the authentic good of every man... not only in Europe. Because this is the Europe in which lives the mystery of Christ who was "sent" to all nations. This is why John Paul II's vision of Europe is also expressed by the fact that he is the Pope who regularly sets out on pilgrimages from Rome – the place where St. Peter and St. Paul arrived – to the world and, going beyond the borders of Europe, he stays within it, or even in its very heart.

In this issue of "Ethos" which we place in the hands of our readers, we present the papers and discussions from a session entitled "John Paul II's Vision of Europe" which was held on May 16–18, 1995, and was organized by the John Paul II Institute of the Catholic University of Lublin in collaboration with the International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein. Already for a long time, the thread of friendship and cooperation has connected Lublin and the Principality of Liechtenstein, one of the smallest countries in Europe. In 1945, this country, opposing the pressure of the great powers, gave shelter to a group of soldiers – the Cossacks – who were fleeing Stalin's revenge. By this act the Principality of Liechtenstein and its ruler Franz Josef were ahead of the rest of Europe and of the world by a whole epoch – advancing beyond the age which divided influence according to the argument of power – and turning towards the spiritual sources of Europe. Today, Liechtenstein, apart from the fact that it is a modern and highly developed country, is also the meeting place of philosophers from different parts of Europe and the world united by the common idea: *Diligere omnem veritatem et in omnibus*. Since this transcends the borders of all countries and continents, there also gathered in Lublin scholars from Europe and North America who spent several days in the "City of Union," reflecting together on the essence and meaning which the heritage of the Old Continent has for the contemporary world.

The materials from the above-mentioned session are preceded by an essay of the then Cardinal Karol Wojtyła, written in 1978 for an Italian monthly "Vita e pensiero": "Where is Europe's Border?," hitherto unpublished in English. The Editors of "Ethos" are deeply convinced that it is worthwhile recalling the testimony of the past. Is this, however, the testimony only of the past? The diagnoses made therein are valid also today in Europe – as it is often said – after the breakthrough, and the current pontificate by the author of this testimo-

ny is a clear realization of the message contained in it. How is this possible? – Maybe this pontificate discloses to Europe the mystery of this first and genuine breakthrough which was accomplished almost 2,000 years ago, somewhere between Asia Minor and Macedonia...

C. R.

Translated by *Partycja Mikulska*

**JOHN PAUL II
TOWARDS THE NEW EVANGELIZATION OF EUROPE**

JOHN PAUL II

TOWARDS THE NEW EVANGELIZATION OF EUROPE*

Christianity in Europe goes back to the time of the Apostles. According to The Acts of the Apostles, the proclamation of the Gospel crossed the border between Asia and Europe, above all, through the work of Saint Paul. Subsequently, the Apostle Peter left Jerusalem and passed through Antioch on his way to Rome, where Paul too later arrived as a prisoner. From that time Rome became the See of the Apostles, and from here the great evangelization began to spread throughout Europe. In a sense that evangelization can be called "the first", and it lasted almost to the end of the fourteenth century. The last to be baptized, together with its king, was Lithuania.

In the context of the phenomena just described, there remains *the permanent presence of Christianity in Europe*, more or less deeply rooted in individuals, environments and societies. In effect, Christianity possesses a definite "right to citizenship" in European history. Through its presence since ancient times it has contributed to the very formation of the culture and consciousness of the various nations. However, immanentistic and secularizing trends in the areas of thought and action are not just a later intrusion. They developed under the impulse of a cultural evolution that was *the expression of a civilization* in which the advances of science and technology gave man an ever increasing *sense of domination*, and, indirectly, of *independence* in relation to the One who is the Beginning and the End of all that exists.

How far this sense of independence stems from a real "reduction" of the processes of knowing and willing, and how far it gives rise to *man's present-*

* Extract from an address delivered by John Paul II on 5 June 1990 at the opening of the consultation meeting in preparation for the Special Assembly for Europe of the Synod of Bishops.

day subjection to immanentism (in relation to the world), are separate questions. What is clear is that in the great successes obtained in the realm of the visible world, in the overall sum of conquests of science and technology, man has found an apparently satisfying "alibi". He is content with what he can get from the world during his existence on earth. He thinks that the world serves him, without in turn making him dependent on it. This is enough for him. It is as if he were to forget his own mortal nature and his need for transcendence. He does not feel the desire to be open to the Kingdom which "is not of this world" (cf. Jn 18 : 36). He also seems not to experience the truth of the words: "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom" (II Cor 3 : 17).

The tragic series of events that have followed one after another during this century, particularly since the outbreak of the World War II, have contributed perhaps in some measure to opening the human heart to the freedom which comes from the Spirit, that freedom by which Christ has set us free (cf. Gal 5 : 1).

Within the nations which at Yalta had been consigned to the superpower of the east as "allies", but in effect as "satellites", a *resistance* had already begun to awaken in the previous decades. Later, and more recently, it showed itself more decisively, first in Poland and then also in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These nations, deeply rooted in the traditions of Europe, began in an increasingly consistent and effective way to make claims against the totalitarian system of the State. This action was based on the inviolability of the *rights of man*. Among these rights a central place belonged to the *right of freedom of conscience and of religion*.

The year 1989 concluded with a series of changes in the countries of the so-called Communist bloc. The Marxist parties lost their absolute power. Free elections in these societies are confirming the widespread disapproval of the forms of political, economic and social life which had been imposed by them. All of this is happening *by way of a peaceful revolution* – a road initiated by "Solidarność" in Poland in 1980 – without the spilling of blood, with one exception: the case of Romania. The process of democratization is in all the countries of that area, except – at least so far – in Albania.

One consequence of these changes is that rights are being restored to the Community of believers, namely the Church, of which she had been systematically deprived under Marxist totalitarianism. The degree of that deprivation varied from country to country. *What was common in them all was the point of departure*: religion as a factor of alienation, had to disappear to make way man's liberation. It can be said that the experience of the period which has just ended has demonstrated the exact opposite: *religion and the Church have shown themselves to be among the most effective means to liberate man from a system of total subjugation*.

In the light of these events, Christians on their part must carefully reflect and ask themselves *if and to what degree* the extinguishing of the Church's

rights was somehow related to *an inadequate evangelization*. It may be asked whether there was not something lacking, for example, in catechesis, either on the part of those who imparted it or on the part of those who received it.

Likewise, the children of the Church must reflect on *the integrity of their Christian profession*, that is, on their effective witness, in public life also, to all the demands of a coherent commitment to their faith. It is important in fact that in the nations which have returned to freedom the altogether legitimate affirmation of civil and patriotic concerns should not be detached from the strengthening, on the personal and community levels, of the values of Christian faith and morals.

The basic criterion which should direct this reflection and inspire suitable responses should be that of *fidelity to man* in the inalienable dignity that comes to him from being *created* and *re-created* in the image and likeness of God. I say this, because if man is to be adequately understood in his historical reality, he must be considered jointly *in the order of creation and in that of redemption*. In this way his dignity appears in all its richness, a richness to be unfolded both in his *dominion over created things*, exercised according to the Creator's intentions, and in *mutual communion* between individuals and peoples in the name not only of a shared humanity but also, and above all, of a shared vocation to build in Christ the one great family of the children of God.

In conclusion, we return to the two questions posed at the beginning. These are questions which involve us, gathered here as Bishops and Pastors of the Church on the European continent.

The first refers to the past, in a special way to the last fifty years, and *what typical gifts do the Churches* of the west, centre and east of Europe *bring to each other* in this moment in which the state of our continent is undergoing notable transformations? What is the meaning of past experiences for particular Churches and for the universal Church? What is that meaning from the point of view of ecumenism and perhaps also of dialogue with other religions, as well as with the world that is foreign to religion?

The second question projects us into the future: *how should we develop* this reciprocal gift *from the point of view of the Church's mission* in Europe and in the world? That is, from the point of view of continuing service to the Kingdom of God by means of a new evangelization which, while it advances the particular Churches with their legitimate traditions, strengthens their bond with the See of Peter, which "presides over the universal communion of charity, protects legitimate differences and at the same time sees that such differences do not hinder unity but rather contribute towards it" (*Lumen Gentium*, 13).

It is a question of discerning what *the Spirit of Christ* is saying to all of us by means of past experiences and, at the same time, of understanding *what path he is opening up before us for the future*.

For almost two thousand years Christianity has been a part of the history of the continent of Europe. Now that we are approaching the beginning of the

Third Millennium after Christ and especially now that the life of the Nations of Europe is beginning to assume a new form, our presence cannot be lacking.

“Watch and pray...” (Mt 26 : 41). We must stand close together and be united in prayer to obtain an inner and at the same time community sensitivity to the word that the Holy Spirit is addressing to the Churches.

We must “watch and pray,” invoking the intercession of the Patron Saints of Europe, Benedict, Cyril and Methodius, and of all the men and women Saints of the continent; “watch and pray” under the special protection of the Holy Mother of God, towards whom the Christian peoples of Europe have always fostered a deep devotion, as testified by innumerable Shrines dedicated to her; “watch and pray” in order to grasp and follow what the Spirit says to the Churches and so be able to lead all those whom the Lord has entrusted to us to the joy of that “inheritance among the saints” of which the Spirit is the “guarantee” (cf. Eph 1 : 18, 14).

THE CHRISTIAN ROOTS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

Cardinal Karol WOJTYŁA

WHERE IS EUROPE'S BORDER?

The geographical delineation of Europe's borders does not cause any problems in the west, north, or south. Nor does it cause any problems in the east, where the border seems to be rather more conventional than natural. The question of Europe's borders remains nevertheless justified and necessary. It is a question not only of borders which demarcate land, but of the much deeper border located within peoples themselves.

It is a fortunate occurrence that amid various factors, an article on the borders of Europe has been included among the various contributions which *Vita e pensiero* is publishing in this issue.¹ It should be understood as an attempt to supplement and even to correct a vision which manifests itself as the result of specialized studies in these pages which seek to present a certain picture of Europe, particularly of contemporary Europe.

Without such a question the picture presented would be one-sided, something which frequently happens. The tendency to speak and think of Europe in exclusively "Western" terms is characteristic of peoples and circles representing the western part of Europe, although this tendency is not exclusive to them. Doubtless, this manner of thinking and speaking has its rationale. It also results from certain objective factors and circumstances. Nevertheless, it is marked by a certain one-sidedness, perhaps even a certain "professional malcontentedness" (if "Europeanism"² or the fact of being European in the "Western" sense can be understood as a certain "profession.")

¹ This article was first published in 1978 in the Italian journal "Vita e pensiero", 61 (1978)/4-6: 160-68. It is now appearing for the first time in English.

² The translator renders Wojtyła's term *europejskość* as "Europeanism." The most accurate rendition of Wojtyła's notion might be to create the adjective "Europeanness," though his idea is also captured in the English word (now somewhat rare) "Europeanity." (Trans.)

THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION

That is why I happily accepted the invitation of "Vita e pensiero's" editorial board to address the question of the borders of Europe. I am convinced that the division of Europe into East and West, which has lasted for thirty years, has excluded from everyday thinking and expression the particular character of Central Europe (*Mitteleuropa*). For thirty years the division of Europe has followed a political and ideological border that divided one nation (Germany) into two states.

On the other hand, during the first half of this century, especially between the First and Second World Wars, the notion of "Central Europe" was explicitly felt. That notion was permeated above all by the very content of the cultures of the peoples and nations which in that part of Europe manifested themselves as being particularly strong, along with their richness and diversity, especially when the centre of Europe moved southward: it is a well-known fact that Europe is most differentiated nationally and demographically on the Balkan Peninsula.

THE BORDER RUNS THROUGH PEOPLES THEMSELVES

When we pose the question: "Where does one find the border of Europe?" we have in that formulation given ourselves to understand that the border is to be understood in various ways which have different meanings for us. This is how we ought to situate our problem.

The geographical border of Europe is clearly defined: it runs along the length of the Urals. To the east of the Urals lies the huge Asian continent. To the west spreads out the much smaller continent of Europe, a continent which, if one takes its area in square kilometers into account, could be regarded as a significantly large peninsula of the Eurasian continent.

The geographical delineation of Europe's borders does not cause any problems in the west, north, or south. Nor does it cause any problems in the east, where the border seems to be rather more conventional than natural. The question of Europe's borders remains nevertheless justified and necessary. It is a question not only of borders which demarcate land, but of the much deeper border located within peoples themselves.

Those very borders divide societies and particularly nations, binding them to a defined piece of territory, which has had a particular significance precisely on the Europe continent. Let us therefore attempt to see what factors determine these kinds of divisions.

Language, culture and history allow us to indicate the lines along which run the borders between France and Germany, or between Germany and Poland.

Can one speak in the same way of the border between the East (where the man we call "Asiatic" lives) and the West (where so-called "European man" lives)? To what degree can that border be seen as "natural" and to what degree is it "conventional?"

That border is "natural" to a much lesser extent than the borders between nations; the analogy to frequently conventional state borders is even more distant. As is well-known, the efforts undertaken at the end of World War I to establish political borders according to criteria of nationality did not prevent the outbreak of World War II on the European continent.

From the history of my own country I know that several generations of Poles have had to bear on their identity papers the stamp of affiliation to a foreign state, despite the fact that they lived in the land of their birth. This was the result of the division of Poland, i.e., of the Commonwealth of the Three Nations: Polish, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian. This division removed the name of the Polish state from the map of Europe during the period 1795-1918. That nation, or rather those nations, nevertheless survived by living their own authentic (though certainly difficult) life.

THE TWO VERSIONS OF THE NOTION OF "EUROPEANISM"

The concept of "Europeanism," while corresponding to the borders of Europe in a geographical sense, cannot obviously be reduced merely to the dimensions of those borders. Neither can one define it by employing the primordial unity of the Indo-European languages, even if their analogical structures influence the minds of the peoples living in Europe (not only genetically but also on the basis of their mutual contacts). The concept "Europeanism" is therefore one with various shades of meaning, at least from the viewpoint of the diverse national identities of the inhabitants of Europe considered geographically. It seems, however, that the division does not have to have a fundamental and definitive significance for the spiritual history of Europe, for the establishment of borders within the continent, for the division into East and West, or for the creation of Central Europe (or for the latter's shifting in easterly or westerly directions). It is therefore necessary to take into account other criteria and elements which have appeared in the history of our continent after the fall of the Roman Empire and of the great migrations of the European peoples.

The process of dividing Europe into East and West, which took place in the second millennium (i.e., the process which gave rise to two different versions of the notion "Europeanism") can perhaps be explained through the influence of the two centres which are found at the southern extremities of Europe. (One of them is geographically located across the Bosphorus, i.e., on the territory of Asia). Those centers are Rome and Constantinople.

The fact that the borders of Europe (or, rather, of "Europeanism") exist also in a geographical dimension is closely connected with the origins of those two centres, which at root operated exclusively on a certain division. Nevertheless, already at the beginning of the present millennium those centres pointed to the existence of certain contradictions.

This is not merely a matter of the division and opposition of centres of power (first of state power and uninterruptedly of ecclesiastical power) between those two centres. It is also a matter of different cultural traditions. Those differences and oppositions are only partially identical with the pre-Christian division between Greece and Rome. They have their own shape, and flow from many different causes and circumstances which were part of the complex histories of the Church and of European politics at the beginning of our millennium.

The significance which the dynamic presence of the influences of Greece and of Asia Minor had on the eastern centre during the first millennium is well-known. Constantinople, which in its day was the centre for forging the eastern version of "Europeanism" and which became its symbol, was itself the fruit of the mutual interactions of those two influences. One must pay attention here to that small segment of the geographical border between Europe and Asia, even more so perhaps because the long northern segment runs along the Urals to the Caspian Sea and along the Caucasus to the Black Sea. It seems that is the border along which Eastern Europe, or rather the eastern version of "Europeanism" was created. It was not only a boundary of opposites and internal antinomies which eastern and western Europe carry in themselves. It was also a boundary of mutual self-completion, of a complementarity whose basis lies in a common source.

THE MILLENNIAL PERSPECTIVE OF POLISH HISTORY

For a moment I would like to direct attention to the process of creating these two versions (Eastern and Western) of "Europeanism" using the example of the millennial history of my homeland, Poland. I do so even boldly since, at the beginning of World War II, Poland was called the "key to Europe."³

As is known, after leaving Constantinople Saints Cyril and Methodius reached Poland's historical southern border which runs through the Carpathians. The evangelization of southern Poland prior to the country's formal history, i.e., the baptism of the Wiślanie tribe in the ninth century, was connected with that mission. The baptism received by the first known historical rulers of Poland, in Gniezno or Poznań in 966 and the conscious policy of the Piast dynasty, which had its beginnings with that baptism, determined that the nation and state

³ See R. L. B u e l l, *Poland: Key To Europe* (New York/London: A.A. Knopf, 1939).

formed by those rulers would be closely bound up with the Holy See and with the western culture radiating from Rome. Lithuania, lying to Poland's north, would subsequently be found within the same cultural orbit (in an explicit way in the fourteenth century).

Within the range of the influence of Rome one can undoubtedly see the border which, within the confines of geographical Europe, determined the division between East and West. Poland's history was played out on those lands which – as a state of one nation from the time of the Piast Dynasty through 1370, and above all, as a unified state of three nations in the fourteenth century – were the centuries-old place of encounter between the influences of East and West, of Rome and Constantinople.

The encounter merits an exact examination precisely from the viewpoint of the title of this article, expressed in question form: "Where is Europe's Border?" We must, however, limit ourselves here to sketching out this problem whose dimensions cannot be entirely explained by events of either a political (e.g. the 1375 Union between Poland and Lithuania) or ecclesial (e.g., the 1596 Union of Brest) nature.

These events bear witness to the mutual interpenetration as well as the opposition of influences originating from those two different centres. One might even propose the hypothesis that it is precisely this process of interpenetration and of mutual opposition of Eastern and Western influences that is necessary for the creation of Central Europe. It is also probably essential to mention here the fact that these processes resulted neither in the West swallowing up the East (nor vice versa) nor the emergence of a kind of conformism going in only one direction. It was rather an attempt at coexistence and coactivity of the two aforementioned versions of "Europeanism," versions evolving according to their own laws. This is important, above all, for the proper evaluation of ecclesial unity which is threatened by a too swift simplification undertaken in the name of twentieth century ecumenism.

THE DIALECTIC OF EUROPE'S BORDERS: THE EAST

An analysis of the problem of the border between East and West, one so important for the development of Europe, requires the introduction of a third element which, although frequently not accounted for, is not insignificant to the history of early and contemporary Europe. This is the problem of military actions from Asian territory directed against Europe.

That event, or rather series of events, fundamentally differs from the episodes of creative penetration which occurred during the first Millennium, above all on that section of the border between Europe and Asia running along the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Those events were connected in a certain way with

the process of evangelization. The military actions launched against Europe from Asian territory, however, were motivated by a desire to subordinate and enslave peoples which in that era (the thirteenth century) began to acquire their own political and cultural profiles.

The invasions of the Tartars, which in the first half of the thirteenth century had already convulsed Russia (Ukraine), subsequently destroyed the Polish lands, reducing cities and villages to the ground. The Mongols, defeated in the Legnica Valley by the son of St. Hedwig, Henry the Pious, retreated to the east of the Dnieper, settling on the territory of today's Russia.

With the same sympathy that he and other Poles felt towards Russia, Adam Mickiewicz spoke out carefully (in his Parisian Lectures of 1840-41 delivered at the Sorbonne) on the subject of the influences of the Asiatic peoples (which included the former Mongols) in shaping the mentalities of the Slavic peoples who, on the territory of later Russia (i.e., after 1450, in the Russia of the Tsars) remained for over two centuries under Asiatic influence.⁴ Karamzin, the historian of imperial Russia, expressed himself even more radically on this subject.⁵

In this way the eastern border of Europe was, above all, the boundary of the influence of the Gospel. It was later the boundary of invasions from Asian lands seeking to enslave the peoples of Europe.

Simultaneously with this strange dialectic of historical events, amid the ashes of numerous borders demarcated and moved by history, one must carefully examine the ways in which that border runs through peoples themselves. How deeply in them does the sense of humanity and of human dignity, drawn from the Gospels, dwell? Where does servile passivity, flowing from centuries of slavery, begin? We must take this into account when posing the question: "Where is Europe's border?"

⁴ See A. M i c k i e w i c z, *Literatura słowiańska* [Slavic Literature], Lvov, 1900.

⁵ "It was not the crowd alone in its fury that killed and burned people. [...] It was also the punishments envisioned by the law which were expressions of cruel barbarism. From that time on, even wealthy and powerful people accused of real crimes against the state, were publicly flogged. We inherited this custom, unworthy of man, from the Mongols. Mongol traders, thieves, and other pickpockets, treated us like slaves who were worthy only of contempt. [...] Losing our national dignity we learned the base passivity of slaves, which replaces the strength of people who are inadequate. We learned from the cheating Tartars to cheat each other. [...] From the thirst for money arose arrogance. The feelings of repression, fear, and hatred ruling in [our] souls gave birth to severe and dark customs" (*Ibid.*, p. 413n).

THE DIALECTIC OF EUROPE'S BORDERS: THE WEST

When one asks this question of people from Western Europe one must immediately remember that the borders in that part of Europe from which the question comes, i.e., in the West, are obvious and raise no doubts.

If however, we are speaking about borders not only in a geographical but also in psychological and ethical senses, then it is not hard to realize that Western Europe is in a deep shock which one might define as a crisis of its borders.

This is not a question of state borders because they seem today to be peaceful (although not too long ago they were not). Rather, it is a question of the phenomenon of post-colonialism, which might be characterized as Europe's return to its original borders. The colonial era had expanded those borders, placing them on other continents. The contemporary phenomenon of the so-called shrinkage of the borders of Western Europe is ultimately also a problem of an ethical nature. It contains in itself not only satisfaction atonement, but at the same time a pang of conscience and a warning:⁶

– Satisfaction, because the colonial nations and states of western Europe are trying to demonstrate by their actions that they are gradually preparing the peoples of the colonial lands once subject to them for national independence and political sovereignty.

– A pang, because without a doubt the colonial states exploited natural and human riches to such a degree that their former subjects, now independent, do not cease to reproach them for this.

– A warning, because colonialism is being born again in various forms of neo-colonialism.

Studying the western border of Europe as understood under this double aspect (spatio-temporally and simultaneously essentially humanly, i.e., ethically) we must therefore look at the eastern border, trying to understand its whole historico-anthropological uniqueness and vice versa.

Furthermore, when we make ourselves aware of the fact of the existence of two "worlds," above all in an ideological and political sense, i.e., the existence of two blocs, one ought to see them as a whole with a profound complexity which is today masked by division.

That complexity is deep and multivalent because historical periods as well as the deeds of individual persons and of whole nations cannot be treated in a mechanical way. It is possible that European man is not identical with the processes of the exploitation of others, of production and consumerism set up in one way or another.

⁶ In the theological sense of atoning for one's sins. (Trans.)

IDENTITY AND FREEDOM GO TOGETHER

We should not, however, depart from our subject. It seems that in response to the question: "Where are Europe's borders?" we can, as a result of our considerations, draw the following conclusions (expressing them at the same time in the form of propositions):

1. A recognition is needed today more than ever of the two different versions of "Europeanism" which were formed under the influence of different traditions. (This should occur without regard to given ideological concerns or systems).

2. A recognition is needed today more than ever that respect for human dignity and authentic freedom cannot be halted at any border, and above all, at any border on the European continent.

3. A recognition is needed today more than ever that Europe can only build its future within its geographical borders and its heritage of civilization/culture on the basis of permanent moral norms, and only under the condition that the creative ferment of the Gospel does not perish there because of the enslavement of individuals and nations.

Translated by *Dr. John M. Grondelski*

Juan de DIOS VIAL CORREA

THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY FOR LIFE

The *Pontificia Academia Pro Vita* was created by His Holiness John Paul II with the *motu proprio* *Mysterium vitae* made public on 11 February 1994, the feast of Our Lady of Lourdes. The activities of the Academy were started on 12 June 1994 in Rome.

On that date, the Directive Council, together with some members who happened to be in Rome, had the joy of being received by His Holiness. The Directive Council convened to draw the first lines of action of the new institution and discuss the tasks that had to be addressed first.

The Academy will consist of seventy members, about forty of whom have already been appointed. They come from all parts of the earth, which is a clear indication of the fact that problems concerning life have essentially worldwide implications, while at the same time they exhibit features peculiar to each region.

Members have been chosen so that many scientific disciplines and social activities are represented. Human life is not mere biology, nor can its present dilemmas be understood by the more classical approaches of medicine and biology. The problem of life such as mankind is facing it in the present century demands the joint efforts of theology, human and social sciences, medicine, and natural sciences, together with social activities of promotion and defence. The mission of the Academy is set up in *Mysterium vitae*.

It (the Academy) will have the specific responsibility of studying, informing and forming in the main problems of biomedicine and law which are directly related to the promotion and defence of life, especially in the direct relation between them and Christian morals as taught by the Church (No. 4).

The proper perspective for the understanding of this task is described in the *motu proprio* *Dolentium hominum*: “to explain and spread the teachings of the Church in health matters, and to favour their penetration in the practice of health care” (No. 6). This requires:

the adequate formation of health operators in matters of morals and bioethics so that it may become manifest that science and technical applications, when placed at the service of the human being and its fundamen-

tal rights, make a contribution to the integral good of man, and to the fulfillment of the divine project of salvation (*Mysterium vitae*, No. 3).

The opening words of the *motu proprio* are very rich in their teaching. They remind us that there is “a mystery of life, of human life in particular” (No. 1). We Christians know that this mystery can be illuminated only in the Mystery of the Incarnate Word. The secularized world turns its back on this road and deals with human life using reductionist criteria that threaten to destroy it under the pretence of surmounting suffering.

The Church looks first to the dignity of the human being and to the integrity of its calling. While taking full consideration of scientific data, the Church must, by the command of Christ, illuminate the conscience of man with respect to the moral requirements that have their origin in man’s nature and which seek to bring the person to fulfillment.

It is precisely this awareness of the value of the person which makes us look upon scientific and technical advances with the greatest interest as they open new and fascinating perspectives. At the same time, however, it makes us aware of new moral questions “that may not be overlooked without risking steps that may be irreparable...” (*Mysterium vitae*, No. 1).

It is in this maze of new questions that “the Church cannot but encounter science” (*Mysterium vitae*, No. 4). This necessary and fascinating encounter is the field of action that is reserved for the Academy.

When things are seen in this light, some aspects of the structure and organization of the Academy are understood more clearly. The presence of its members throughout the world should allow it to perceive the pulse of life as it is both fostered and threatened on the surface of the globe. The way in which members of the Academy will be chosen is aimed at creating a place of encounter for diverse disciplines, so that the task of unfolding the meaning of human life is not appropriated by any of them, and each may benefit from all.

The Academy is an autonomous entity, closely linked, however, to the Holy See through the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral of Health Operators. This provides a link, so that the Academy may communicate with those who hold responsibility in the Church and in scientific and health organizations. It should also help in the formation of a culture of life. By doing this in faithful observance of magisterial teachings, the Academy takes part in a central commitment to the contemporary Church. This commitment has been stressed by His Holiness John Paul II with moving words and with the high example of his constant pastoral work in the promotion and defence of life. This is what is expressed in a document which must be signed by every new member of the Academy. This document is called the “Pledge of the Servants of Life” and it consists essentially in a solemn reaffirmation of our fidelity to the Church.

It should be clear that the action of the Academy is inspired by the sacred nature of human life. "Sacred" means, from ancient times up to the present, that in which a persisting and authentic reality becomes manifest.

The Incarnate Word was made present in human life and through human life. Life was then revealed as the manifestation of the love of God which moves worlds. "*L'amor che muove il sole e l'altre stelle.*" The voice of the Church is the only voice today that brings to man's mind the awareness of this immense dignity. Only the Church can say of itself that it accomplishes an essential act of its mission "in the loving and generous reception of every human life, especially when it is feeble or sick" (*Christifideles laici*, No. 38). This is because only the Church looks toward the nucleus of personal reality where God loves man for his own sake.

The fulfillment of the mission of the Academy will require the collaboration and generous cooperation of many from whom constant and dedicated work will be demanded.

It will require, above all, an unflinching fidelity to the teaching of the Holy Church, a never-dimmed awareness that the Academy lives to serve the Church in its mission to man, which is the imitation of Him who taught this. He came so that we "may have life and have it to the full" (Jn 10 : 10).

Juan de Dios Vial Correa
President
Pontifical Academy for Life

Carl A. ANDERSON

EVANGELIUM VITAE AND THE NEW CULTURE FOR LIFE

Cain's indignant challenge, "Am I my brother's keeper?" is with us still. Evangelium Vitae proposes that the answer to the Cains of our day must be "Yes". In doing so, the Pope's latest encyclical stands as one of the great moral testaments of our time.

Five years ago, in his great encyclical on the mission of the Church, *Redemptoris Missio*, John Paul II looked to the future and assured us that God is preparing "a great springtime for the Gospel." This year, with the publication of *Evangelium Vitae*, the Pope reminds us that the Gospel proclaimed by the Church is "the Gospel of Life."

John Paul II has long been concerned about the global culture of violence and death that is emerging in our societies; a development which he rightly judges to be an "anti-culture" and "a conspiracy against human life." His solution is to call for a return to basic moral truths – truths which Europeans and Americans have long embraced but which now seem increasingly to be slipping away.

As a member of the United States Commission on Civil Rights I have had occasion to listen to hundreds of witnesses giving thousands of hours of testimony regarding the racial and ethnic tensions straining the fabric of American communities. Some of the most dramatic statements were given to the Commission within days of the 1992 riots in South Central Los Angeles in which more than fifty people were killed, and more than one billion dollars in property was destroyed. In one way or another, these witnesses echoed what a young Hispanic woman I met during that tour of Los Angeles told me: "Why can't we stop hating and just see each other as human beings?"

With the publication of his latest encyclical, *Evangelium Vitae*, "the Gospel of Life", Pope John Paul II has pointed the way out of the dilemma which government has been unable to answer. *Evangelium Vitae* urges us a return to three of the most fundamental of these moral truths. First, John Paul insists upon the recognition of the unsurpassed dignity of every human being, regardless of age, condition of dependency, and race. This especially is the case with regard to the weak and defenseless. Second, he maintains that it is always a violation of our human dignity to treat another person like an instrument or

as a means to an end. Every person must be seen as good in himself and never as an object for manipulation. Third, the Pope urges us to understand that the killing of an innocent human being can never be regarded as an answer whatever the circumstances.

The prescription proposed by *Evangelium Vitae* goes right to the foundation of our culture's moral and social illness. Today, the overriding question for both Europe and America is the search for a common moral ground in our society. Without such a basic moral consensus we cannot hope to find stability in the numerous communities in which we live: family and neighbourhood as well as nation. Politics no longer seems an adequate forum in which this moral meaning can be discovered. *Evangelium Vitae* proposes nothing less than a call to action for Catholics at all levels of our society to fill this moral void.

John Paul II begins his analysis at the beginning, with the *Book of Genesis*. He finds the root of our contemporary problem to be as old as the story of Cain and Abel. The Pope reminds us that human society, whether that of the modern industrial state or of a nomadic tribal family, remains vulnerable to a distorted concept of human freedom that can poison our most basic relationships. Cain's indignant challenge, "Am I my brother's keeper?" is with us still. *Evangelium Vitae* proposes that the answer to the Cains of our day must be "Yes". In doing so, the Pope's latest encyclical stands as one of the great moral testaments of our time. And yet John Paul insists that the Church's answer must be more than simply "yes". The Good News of the Gospel may never be reduced to merely a moral code or "system" for it is, above all, an encounter with the risen and living Lord.

John Paul II turns from the *Book of Genesis* to the *Gospel of John* and its theme, "I have come that they may have life." The Pope presents in *Evangelium Vitae* what may be seen as a moral commentary on St. John's Gospel. He writes that ultimately it is in the "glory" of the Lord suffering and crucified that the meaning of the communion of persons and brotherhood is revealed. This revelation from the Cross calls the Church to affirm always the goodness of human life and its immeasurable dignity. It calls on the Church to stand up always and insist that the lives of innocent human beings may never be directly taken. Further, it calls on all persons who share in God's "dominion" over His created world to exercise their "dominion" in a way consistent with the "dominion" exercised by Jesus on Calvary. In *Evangelium Vitae*, the Pope presents a moral way of life which finds in the suffering of Jesus the ultimate meaning of community, brotherhood, and the dignity of the person.

In *Redemptor Hominis*, John Paul II wrote that "the cross has definitively restored his dignity to man and given back meaning to his life in the world" (No. 10). In his latest encyclical, John Paul II maintains that the example of Jesus obliges Christians to stand up always and insist that innocent persons may never be directly and intentionally killed and their dignity must be respected.

Christians take on the responsibility of making truly present to society the meaning of human dignity within the context of the mystery of the Redemption. This responsibility of the Christian witness to the dignity and sanctity of human life sets it apart from what may normally be expected within the customary discourse of the political community.

Not everyone in our pluralistic societies may agree with John Paul II when he applies this vision of human dignity to argue for the prohibition of abortion, euthanasia and suicide. But it would be short-sighted to reduce his vision to just one more argument in the present abortion controversy, or to dismiss it as mere idealism. Instead, John Paul has offered the context for a new dialogue on these questions which places a priority upon human dignity, community, service to others, and the sanctity of all human life.

Indeed, some may think it contradictory to consider *Evangelium Vitae* as offering any hope in building social consensus. After all, abortion has proven to be one of the most divisive issues in the life of many nations. Nonetheless, it will have to be resolved if an authentic sense of community is to be regained. In this regard, it is well to reflect upon how so many of our societies have arrived at the point where millions of unborn children are killed each year by abortion.

Twenty-five years ago, “California Medicine”, the journal of the California Medical Association, editorialized on the issue of morality and abortion. It stated that our traditional ethic of reverence for and recognition of the “intrinsic worth and equal value of every human life, regardless of its stage and condition..., is being eroded at its core and may eventually even be abandoned.” In its place was emerging a new “quality of life” ethic which rejected the absolute value of human life and which was willing to accept and even propose the killing of some human beings. The editorial went on to predict that this “quality of life” ethic would govern not only “birth control and birth selection” questions but would be “extended inevitably to death selection and death control.” But perhaps most importantly the editorial recognized that “this shift in public attitude has affected the churches... rather than the reverse.” *Evangelium Vitae’s* greatest accomplishment may be in meeting this challenge and re-evangelizing Catholics and other Christians on the question of the sanctity of all human life.

The challenge confronting Christianity within the increasingly postmodern culture of Europe and America is to escape the social pressures to reduce Christianity to a form of “meta-narrative” of the human experience, that is, as merely another way of proposing an ethical system constrictive of human liberty and self-development. Particularly in Europe, where recent historical developments have witnessed an unprecedented sacrificing of concrete and particular in human experience in the desire to achieve in various forms an artificially constructed universal ideology, Christianity must constantly distinguish itself as absolutely distinct. As such, Christianity provides the opportunity for the indi-

vidual human person to realize his own self-determination without sacrificing his own particularity in the face of absolute universality. Indeed, it is only in this way that the person may truly find and affirm his unique, unrepeatable individuality. At the same time, the Gospel of life offers society the authentic alternative from the radical individualism which has become the secular response to the extreme ideologies of the recent past. While unique, the human person is created *in* and *for* personal communion and can only realize his destiny and self-determination through communion with others.

The responsibility of the Church as an avenue to overcome this fundamental dilemma confronting the identity of the human person in contemporary culture was taken up by John Paul II in his first encyclical, *Redemptor Hominis*. There, quoting from *Gaudium et Spes* (No. 76) he wrote that the Church must be “a sign and a safeguard of the transcendence of the human person” and that this means a defence of the human person “in all his truth”, that is, not “the «abstract» man, but the real, «concrete,», «historical,» man” (*Redemptor Hominis*, No. 13). The Church must be willing to respond to each person because “each one is included in the mystery of the Redemption and with each one Christ has united himself for ever” (No. 13).

Since *Redemptor Hominis*, John Paul II has returned repeatedly to this theme of the mystery of the Incarnation as the reconciliation of the particular with the universal. For example, in *Redemptoris Missio* he wrote, “The Kingdom of God is not a concept, a doctrine, or a programme subject to interpretation, but it is before all else *a person* with the name Jesus of Nazareth” (No. 18). It is, of course, with the implications of this truth that *Veritatis Splendor* is concerned, and the structure of the encyclical itself becomes a kind of exposition of this central reality, beginning as it does with the encounter of Jesus with the rich young man. The first chapter of the encyclical focuses on the calling of the Christian as *sequela Christi* in which the call to discipleship “is not a matter only of disposing oneself to hear a teaching and obediently accepting a commandment. More radically, it involves *holding fast to the very person of Jesus*, partaking of his life and his dignity” (No. 19).

By selecting the dialogue of Jesus with the rich young man, John Paul II focuses *Veritatis Splendor* precisely on a central point of encounter between Christianity and contemporary culture, that is, Christianity’s ability to overcome our present cultural inability to deal adequately with the relationship between the particular and the universal. Should the Christian way of life have found that the young man’s obedience to the moral law was entirely sufficient, then it might appropriately be asked, as does John Paul II himself ask later in the encyclical, “how can obedience to universal and unchanging moral norms respect the uniqueness and individuality of the person and not represent a threat to his freedom and dignity?” (No. 85). As John Paul II maintains in *Veritatis Splendor*, Christianity’s answer to that question cannot be separated from the

reality that “Jesus himself is the living «fulfillment» of the law... He himself becomes a living and personal law, who invites people to follow him” (No. 15).

Chapter Two of *Veritatis Splendor* provides that this calling of the individual person by Jesus Christ is inseparable from the moral norm which itself resonates within the inner being of the human person. In this sense the very presence of Jesus Christ in the saving encounter with each person is “conditioned” by the moral norm which provides the “directive” for this encounter, and it is because of this that the human person is able to find both authentic self-possession and self-determination only with the *sequela Christi*. Thus, it is clear that analysis of *Veritatis Splendor* is in many ways a precondition to the promulgation of *Evangelium Vitae*. The moral context of the encounter between Jesus Christ and the person uncovers the brightness of personhood which directs itself toward a sacrificial service to others which participates in that mysterious sacrificial service of the Incarnation.

Evangelium Vitae opens with a recitation of the threats to human dignity which concerned the Second Vatican Council and were recorded in *Gaudium et Spes* as, among others, genocide, abortion, euthanasia, subhuman living conditions, torture and violations of conscience (No. 27). Reflecting on this passage, John Paul II observes that this global situation far from decreasing is, to the contrary, expanding in two ways: first, through new scientific and technological developments which threaten human dignity, and second, “a new cultural climate is developing and taking hold, which gives crimes against life a new and – if possible – even more sinister character” (No. 4). This situation writes the Pope, requires the reassertion of the immeasurable dignity of the human person and the inviolability of every human life proposed by the *Gospel of Life*. Yet the response by the Church to this widening crisis, asserted by *Evangelium Vitae*, must be one which is consistent with that proposed by the Council itself (*Gaudium et Spes*, No. 22) as well as John Paul’s earlier encyclicals. In *Evangelium Vitae*, John Paul writes:

Faced with the countless grave threats to life present in the modern world, one could feel overwhelmed by sheer powerlessness: good can never be powerful enough to triumph over evil! At such times the People of God, and this includes every believer, are called to profess with humility and courage their faith in Jesus Christ, “the Word of Life”. The *Gospel of Life* is not simply a reflection, however new and profound, on human life. Nor is it merely a commandment aimed at raising awareness and bringing about significant changes in society. Still less is it an illusory promise of a better future. The *Gospel of Life* is something concrete and personal, for it consists in the proclamation of *the very person of Jesus* (No. 29).

In their 1989 resolution on abortion the American bishops declared that “at this particular time, abortion has become the fundamental human rights issue for all men and women of good will.” *Evangelium Vitae*, in its entirety, can be seen as an exposition as to why it is that “abortion” has become the fundamental human rights issue of our time. John Paul II writes:

The Gospel of Life is for the whole of human society. To be actively pro-life is to contribute to the *renewal of society* through the promotion of common good. It is impossible to further the common good without acknowledging and defending the right to life, upon which all the other inalienable rights of individuals are founded and from which they develop (No. 101).

How the Church fulfills its mission to safeguard the fundamental dignity and rights of the person was addressed by John Paul II in his first encyclical, *Redemptor Hominis*. There, in 1979, the Pope wrote that the Church safeguards human dignity by sharing more fully in the three-fold office of Christ as Prophet, Priest, and King. Thus, by making Jesus Christ “newly present” within society the Church is “a sign and a safeguard of the transcendence of the human person.”

While Catholics in the United States remain a religious minority, the Catholic Church provides through its hospitals and health care facilities the largest network of non-governmental, not-for-profit health care system in America. At the same time, Catholic Charities USA is the largest non-governmental provider of social services to Americans – both Catholics and non-Catholics. Other Catholic volunteer organizations, such as the Knights of Columbus, during the past decade have provided over one billion dollars in direct contributions and services to thousands of charitable causes, including those which educate the public on the evils of abortion and care for women suffering the physical and emotion trauma which follows abortion.

In *Evangelium Vitae*, John Paul II returns to this theme and calls upon all Christians to participate in the ministry of Christ as Prophet, Priest, and King by proclaiming, celebrating, and serving life. In this way, the People of God, as a “people of life and for life” may approach the Third Millennium as a beacon pointing toward the dignity and value of the person and the realization of the civilization of love.

It is clear that the evangelization of culture must proceed by way of the cooperative effort of many “cultures” of evangelization. Thus, public statements in favour of the right to life of the unborn, the elderly, and the ill and handicapped, must be accompanied by an experiential witness. There must exist, for example, centres of medical practice in which the Christian vision of the sanctity and dignity of human life is the foundation and animating principle of health care. There must be centres in which the experience of the truth of the human person exposes the falsehood of abortion and euthanasia. Thus, there must

continue an evangelization of the Catholic medical profession and Catholic health care institutions as foundational not only for a “new” evangelization, but also as the very practical precondition of “a culture of life and for life.” In *Evangelium Vitae* John Paul writes, “We need to begin with the renewal of a culture of life within Christian communities themselves” (No. 95).

Evangelium Vitae concludes with an affirmation of that most fundamental of human communities – the family. John Paul II has repeatedly said that the Church’s pastoral care of the family is at the centre of the new evangelization. In proclaiming the “Gospel of Life” the family has a specific and unique role as the “sanctuary of life.” It is in the family – through its unique communion of persons – that each person’s own understanding of human dignity and respect for life is developed. When the family is properly the “sanctuary” of life it becomes also the “sanctuary” of the *moral* life. Thus, John Paul writes in *Evangelium Vitae* that “the role of the family in building a culture of life is *decisive and irreplaceable*” (No. 92). Since the family as a “domestic church” participates in the three-fold ministry of Christ, it, too, “is summoned to proclaim, celebrate and serve the Gospel of life” (No. 92).

John Paul II concludes *Evangelium Vitae* with an “urgent call” for “a general mobilization of consciences and a united ethical effort” to build “a new culture of life” (No. 95). Early in the last decade we also heard a similar call from this Pope for a new “solidarity of consciences” with the result that the face of Europe was changed. That experience should give us both humility and courage to insist that the “culture of death”, no matter in what institutional form it is manifested, shall not prevail against the Gospel of Life.

John CROSBY

MAX SCHELER'S PRINCIPLE OF MORAL SOLIDARITY AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

We all know the magnificent final chorus of the Ninth Symphony of Beethoven. The text of Schiller and the music of Beethoven celebrate a fundamental solidarity of all men, which is a source of profound joy for them. [...] Max Scheler has explored it philosophically in his elaboration of "the principle of moral and religious solidarity." It has lost none of its timeliness since Scheler formulated it at the time of World War I, indeed, it has much to say to us today as we deliberate about the future of Europe and the rest of the world.

How should an American have anything interesting or insightful to say about the theme of this conference, the future of Europe?¹ I have decided to deal with my predicament by not speaking in my own name but instead by letting a great German philosopher speak for me. I refer to the important phenomenologist, Max Scheler (1874-1928), who in his time, and especially at the end of World War I, gave much thought to the future of Europe. And in order to cover myself as much as possible I would also like to refer here at the beginning to another great European spirit: I mean the Russian writer, Dostoevsky. In the *Brothers Karamazov* Dostoevsky puts into the mouth of the Staretz Zosima thoughts which are in perfect agreement with those of Scheler with which are about to become acquainted.

I

In 1917 Scheler wrote two studies on the future of Europe. He found himself in a situation very different from ours today. After all, we are not at the end of a world war. And yet it seems to me that much of this important Christian thinker had to say then, retains its relevance for us as we deliberate in 1994 about the future of Europe and of the rest of the world.

Let us look at the lecture of Scheler entitled, "The Cultural Reconstruction of Europe," in which we read, probably to our great surprise:

¹ The first public version of this paper was presented at the conference on the future of Europe, *Die Schatten der Zukunft*, held at the International Academy of Philosophy, September 30-October 1, 1994, in Balzers, Principality of Liechtenstein.

A cultural reconstruction is only possible if an increasingly large proportion of the European peoples learns to look upon this cataclysm as resulting from *a common guilt* of European peoples mutually influencing each other...

First, therefore, must come the recognition that in the final analysis there is only *one* answer to the question, Who or what nation is responsible for this war? The answer is You, the asker of the question – by what you have done or left undone.²

This way of extending the guilt and responsibility for a war strikes us at first as an exaggeration beyond all measure. But let us set aside for a moment the obvious objections which leap to mind, and let us see how Scheler develops the thought. In the following we find him distinguishing between the guilt which concerns him in this essay and the guilt which will concern the politicians at the peace conference after the war.

I do not say that once and for all the politician or historian must refrain from asking where the *political*, historical guilt for the definite occurrence lies, guilt for the outbreak of August, 1914.³

In other words, as we might say by way of rendering Scheler's thought more concrete, Serbia had a responsibility for the outbreak of the war that, for example, Belgium did not have; on this level of guilt, Serbia was guilty and Belgium was innocent. But on the deeper level of guilt of which Scheler speaks, we cannot localize the guilt so easily; the guilt is more diffused, and almost everyone has some share in it. Scheler proceeds to explain this deeper guilt as a guilt, not for starting the war, but for creating the moral *milieu* in which the war was possible at all.

What forms the object of common guilt is not that the war did take place, still less the how and when of its beginning, but that it *could* take place, that *such* an event was possible in this European quarter of the

² M. S c h e l e r, *The Cultural Reconstruction of Europe*, in: *On the Eternal in Man*, (tr.) Noble (Hamden, Conn., 1972), pp. 416-417. I do not think that the translator was well advised to translate *Gemeinschuld* as "collective guilt"; here and elsewhere I have amended his translation to read "common guilt." The German text reads: "Ein kultureller Wiederaufbau ist nur möglich, wenn ein immer größer Teil innerhalb der europäischen Völker lernt, dieses ganze Ereignis als Folge einer *auf Gegenseitigkeit beruhenden Gemeinschuld der Völker Europas anzusehen...* Zuerst also die Anerkennung, es gäbe in letzter Linie nur *eine* Antwort auf die Frage: Wer oder welches Volk ist schuld am Kriege? Die Antwort: Du selbst, der fragt – sei es durch Tun, sei es durch Unterlassen." M. S c h e l e r, *Vom kulturellen Wiederaufbau Europas*, in: *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* (Bern, 1968), p. 416. (Henceforth, VEM).

³ *Ibid.* "Ich sage damit nicht: Es müsse die *politisch-geschichtliche* Schuldfrage für das bestimmte Stattfinden dieses Krieges, seinen Beginn im August 1914 ein für allemal vom Politiker oder Historiker unterlassen werden." VEM, p. 416.

human globe, that it was an event of such a nature as we know it to be. The object of common guilt is its possibility, then, and its quality, not its actual occurrence and real beginning. As you must be aware, within the individual the object of any deeper guilt-feeling is likewise not «that I did it» but that I *could* so behave, was *such* a person could do it. Only this common act, insight into the *reciprocity* of the shared responsibilities of every belligerent nation and all its subdivisions, down to the family and individual, can produce the psychological atmosphere from which European culture can arise renewed.⁴

Perhaps the reader is still bewildered at the universality of Scheler's common guilt. Perhaps he will remind us of the way in which a great moral personality of our time, Victor Frankl, rejects emphatically the very idea of collective guilt. In the spirit of Frankl, and in many others, one might say against Scheler that guilt always only exists as individual guilt and that there is no such thing as Scheler's common guilt.

In response I would say that one can preserve all the truth in such an objection, even while affirming a moral solidarity of human beings in the sense of Scheler. Indeed, one can find in the writings of Scheler himself all the truth of the objection; Scheler, in fact, understood it deeply and knew how to explain it. He does not dream of letting the individual person and the individual responsibility of individual persons get lost in some encompassing community. In his other lecture from 1917, "Christian Love and the Twentieth Century," which also deals with the future of Europe, he says that the recognition of "the infinite worth of the *individual* soul" is "the *magna charta* of Europe." In the same place he embraces a certain (not primarily economic) individualism

which categorically denies that the individual person is a mere "*modus*" of some generality – the State, say, or society, or «world-reason» or impersonal self-generating historical process...⁵

⁴ *Ibid.* "Nicht daß der Krieg stattfand, noch weniger, wie er und wann er begann, ist Gegenstand der Gemeinschaft; wohl aber, daß er stattfinden *konnte*, daß *solch* ein Ereignis *möglich* war im europäischen Menschenkreise dieser Erdkugel, und daß er so, so beschaffen aussah, wie er aussah. Seine Möglichkeit und sein Sosein, nicht sein wirklicher Beginn also ist Gegenstand der Gemeinschaft. Es ist ja auch im Einzelleben nicht «daß ich das tat,» sondern daß ich so handeln, so tun *konnte* – ein *solcher* Mensch war, daß ich es konnte – der eigentliche Gegenstand jedes tieferen Schuldgefühls. Erst dieser seelische Gesamtakt der Einsicht in die *Gegenseitigkeit* der Verantwortung, der Mitverantwortung und Mitschuld eines jeden Volkes am Kriege, eines jeden Untergliedes im Volke bis zu Familie und Individuum herab kann die Gemütslage erzeugen, die *seelische Atmosphäre*, aus der ein Wiederaufbau der europäischen Kultur möglich ist." VEM, pp. 416-417.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 384. "...der es entschieden leugnet, daß die geistige individuelle Einzelperson nur ein sog. «Modus» [oder bloßer Teil] irgendeiner Form des Allgemeinen, des Staates, der Gesellschaft, einer sog. Weltvernunft oder eines aus sich herausströmenden sachhaften Geschichts-

This means that Scheler's individualism recognizes in each individual person such a being-of-its-own that no possible whole could ever encompass him as a mere part of itself. The individual person is a whole of his own. This is why Scheler in this passage proceeds to speak of the individual person as a subject of rights. He says that:

the separate individual...has an original sphere of action and natural right which is all his own, is independent of the State and its legislation; therein he enjoys the exercise of those «natural rights» which are innate in the essence of personality...⁶

On the basis of his deep understanding for the individual person Scheler can make telling criticisms of certain forms of social life. Thus, for example, he objects as follows to the ancient Greek ideal of community:

they were ignorant of the independent, Stateless, God-created, spiritual and immortal soul, superior in its innermost being to any possible State, possessing an inner world of religion and morality...⁷

With this personalistic individualism Scheler has much to say to us about our future; we have not yet come so far that it is superfluous to be reminded of the fundamental rights of the human person, or of the incommensurability of the individual person with the political community. But in this paper I want instead to draw your attention to his ideal of solidarity that underlies his claim about the common responsibility of Europe for the war. I have mentioned his individualism to show that Schelerian solidarity is not meant in a collective way, that it does not imply anything depersonalizing; it rests on personalism that takes very seriously the responsibility of each individual person.

But one will ask *how* this personalism can cohere with the talk of common guilt and of the other forms of human solidarity discussed by Scheler. One is naturally not content with the mere juxtaposition of apparently opposed lines of thought, but wants to know whether they form some unity in Scheler.

prozesses sei..." VEM, p. 382.

⁶ *Ibid.* "...das einzelne Individuum...hat noch seine ursprüngliche *Eigensphere* des Wirkens und des natürlichen Rechtes, eine Sphere, die vom Staate und dem von ihm gesetzten Rechte unabhängig ist: sein ihm eingeborenes, mit dem Wesen einer Person selbst gesetztes sog. Naturrecht..." VEM, p. 383.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 383. We need not concern ourselves with the question whether it is really possible to speak so generally of the "ancient Greek ideal of community," or whether one should restrict such characterizations to, say, the Aristotelian philosophy of the *polis*. What is important for us is that Scheler refuses to let the individual person be absorbed into the political community.

II

In order to answer this question we have to go back to the very foundation of Scheler's philosophy of the person, and in particular to this idea:

it is inherent in the *eternal, ideal nature* of a rational person that all its existence and activity as a spirit is from the very beginning just as much a conscious, co-responsible, communal reality. The being of man is just as originally a matter of being, living and acting "one with another", as it is a matter of existing for oneself.⁸

With this, Scheler rejects any and every social philosophy that sees the highpoint of social life in *Gesellschaft*, or society, which for Scheler means that form of living together in which all bonds with others, and all responsibilities for others, arise only through persons explicitly assuming responsibility for others. What he rejects, therefore, is the idea that the individual person arbitrarily posits the social relations in which he lives, and that before he acts to posit them he simply stands next to other persons, lacking any bond with them. What he affirms, by contrast, is the idea that persons are bound to each other, and thus co-responsive for each other, as a result of their very being as persons and in advance of any conscious acting (of course, he does not deny that there is *also* such a thing as an obligation that is freely assumed). Individual persons are from the very beginning comprehended in a fundamental human community; they do not create it but find themselves already in it; their social existence unfolds within this community, and finds in it a basic norm.

With this we are in the position to understand better Scheler's thought on the so-called common guilt and common responsibility. It is because we are established one with another in the community of mankind, and so have to do with each other even before assuming any particular responsibility, that we dwell in an interpersonal space in which "there is no moral gesture so trivial that does not radiate, like the splashing stone, an infinity of ripples – circles soon lost to the naked eye."⁹ From the point of view of *Gesellschaft* the moral condition of the individual remains with the individual until he turns to someone who consciously receives his act. But from the point of view of what

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 373 (I have amended the translation in several places). "Es gehört zum ewigen ideelen Wesen einer vernünftigen Person, daß ihr ganzes geistiges Sein und Tun ebenso ursprünglich eine selbstbewußte, eine selbstverantwortliche individuelle Wirklichkeit ist, *als auch bewußte mitverantwortliche Gliedwirklichkeit in einer Gemeinschaft* (my italics). Sein des Menschen ist ebenso ursprünglich Fürsichsein als auch Miteinandersein, Miteinanderleben, Miteinanderwirken." VEM, p. 371.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 377. "Es gibt keine noch so kleine moralische Regung, die nicht wie der Stein, der ins Wasser fällt, unendliche Kreise um sich zöge – und auch diese Kreise werden nur für das rohe, unbewaffnete Auge schließlich unsichtbar." VEM, p. 376.

Scheler calls "the principle of moral and religious reciprocity or *moral solidarity*,"¹⁰ the moral substance of the individual person has the irrepressible space and so to affect, for better or worse, the spiritual atmosphere in which the others breathe. In moral state of more of his fellow human beings than he can possibly count.

In one place Scheler makes an attempt to understand more exactly that transmission of moral influence by which we become co-responsible for others.¹¹ He thinks through what is involved in me failing to show love to another to whom I should have shown love. He says that the other would have been "called" to love me in return if I had loved him, since all love, by its inner logic as love, calls for some requital. My failure to love the other leaves him with one less reason for loving, for it deprives him of the call to requite my love. But in having one less reason for loving, the other grows that much less in the power to love, for the power to love grows by performing acts of love, as Aristotle recognized in his theory of moral virtue. When the other turns to all those who are his others, he turns to them with less power to love than he would have had if I had loved; in this way my failure takes its toll on all of his relations to others, thus making itself felt far beyond anything that I can track, just as the stone falling in the water sends its ripples across the lake and out of the sight of the one who dropped the stone. On the other hand, if I had loved as I should have loved, then I would have been co-responsible for the growth in the power of another to love, and thus co-responsible for the greater love he would have shown throughout his life in all of his relations with others.

Needless to say, Scheler does not mean that the moral and religious solidarity of which he speaks *consists* in such diffusion of moral influence and in the co-responsibility resulting from it. This solidarity already in some sense exists even before moral influence is diffused, and forms the basis of the co-responsibility. Of course, the solidarity is actualized and lived in a particular way when persons become co-responsible for good in each other.

Let us return to the common guilt which Scheler saw existing in Europe on the eve of World War I. Scheler means that everyone who in the years before the war did any moral wrong, contributed to the formation of the interpersonal situation in which a world war was possible. The wrong that each committed

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 377 (slightly amended by me). In VEM, p. 375, he speaks of what he calls "das [Prinzip] der moralisch-religiösen Gegenseitigkeit oder der *sittlichen Solidarität*."

¹¹ See his *Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (Bern, 1966), pp. 523-526. He recapitulates this analysis in *Christian Love in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 377-378; German VEM, pp. 375-376.

did not stay with the wrongdoer but was able to spread throughout the European community, enhancing the possibility of a world war.¹²

It is now perfectly clear that Scheler's *Gemeinschaft* has nothing depersonalizing about it; it is in no way meant as a substitute for individual guilt and individual responsibility. Common guilt has its origin in individual persons who are co-responsible for their community, and it is nothing apart from such individual persons. If someone were to blame others for the war, Scheler would remind that person that he, too, is to blame for it. We can say that Scheler, far from denying individual responsibility, extends the range of it, so that it includes not only responsibility for oneself but also responsibility for others. It is true that according to the logic of Schelerian co-responsibility, I am not the only one who is responsible for myself but that others are co-responsible for me, and that as a result, my responsibility for myself is somewhat modified. But for Scheler these others never prevent me from also being responsible for myself, nor from being in some way co-responsible for all of them.

It is now also clear that the personalistic individualism of Scheler has nothing to do with the individualism proper to *Gesellschaft*, and that, quickened with the principle of moral and religious solidarity, his individualism is organically completed by his teaching on co-responsibility. We can take these words of his as a recapitulation of his teaching on solidarity:

each individual is not responsible solely for his own character and conduct, responsible through his conscience before his Lord and creator, but each individual...is, in his capacity as a "member" of communities, also responsible to God – as fundamentally as for self – for all that bears spiritually and morally upon the condition and the activity of its communities.¹³

¹² It is remarkable how the thought of Scheler, which for him can be understood in a properly philosophical way, can be found in a recent papal teaching. In his 1984 Apostolic Exhortation, *Reconciliatio et paenitentia*, John Paul II says (para. 16): "To speak of *social sin* means in the first place to recognize that, by virtue of a human solidarity which is as mysterious and intangible as it is real and concrete, each individual's sin in some way affects others. This is the other aspect of that solidarity which on the religious level is developed in the profound and magnificent mystery of the *Communion of Saints*, thanks to which it has been possible to say that «every soul that rises above itself, raises up the world.» To this *law of ascent* there unfortunately corresponds the *law of descent*. Consequently, one can speak of a *communion of sin*, whereby a soul that lowers itself through sin drags down with itself the Church and, in some way, the whole world. In other words, there is no sin, not even the most intimate and secret one, the most strictly individual one, that exclusively concerns the person committing it. With greater or lesser violence, with greater or lesser harm, every sin has repercussions on the entire ecclesial body and the whole human body."

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 376. "... daß nicht ausschließlich jede individuelle Person nur für sich allein und nur vor ihrem eigenen Gewissen und mit ihrem eigenen Gewissen ihrem Schöpfer und Herrn für ihr eigenes Sein und Tun verantwortlich ist, sondern daß sowohl das Individuum wie jede engere

III

Let us now try to address the theme of our conference: the future of Europe as seen from the year 1994. How can Scheler's principle of solidarity, as formulated in 1917, give us direction as we face our future? I offer here only a few suggestions, which I believe are according to the mind of Scheler.

1. If Scheler were still alive and we were to ask him about the guilt for the murderous war in the former Yugoslavia, we can be sure that he would answer, not by accusing Serbians, or the former Communists, but by saying,

You who ask the question – you are guilty, too. You Europeans, and you Americans as well, beware of the idea that these crimes, crying to heaven for vengeance, are taking place completely apart from you. It is not enough to establish the fact that you did not commit the crimes, and in fact did not even instigate them, and have even officially disapproved of them. If you people lived juster lives, it would be that much less possible for such a war to take place. You stand in a fundamental human unity with the Serbs, Croats, and the others, who are fellow human beings as well as fellow Europeans; the result is that your wrongdoing, which you think remains within the bounds of your own nation, spreads beyond them and has its effect on the combatants in the former Yugoslavia. You are all implicated in an immeasurable reciprocity of guilt in the international realm of Europe.

Scheler I believe, would, be quick to reject any quietistic consequences that one might try to draw from his idea of solidarity. Let us suppose that certain statesmen have some opportunity of restraining the aggressive Serbians and of protecting the children endangered by the fighting. Scheler would not say, "Who are you to oppose the aggressors and to defend the innocent? You are yourself one of the aggressors. It is hypocrisy in you to take sides in this way." He would not say this, because he never intended that his *Gemeinschaft* should substitute for the other level of political guilt, where guilt is really more localisable. And yet it is true that the statesmen trying to mediate between aggressors and victims will be preserved from a certain pharisaism by remaining mindful that at the deepest level of guilt they share in a certain common guilt for the war.

2. One of the most appalling developments since 1989 is the eruption in various places of ethnic hatred, which shows itself whenever one people rises up against another to drive it out of its midst. The atrocities that one people

Gemeinschaft ebenso ursprünglich, wie sie selbstverantwortlich ist, in ihrer notwendigen Eigenschaft als "Glieder" von Gemeinschaften vor Gott alles mitzuverantworten habe, was das Ergehen und Verhalten der je umfassenden Gemeinschaft in geistiger und moralischer Hinsicht betrifft." VEM, p. 375.

is ready to commit against a foreign people are usually prepared by a certain dehumanization of those who are foreign. The foreign people are taken as somehow sub-human, indeed as a source of cultural pollution. This has the result that one can no longer feel the infinite value of each person in the foreign people. It also has the result – and this is the point that particularly concerns us here – that one banishes the foreigners from the fundamental solidarity of all human beings and of all peoples. One gets rid of any feeling of having-to-do-with-one-another. The foreign people are cast completely outside the realm where the aggressive people dwells with all those of its kind. In this way the foreign people are largely deprived of a certain moral protection, and in the end we see an otherwise cultivated and even Christian people becoming capable of doing dreadful things with an apparently conscience. Scheler would say to us that we set up one main bulwark against such moral lapses by deepening our sense of the moral solidarity of all men and of all peoples, and of our sense of their underlying metaphysical solidarity. He would say to us that it is relatively easy to feel oneself united with others in the same tribe or in the same nation, but that it is much more difficult to experience that unity which springs from a much deeper place in the person and which unites all fellow human beings. But until we learn to cultivate this deeper experience of unity, we will continue to have Bosnia's and Ruanda's.

3. Scheler's principle of solidarity has consequences even for the way in which economic life is to be organized in the future. Let us recall what in the social teaching of the Church is called the universal destination of the material goods of the earth, which simply means that these goods belong to the whole human family. If some economic group were to gain exclusive control of one basic good of the earth, so that none of it remained for anyone else, while that group had far more of it than it could ever reasonably use, then the group would be committing a serious offence against human solidarity, even if it acted legally in the acquisition of the good. It does not suffice to attain the goods of the earth without violating anyone's rights; one must in addition take account of the fact that these goods "address themselves" to all human beings. All men are comprehended in such a unity that the use of the elementary goods of the earth could never be reserved only for some people and denied to others.

4. The insights of Scheler into the solidarity of human persons also have consequences for one of the most burning issues of our time: the issue of abortion.

I recently heard an impressive lecture by the outstanding American student and critic of religion and public life, Richard Neuhaus. He said that the abortion debate does not turn only on the question of the being of the human embryo, on whether it is a human being or not. He said that the humanity of the embryo is so firmly established that there is not a great deal more to say about it. The question of abortion has its real centre of gravity in another place. He

said that "the great question is, who belongs to the community for which we accept common responsibility?" This means that it is not enough to appeal to the right to life of the unborn. Important as it is, indispensable as it is, it is not enough to affirm that in every abortion a right is violated; this has to be completed by another affirmation. If our stance in this great moral question of our time is not to suffer a certain individualistic distortion, then we must also appeal to the moral solidarity of all men, to the fundamental responsibility that we have for one another. Abortion is not only a violation of a right, but also a betrayal of a brother or a sister. It not only violates the rights of the aborted person, but also the fundamental solidarity in which we stand with him or her.

Some years ago an article appeared in a philosophy journal entitled, "A Defence of Abortion." It was very widely read and exercised no little influence. For the sake of her argument the author assumed that the human embryo which is aborted is a person. She argued as follows. It is indeed very generous if a woman lets live the child which she has conceived, but the burdens of pregnancy are such that she has no obligation to keep it; the mother performs a work of what ethicists call supererogation if she keeps it. Abortion is justified from this point of view not on the grounds that the embryo is not *a human being*, but rather on the grounds that it is not *a fellow human being*. This justification seems to express the sense that the mother has, morally, nothing to do with the child until she decides to act on its behalf. What is needed to overcome this point of view is some understanding of Scheler's principle of solidarity and of the co-responsibility for others in which we are established, in virtue of which we have morally to do with others even before we do anything in their regard.

CONCLUSION

We all know the magnificent final chorus of the Ninth Symphony of Beethoven. The text of Schiller and the music of Beethoven celebrate a fundamental solidarity of all men, which is a source of profound joy for them. Dostoevsky has explored this solidarity in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Now Max Scheler has explored it philosophically in his elaboration of "the principle of moral and religious solidarity." It has lost none of its timeliness since Scheler formulated it at the time of World War I, indeed, it has much to say to us today as we deliberate about the future of Europe and the rest of the world.

JOHN PAUL II'S VISION OF EUROPE

ACADEMIC CONFERENCE OF THE INSTITUTE OF JOHN PAUL II, 16-18 MAY, 1994

Rev. Prof. Stanisław WIELGUS

Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Most distinguished participants in the conference "The John Paul II Vision of Europe"!

I am immensely pleased that the Catholic University of Lublin is today host to the conference entitled "The John Paul II Vision of Europe," and, thanks to this opportunity, may welcome the company of such distinguished guests coming from many countries of Europe and from America.

The conference which you are about to begin is primarily connected with the person of the Holy Father, and also with a word which is so often spoken by us, particularly since the time of the famous turning point of the year 1989. This word is – Europe.

A full evaluation of the importance of John Paul II's pontificate for the history of mankind is perhaps, as yet, impossible. It will be achieved, owing to a proper distance, only by future generations. Is it not the case that the meaning of the Paul VI pontificate may be understood in a fuller sense now while we follow the pontificate of John Paul II? Let us consider finally the first pilgrimages by Pope Paul VI, The Second Vatican Council, the encyclical *Humanae vitae*, a proclamation of the ideal of a "Civilization of Love," and let us now think how all these works and events are bearing fruit in the John Paul II's pontificate. It was here in Poland that John Paul II recalled the desire of Paul VI to come to us at Jasna Góra in Częstochowa – this was in 1966 – and that this was such a great desire that it "overgrew the framework of a singular pontificate."

Although we still lack the prospect of being able to grasp the fullness of the importance of John Paul II's pontificate, we evidently see already now, in fact, how much it also outgrows its own framework. In a certain sense, it begins a new epoch in history. Some historians claim that the nineteenth century ended with the outbreak of the World War I. Beginning with that big war, the world – and Europe in particular – entered the twentieth century. I think that now, through the pontificate of John Paul II, we are already entering the twenty-first century.

André Malraux said: "The twentieth century will be an Age of Spirit, or it will not occur at all." This short sentence renders very accurately an alternative which confronts us today. John Paul II points out the solution to this alternative. He is a Pope of the liberation of man for life "in spirit and in truth." This is the reason why his pontificate is marked by such unconditional commitment – a commitment at the same time so pregnant with effects for the whole of Europe – to the liberation of the people of Central and Eastern Europe from Communism, thereby pointing the way to the future for the whole of Europe, and for the world. "There is no better programme than the programme of solidarity" – he has said some years ago in Gdańsk, one of the great European cities.

Ladies and gentlemen! When in 1983 John Paul II came on a pilgrimage to Poland, we Poles were concerned about what the Holy Father might say to people living under the difficult conditions of martial law. But when the pilgrimage was over, someone appeared who was already living in exile, a Professor of our university – Father Blachnicki – who had conceived and understood the papal programme. Father Blachnicki phrased his comments on the teaching of John Paul II as follows: "An evangelical programme, a difficult programme – an indispensable programme." The same programme, grasped and formulated at that time by this Polish priest, is today called the Programme of the New Evangelisation, and this is a task for the whole of Europe.

I hope that this conference, which I am honoured to open today, will be a help to all of us who come from different parts of Europe, and from other parts of the world, not only to comprehend the programme of John Paul II but also to proclaim it – together with him – to contemporary humanity, so that this programme may more and more become a reality.

I apologize for not being able to take part in the individual sessions, as I am hindered by my various duties as Rector of the University. I am convinced, however, that the results of your conference will remain as a lasting part of the legacy of the Catholic University of Lublin, and in this way I shall be able to participate in them myself, and use them. In this spirit I open the conference "The John Paul II's Vision of Europe" and wish you good and fruitful proceedings.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

Tadeusz STYCZEŃ, SDS

FOR EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY To the participants of the symposium “John Paul II’s Vision of Europe”

“No one can proclaim his own sovereignty or execute his rights at the cost of the sovereignty and rights of his brothers.”

John Paul II

John Paul II formulated this moral imperative fundamental for politics and social life in the contemporary world during his address to the leaders of the delegations to the summit Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, recently held in Rome. Today, as always in the time of radical change, the question of the principle of sovereignty, of particular individuals and of whole nations, together with the question of the actual grounds of human rights, cause an acute political problem.

The present transformation of Europe, and of the whole world, was first started by the events of 1989 – the year of the “autumn of the people.” The radical political changes and the collapse of the totalitarian systems in many European states restored the history of particular individuals, and of whole nations, to their correct perspective. Once again, Europe was offered a chance to regain her unity, to become one Europe with one history.

Solidarity provided the basis for the new politics. It began to spread with the awakening of conscience among the workers in Gdańsk and Szczecin, and it turned out to be so powerful that it finally brought down the Berlin wall, the symbol of the division of our continent. It was solidarity that seemed to have replaced the existing calculations: the division into the spheres of influence and the calculated balance of power. The bloodless withdrawal from the system of totalitarian rule in the states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the return of these states to democratic government, aroused a hope that European politics would restore the respect for the principle *Plus ratio quam vis*.

Unfortunately, it is becoming more and more evident that this optimistic vision also shows certain distinct flaws which are a cause for serious concern and the deepest anxiety. The successive decisions taken by European politicians seem to point to the fact that the division of Europe into spheres of influence has not yet been overcome, and that the principle *Plus vis quam ratio* still remains the criterion of this division. It is still considered that to be sovereign

means to impose one's freedom and interests, by means of power, on the freedom and interests of others.

And so, in answer to the aspirations of Poland, and of other Central and Eastern European countries, to enter the European economic, political and military structures, the suggestion is offered that Russia should become the guardian of the safety of these states in Europe. Some nations and states have thus been assumed to be economically too weak and politically not stable enough to become integrated with the part of Europe whose attributes are power and welfare.

Has it been decided, when the short period of euphoria after the year 1989 was over, that the politics of Yalta should be continued?

A symptomatic and disgraceful sign of this continuation has been one of Europe's greatest tragedies in post-war history: the fratricidal war in the Balkans. This war is a tragedy not only for the nations which are directly involved in it and fighting against one another; it is also a tragedy for the whole of Europe which, because of her passiveness, bears the blame for what has been happening in the Balkan region, right in front of our eyes.

In our country, Poland – and especially in this University – we have particular reasons for speaking of matters which are fundamental for Europe. Since it was here, in this country, that workers made the principle of interhuman solidarity the method of (morally right and at the same time efficient) political action, we will always feel obliged to recall this principle and to defend it whenever it is imperilled.

Somewhat less than three years ago, on February 2, 1991, the Institute of John Paul II at the Catholic University of Lublin initiated a debate among the representatives of different branches of science: ethics, law, medicine, psychology and theology on the one hand, and some "Solidarity" senators of the Republic of Poland on the other. The reason for holding the debate was our anxiety caused by the demands made by some "Solidarity" senators – democratically elected with the help of our votes – who strongly promoted a parliamentary act which would outlaw one category of people, namely the unborn.

Another equally important reason for our worry concerned the possible destructive consequences which the act depriving the life of some human beings of any legal protection would have for the institutions of state and law, should such an act be passed and accepted by the state. The transcript of the discussion which took place on that occasion was published in a book whose title is simultaneously a thesis: *Nienarodzony miarą demokracji* (*The Unborn as the Measure of Democracy*).

The question of legal protection of the unborn by the state turns out to be closely connected with the question of saving the state and the law from totalitarian corruption. It is impossible to deprive anyone of the legal protection of his inalienable right to live without arbitrarily claiming the power to question

this right, which is the basis of all other human rights. Does any parliamentary majority, who claim for themselves this power, differ in any respect from a dictator claiming for himself the prerogative to be above the law?

Are we not, then, in for a particular *coup d'etat* which is directed against the very essence of the institution of law and state?

Thus, we see the necessity to proclaim a "state of moral and political loss" and, at the same time, to bring an *accusation* against the ones who are responsible for it.

Let us have a closer look at the latest proclamation of the German Constitutional Tribunal in Karlsruhe which, due to its verdict concerning the act of crime on the unborn (*rechtswidrig und straffrei*), materializes the infamous *jein* principle: *ja* and *nein* simultaneously. The ruling which defies both human reason and the unequivocal character of the law is becoming more and more the leading principle in European politics. What would the one most concerned here, namely the unborn, say to this verdict if he were given a chance not only to scream silently but to speak openly on the matter which is to decide on his life or death? Would he say "Thank you," or would he rather say "I accuse!"?

The course of recent events, both in Poland and all over Europe, makes us not only deepen our concern, but also broaden its scope into other domains where violence and oppression predominate.

Is it not now time that the ones who feel most deeply worried by these problems express their common concern (*solicitudo rei socialis*) in a particular way? A chance for us to do this could be at the Lublin symposium "John Paul II's Vision of Europe," and particularly on the birthday of the Holy Father, the author of the encyclical *Solicitudo rei socialis*.

Translated by *Dorota Chabrajska*

Josef SEIFERT

DILIGERE VERITATEM OMNEM ET IN OMNIBUS
(To Love all Truth and to Love it in Everything)

The first commitment of the philosopher is to the truth; it is the diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus. [...] To love truth in everything is very hard, no doubt, but we should commit ourselves to this goal, striving for authentic philosophy.

No adequate vision of man in Europe today is possible which does not recognise that man's first task is the search for truth, and the quest to build his life on the foundation of truth. For rational life of the intellect is impossible without making judgements and holding convictions about states of affairs, about things existing or not existing, about their being so or otherwise. And each judgement, each proposition that something is the case or not the case, makes a claim to truth, whether this claim to truth is fulfilled or not. The inescapable claim to truth of each judgement, a claim to truth which is inseparable from its essence, is the claim that our judgement about a state of affairs actually corresponds with the reality of that state of affairs, that things themselves are as we judge them to be. Whether our convictions and judgements about the being and value of things is arrived at by rational knowledge, by some belief based on probabilities, or by an act of trust or of faith in the word or testimony of others, it is impossible for man to live without making judgements about how things are. This idea that truth is the inner principle of human action and that no *actus humanus* is possible which does not aim at a foundation in the truth about man and about things themselves, stands also in the centre of the vision of man expressed by Pope John Paul II (already in *The Acting Person*) and in his Papal documents.

But if truth is everywhere presupposed, then not only the problem of what truth is but also the problems of how *knowledge* of truth is possible, and how error can be avoided are crucial. Aristotle states in his *Metaphysics* that such a claim to truth also presupposes the necessary truth of the principle of contradiction, which says that nothing can be and not be at the same time and in the same sense, and that therefore no judgement and its contradictory opposite can both be true. No assertion and meaningful action, Aristotle asserts, is possible without presupposing the truth of this principle. He adds that the radical sceptic, Cratylus, who denied all knowledge of truth, understood this and

therefore remained completely silent for many years. And yet – says Aristotle – he was not completely consistent. For he indicated with movements of his fingers how he felt or what he wanted – and in this he still presupposed the truth that what he affirmed to be the case was not at the same time the object of a true negative judgement. Only in a vegetative state without any thought, Aristotle observes, no truth-claim is being made. On the other hand, any distinction, any assertion and any action presupposes truth. Thus, truth as conformity of our judgements and propositions with reality, with the actual state of affairs, is not only a crucial theme of philosophy and science, but also of any human life and of any rational act. And therefore every vision of man must be built upon the foundation of recognising the indispensable and crucial role of truth for human life.

It is both a special joy and an honour for me to speak about the *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus* (about loving all truth and loving it in everything), which is the ideal and motto of our Academy precisely at this meeting which constitutes the biggest encounter of faculty and students of the University of Lublin with members of the Board, faculty and students of the International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality Liechtenstein. This meeting is both the symbol and reality of a manifold and profound mutual relationship between our institutions to which already at a previous occasion the Rector of this University has made reference. A former student of the KUL, Father Józef Tarnówka, is presently proposing a doctoral thesis at our Academy which speaks of an LL-School (Lublin-Liechtenstein-School) – a school which is even less likely to be a mere invention than the “Cracow-Lublin-School” (of which I spoke in “Aletheia”)¹ and the legitimacy of which was disputed by Professor Georges Kalinowski and kindly defended by Professor Tadeusz Styczeń in “Aletheia” No. IV.

The new Lublin-Liechtenstein-School of philosophy was born from an encounter of the Polish thinkers who find a special home in Lublin with those philosophers who – in 1986 – elected Liechtenstein as the seat of their academic endeavours (some of them were active before in the USA). And the intellectual union of these two schools – through many lectures, dialogues, and courses – became so close and profound that the professors and some students of this university feel quite at home in Liechtenstein and we, professors and students of the IAP, also feel that Lublin is our spiritual home.

¹ Cf. J. S e i f e r t, *Karol Cardinal Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II) as Philosopher and the Cracow/Lublin School of Philosophy*, “Aletheia” 2(1981) pp. 133-194; G. K a l i n o w s k i, *La Pensée Philosophique de Karol Wojtyła et la Faculté de l’Université Catholique de Lublin*, “Aletheia” 4(1988) pp. 198-216; T. S t y c z e ń, *Reply to Kalinowski: By Way of an Addendum to the Addenda*, *ibid*, pp. 217-225.

In the light of the reality of an LL-School, as sketched out here, such an encounter as the present one proves quite significant and takes on the almost historical dimensions of a meeting between representatives of this great seat of existentialist Thomistic *philosophia perennis* and of a new ethical personalism with the realist phenomenological school of Liechtenstein. And nothing could illustrate better the meaning of the relationship between our institutions than the words *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus*, which may well be regarded as the motto of both schools, and at the same time as the principle which led to the encounter and growing union of Lublin and Liechtenstein. In both schools the strict openness to things themselves, to the given, is regarded as the supreme principle of philosophy. And *epoché* (the bracketing of the existential autonomy or of the autonomy of essences *vis-à-vis* consciousness) can only qualify as an adequate method if being itself really requires a pure concentration of essence. Members of the LL-School both accept and reject many Aristotelian and Thomistic positions in accordance with the question of how closely they adhere to the given.

It is hardly possible to speak here about all aspects of the application of *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus* to the specific thought of Karol Wojtyła, and more qualified interpreters of the Pope's thought will speak on this subject. Thus, allow me to speak here about all aspects of the application of *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus* first of all as it applies to philosophy. In order to explain the elements involved in the *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus* as it applies to philosophy, we have to consider a number of intellectual elements, conditions and goals.

1. In the first place, the primary task of teaching and research in an institute or school committed to our principle consists in philosophising about reality itself, and not in a primary effort of achieving historical knowledge about philosophical ideas.

At the centre of such a goal of philosophical work stands philosophising itself – the asking of philosophical questions and the gaining of philosophical knowledge – and in the first place its object, i.e. reality, being, essence, value, and the existence of things themselves. The *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus* follows the conviction expressed by St. Thomas Aquinas, that philosophy is not just concerned with the opinions of others about things. For this reason, studies in the history of philosophy, however important they are, can never replace philosophy itself. Precisely this goal, as stated at the beginning of *The Acting Person* of Karol Wojtyła when he says that his goal consists in exploring the thing itself under consideration – namely the person himself – is characteristic of such a genuinely philosophical quest for truth. In contradistinction to philosophies which restrict philosophising to linguistic analysis, or to a hermeneutics of texts, such a genuine philosophising as the one described here aims at an ultimate methodological foundation of objective philosophical

knowledge in epistemology, ethics, philosophy of man, social and political philosophy, etc. A serious effort in this direction culminates in the interest for ontology and axiology as the investigation of principles and kinds of being and good (values). The research in the field of philosophy of being (ontology) reaches its climax in the metaphysics of the person and of the absolute reason of being. Such a classical conception of philosophy aims at a clear knowledge of the truth of things themselves, and seeks to attain as great a freedom as possible from all kinds of narrowness, undue restrictions, or distortions of philosophical knowledge. This is of special significance also in the field of ethics, as it was treated in the Lublin School – grounded, among others, by Karol Wojtyła and developed by T. Styczeń and A. Szostek. For at issue here are the highest values and human responsibility. Therefore, any intellectual aberration in this sphere has its dire effects on the level of the concrete being, and life of the individual and society. Europe today is especially threatened by a relativism and by arbitrary theories and ideologies as the foundation for human action, instead of being founded upon the principle of the truth about man and about things.

Precisely in view of the overwhelming new problems of ecology, medicine, in addition to many others, ethics – as clarification of the foundations, as well as of the essence and content of morality – assumes a significance it never possessed before. In this regard, the constant return of our thinking to experience also becomes decisive.

The knowledge of the history of philosophical ideas should always serve the knowledge of things themselves. The task of philosophy in a new Europe is inseparable from the effort to free oneself from any form of reduction of philosophy to its history. Certainly, scholarly acquaintance with texts and knowledge about the history of philosophy are indispensable for responsible philosophising today; and yet historical studies must never replace the proper philosophical understanding of reality. This also in no way means that thinkers or philosophy students are spared the effort of serious hermeneutical work. Intense studies of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury, Descartes, Machiavelli, Kant, Hegel, Bolzano, Brentano, or Husserl are necessary in order to keep alive the great European and universally human tradition, and in order not to fall into the narrowness of a sterile philosophising of one's own in which the great discoveries of the past are lost. But also studies in the history of philosophy must stand under the primacy of the effort to know "things themselves." For, as Goethe observes, we cannot understand "the Ancients" if we do not ourselves attempt what they attempted: namely, "to understand the world and to express the fruit of this knowledge."

2. A second aspect of philosophising which is committed to the principle *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus*, can be summarised in the following way: Back to Things in Themselves (with the stress on phenomenological real-

ism and ethical personalism). Pursuing a philosophical research which – always harkening back to the classical and medieval, as well as to modern sources – at the same time returns to things in themselves, the philosopher today also fulfils in a special way the call of Edmund Husserl – “Back to Things in Themselves” – in the original realist and objectivist interpretation of this exhortation. This Husserlian maxim was later carried out and applied to different areas of philosophy by A. Reinach, M. Scheler, D. von Hildebrand, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein, and by thinkers close to the analytical tradition of philosophy, such as R. Chisholm and – again in a different fashion – by the representatives of Polish ethical personalism: by K. Wojtyła, T. Styczeń, A. Szostek, and others.

In the ethics of Polish ethical personalism and in the thought of Karol Wojtyła, to whose vision of Europe the present conference is particularly dedicated, Husserl’s maxim assumes the form of a return to the most eminent “thing itself”, to the person in his or her specifically moral dimensions. Such a personalism in ethics finds its full expression only in a phenomenology and in a metaphysics of the person – as inspired by Max Scheler, Edith Stein and Dietrich von Hildebrand.

Certainly, an authentic personalism is possible also without ultimate epistemological and metaphysical foundations, as the work of some French personalists, for example E. Lévinas, proves. However, it requires a firm metaphysical foundation, which is a distinguishing goal both of the thought of Karol Wojtyła and of the new LL-School.

Also Augusto Del Noce, by whose philosophy Rocco Buttiglione – who is going to be honoured at the end of this conference – was inspired, fits into this line of thought which seeks to return also with respect to the vision of Europe and of man in European history, to a great metaphysical and epistemologically founded vision of society and politics, a vision based on the truth about man and the indefatigable search for truth.

3. A third main goal of any philosophy committed to the *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus* is a critical new foundation of philosophical realism, which could also be described as a movement “back to the *noumena*” – to the knowable “things in themselves”. Although *noumena* – in purely linguistic terms – means the intelligible things, Kant meant by this term a totally unknowable object, which – according to his view – can be designated by a mere limit-concept: “thing in itself”. In the aftermath of Kant and of British Empiricism, it appears to most philosophers from the eighteenth century onwards that it is impossible to do philosophy as a science of that which is in itself. Husserl saw in 1901 almost no philosopher who kept his thought entirely free from general relativism, and after 1905 he himself fell into a transcendental relativism which led to the abandoning of objectivist realism – with meaningful exceptions – within the phenomenological movement.

Deeply convinced that an authentic philosophical realism continues to be rationally and critically justifiable, also after Kant's "Copernican turn" towards the subject and Husserl's conversion to subjective idealism, and that the insights of realist phenomenology and personalism opened the way for the new formulation of classical metaphysics in twentieth century, Karol Wojtyła and his co-founders of the realist school in Poland – as well as other related tendencies such as realist phenomenology in Liechtenstein – are in a critical but open dialogue with all these philosophies of the past and future which, since the ancient sceptics, and especially since Hume and Kant, have called into question the possibility of metaphysics and of the objective theory of being and value in general.

Not without the impact of such works as M. Scheler's *Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik*, or the epistemological writings of Dietrich von Hildebrand, the school of thinking in philosophy, theology and ethics – inspired in a decisive way by Karol Wojtyła – has achieved the radical new formulation of phenomenological method. It has pointed out that precisely the philosophy which returns to the things themselves and to the person, also today can know and demonstrate the essential structure and existence of the world and of being which are in themselves and totally independent from human thinking. Equally, it discloses the values and foundations of moral action which are not the result of subjective human decision, but are discovered by man.

This principle which St. Augustine formulates by saying that such truth about man *non facitur, sed invenitur*, stands in the centre of the vision of thinking about man which, according to the present Pope, can help to renew European culture today. This principle of a great intellectual father of Europe – St. Augustine – involves the receptivity of knowledge, that the movement of knowledge goes essentially from being and the intelligible nature of things, towards the human intellect.

It involves the resistance to all Promethean tendencies of constructionist thinking and reductionisms which do not do justice to being and to a spirit of openness, of penetrating into the structures of reality itself.

It involves an overcoming of the sceptical despair of truth and the discovery that in all errors many true insights are already contained, and that no man is able to avoid the search for truth, much of which he already presupposes and often understands.

4. A fourth goal of philosophy truly committed to *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus* concerns a knowledge of the whole of reality and of man – a knowledge which resists the fragmentation and tearing apart of philosophy and of human thought, as such, into little partial disciplines. At least since the time of Plato and Aristotle, philosophy has laid claim to a knowledge of reality as a whole. And it had presented itself as an ordered whole of partial sub-disciplines, which extend from epistemology, logic, and formal ontology,

to the philosophy of nature, as well as from a philosophy of man, of the state and of society, up to metaphysics, and to a philosophy of the first and absolute being. Sharing the claim of philosophy to a universal knowledge of the whole, whose idea was elevated in German idealism to the rank of alleged “absolute knowledge,” certain fields of philosophy possess primordial significance: epistemology, as it aims at an ultimate foundation of all knowledge and of all science, including philosophy; logic, as the most general theory of all sciences and as the foundation of the specific methods of particular sciences; ontology, as the exploration of the most universal principles of being, and metaphysics of absolute being. This classical claim – inseparable from the essence of philosophy – of attaining a systematic and therefore ordered body of knowledge, appears in the history of philosophy mainly in three forms:

a) In the form of ancient philosophy which – in spite of its claim to universal knowledge, especially of the absolute Being and Good (Plato, Aristotle), and in spite of its attempts at replacing the weak Greek religion by purely philosophical religion and teaching about salvation – also insists on Socratic ignorance and on man’s awareness of the limits of his own knowledge, and – at least in Plato, and even more so in Socrates – is open towards higher wisdom, beyond the reach of human reason.

b) In the form of Mediaeval *Summa*, according to which the universal understanding of reality is only possible as a symbiosis of philosophy (reason) and of revealed theology (faith).

c) In the form of the “system-thinking” of modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, and in a less dominant form up to the present day. It attempts to achieve an autonomous and universal “absolute knowledge”, in which other sciences and religion appear only as moments which are both cancelled and preserved by means of pure reason alone. This “system-thinking” culminates in Hegel.

After the historical breakdown of Hegel’s system – and even more in the face of the increasing distrust of the Western and Eastern world against Marxist and other “comprehensive visions” of the world – led to a breakdown of any faith in absolute systems, philosophy fragmented more and more and concentrated on specialized research of particular issues. The philosophers abandoned their aspiration to a knowledge of the whole, and it was often natural science which usurped more and more the claim to comprehensive knowledge. This claim, abandoned by the philosophers, reappears today in many absolutisations of partial knowledge by scientists: evolutionism and other ideological explanations of the whole world through accident or necessity, or through the sub-conscious, or in terms of social determinisms and of history, etc.

A special task of the school of thought about man and the spiritual foundations of Europe, inspired by Karol Wojtyła, can be seen as a rehabilitation of the ultimately unrenounceable, systematic character of philosophy, and, in the

first place, its aspiration to the universal truth about man, remaining in accord with the revelation, faith and the teaching of the Church.

But how is this possible, precisely from the point of view that remains close to the given? According to the principles of rational knowledge, at least the third above-mentioned notion of philosophy must be greeted with scepticism.

A justified scepticism *vis-à-vis* any human claim to a comprehensive universal knowledge, in the context of which each single question would be perfectly answerable, does not entail or justify a scepticism towards any systematic proceeding of philosophical knowledge, nor to the aiming of philosophical knowledge at completeness, logical coherence and a cognition of the first principles of being, thought and action. Thus, the great Thomistic philosophical tradition in Lublin – complemented through the personalism of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II, which constantly seeks to return to experience – is characterized by a lively interest in metaphysics as the knowledge of “all being” and of “being as such,” as it was understood by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas.

At the same time, Karol Wojtyła connects the aspiration to knowledge of the whole, based upon the love for truth, with humble recognition of the limits of human knowledge. If the limits are not accepted, the aiming at the systematic universal vision of reality succumbs to the danger of a premature systematisation which obscures the true nature of things themselves, as it was characteristic of reductionist philosophies of the past and present. The John Paul II vision of man constitutes their opposition in the sense of Socrates’ knowledge of one’s own ignorance. In it there is always an awareness of the abysses of human suffering and of the apories and mysteries of being – as in many thinkers such as B. Pascal, S. Kierkegaard, J. H. Newman or G. Marcel. This awareness does not permit any purely rational explanation or even deduction of all the truths, and forbids man the Promethean ethics which ignores the limits of human knowledge, and against which Hans Jonas has especially warned.

The complex relationships between philosophy and religion in Karol Wojtyła’s thought involves the eminently positive mutual enrichment of both. Fundamental, and today almost universally accepted discoveries such as the equal dignity of man and woman, freedom or universal human rights which forbid, for example, slavery, and which in Poland in the days of Solidarity, and before the liberation of many European countries from Communism, acquired a crucial political significance, were gained historically only after centuries of influence of the Christian vision of man. Pope John Paul II during his first visit to Poland presented to Europe in an impressive way the connection of human rights to philosophy and religion – as well as to the history of Poland and the protest of King Sigismund August against the principle *cuius regio eius religio*: freedom of conscience, freedom of religion – but freedom committed to truth!

Also, an atheist will hardly overlook the actual positive influence of Christianity and of John Paul II's vision of Europe, based on faith and philosophical insights.

Thus, the vision of Europe presented by Pope John Paul II is at the same time profoundly rooted in Western tradition and modern, open to contemporary philosophical contributions.

But the vision which is implied in the motto of IAP – which I dare to consider also as the motto of the vision of Europe of John Paul II, this vision cannot be restricted to a purely intellectual vision of Europe. If we consider the motto of an academic institution, *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus*, we might first be struck by the fact that it begins with the word *diligere*. How can an academic institution given to learning, to study, to knowledge, exhort its members to give a response of their hearts and will to truth? Where knowledge counts, which role does love play?

Maybe we will see that immediately and why a commitment of the will is extremely important in practical fields concerned with human actions, for example in medicine, because it is quite clear that medicine is not only a matter of studies and of detailed theoretical knowledge about the human body, about the causes and cures of disease, and about the health of the human body, but also possesses a crucial practical and ethical dimension. It therefore requires the commitment of medical professionals to use their knowledge according to the ends and purposes of medicine, as the Hippocratic *Oath* expresses so admirably.

Even with regard to a science of such practical dimensions as medicine, however, it was by no means universally recognized that it requires a free commitment of the will to its final end. Aristotle, for example, says that the end of medicine, namely the promotion of health, is willed by any physician as necessarily as – according to him – happiness is necessarily willed by every man. Since Aristotle thought that the ultimate end of human actions is willed necessarily, he could not hold that the final purpose of medicine or of human action can and must be an object of free choice. Therefore the physician can, accordingly, only deliberate concerning the means to achieve his fixed goal, the health of patients. But when we consider the practice of euthanasia or of abortion, or when we consider the recent history of the concentration camps where Nazi doctors damaged the health of people, or when we think of all the doctors of all times who, oppressed by political systems and political powers, consented to harm their patients or prisoners, or confined healthy persons to mental hospitals, when we consider all the crimes committed by medical doctors in Chile and in other totalitarian regimes in which doctors were forced or were seduced to become the instruments of torture of the innocent, then we see easily that the goals of medicine, the values for the service of which medicine was instituted, can be quite radically violated by a member of the medical profession. We understand, however, that when physicians fall victim to such temptations,

their activity no longer deserves the name of medicine: for instead of serving life it destroys life, instead of saving the life of people who are dying, it delivers them to death or to torture, and thus it becomes clear that the values medicine serves, that the ethics and ethos of medicine, must be freely chosen.

Against this background, we understand the significance of one of the great texts of mankind: the Hippocratic *Oath*. The free commitment to values it entails is even more urgently needed today and is more up to date than ever before. For the practitioners of medicine at the time of Aristotle could perhaps be believed to adhere necessarily to their noble goals – although even in Aristotle's times, of course, this was not true. Hippocrates in fact introduced the text of this *Oath* as a solemn condition for bestowing the right to practice the medical art on doctors because of the great temptation of physicians to abuse their art. Only for this reason did he require the physician to swear solemnly never to abuse the patient, never to be more concerned with payment than with the welfare of the patient, never to damage health intentionally, never to give a pregnant woman a deadly potion to kill her baby, never to refuse medical treatment for reason of poverty, never to intend any other ends more than the good of the patient, etc. In a word, the Hippocratic *Oath* requires from all physicians to refuse all the *intrinsece mala* which they will be tempted to commit in their professional life. And thus this *Oath* is one of the precursors of the Encyclical *Veritatis splendor* with its insistence on the existence of actions which are evil in and of themselves, and can never be justified by consequences of calculations of good effects. And from the solemn and magnificent text of this *Oath* it was clear that the doctors also at the time of Hippocrates and Aristotle could freely choose other ends, not merely the ones which medicine is supposed to serve. Today this is clearer than ever. And it is likewise clear that the characteristic essence of medicine – in contradistinction to organised crime through technical medical means – has as part of itself the moral dimension and commitment of the physician.

In philosophy – although its very name means love of wisdom – or in other purely theoretical disciplines it is more difficult to understand why a commitment of love should have any decisive place. But in a certain way for philosophy – and of course also for theology and other kindred disciplines – love, in the sense of a free moral commitment, is even more essential than for medicine and, as a matter of fact, co-constitutes the very essence of authentic philosophy. A medical doctor may abuse his art, even commit crimes, and still retain the ability to solve medical problems and be a superb doctor for certain patients. He can do excellent work in part – even if his free attitude to the goals of medicine is bad. But since philosophy consists in the pursuit of higher truth and wisdom, the fundamental moral commitment to the *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus* is even more essentially and absolutely necessary for the philosopher than the fulfilment of the medical oath by the physician. For as

soon as the philosopher abuses his more technical skills, his intellectual faculties, his learning, his ability to think and to make distinctions, his knowledge of great texts, his ability to interpret them, his ability to unfold and to use ideas, to deduce certain consequences from premises or to defend certain intellectual positions, he becomes a sophist and does not reach the fundamental goal of philosophy which, according to texts of St. Augustine and of St. Thomas Aquinas, does not have as task the study of the mere opinions of other philosophers, but rather to know the truth of things.

As soon as the philosopher abuses his learning and mental abilities for the sake of his own glory, or of money, he will immediately turn into a sophist, which Plato in all his dialogues presents as the great antipode, as the antithesis of the philosopher. Thus we should recognise that all our learning, all our knowledge, all the knowledge on which we can be tested in an examination – is not the most essential part of being a philosopher. The very essence and soul of the philosopher is his knowledge of things themselves and his free commitment to the highest goal of philosophy: namely the pursuit of wisdom, of knowledge, of the whole truth which he should love in its most modest parts, as Plato says. This, of course, does not diminish but increases the weight and significance of receiving and acquiring proper intellectual and scholarly training in philosophy.

A free commitment of the will to the authentic values and goods which philosophy should serve and a free acceptance of the responsibilities and duties which one has as a philosopher are required. And this commitment of the will is in a certain way more essential for the philosopher than his purely intellectual achievements. Because the most refined mind, when it is straying from the truth, and does not even search for it, is an antithesis to the philosopher. The most brilliant, devilish mind is even more opposed to the essence of the philosopher than the simple farmer or child who has a moral commitment to the pursuit of truth. So from a certain point of view, the freely chosen pursuit of truth, even though this is not philosophy proper, academically speaking is a factor more important in the constitution of the essence of the philosopher than is the intellectual ability of knowing, distinguishing, or analysing the essences of things. The radical example of the devilish mind should teach this unambiguously.

It is interesting to note that in Plato – who always insists on the love of truth as the foundational virtue of philosophy (the IAP motto being just a transcription of some Platonic texts in the catalogue of virtues of the philosopher from book VI of Plato's *Republic*) – you find two ideas of philosophy and of the philosopher: one is quite academic and really a goal for very few, brilliant, academically-oriented people of the highest class. Only a few are able to be philosophers in this sense – and, of course, also and especially these most gifted philosophical natures are bound to use moral criteria to love the truth in

everything and to hate falsehood; otherwise they turn into seeds of corruption and sophistry and "nothing healthy is in them," as Plato puts it.

But at the same time there are passages in Plato's works in which he not only praises love of truth and other virtues as philosophical virtues, but in which he praises the simple man as the one who pursues truth and justice: for example, in the *Crito* Socrates praises the very simple jailer who served Socrates before his death, and he says of this man that he is a wonderful, fine man who pursued justice and truthfulness truly in everything. So Socrates in a certain way presents this simple and humble man to his own students of philosophy as an example of someone who loves the truth. This reminds us a bit of the role of the child in the Gospel. Thus you find also another idea of philosophy in Plato, universally accessible to every man and simply constituted by the free and profound commitment to the pursuit of wisdom, of truth and of wisdom.

In the sphere of the intellect the free commitment to noble goals is, in a certain way, even more difficult to achieve and at the same time more profoundly important than in medicine. As long as a given society will punish a doctor if he substitutes the care of health by destroying health, he will easily abstain from prescribing poison. After prescribing poisonous pills, he will be immediately put to jail and perhaps stay there for two and three decades. But in philosophy, if somebody sells poisonous pills and earns a lot of money, if he writes books full of devastating errors which can in fact lead a nation to the abyss of ruin, he has rather excellent chances to be praised and to become a super-star on television, to be mentioned by every newspaper and become much richer and more famous than if he practised philosophy in a more noble manner. Already in Athens the philosopher Socrates was poor and the Sophists were so rich that they could erect golden statues of themselves. The temptation of aspiring more to fame than to truth is great for philosophers.

Recently, Prof. H. Lübke from the University of Zürich, who defends a functionalistic idea of truth in his philosophy of religion, said before the General Assembly of the European Academy of Sciences in Salzburg that the responsibilities of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, of the humane disciplines, are enormous. He believes that in the future the thing that will be most frequently mentioned about this century is that in it more people were murdered by political systems than in any other age before: through the Stalinist system, through the Nazis, and many others. Lübke added that one will be inclined today to think that this constitutes a relapse of the twentieth century into a barbarian, primitive mode of thinking. But he expressed the conviction that while perhaps a certain state of mind in former Yugoslavia, in Croatia, in Serbia, Georgia, Sudan, and many other countries, constitutes simply a relapse into barbarism, the greatest crimes of the century were coolly planned and were the fruit of the philosophical and very sophisticated intellectual ideas of Marx and of many

others. It was such ideas that led to the intellectual defence of millions of murders committed in the name of ideologies and ideas. And therefore, Lübke argued, the responsibility of the *Geisteswissenschaftler* shows itself to be even larger than that of any other scientist. For while philosophy does not so immediately influence society as technology or medicine, it does so indirectly and most powerfully. It is the ideological ground of great political systems or of general ideas which dominate society. And thus philosophy plays a crucial role in public and political life, as background and source from which revolution and reforms spring. Even if revolutions and reforms, especially religious and spiritual ones, require much more than ideologies or philosophical ideas to happen, and even if it takes great and inspired personalities to bring them about, the philosophical ideas and atmosphere of the time and country will exercise tremendous influence upon men. In the form of racism, of the oppression of parts of society, of abortion laws, of euthanasia, and of countless other concrete social and cultural realities, it is really philosophical ideas which cost the lives of many more people than any medical mistake. If you ask the question whether each human being has an inherent dignity or not, than the answer to this philosophical question is much more decisive for millions of people, living or dying, than the question of certain malpractices or medical mistakes. In his racist and false philosophy of man, a Hitler could write-off systematically millions of human beings worthy of protection. And this was done by the force of mistaken philosophical ideas. And Karl Marx did the same with members of certain classes.

To develop a philosophy for vain glory's sake is a tremendous danger, especially for philosophers, who do not perhaps gain money so easily, but gain recognition and acceptance by the academic community; to be "in," to be in the main stream, to be recognised, to publish in well-known journals, to be on good terms with colleagues, etc., are tremendous seductions. In fact, Lübke also said very well in his talk in Salzburg, that it is the sweet poison of fame that seduces almost every academic in one way or another. And I think this is indeed a poison which is very attractive and very dangerous. To resist this, to pursue truth even when it is unpopular, even when it goes against the stream, even when this means perhaps risking one's life, is a very difficult task. The persons who received honorary doctorates from the Academy had this in common, that they risked their lives for the truth: Viktor Frankl refused to escape with his wife – because he decided not to show impiety towards his parents, leaving them in the hands of the Nazis. And he saw the death of his wife, of his parents, and of other relatives. Radim Pauloš, to whom we gave an honorary doctorate, defended Charter 77 at great personal risks. President Cossiga took political responsibilities upon himself when he could easily have been murdered for this reason. And this applies *a fortiori* to Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

So the first commitment of the philosopher then is to the truth; it is the *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus*. In an admirable text from the *Apology*, Socrates asserts that virtue does not come from money, but in pursuing truth one also pursues the good of mankind.

The IAP's original text for pledging the *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus* said: "Mindful of the dignity and of the limits of my personal vocation in philosophy [...] I vow and promise to love all truth and to love it in everything." This is a very stern pledge. I remember always a charming female freshman (the student in the first year of American College) at the University of Dallas. When I spoke about the virtues of the philosopher, referring to Plato in book VI of the *Republic*, I went through the long list Plato gives of the philosopher's virtues: he must not fear death in the pursuit of truth, he has to be courageous, he has to love all truth and hate all falsity and all lies, he has to love honesty and nobility, and not be petty and small-minded, etc. The mentioned girl suddenly stood up, almost furious and passionate, and she said: "Professor Seifert, are you a philosopher? I think nobody was a philosopher if this is what a philosopher is." And I said: "Yes, yes, this is true. The virtues demanded from the philosopher are an ideal vocation and almost all professors of philosophy fall short of being fully philosophers."

To love truth in everything is very hard, no doubt, but we should commit ourselves to this goal, striving for authentic philosophy. The previous text of the IAP professional pledge for philosophers continued:

I pledge always to honour philosophy by speaking and acting righteously, so as not to inflict shame on the institution and the name of philosophy [...] I shall not consent freely to error or falsity.

Keeping this pledge is particularly difficult of course under totalitarian regimes, at times of oppression; but it is also difficult when someone is too dependent on public opinion, or when he is a coward, or when he uses sophisticated arguments in writing or in speech, or is under political or private pressure. Dietrich von Hildebrand, to whom the inspiration of this Academy is owed, risked his life professing the results of his philosophical insights. He had to leave Nazi Germany, then Austria, then France, and always on the Nazi list of the first people to be killed. We could all fall again under such a regime, and this could in fact possibly require martyrdom.

In the original long text in which the Academy expressed this moral commitment of the philosopher, it demanded always to be rigorous [...] to be faithful to the evidence which proceeds from the nature of things themselves, not to construct and not to violate the given, to learn from objections, etc.

It is a very common thing among professors, but also among students and other men, to react to criticism simply by some kind of hardening of one's line or even by some personal attack on others. In fact, Socrates says in a marvelous passage in *Gorgias* that normally when he comes to refute somebody's

errors or shows him that his philosophy is contradictory, then this person who is refuted feels ashamed and gets angry. The persons whose errors he refutes start to use foul language and hurl such insults at the man who delivers them from their error that even low-level workers would be ashamed of using such terms in a public debate. Socrates does not consider this response rare, but says that that is the normal reaction men take towards the truth.

Socrates observes that men normally react to justified criticisms as if it were the greatest evil to be refuted in one's errors. But a philosopher should regard it as the highest good to be refuted, and should much more love to be refuted and shown that he is in error than to refute someone else. In being refuted a man receives a great service, namely, the blessing of being healed from an error and of being led to true knowledge, whereas in refuting others he only renders this service to others but does not profit from it.

The totality of such virtues of loving the truth to the end belongs to this holy, saintly philosopher of whom the student told me that neither I nor any other frail human person will ever manage to become. It is to this context indeed that the important speech of Cardinal Ratzinger on Christ as archetype and model for philosophers applies. For no finite subject can embody the pure love of truth perfectly. Only Christ can.

Jacek SALIJ, OP

“MAN CANNOT BE FULLY UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT CHRIST”

Christ is not only the testimony of this astounding value that man has for God, but is also its source. For in the everlasting plan of his love God decided that man should “become like his Son”. This is exactly why man has remained very dear to the loving Father, even when this likeness of the Son was lamentable. Even though man is sinful, he is so dear to the Everlasting Father that he never even hesitated “to deliver his own Son in order to ransom a slave” – as we sing in the paschal proclamation on Holy Saturday.

I would like to recall an event which was the deepest expression of the collective spirit in which I have ever participated. I mean here the applause, enthusiastic and unbelievably long-lasting – over five minutes – with which the people gathered together on the 2 June 1979 on the *Plac Zwycięstwa* (Victory Square) in Warsaw, reacted to the following words of John Paul II:

To Poland, the Church brought Christ, the key to understanding that great and fundamental reality that is man. For man cannot be fully understood without Christ. Or rather, man is incapable of understanding himself fully without Christ. He cannot understand who he is, nor what his true dignity is, nor what his vocation is, nor what is his final end. He cannot understand any of this without Christ.

I remember as if it were only yesterday (for the recollections of such deep experiences do not grow old), that in these words I heard much more than what they unequivocally meant. I heard in them an open claim for the right of this society to Christ. During the years of Communist rule, Christ was regarded in public life *per non est*, and efforts were made to lock Him up tightly in our private beliefs. The Pope’s words made us aware of the abnormality of this situation. The people noticed the hidden accusation against the social order, from which Christ was to be deliberately excluded. The unique, enthusiastic reaction to this statement shows their intuitive understanding that the degradation of our human dignity suffered under the Communist rule resulted from the eradication of Christ from our public life.

From the point of view of the text, the Pope did not say anything new. He only repeated the thought of Pascal, renewed by the Second Vatican Council, a thought he then widely popularized. Let us look closer at the thought that

“man cannot be fully understood without Christ” as it was understood before proclamation on the *Plac Zwycięstwa* (Victory Square) in Warsaw.

Pascal was the first Christian thinker to make a conscious effort to stop the process of de-Christianisation that had remained almost unnoticed in his time. He understood the significance of the reduction of faith to the level of *Weltanschauung* (outlook on the world; though Pascal didn't know the expression *Weltanschauung*) as the source of de-Christianization. Therefore, in the apologetic work, which he only managed to write in the form of draft notes (posthumously published as *Pensées*), he intended to present the Christian faith as the truth powerful enough to overwhelm the whole of man and to actually transform his life.

Pascal's remark on man that interests us is a kind of gloss to the words of Christ from Mt 11 : 27 (Lk 10 : 22): “Not only do we know God by Jesus Christ alone, but we know ourselves only by Jesus Christ. We know life and death only through Jesus Christ. Apart from Jesus Christ we do not know what is our life, nor our death, nor God, nor ourselves” (*Pensées*, No. 547, p. 147).¹

Obviously, it is not the philosophical genius of Christ our Lord that reveals to us the truth about ourselves, but His redeeming power. Pascal has no doubt that if we do not know ourselves, then this results from our sinfulness rather than from deficiency in our intelligence: “True nature being lost, everything becomes its nature; as the true good being lost, everything becomes its own true good” (*Pensées*, No. 426, p. 114). Thus in pre-Christian times man could have at most guessed the truth about himself – he could not have known it (*Pensées*, No. 432, p. 119). Only thanks to Christ are we able to really know our sin and to receive his absolution (*Pensées*, No. 545-546, p. 176) – and in this way to learn who man is, or I myself really am.

Pascal saw the danger of de-Christianization, but never personally faced a de-Christianized society. Certainly, he was unaware of the fact that the society which rejected Christ would be essentially different in its conception of God and man from the one that did not know Christ at all. Today, we already know that the atheism which was formed on the ruins of Christian faith has no counterparts beyond the circle of Christian culture. After a certain amount of reflection, we also begin to understand that despair about God is unavoidably followed by despair about man.

Sometimes even the very form of the statements proclaiming this despair about man includes the suggestion that it results from the renunciation of the Christian faith. The famous sentence of Max Scheler from his posthumously published article *Man and History* is clearly related to the above-quoted statement by Pascal. It is as if Scheler wanted to tell us: it finally became clear that even Christ could not help us to understand who we are! But let us ourselves

¹ B. P a s c a l, *Pensées*, transl. W. H. Trotter, London, New York 1940.

judge this irrevocably pessimistic diagnosis of anthropological consciousness in the post-Christian era:

In approximately ten centuries of history, this is the first in which man finds himself completely and utterly “problematic,” in which he no longer knows what he is and simultaneously *knows* that he does not have the answer.²

The two World Wars and two terrible totalitarian systems witnessed by the twentieth century are the most spectacular confirmation of this identity crisis in contemporary man.

This, however, began with the slogans calling for the bringing to light of human dignity, and telling man to become more deeply rooted in this world, since faith in eternal life allegedly makes him abandon so-called real life. In addition, it seemed to many people of good will that concord in society and mutual tolerance would be easier to establish and strengthen if public life were freed of any relationship with religion.

But when the postulate of the neutrality of popular *Weltanschauung* began to be put into practice, it was permitted to judge these changes only positively: as the liberation from the burdensome ballast of the requirements of religion, as the opportunity to organize public life exclusively according to the principles of common sense. People did not realize then that if social morality had been shaped by religious principles, “neutral common sense” would have postulated something completely different from the present case, in which even the moral commandments of the Decalogue had been called to question. Only today do we begin to understand that agnosticism is anything but an attitude beyond a specific *Weltanschauung*, that is but one like all the rest, and that the imposition of the irreligious behaviour following from it, like any other forced imposition of attitudes related to *Weltanschauung*, is the restriction of religious freedom (and is especially regrettable and should be denounced, if approved by the law).

In some countries, for the sake of this neutrality, religion has been almost entirely eliminated from public life. The victorious agnosticism has caused even more damage to our moral sense. It is not by accident that since the time of Auschwitz the most popular trends of ethical thought in Europe have been utilitarianism and hedonism. If one does not even know whether God exists, one cannot seriously ask oneself the question of the ultimate goal of human existence. Thus *bonum honestum*, the good that actualizes the goal of our humanity, had to be excluded from the moral thinking developed by the agnostics. Moral philosophers have limited their ambitions to the classification of the problems

² M. S c h e l e r, *Man and History*, in: *Philosophical Perspectives*, transl. O. A. Haac, Boston 1958, p. 65.

concerning our relation to the *bonum utile* (the good which in principle is relative, for it can always be thought of as the means to other goals) and to the *bonum delectabile* (which, if one ignores the *bonum honestum*, may easily be considered a sort of goal for human existence).

What began with theological agnosticism has led, with inevitable logic, to anthropological agnosticism. It seems that the attempts to bring human dignity to light by locking man exclusively within that which can be known empirically could not possibly reach a different conclusion. For when the only good a man is able to recognize is the pleasurable and the useful, such a man truly does not know who he really is, nor for whose sake he lives.

In short, processes of de-Christianization have caused that of which Pascal had merely had a presentiment, which the Second Vatican Council described as the reality of the bewilderment of contemporary man:

By contrast, when a divine substructure and the hope of life eternal are wanting, man's dignity is most grievously lacerated, as current events often attest. The riddles of life and death, of guilt and grief go unsolved, with the frequent result that men succumb to despair. (*Gaudium et spes*, No. 21)

Furthermore, contemporary man is not always fully aware of his despair:

No doubt very many whose lives are infected with a practical materialism are blinded against any sharp insight into this kind of dramatic situation. Or else, weighed down by wretchedness, they are prevented from giving the matter any thought.

Thinking that they have found serenity in an interpretation of reality everywhere proposed these days, many look forward to a genuine and total emancipation of humanity wrought solely by human effort. They are convinced that the future rule of man over the earth will satisfy every desire of his heart.

Nor are there lacking men who despair of any meaning to life and praise the boldness of those who think that human existence is devoid of any inherent significance and who strive to confer a total meaning on it by their own ingenuity alone. (*Gaudium et spes*, No. 10).

But neither ignorance of the fact that the situation is desperate, nor masking it with activities and hopes, changes the objective fact that the situation really is desperate. At the same time, the question of who I am and for whose sake I live cannot be removed from human consciousness; even our attempts to relativise the answers to these questions are unsuccessful.

The Church can afford to speak bluntly about the deep bewilderment of contemporary man, because the Church knows the way out. For the Church knows and proclaims Christ in whom "the mystery of man takes on light. [...] Through Christ and in Christ (even) the riddles of sorrow and death grow

meaningful. Apart from His gospel, they overwhelm us” (*Gaudium et spes*, No. 22).

It would certainly be possible to easily point to the affinity between some formulations of *Gaudium et spes*, No. 22 (and those included in the encyclical *Veritatis splendor*, No. 10) and Pascal’s *Pensées*. But it was not Pascal who discovered this truth, that “without Christ man cannot fully understand himself”; it is deeply rooted in the New Testament, as well as in the whole Christian Tradition. Let us study its actual content.

I would especially point out three dimensions of this truth. In the first place, Christ – and especially his Incarnation and Cross – is a living testimony of the unbelievable *value* man represents in God’s eyes. “And God showed his love for us by sending his only Son into the world, so that we might have life through him” (1 Jn 4 : 9; see Jn 3 : 16). “Even before the world was made, God had already chosen us to be His through our union with Christ, so that we would be holy and without fault before him. Because of his love, God had already decided that through Jesus Christ, He would make us His sons” (Eph 1 : 4-5). “... God, who did not even keep back His own Son, but offered Him for us all!” (Rom 8 : 32).

“Let mankind raise his hope and recognize his own nature!” – says St. Augustine with enthusiasm for this love that God has for man – “Let him see how important is the place he has among the works of God!”³

Christ is not only the testimony of this astounding value that man has for God, but is also its source. For in the everlasting plan of his love God decided that man should “become like His Son” (Rom 8 : 29; see Gen 1 : 26). This is exactly why man has remained very dear to the loving Father, even when this likeness of the Son was so obscured and disfigured as to be lamentable. Even though man is sinful, he is so dear to the Everlasting Father that he never even hesitated “to deliver His own Son in order to ransom a slave” – as we sing in the paschal proclamation on Holy Saturday. Moreover, it is not quite fortunate to say that God loves us in spite of our sinfulness. We should rather say that God loves us against our sinfulness in order to save us from our sins. In any case, this divine love for us sinners is incomprehensible enough to make us fear. “Go away from me, Lord! I am a sinful man!” (Lk 5 : 8) – Simon Peter once blurted out.

Secondly: Christ helps us to understand ourselves, our own humanity, also in the sense that he lived his earthly life as a man in an *ideally perfect* way. Therefore, looking at Him, we can better understand what it means to really be a man.

³ S t. A u g u s t i n e, *De agone christiano*, XI, 12, in: *Patrologia latina*, J. P. Migne (ed.), Paris 1878, vol. XL, p. 297, transl. P. M.

Let us look, then, at Christ as Perfect Man. In His human nature he was also fully and entirely united with his Everlasting Father. "The Father is in me, and I am in the Father" (Jn 10 : 38) – He said about himself. "My food is to obey the will of the One who sent me" (Jn 4 : 34; see Mt 26 : 39; Phil 2 : 8). He was fully united with the Father not only in His deeds but also in His teaching: "What I teach is not my own teaching, but it comes from God who sent me" (Jn 7 : 16; see 8 : 28; 12 : 49). Even more so this Perfect Man did truly say: "Whoever has seen me, has seen the Father" (Jn 14 : 9; see 12 : 45).

In this way, Christ – to use the expression of the last Council – "fully reveals man to man himself" (*Gaudium et spes*, No. 22). He reveals that the source of the truth of our humanity is the fact that God loved us first, and that we will more completely realize ourselves as human beings as our relationship with God – to whom we are brought nearer only by Him, the only Mediator between God and man – deepens and becomes more all-encompassing.

As the Perfect Man, Christ is actually also a model for us, a model of what we should do in order to realise our humanity more and more deeply. First of all, He teaches us that also in the present world so much distorted by sin, one can, with God's assistance, remain obedient to the will of God – only it may not be easy: "If anyone wants to come with me, he must forget self, carry his cross, and follow me" (Mt 16 : 24). Ultimately, the carrying of the cross consists in the fact, that love – this love that comes from God – is the highest principle for man's life (see Jn 15 : 13; Eph 5 : 1 ff; 1 Jn 4 : 18-21).

In the light of Christ – the Perfect Man – the entire untruth and poverty of how we realize our humanity is also revealed. The measure of this untruth is our sin. Unfortunately, none of us can be said, like Christ, to be without sin. From this follows the understandable, though deplorable impulse that we as sinners feel to run away from Christ: "The light has come to into the world, but people love the darkness rather than the light, because their deeds are evil. Anyone who does evil things hates the light and will not come to the light, because he does not want his evil deeds to be revealed" (Jn 3 : 19-20).

Fortunately we can also react properly to this light which is Christ, we can accept Him as the Redeemer and let Him transform us: "I have come into the world as light, so that everyone who believes in me should not remain in the darkness" (Jn 12 : 46). Christ, then, is not only a model for us. Even the mere human perfection of Christ – our Lord – so unimaginably surpasses us that if he were just a model for us, without simultaneously being our Redeemer, we would surely fall into despair.

I would suggest looking at the third dimension of the truth that "man cannot be fully understood without Christ" in the light of Eph 4 : 13: that our faith in Christ will make us "mature people, reaching to the very height of Christ's full stature." In other words: Christ helps us to understand ourselves primarily

in this sense – that he *heals our humanity* with his grace and gives us power to realize it more and more genuinely.

The New Testament describes this dimension of discovering what it means to be man, among other things, as the destruction of the old, unauthentic self, so that we could be overwhelmed by “the new self which is created in God’s likeness and reveals itself in the true life that is upright and holy” (Eph 4 : 24). Thus, Christ is the new Adam, through whom all our humanity is renewed (Rom 5 : 5-19). The end of this process of redemption will be universal resurrection, when the glorified humanity of Christ reveals itself as the source of the ultimate and complete renewal of all the redeemed (1 Cor 15 : 20-23).

Does it follow from this, then, that as long as I am a sinner, I am not yet fully a man? This is exactly what St. Ignatius of Antioch, the immediate disciple of Apostle John, wrote about himself. This is how he implored the Christians in Rome not to prevent him from passing through martyrdom on his way to eternal life:

Do not interfere with my life, do not wish me to die; you should not surrender to the world nor lead astray with material things the one who wants to belong to God. Allow me to receive the pure light. *When I reach it, I shall become man.*⁴

“Though I am imprisoned for the sake of the Name” – the aged Ignatius wrote in another letter – “I am not yet perfect in Jesus Christ. Only now am I beginning to be a disciple, and I speak to you as to my fellow disciples in learning”⁵ (*Epistle to Ephesians*, 3, 1). St. Ignatius perhaps would not write that “man cannot be fully understood without Christ.” But he would write that “only in Christ can man really and ever more fully understand himself.”

Personally, I have no doubt that this is exactly what was meant by Pascal, Vatican Council II, and John Paul II.

Translated by *Patrycja Mikulska*

⁴ See St. Ignatius of Antioch, *To the Romans*, 6, 2, in: *Corpus Ignatianum*, London 1849, p. 50.

⁵ See St. Ignatius of Antioch, *To the Ephesians*, 3, 1, in: *ibid.*, p. 20.

DISCUSSION*

Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS

To begin with, I would like to draw your attention to Prof. J. Seifert's lecture, devoted to the philosophers' responsibility for the spiritual condition of the contemporary world. To be exact, I would like all of us, as philosophers, to consider the case of the young woman who came as a student to the International Academy of Philosophy in Dallas, USA, which takes so much pride in the motto of Plato's Academy – *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus* – just to tell its rector straightforwardly that there are no philosophers in today's world, and that likewise her professor cannot be called a philosopher.

As we can clearly see, the girl does not merely represent the attitude of a neutral observer who simply states that there are no philosophers in the contemporary world. Her remark is a reproach, in saying that those who profess themselves to be philosophers are not philosophers. Let us put aside – for a moment – the problem of whether her accusation is or is not well justified. Rather, we must be sure not to miss something particularly important which comes to light in this accusation. The very fact that someone who does not simply express his own opinion, but on behalf of the whole world accuses philosophers of having betrayed philosophy, proves at least two important things: firstly, that the ideal of philosophy, though betrayed by philosophers, remains something indisputably important not only to the one making the accusation, but also to the whole world; and secondly, that the philosopher's betrayal of this ideal is considered not only as faithlessness to his vocation, or as the philosopher's betrayal of himself, but also as his betrayal of the world. The philosopher is simply accused here of doing harm to the world by depriving it of himself – as philosopher – and by lying to the world. While actually depriving the world of himself as a philosopher, he placates it by pretending to remain a philosopher. Instead of pursuing the job of the true philosopher, which consists in strengthening and meeting the need for truth, he thus offers the

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world an image of the sophist, of someone who only flatters its tastes and preferences. Thus, this accusation expresses – first of all – the call to make the ideal of philosophy present in the world once again, to make it remain in the world; in other words, to make the “ideal” represented by philosophers “reach the pavement”... To sum up: the young woman expresses the world’s opinion that there are sophists everywhere, yet one cannot see a philosopher; we are waiting for them to return...

However, the fact that the girl has not yet met a philosopher does not mean that there are none in the world. Still, the accusation inherent in her statement makes us reflect on this situation and draw the right conclusions. I have two of them, and I would like all of us to give them careful, though critical consideration. The very fact that we can be accused of betraying philosophy may sadden us. Is it not a real drama not to have withstood the test in one’s own vocation? Yet, a deeper look into the reason for having made such an accusation against philosophers raises a hope, or even a certain optimism... While accusing philosophers of betraying their profession, the world still remains hungry for philosophy, it is still waiting for philosophy, and it even sees philosophy as the way to regain its true identity. And though it is the world that keeps praising sophists who offer it imitations of freedom at reduced prices in place of philosophy, and promises of hope disguised in imitations of truth; though it is the world enslaved by its own confusion, that will condemn to death philosophers who are troubadours of difficult truths and of good that places demands upon us, as it condemned Socrates in Athens for having disrupted its peaceful existence; this very same world will in time discover that it has let itself be lured on by appearances of truth and freedom, and that it has been killing its prophets in the name of these delusions. Then it will be able to distinguish between a sophist and a philosopher. It will stop following the sophist and start waiting for another return of the philosopher, which may, or even must mean to us that the world is waiting for our conversion...

A philosopher is usually expected to be a disciple of what he can teach quite well, of that which he has mastered. One could even suppose that the young woman in Dallas, who accused philosophers of betraying philosophy, was able to make this accusation because, through their lectures, she was able to grasp the universal significance of the essence of philosophical teaching. The philosophers she encountered may have lacked this “something more” – a testimony, a philosophical argument *par excellence* – which in a way constitutes the final justification for all the demonstrated – and otherwise important – foundations of what they, as philosophers, proclaim.

Let me add something more to the argument concerning testimony. Let us assume the optimum conditions in which, as philosophers, we possess all the didactic abilities of the master Socrates. Let us further assume that the group of our disciples comprises only men of that genius which distinguished Plato

among Socrates' disciples. Even if our assumption were true, which is rather improbable, we must not forget one thing: even Plato himself, having such a master, was able to understand what Socrates – as a philosophy teacher – had been trying to hand down to him only at the moment when Socrates' refused the offer to help him escape from prison in order to regain freedom. Plato was able to grasp the essence of freedom only when Socrates revealed it to him in his decision to stay in prison, when he could have freely left it and chosen the freedom outside. He would remain free only if he remained faithful to the truth, because of his love for it, but also because of his love for all those people towards whom he felt the obligation to testify to truth, including those who had put him in prison because of this testimony, and who were going to kill him. Thus, the price of freedom, which proved to be the fruit of faithful love of truth and of truthful love of people, is not only the readiness to give one's life for truth, but also the readiness to be rejected by those to whom, because of his love for them and for the truth, one reveals it. A philosopher appreciates being popular; after all, the reason why he teaches is that he wants his ideas to be accepted, and that he would like himself to be accepted together with them. Yet, he is ready to abandon his popularity whenever it turns out to be opposed to the love of truth, or to the truthful love of people. His ultimate readiness for physical death at the hands of the people, as well as the readiness for death in the eyes of their opinion prove to be the features constitutive for a philosopher. It is only by these features that he can be identified as a philosopher.

Plato, Socrates' disciple of exceptional talent, was able to grasp all of this only on his way home on that memorable night after he had visited Socrates in prison for the last time, and when he had left him there, lonely and awaiting execution, wholly because of his love for truth and for people. There would be no Plato today, neither would there be his Academy with the motto "*diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus*," if it had not been for this testimony of the Philosopher. And despite his disciple's rare genius and his own didactic talent, Socrates, Plato's prodigious master, probably would not have been able to assist at Plato's moral birth, or to teach him what constitutes the *unum necessarium*, by any means other than this testimony. Had it not been for this testimony, Socrates would not have been able to teach Plato that which constitutes the very core of ethics and anthropology; namely, that man fulfills himself and attains his freedom always and only by his love for truth and for man – the one who can find and fulfil himself only by the identification of this self – in an act of free choice – with the truth which he has grasped. To put it briefly, man attains self-fulfillment and freedom through the love of truth.

So, even if they do not have disciples as intelligent as Plato, and even if they themselves are not as masterful at teaching philosophy as was Socrates, cannot contemporary philosophers, despite all this, be philosophers? It seems

that they can if only they have enough courage to reach for the argument which is most important for any philosopher – for the argument of testimony. And it is for this argument, above all, that the contemporary world, with its representatives – such as the young woman in Dallas – is waiting. Maybe we really need to treat her accusation as an appeal on behalf of the whole world, directed to us all, as an appeal for honest self-examination. Unpopularity and the possibility of being condemned to banishment, or to death by absence among the living while still alive, probably remain constant points of reference in the philosopher's self-examination. During the celebration at Pamplona University in which the Faculty of Philosophy conferred the title *doctor honoris causa* title on Robert Spaemann, he joked: "Have I become a sophist if the world approves of me by conferring on me the *doctor honoris causa* title while I am still alive?," and then added "A philosopher should end his life the way Socrates did, and bear fruit by his death." A Polish poet, C.K. Norwid, expresses this truth in the famous verses: "What have you done to Athens, Socrates,/ That the people make a gold statue to you,/ having poisoned you before?..."

Jan Sieg, SJ

It is a nice surprise for me that despite the philosophical character of our symposium, there has also appeared in Fr. Salij's lecture, a topic referring to the Person of Christ. If we keep separating philosophy from theology, we will never be able to grasp the whole truth. I am positive that this is the reason why we have been so weak while facing the world. Whenever we act as mere philosophers, we are vulnerable in many respects. But when we speak as Christian philosophers, we present not only new ideas, but also the perspective of Grace. Therefore I am very content to see the union of philosophy and theology here.

Now, I would like to make a remark concerning the first lecture. Truth is the correspondence between idea and reality (*adequatio mentis et rei*). Yet, I must stress that it does not suffice to speak about the human idea, since all truth is first in God. As His Father's idea, Christ is the truth; as the *Verbum*, He is the first truth which is God. Everything has been created in God, and human nature was first thought of by God. The very first problem concerning *adequatio* is the *adequatio* of human nature and God's idea. When we have a closer look at the contemporary world, we cannot help asking the question whether the human race is in correspondence with God's idea today; whether it corresponds to God's idea embodied in Jesus Christ, and not just to the human idea. *Gaudium et spes*, the Constitution of the Second Vatican Council, addresses today's world, but every one of its chapters concludes with a christological vision. The Council has been speaking to the world from the christological perspective. And therefore, if we are talking about truth today,

we must not forget to ask about the *adequatio* of the world of today's man to God's idea of man, which can be seen in Jesus Christ.

To conclude, I must repeat that I am very pleased with the programme of this session – both with its philosophical and theological dimension.

Wolfgang Waldstein

With reference to what we have heard, I think it would be worthwhile to distinguish between two historical phases which have been crucial for the origins of Europe. The first one concerns pre-Christian times, when man stood in the attitude of advent, of openness to God and truth, and to what he was able to grasp by his unaided powers. In *Dei verbum*, the dogmatic Constitution on God's Revelation, the Second Vatican Council stresses that man was generously lavished with the power of cognition, and that, with the power of his reason, he can correctly get to know God from his creation. This is absolutely true about the times before the Christian Revelation, about the cognitive efforts of Greek philosophy, about its Roman continuation, and above all, about Roman law. However, the situation changed diametrically after the Revelation. One could say that now, people no longer have any justification for rejecting the truth revealed to them by God Himself. However, the truths grasped before do remain valid. While reading the encyclical *Veritatis splendor* I recognize many ideas which can already be found in Cicero. Truth is independent of time, and always remains valid. In my opinion, a revival of all the diversity of the truths grasped is crucial to the future of Europe, and I think that the encyclical *Veritatis splendor* is a document addressed to the future of the twentieth century. Why is this so? Because truth is often rejected today, because people have grown blind to it, and many contemporary teachers, many theologians, are no longer able to comprehend this encyclical. This situation calls for a radical change, and with God's help people must become open to truth again, and if they do so, they will also be able to understand the encyclical.

Alphons Horten

I would like to make a statement concerning a different matter. Unlike the Rev. Fr. Styczeń, I think that the Karlsruhe judges reached a very bold decision, which can be seen if we consider the context in which they were acting. There was no "*jein*" – ["yes-no"]. If, for whole decades, the existing law had not been enforced, it could be declared – at best – that a given act is a violation of the law; yet the court could not be ordered to declare this violation liable to penalty. Such has been the political practice in the "post-Christian" era.

Having a close look at the *De regimine principum* by St. Thomas Aquinas, you can see that the author gives the prince freedom of choice of the lesser

evil. Anyone in the position of the prince whom St. Thomas counsels must – in his decisions – take into consideration conditions other than the ones taken into account by someone who considers matters purely theoretically and sets principles.

I honestly find the verdict reached by the Constitutional Tribunal in Karlsruhe, which proclaims abortion as a violation of the law, to be a particularly courageous decision. Though we do consider abortion as a violation of the law, the general condition of public life is such that we cannot prescribe the court to penalize abortion.

However, it is interesting that, as the press has made it known, the pronouncement of “violation of the law” has exerted a substantial influence on public opinion in the new German states.

Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS

I wish to address Mr. A. Horten’s critical comments on my remark about the declaration of the Karlsruhe Tribunal. I should have better developed the idea which I briefly expressed as a proposal to invite the Karlsruhe Constitutional Tribunal to call for the reaction of one of the very first be affected by their declaration. I was rather doubtful whether the unborn would express their gratitude to the judges, whether they would say “Thank you.” While listening carefully to Mr. Horten’s statement I was hoping, thinking already of this invitation, to hear some kind of reference to it, and I was interested in the other possible reactions which he would propose for consideration. Who should call on whom? I was anxious to hear such a statement, which in my opinion is so telling. However, I did not hear it. This is a pity. For it is only in the dialogue with the unborn on the subject which concerns them so deeply that we can learn what is necessary for the legal and ethical regulation of their case, what is necessary so that the law would remain law, so that it would not turn into a “*corruptio legis*.”

Mr. Horten mentioned different circles of the addressees of this declaration, yet he took no stance towards my suggestion, presented already in the opening speech, to call on the unborn first of all, and to talk to them on this matter which is indeed a matter of life or death. After all, this issue concerns them primarily. What would they say to the Karlsruhe judges? Thank you?

Mr. Horten was speaking about the necessity of taking into consideration contemporary German public opinion, which is not used to respecting the life of the unborn, and which the Tribunal could not ignore. But why should a judge make himself dependent on anyone, if his role is to be dependent on nobody and on nothing, other than that which is due to one man from another in the name of the truth about himself? This truth is that of the *suum cuique, suum vel ius sive iustum*. Why should the judges be obliged to such an extent

to take into consideration the “post-Christian mentality” of public opinion, if the matter at stake concerns man as man, regardless of any epoch or time, and therefore because it is timeless? Has Socrates’ “pre-Christian” adage “More fortunate is the victim of a wrong than the wrongdoer” lost any of its accuracy today? Why did the judges have to take public opinion so much into consideration if the point is that they should be shaping it without any servile flattering of it, the task of the court is not consideration of public opinion, but the passing of verdicts which respect the principles of justice absolutely.

So, I am asking: what, according to those judges, and also according to Mr. Horten, does the principle of the independence of the court consist of in the context of the verdict given by the Constitutional Tribunal in Karlsruhe? Is the Tribunal really unable to render a verdict which would respect the equality of all people in front of the law, as such a Tribunal, if its faithful advocacy of what is just were in fact be rejected by the people of a “post-Christian” mentality? For what, then, does the Tribunal exist? Does it still remain itself, and is it at all helpful when bowing and scraping to public opinion and to circumstances, “*unter Umständen*,” as Mr. Horten has put it? Does the argument by which Mr. Horten would like to defend the judges, namely that public opinion has to be taken into consideration, have enough validity, if their task is to defend man solely because he is man, regardless of all historical or cultural circumstances? What is the point of stressing “*unter diesen Umständen*” here, while the matter in question absolutely excludes any haggling, any “in such circumstances,” because those whom it concerns are humans, not things, because the problem of man and his life is betrayed the moment we let the idea of any compromise, or bargaining about it, enter our heads?

So, I am asking right now if there is sufficient reason for passing a verdict which does not respect the principle of justice in the possibility, or probability, that it would be rejected – together with the Tribunal – by the people? Would not such a rejection provide the grounds for taking pride in the Tribunal’s work? Is not refraining from the verdict and following the opinion of a morally corrupt society a renunciation of the only chance of giving this society a “shock treatment”? What would the pre-Christian Socrates say to the “carefulness” of their arguments were he to sit among the judges of the Constitutional Court? Would he woo public opinion and the tastes of the voters-to-be at the cost of the lives of innocent human beings?

Finally, there was a suggestion to call on St. Thomas, as the author of the small book, *De regimine principum*. I would like to put aside the fact that in this very matter such a suggestion is totally out of place. Yet, even if – *dato non concessio* – St. Thomas should allow any compromise in the question of killing the unborn, what would we hear from the Teacher who reprimanded not only the Pharisees, but also Moses, for having bowed to the opinion of the headstrong in the question of divorce. There are matters which exclude

a possibility of compromise, even if compromise has been practiced for whole centuries. Among them lies the protection of the unborn from any attempt on their lives made by the lawmaker who, instead of defending them, collaborates with the very perpetrator of this crime.

This is the matter standing at the top of the list of those which are not subject to compromise. Submission here would mean the destruction of everything else. All the things mentioned by Mr. Horten are probably important variables of the problem, yet these variables cannot change the essence of the evil of murder committed on innocent human beings with the assent of the law. Therefore, having estimated all the parameters at their proper value, we must consider them from the point of view of the ones who are the main, or even more, the very first addressees of the Tribunal's declaration, as they are the ones primarily interested in its fundamental essence. They are the ones who, having received no legal support, are to lose their lives due to the Tribunal's recognition that the act of killing any of them is exempt from punishment. It is the Tribunal itself that will take the responsibility for their deaths. The Tribunal will finally be called to account for the way it has carried out its duties, and not for the words it has spoken, since preaching is not the job of the Tribunal, but of preachers and moralists. The unborn are the ones who will die, killed by the aggressor, left abandoned during this attempt on their lives. Therefore, the main addressee of the Tribunal's declaration is the *nasciturus-moriturus*. And thus, only his opinion has the value of being decisive in the evaluation of the verdict given. Are the unborn – by means of this legal verdict – legally protected? Let them give the answer. And let the judges who are to decide whether the law is the law, or only an appearance of the law, listen to this answer. *Caveant consules...*

This is why I reiterate my invitation directed to the authors of the verdict “*rechtswidrig/straffrei*,” and maybe to Mr. Horten as well, to face the ones who will die helpless, without any support on our part, due this declaration. By the way, we must feel the consequence of the present moment, we must feel the importance of this hour, and of our personal responsibility for it. If we support – here and now, during the symposium “Europe – to be or not to be,” held at the Catholic University of Lublin – the Karlsruhe formula “*rechtswidrig/straffrei*,” if we use such a tool as the performative function of language, we publicly perform the act of condemning the unborn here in Europe, that is, of depriving their lives of any legal protection. Thus, we also become guilty of their death, because of our participation in this concrete act on the part of the European Legislator and the Highest Supreme Judge (*Bundestag* and the Constitutional Tribunal in Karlsruhe) who corrupt the law by collaboration with the perpetrator of a crime, and who protects the perpetrator from any consequences of the act of killing innocent victims by giving the victims no shield, except

for an attempt to persuade them that the perpetrator's action, in which the Tribunal as a lawmaker participates, is a violation of the law.

Here in Lublin we have been trying to defend the victims, as well as the name of the law, by means of persuasion. We appeal to the Karlsruhe Tribunal to visit one of the unborn. We believe in the diagnostic power of such a visit to one over whom hangs the death sentence. Such a visit may bring a flash of light. We therefore recall here Plato's night visit to Socrates. I cherish the hope that a flash of sudden revelation awaits the authors of the Karlsruhe declaration during their visit to one of the unborn – to one of those condemned to death. Thus, I appeal for a little courage and a little imagination to be able to pay such a visit. And let us imagine this visit from the perspective of the *nasciturus-moriturus* himself, who is waiting in his mother's womb for the execution of the death sentence already passed. He – our *nasciturus-moriturus* – receives some particularly good news. In a moment he will have an unusual visit. The representatives of the state, who are responsible for his well-being, are coming to see him. And the matter concerns his most fundamental good: his life. Every human being is who he or she is if he or she is alive. To make an attempt on someone's life means to make an attempt on this person. They know it well in Karlsruhe. There exists an appropriate regulation in the Constitution. It guarantees everyone the inviolability of their life, together with equality in front of the law. It is they, the supreme judges, who pass verdicts in light of the truth about the human dignity proper to every individual person, and who are guided by no other opinion than by this truth, are coming especially to him or to her, with a specially prepared message, in the exercise of their office. They will visit him in person, as the representatives of the Supreme Arm of the Law in Germany – all the celebrities of the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court will come to him to announce the result of their work on the verdict concerning the legal regulation which allows for his unpunished murder, passed by a majority of votes in the *Bundestag*, and appealed by the parliamentary minority. And now, the verdict specially prepared for him will be announced. And the verdict is: "*rechtswidrig/straffrei.*"

Let me express one variant of an unborn child's possible reply: "Gentlemen! No moral objection can be raised against you. You cannot be accused of betrayal, of having betrayed me, or the institution of law. The reason is that one who is unable to see what constitutes the necessary condition of any rational discourse among people does not know what he or she is doing. This is all I have to say to you before I die. And let it be my gift for you, for the rest of the life which remains to you."

I consider it my duty, not the duty of a philosopher, but simply the duty of a human being, to support the unborn in the name of interhuman solidarity – to support them as victims of the greatest wrong that the strong can do against those who are totally helpless and completely innocent, citing as their warrant

the majesty of the law and the state. I must support the unborn, tell the whole world about their plight, try to amplify the “silent scream” of man, of the *nasciturus-moriturus*, who was ordered – from the pedestal of the supreme seat which decides upon the validity of the law – to die, and given no kind of help. He would not be able to say: “Thank you for your help” without putting into question not only his own dignity, but also the human dignity of those who come to announce to him the verdict passed on his case. He has no cause for gratitude not only because he has not received the assistance due to him from the court of justice, but also because he is addressed in a language which brings discredit to the rationality of the ones who dare use it. The reason is that the one who is capable of accepting a principle which includes both “yes” and “no” cannot be taken seriously as a partner in a rational discourse. Such discourse assumes respect for the principle of non-contradiction as its necessary condition. If, despite the visit, the Tribunal claimed to have done its best in those circumstances – because of the state of public mentality – to rescue the life of the *nasciturus-moriturus*, its members can now return home to reflect on their merits in saving the lives of the unborn. The very unborn are no longer interested in the false help of the arm of the Law. Among moralists and preachers they will find advocates better than the supreme judges of Karlsruhe.

Would there be any other reason for the visit paid to one of the unborn by the persons who have introduced themselves as advocates of the Constitutional Tribunal, if the dialogue between the partners proves to be totally impossible because of the lack of logic on one side?

While trying to listen intently to the wordless scream of the unborn, I could not hear a “thank you” (would the formula: “thank you for hurrying to help me at the moment of the attempt on my life with your verdict: *rechtswidrig/straffrei*” – not be a great irony?) Thus, I have considered it my duty to take up action on behalf of the ones who, apart from the silent scream already visible through the eye of the camera, are left with nothing but the weapon of the truth that they are human beings. Who will put this truth into words for them, if the Independent Tribunal made its verdict dependent on public opinion instead of turning people to the truth that man is human and, as such, has an absolute right to have his life protected, whatever the circumstances.

On this occasion, I recall a voice from nearly a century ago, a voice which Hannah Arendt refers to in *The Origin of Totalitarianism*. “*J'accuse!*” “I Accuse!” It was the voice coming from beyond the body which acted on behalf of the French state, from outside of the government responsible for the injustice committed against citizen Dreyfuss in order to satisfy the French people, suffering from their own racial hatred. Only the novelist Emil Zola hurried to rescue the honour of the French Republic, throwing “*J'accuse!*” in the faces of public opinion and the French legal organs, which were consumed with antisemitism.

Are we not exceeding all the possible stages of our own disgrace and of the profanation of the most laudable achievements of political culture – which indeed state and law are for the human community understood as *res publica*, as the brotherhood of all people committed to the good of every individual, without exception – if the “*rechtswidrig/straffrei*” declared by these institutions is their only declaration addressed to the innocent whose lives are threatened? Have we not sunk as low as is possible, if this is all that today’s moral and political organs of final appeal against injustice are able to do for them?

This is why I stand by the unborn, and I am calling from Lublin to the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe on their behalf: “I Accuse!”

However, all of us, particularly philosophers, are called today to speak about how to protect mankind from this unprecedented disgrace, and also from the attempt to hide this disgrace from ourselves, which is also unprecedented – we are called to speak about how to prevent this disgrace which continues to grow as those who bring it about are trying to disguise it with the appearance of virtue.

Rocco Buttiglione

First of all, I ask myself a question about the mutual relation between the two lectures. Fr. Salij pointed to Pascal. Pascal tells us that our God is not the God of philosophers. Philosophers will never be able to get to know this God. This is where an enormous tension between philosophy and theology appears. More in the spirit of Malebranche, Prof. Seifert tends to say that the God of philosophers is, or may be, simultaneously the God of the Christians; that there is no contradiction between the God of Plato and the God of Jesus Christ.

As an Italian, I started my academic career with the history of Greek philosophy, so let me ask a historical question: where – from the historical point of view – does the contradiction start? What did Pascal have in mind when he distinguished and set the God of philosophers against the God of Christians?

I have the impression that Pascal meant the God of his own interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy. According to this interpretation, Cartesian philosophy deals exclusively with the notions of extension and pure idea – one extreme being the pure idea (*res cogitans*), and the other one – pure extension (*res extensa*). What does this philosophy lack? It lacks an existential synthesis, namely the person. I think that when he speaks about the God of philosophers, he means the God who is the object of the mere *esprit de géométrie*. The *esprit de géométrie* is the faculty of direct inference of conclusions from premisses. However, if you want to comprehend the human world, the *esprit de géométrie* turns out not to be useful. Why is this so? Because the problem of what is human cannot be exhausted in our being able to link premisses with conclusions in a logical way. Though mere logic would suffice in order to establish

these relations, there are too many premisses to take all of them into account. We have too many pieces of information. The world of geometry is a simple one. The human world is much richer. Already Pascal formulated a theory of a surplus of information which actually destroys itself. If we have too many pieces of information, we turn out to have no information at all. And here, the *esprit de finesse* appears. Its role is to discern principles and provide us with relevant premisses, since there are many things which appear the same but are totally different. However, according to Pascal, this is not philosophy. Philosophy remains limited within the domain of *esprit de géométrie*. When Josef Seifert speaks about philosophy, this philosophy is a phenomenological one, i.e. it starts with making accurate distinctions, and thus its domain spreads into the domain of what is human, so that in the end it is possible to create the philosophy of the person. Pascal considered that such a philosophy could be created only through a close union with theology, and he actually saw it as part of theology. Therefore, while considering the relation between theology and philosophy, we must remember the difference between these two philosophies – the philosophy which does not, and which cannot, consider the person, and the one which ultimately considers itself personology. Is the latter philosophy possible without the person of Christ? There have been attempts at creating such a philosophy which seem independent of the person of Christ, and yet which are dependent on Him, at least as *semina verbi*. However, as far as the existential dimension is concerned, the philosophy of person was discovered within theology.

Later, this union was understood much better than in Pascal. In our considerations, we start with philosophy which, while remaining itself, simultaneously preserves its existential relation with the Christian faith.

Jarostaw Merecki, SDS

My remarks will concern the lecture delivered by Prof. Fr. J. Salij. Fr. Salij characterized modernity as the period of gradual departure from Christ, so according to his words, we could say that today we are, in a way, living in the post-Christian times. It would then be possible to express the most significant characteristic of modernity by means of the imperative “Let us depart from Christ.” This statement does reflect an aspect of the complex spiritual process of the origin and development of the phenomenon called modernity. However, it is worth pointing here to another – in a sense opposite – aspect of this phenomenon. A great Italian philosopher, Augusto Del Noce, once said that in the very centre of the problem of modernity is the person of Christ. Modern man often rejects Christ in the dimension of His divinity; to be more general, he rejects the existence of any supernatural reality. However, the longing for salvation remains in him. It is the longing for “something totally different” (“*Die*

Sehnsucht nach dem ganz anderen"), to use Horkheimer's words. All the great philosophies of modernity, particularly Marxism, have been trying to replace transcendent salvation with an immanent one taking place within this world. Today, after the collapse of Marxism, we know that the attempt to replace the "Kingdom of God" with the "kingdom of man" was a failure. So, we are on the threshold of a new epoch. Modern man may completely give up his yearning for "something totally different" and eradicate the thirst for salvation from his heart (the phenomenon of the so-called post-modernism seems to point to such an evolution). However, the unsuccessful attempt at salvation within the worldly dimension may have made contemporary man more open to the offer made by Christianity (all the more so since the religious motive has always been present in modern culture, not just the non-religious one). Thus, Christianity may be facing a particular challenge today. And here is my question: how would you describe the spiritual condition of today's Europe in this respect: Can we say – and if so, in what sense – that this is the "post-Christian" Europe?

Josef Seifert

To begin with, I would like to refer to the remarks concerning the relation between the lectures delivered by Fr. Salij and myself; and speaking generally, I will take into consideration the relation between the faith, Christianity and philosophy, also taking Pascal's views into account.

Firstly, I would say that mere philosophy, or philosophical cognition of truth, is independent in the sense that it has its own rationality, and that virtually everyone is able to grasp certain truths; but also in the sense that philosophy, or natural pre-theoretical cognition is a condition of religious faith. The principle *fides presupponit rationem* is as important here as *gratia supponit naturam*. One can say that the very basic notions, such as God, man, salvation, sin, conscience, judgement, justice, humility, would not be understood, nor would the revealing of them be accepted, were man not in possession of the light of reason – of cognition – which enables him to accept them. In this sense, I find fideism, which considers philosophy an extension of religious faith, totally unjustified. It seems unjustified also from the historical point of view: in my opinion, Cicero, quoted here already by Prof. Waldstein, was able to know natural law, just as Hippocrates was able to know medical ethics, so if our society decided to shape its law or ethical notions according to this knowledge, the Christians would surely be delighted.

Secondly, I am convinced – as is Fr. Salij – that Christians have gained not only a new understanding of what was already grasped with the help of reason, but also a totally new truth, together with a further knowledge of the truth about God and man. Thus – also according to the words of Pascal and John

Paul II – it is really possible to grasp this new dimension of man. And I think that what Fr. Salij presented in his lecture as the new centre of being is closely related to what was also aptly expressed by Scheler – that the novelty of Christian Revelation consists in the reversed direction of love. During the whole period of antiquity God was considered as the supreme object of love; however, it was thought impossible, as Plato put it, that the most perfect Being should love not itself, but man. Thus, the dimension of the truth about God and man of which the philosopher could only have a vague intuition is the truth that God first loved man, that the Supreme Holiness not only loves sinners, but also loves them enough to have sent His Son to this earth and to deliver Him up to the dread of crucifixion. And it is also in this sense – as Scheler stresses in his philosophy of religion – that these truths could not be grasped in their essence by man himself, since they presuppose some divine action. They cannot be deduced from evident philosophical data since they are not necessary, geometrical conclusions, but proceed from the free will of the Saviour. And I find it dangerous when philosophy tries – as in Hegel – to interpret the truths of religious faith in an almost geometrical, or purely philosophical mode.

And thirdly, I would like to stress that from the historical point of view, Revelation has a very positive influence on philosophy. Truths which can, in principle, be grasped by human reason have become more intelligible, thanks to Revelation. The most beautiful explanation of why these truths were also revealed was, in my opinion, given by St. Thomas. He shows first of all that Revelation made it possible for everyone, not only for the few, to grasp these truths. Then he adds that due to Revelation, these truths will not have to be grasped as a result of philosophical effort, which sometimes takes many years, but will be known immediately and unmistakably. In my opinion, philosophy of the person, philosophy of man, equality of all people, the injustice of slavery, emancipation of women, as well as many other things which today are considered as obvious, were in fact discovered due to the positive influence of Revelation.

As far as the Karlsruhe declaration is concerned, I also find the verdict passed by the Constitutional Tribunal a substantial step forward, unlike in the USA, where – on the plea of the right of the freedom of conscience – abortion was declared legal. So, the Karlsruhe declaration does seem to me to have been an important step that cannot be compared with the verdict officially stating that the right to live does not belong to everyone.

However – and here I would agree with Fr. Styczeń – it seems to me that the statement which recognizes that the unborn also have the fundamental right to life guaranteed by the constitution, and which simultaneously states that the violation of this right will be exempt from punishment, comprises an internal contradiction. If it is said that the one who violates the law cannot be punished, and should only be sent for consultation, then – it seems to me – it is an-

nounced that his act was not a crime. If rape is considered a crime, that is, if the state recognizes the woman's right to preserve her sexual integrity, and if someone perpetrates rape on her and does not get punished but only sent for consultation, then such a verdict implicitly sanctions the violation of this fundamental human right. Thus, such a verdict is deeply illogical, because if something is a fundamental human right, its protection is the first obligation of the state.

Alphons Horten

I am still not convinced. The relevant legal regulation cannot be always enforced in the given circumstances. This is the point. The Karlsruhe judge must have known that it was implausible to restore punishment for violation of a law which had not been enforced for so many years. What is more, there were five judges on the Tribunal, so the Catholic one did not decide by himself – a majority vote was obtained, one could say, thanks to a compromise. And in these days it would be impossible to achieve even that. The case of the Karlsruhe declaration is analogous to the one of the prince about whom St. Thomas writes. Aquinas does not approve of indecency, yet he says that the prince cannot prevent it. In the given circumstances, he is not to renounce his respect for a principle, but to choose the lesser evil (*minus malum*). This difference turns out to be decisive. Should then the Catholic judge have clung to his beliefs, and should he have taken responsibility for the Tribunal's having taken no decision at all, or should he rather have said "Let us make this compromise with others." We must not forget, after all, that this compromise not only turned out to be a great achievement, but also provoked numerous protests after the verdict had been announced. Anyway, apart from that, nothing else could be changed. This is what St. Thomas tells the prince: you cannot change anything. In my opinion a real problem is exemplified here; it is by no means merely a legal problem, but the problem of the judge who must decide in accordance with his conscience, just as the prince had to. They must both face the law.

Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS

We must nevertheless remember and distinguish one thing: a verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal is to qualify directly a legal regulation or law-making parliamentary act. The legal act in this case was appealed by a parliamentary minority as an act legalizing lawlessness. This lawlessness consists in the law-maker's depriving the one who is being killed of any protection, and in providing protection for the murderer from any legal consequences. Thus, the question here concerns legal protection (*lex*) of an essential and fundamental

human right (*ius*). What the Tribunal directly qualified was a Parliamentary law-making act, and not the actual act of having committed murder, the latter being qualified only indirectly. The role of a judge on the Constitutional Tribunal must be distinguished from the role of a judge who is to decide on the verdict and punishment according to law existing in a jurisprudential state. I do not object to the judge's being magnanimous while applying the law (while deciding on the delinquent's ability in body and mind), assessing the degree of criminality and deciding upon the punishment. In some circumstances the judge may, or even should, renounce inflicting a punishment for killing one unborn, yet the very act should remain punishable in the legal sense. The controversy has been provoked by the law-maker's declaration that the act of killing the unborn is not to be punishable, and as such it will remain... unpunished. There is no doubt that a judge can desist from inflicting a punishment for a legally penal act. However, if a law-maker promulgates impunity for the act of killing the unborn, and simultaneously declares that such an act is a violation of the law, then he arbitrarily dismisses himself from the duty which constitutes his identity as the law-maker in a jurisprudential state. He pretends to have adopted the role of a moralist or a preacher, and deceives public opinion as to the essence of his mission and responsibility in a jurisprudential state. He makes a false impression that he does care about the common good, whereas he collaborates with the criminal in violating this good.

In this context, I suggest that we should stop using the term "lesser evil" or "*minus malum*," which has become encumbered with so much ambiguity, and start talking about the unsurpassable limits of compromise. It is certainly clear that we must accept having a finger cut off, if this is the only way to save the hand. Here, it is possible to say that a lesser evil must be allowed so that a bigger one should be prevented. We should rescue a whole by sacrificing a part. However, this way of thinking by means of categories: a part of a whole, a whole, must not be used in relation to persons, as a person is not a part of the society in the way a hand is a part of the body, or a tree is a part of a forest. A human being is an absolute good in him or herself, and this is so regardless of whether he or she is a part of a whole. The reduction of the person to a part of a whole means departure from the ethical and legal personalistic attitude, and it signifies we have reached the level of utilitarianism where the human person is treated as an element of a collective. The notion of the lesser evil, of the *minus malum*, means – on the basis of utilitarianism – that people can be counted in the same way as things: how many for how many. This one will be killed, though he is innocent, since assent to this murder will save the rest. Thus, we depart here from the level of ethics (*non sunt facienda mala ut eveniant bona*), and we take up the position which is contemporarily called proportionalism. The United Nations Conference on "Population and Development," which is to be held in Cairo, has already become the arena

in which these two attitudes or tendencies will engage in a confrontation. One of them can be expressed by the idea that the lives of some people must be taken in order to protect the lives of others (whose life for whom?). The other has an authentically ethical character and declares that no one can be killed in any circumstances in order to protect the life of another. The *minus malum* category cannot be used if we are confronted with something that is intrinsically evil (*malum necessarium*) – the attempt to justify it morally, through comparing it with another evil, turns out to be a fallacy (*ignorantia elenchi*). Caiphas' argument would still remain ethically invalid, even if the whole nation had been saved from destruction by putting the Innocent to death.

Alphons Horten

The principle of *minus malum* states that in practice nothing better can be done.

Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS

It is necessary to know where the principle of *minus malum* can, and even should, be applied, and distinguish it from instances in which any attempt to use it is an ethical absurdity. A surgeon is not only allowed, but even supposed to cut off a patient's finger if this is the only way to save his hand. Raskolnikov must not kill the old woman, who may well die on her sack full of gold the next day, even if – by killing the old woman and saving himself from starving to death – Raskolnikov will save for society his own unusual, personal talent. And it would remain true even if, by this murder, he were to save the whole of Russia from unavoidable catastrophe.

Alphons Horten

Fr. Styczeń has agreed that the alternative to the compromise is an even worse law, in which there would appear no open contradiction. And this is exactly the law which the Christian judge opposed.

Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS

It is an obligation of the lawmaker to give protection to the victim of an expected murder in the form of a relevant legal regulation which will defend him, or her, from the perpetrator's fatal blow, and which would – at the same time – protect the very perpetrator from the morally suicidal blow. If the lawgiver does not perform this elementary duty, all his further rhetoric is a mere mocking of the victim. Thus, all the worse for the lawmaker if he hides his essential yet unfulfilled obligation towards the victim behind the rhetoric of the Christian

paraenesis in order to achieve his aim. It even looks like a mockery of Christianity, if you have in mind the words: “whenever you refused to help one of these least important ones, you refused to help me. Get away from me, I never knew you!” and if you note that this warning comes from Jesus Christ, God most compassionate in human form. The lawmaker’s obligation is to actively protect the victim of murder, and not merely announce that the attempt on his, or her, life is a wrong. By taking no legal action against attempted murder, and by only declaring that the murder is a wrong to the victim, the lawmakers are making a rod for their own backs, as their inaction will bring condemnation upon them. They pass a verdict upon themselves. They themselves have done nothing where it was absolutely necessary to take up action in order to protect the victims of violence from lawlessness. The law-makers disclose that they have entered upon the slippery way of cooperation with the perpetrator. Thus, I would not advise taking the trouble of defending them, and, at any rate, there is no chance of exculpating them.

Yes, you are right, and I take full responsibility for what you suggest: it would be even better – not worse at all – for the law and for the law-makers – if they did not disguise with stylistic rhetoric the fact that they are not doing what they, as law-makers, absolutely must do for the victims. They should not adopt expressions belonging to preaching, when they have not fulfilled the duty of defending the victims of an extreme wrong. We do not have to do with a worse law here, but with the lack of any law, and thus with a *peccatum omissionis* – with having reneged upon an action fundamentally due on the part of the law-makers, which is difficult to explain or to justify.

If it does not even occur to the law-makers that they are allowed not to provide legal and penal protection against the act of stealing such a good thing as a car, which it is totally possible to live without, how can they consistently justify having abandoned legal and penal protection of the good which absolutely no one can live without, namely of the good of life. Thus, if the law-makers do not want to undermine the basis of their own existence as law-makers, they must choose: either to provide absolute legal and penal protection of the life of the unborn, as fundamental good belonging to every human person, or to give up legal and penal protection of any other good belonging to man, and thus to erase the whole penal code. *Tertium non datur nisi tertium confusionis*. This is the confusion which confronts us here. It can be characterized either by means of Duns Scotus’ law, which I have just mentioned, or with the help of the infamous German “*jein*.” The choice between these two is a matter of taste.

Let us return to the imagined visit to the cell of the condemned. The *nasciturus* is the condemned, and the cell is the place which so far has been the safest one for man – his mother’s womb. Despite everything, the *nasciturus* is the *nasciturus-moriturus* now. The law-makers know it. And everything that they have to offer to the one threatened with death is reduced to nothing at all

– while they remain law-makers! – reduced to the act of telling him there – in that cell – that the one who will take his life will perform an act of wrong, an act of lawlessness against him. Can you not hear the answer now: “But haven’t you introduced yourselves as advocates of the Tribunal? Have I been mistaken? Or maybe you are children who have disguised themselves in the law-makers’ or judges’ gowns? If so, go back to school so that they can explain you your task, the role of the law-maker in a jurisprudent state, the role of the Tribunal judge. And then come to visit me. I am looking forward to it. My life depends on your having understood these roles, and on your having taken their meaning into account. I am waiting. You will save yourselves if you save me. I am waiting. There is not much time left. So, hurry up so that you can manage to come before I am murdered. And before you die. I am waiting.”

Wolfgang Waldstein

I cannot go into details of the Karlsruhe verdict, this matter would require more time. I totally share Fr. Styczeń’s point of view, and I agree that we deal here with one of the most important problems of our times. The inconsistency of the Karlsruhe verdict was certainly conditioned by the actual state of affairs. The verdict in question not only proclaims that killing unborn babies is violation of the law, but it also states clearly that the state may abandon penalization in order to defend this law. This compromise was the only chance to arrive at any decision. Nevertheless, I must say that the decision not to penalize is contradictory to the Tribunal’s own verdict. So, I think that in this sense we can justifiably state that finally there did emerge a “*jein*.”

The fact that nothing more was possible is the objective reality. However, I think that it is also worth noting the initiative taken up in the *Bundestag* (though I do not know anything about its chances of being passed) to introduce another amendment, if the Tribunal had not excluded its possibility. The Tribunal, so to say, proposed another option, but it can be clearly and immediately seen what was done to this proposal. The new bill proposed for ratification by the coalition sets a time limit to the permissibility of abortion in the guise of the obligatory consultation. So, we can see what such a compromise leads to. However, to conclude my remarks, I would like to stress that we need to pray for these two parliamentary members who have introduced this new bill, so that their initiative will be successful.

Jacek Salij, OP

I would like to answer two questions: firstly, the one concerning the relation between the God of the Christian religion, of the God of Abraham and Isaac, and the God of philosophers; and secondly, the question whether there is any

sense in distinguishing pre-Christian thinking from post-Christian. I do agree with what Prof. Buttiglione said about Pascal's idea of the God of philosophers, which actually referred to the God of Descartes. However, generally speaking, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that too radical a differentiation of the God of reason from the God of Revelation is directly inconsistent with the Catholic faith, which has been written in the *De fide cattolica*, the dogmatic Constitution of the First Vatican Council. In my opinion, the whole sense of distinguishing the God of Abraham from the God of philosophers lies in two points. Firstly, it expresses an objection to the false God created by the human reason. Thus, the point is that reason, which does not want to recognize the true God and which creates Him in its own image, is speaking about a false God. Secondly, this differentiation shows that owing to the Revelation of God, we can get to know Him in a better way, which draws us closer to Him. According to the formula of the Catholic faith, God, who created the world, and whom unaided human reason is able to know in some way, is the same God who revealed Himself in Jesus Christ. This formula derives from the Constitution *De fide cattolica*, and it was repeated in the Constitution *Gaudium et spes*. And this perspective certainly also concerns the moral law. What has been said throughout the discussion about Cicero, Hippocrates, and other wise men who were able to discern the moral law, deeply harmonizes with the formulas of these councils.

As to the problem whether there is any sense in differentiating the pre-Christian from "post-Christian" thought, I think that the main characteristic of post-Christian thought is that man has started to pretend that he is no longer man, and that he rather sees himself as the Demiurge standing not in front of reality, but in front of a chaos which he can shape according to his ideas. As far as pre-Christian thinking is concerned, it was deeply tied up with a search for truth, for the truth about God as well as about man and morality, even if this search was "not unmistakable and not totally clear," as the Second Vatican Council put it.

And I would like to return to the first question. I warmly agree with Fr. Styczeń, who sees in Socrates a great pre-Christian prophet. Let me draw your attention to the fact that already in the year 160 A.D., St. Justin said so about Socrates. After all, it was not accidental that the Christians made use of the Stoic notion of *logoi spermatikoi* in order to speak about the *semina verbi*, diffused in pagan thought, which have been recalled in today's discussion.

Translated by *Dorota Chabrajska*

MAN AND SOCIETY

Alphons HORTEN

THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ENTREPRENEUR (EMPLOYER)

Society is not only interested that the enterprise should achieve great economic success and that good wages are earned without conflict. It is even more concerned that the workers should be trained in the factories to carry out careful, responsible work.

In order to give a proper answer to the question about the social responsibility of the entrepreneur, it seems necessary to start by mentioning three aspects of this question; in doing so I speak as a Christian employer and refer mainly to my experiences in the German Federal Republic.

First, we have to define more precisely the idea of the employer. It covers many categories in very different fields of production and marketing, starting with the craftsman, working with his apprentices in his own workshop. Then there is the owner of a medium-sized business, who can still maintain a personal relationship with his employees. Thirdly, there is the chairman of a concern with thousands of workers in different places, some of them abroad.

The essential common criterion of each of these entrepreneurs is that, no matter what the type of work in question, he is responsible for organizing and directing the work of dependent co-workers, whether as owner of the enterprise or as one of its employees.

In consequence of Marxist slogans that give the impression that the whole complex of economic procedures can be explained in terms of Capital and Work, the employer has, consciously or unconsciously, been assigned to the category of capital. Even the Second Vatican Council has, in the Constitution *Gaudium et spes*, used unclear terms in connection with economic events.

According to the famous footnote of Oswald von Nell-Breuning, the function of the entrepreneur was so inadequately treated owing to lack of time, and was thus even less well-defined than in *Quadragesimo anno* of Pius XI. In the Encyclical *Laborem exercens*, John Paul II formulated clear concepts for the first time. The Pope says that "work in the subjective sense," i.e. as an expression of the human person, has the same meaning for all working people; for, as the Pope continues, "the dignity of work is rooted more in its subjective than in its objective dimension" (LE, No. 6). In this connection, Wilhelm We-

ber, spiritual adviser to the Association of Catholic Employers in Münster, remarks:

Thus the Pope removes the concept of work from the narrow sense in which it has been regarded by all sections of German Catholicism, and which almost constructed a class opposition between the entrepreneur and financier on the one hand and the “worker” on the other.

Referring to a few over-briefly formulated sentences from *Mater et Magistra*, work had, in the mentioned constricting sense, been limited to the idea of muscular function, while the owner-entrepreneur, the employed manager and the financier were assigned, lock, stock and barrel, to the abstract category of “Capital.”

This is now no longer possible. In the words of the Pope:

Capital cannot be separated from labour; in no way can labour be opposed to capital or capital to labour, and still less can the actual people behind these concepts be opposed to each other (LE, No. 13).

Thus the achievement of the entrepreneur is expressly included in the concept of work. Just as an orchestra is unthinkable without a conductor, who himself plays no instrument, or a building without an architect, who handles no stone himself, so too an enterprise needs the direction of the entrepreneur or manager. While Karl Marx describes capital as “clotted” work, i.e. as the proceeds of that part of the proletarian’s work for which the capitalist pays no wages, but which he takes for himself as the added value or profit of exploitation, the Pope defines capital as “the fruit and sign of human work.” Thus he overcomes the Marxist limitation of the concept of work and renders the resulting Marxist-Socialist demands irrelevant.

However, the Encyclical states very clearly that work, in the broadest sense, is primarily and morally the highest entitlement for acquisition and ownership of property, and is thus of a higher category than capital.

Therefore, at the inaugural assembly of the Association of Catholic Employers in 1949, my spiritual guide, Joseph Höffner, later Cardinal of Cologne, said:

So the central point of the economy is not the capital involved, but the human beings. The purpose of the economy is neither the accumulation of capital nor technocracy, but concern and care for human beings. No doubt the entrepreneur bears the main responsibility for the fulfilment of this purpose.

And a few years later *Mater et Magistra* states:

It should be stated at the outset that in the economic order first place must be given to the personal initiative of private citizens working either as individuals or in association with each other in various ways for the furtherance of common interests (No. 51). Experience has shown that where personal initiative is lacking, political tyranny ensues and, in addi-

tion, economic stagnation in the production of a wide range of consumer goods and of services of the material and spiritual order – those, namely, which are in a great measure dependent upon the exercise and stimulus of individual talent (No. 57).

The outside observer, unfamiliar with practical procedures, usually does not realize how greatly the fiscal, social and economic measures of the last few decades have affected the performance of the entrepreneur and his colleagues. Protection against wrongful dismissal, as widely practiced in Germany, compulsion to make social plans for redundant workers, the often one-sided interpretation of social laws by the industrial tribunals, the inflexible wage contracts, which are not suited to individual cases, all these largely determine conditions and working relationships and are therefore in most cases more important than what the employer and employee could regulate for themselves within the firm. In view of these extensive legal regulations and their effects, *Laborem exercens* often speaks of the “indirect employer.” In addition, public discussion of economic issues, which also influences legislation, is often marked by an alarming degree of ignorance.

For example, few people, even among well-meaning observers, know exactly what they are talking about when they speak of “profit” or “a fair wage.” Who really knows, for instance, who are the beneficiaries of the net product of Germany’s largest firm, Siemens? Of its net product, that is the added value created by its own efforts after deduction of the costs of raw materials and third-party services, 62.2% goes to the workers (without employment tax), 25.5% to the state in form of taxes, 8% goes on depreciation and improvements, 4% to the firm’s creditors and 1.6% to the owners. This means that the owners get a 1/38th part of what the workers receive. This is only one example to show how remote the simplistic ideas of many present-day theoreticians are from reality, and also to show how restricted is the employer’s freedom of action, within what narrow limits and with what foresight he must proceed.

After these preliminary remarks, I now come to my main theme. The social responsibility of the employer can be viewed from three aspects:

1. responsibility for the continued existence and competitive efficiency of his enterprise;
2. responsibility towards his workers;
3. responsibility towards the public and the state.

1. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE AND COMPETITIVE EFFICIENCY OF AN ENTERPRISE

The system of socially-committed market economy, developed by Ludwig Erhard, Müller-Armack and Eucken, determines economic life in the Federal

Republic, as also in Austria and Switzerland. This system links competitive ability with social compensation and has proved to be far superior to all other systems, as can be seen by comparing it with recent developments in China and Russia, where an attempt is being made to mitigate the disastrous results of a state-run, planned economy that has led to dangerous inefficiency. Despite the many shortcomings and imperfections of a free economic system (as are found in any human endeavour), the socially-committed market economy remains flexible and efficient. Its legally based, competitive nature prevents stagnation and promotes efficiency and development, though often with painful sacrifices and hardships. Above all, the socially-committed market economy is enterprising. As far as possible, it gives the entrepreneur freedom of action, and so provides the necessary conditions for creativity and further productive development. The important function of the entrepreneur in relation to society is, therefore, that he preserves himself within the given order, i.e. he secures the existence of his enterprise and with it the working places that depend upon it. Therefore, the chief task of the entrepreneur in relation to society is that of preserving and promoting the principle of a free, socially-committed economy within his own enterprise.

2. RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS THE WORKERS

Largely determined by the principles of Catholic social teaching and based on the success of the social market economy, a high degree of social security has been achieved in the German Federal Republic. The generally high level of wages guarantees a fair wage. However, this level is often exceeded when additional wage costs prevent investment of future development; this can lead to extreme measures of reducing production costs, or may even compel the company to transfer its activities abroad.

The rights of the worker in industry are guaranteed. For the past 60 years he has been legally represented by worker counsellors. Over the past 30 years the regulations governing industrial relations have often been supplemented, and these ensure that the works committee has a voice in all important matters. The economic committee provides comprehensive information. The constant work of gathering information gives each worker the possibility of making suggestions and lodging complaints.

But these manifold provisions and legal protection in the event of dismissal are not enough. A decisive factor is the spirit in which they are applied. Here we may quote from *Laborem exercens* on the relationship between employer and employee:

However, this struggle should be seen as a normal endeavour "for" the just good: in the present case, for the good which corresponds to the

needs and merits of working people associated by profession; but it is not a struggle “against” others. Even if in controversial questions the struggle takes on the character of opposition towards others, this is because it aims at the good of social justice, not for the sake of “struggle” or in order to eliminate the opponent (No. 20).

In practice that means much more than concern for a good working climate, or the cultivation of human relations. It implies regard for the employee as a brother and, to quote Cardinal Höffner, “a human co-existence, with and for one another.”

The entrepreneur faces this high and great task anew each day in addition to coping with the pressure of work, the difficulties and emergencies encountered in fulfilling his main task of ensuring that his enterprise remains sound and that, in consequence, the jobs are guaranteed.

The larger the enterprise the less is the possibility of personal conversation with individual workers. Yet to some extent, the head of the company or his representative should be available to everyone. The chairman of a big concern with whom I am acquainted undertook, in spite of the many calls upon his time, to talk with the apprentices for two hours every week. I know a big factory where every employee, of whom there are several hundred, can once a year have a private talk with one of the owners, to discuss his personal wishes and worries. The same rule is followed at the lower levels, each worker being able to have a confidential chat with his departmental manager once a year. In another case, the employer spends a full afternoon every fortnight, discussing with the foremen the best way of dealing with the workers under their control.

These few examples show that there are many ways for management to maintain personal contact with their employees, particularly since two-thirds of the workforce are in factories employing fewer than 1,000 workers, so that an overall view is relatively easy. In addition to this, there are the many handicraft and service establishments with far smaller numbers of workers. All this should not breed laxity. Order and discipline should not suffer, but the workers should have the feeling that their employers are well-disposed towards them, that the material success of the enterprise is not the sole criterion, but that it is desired that the employees should find satisfaction with their jobs and can, through far-reaching delegation and circumscription of their field of work, act with as much independence and self-responsibility as possible.

The employer must always remember that the great privilege of leading others goes hand-in-hand with far-reaching responsibilities. He must exercise great patience and benevolence and must not be discouraged by lack of specialised knowledge, lack of appreciation, misinterpretation and envy, which crop up wherever one has to do with people.

John Paul II says:

Labour is in a sense inseparable from capital; in no way does it accept the antinomy, that is to say, the separation and opposition with regard to the means of production [...] When man works, using all the means of production, he also wishes the fruit of this work to be used by himself and others, and he wishes to be able to take part in the very work process as a sharer in responsibility and creativity at the workbench to which he applies himself (LE, No. 15).

So here we see the importance of the right attitudes and the intelligent leadership of men. Recognition of human dignity arouses a natural feeling of responsibility in the individual, and with it his creative power.

The employer's ability to lead men must lie above all in his power to persuade them. He must possess credibility. Nowadays every reasonable worker knows that an enterprise cannot run by itself, but that all participants are subject to the often merciless conditions of technical development, of structural change, of competition at home and abroad and that, therefore, difficult decisions may have to be made in the interest of the enterprise and its workers. He also knows that unproductive jobs cannot be kept, since unsaleable production earns no wages and often endangers other jobs which otherwise would still be viable. When the employer is asked to strive untiringly on behalf of good, understanding relations with his workers, this should not be regarded as exaggerated social enthusiasm, but as good, realistic business management.

A few years ago a friend of mine took over a medium-sized enterprise in a neighbouring country, where previously there had been frequent strikes. Through serious and consistent efforts to establish confident, credible cooperation, he succeeded in a surprisingly short time in raising the efficiency of the enterprise to the level of the German parent company. The atmosphere changed from one day to the next simply by shaking hands with the foreman and senior workmen and by providing clean recreation rooms. In another case, the buyer of an important firm, immediately after his take-over, commissioned a group of senior staff-members to pay special attention to personal relationships with individual employees, something previously unknown in that firm. Here too, economic success soon confirmed the correctness of this measure. It is no wonder. According to Thomas Aquinas "reality is the basis of goodness. What is good is that which corresponds to fact. Goodness is that which accords with reality."

So when the entrepreneur, with sound, untroubled regard for the reality of the world, and with the right appreciation of the human being in his employ respects the human dignity and spirituality of his work, then he not only fulfils his duty as a Christian, but also acts correctly as a businessman.

I have dealt in such detail with the right relationship of the employer to his employees, because in this respect, the employer has a particularly important function vis-à-vis the public at large. Society is not only interested that the

enterprise should achieve great economic success and that good wages be earned without conflict. It is even more concerned that the workers should be trained in the factories to carry out careful, responsible work. The importance of this standpoint is shown by a comparison with England, where the fact that the economic achievement of a county depends so greatly on careful professional and vocational training of its young people is only now being taken into account, and where the Thatcher government thereupon introduced more rapid methods of training apprentices in factories and training colleges, methods that we adopted long ago, and with great success.

3. RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS STATE AND SOCIETY

As a citizen, the entrepreneur also has a special duty toward society and the state. By virtue of his privileged position, he is not only called upon to cooperate to the best of his ability within his community; he has the task of explaining the real function of the employer and to make it understandable. The public image of the entrepreneur is often mistaken and quite false. Only when the public understands what is economically necessary and unavoidable, e.g. when radical and often painful structural changes have to be made, can these measures be reasonably effected. For a better understanding of economic relations, it is important to demonstrate that wage increases and inflations have an overheating effect and weaken a firm's competitive edge over that of foreign rivals, and thus tend to work against the common good.

This explication of matters to the public can be achieved in various ways, such as by inviting schoolchildren and others to visit factories, and thereby to discuss the conditions of work management. Public information can also be carried out on a bigger scale, e.g. through advertising campaigns on suitable occasions, and the distribution of pamphlets and brochures on topical questions – briefly, in very many different ways. However, this calls for personal engagement on the part of the employer, or at least for his material help.

A further task of the entrepreneur lies in ensuring, through his professional associations or even his personal intervention at parliamentary level, that sufficient expert knowledge is available when it comes to drafting new laws. This is a matter not of a pursuit of special interests, but of intervention for the common good, which is often met with serious misinterpretation and slander. For politicians, officials, and not least for theologians, it is usually difficult to make a correct assessment of economic conditions and the consequences of legal measures. A reasonable social policy, favourable to those concerned, must take account of the hard realities of the economy. In the words of Thomas Aquinas, "Charity without justice is the mother of dissolution." In Germany we have experienced that exaggerations of basically well-intentioned social benefits, e.g.

dismissal protection, social plans, etc., can also lead to loss of jobs and, as a final result, even to the destruction of enterprises. A policy of exaggerated social benefit is in truth opposed to the aid which is actually necessary, and therefore also works against the general social welfare.

If, quoting Abraham Lincoln, in a democracy “with public opinion everything can happen, against it – nothing,” the public intervention of the entrepreneur becomes particularly important. As a pillar of socially-committed market economy, he must strive to ensure that this superior economic and social system survives and develops vigorously.

To summarize:

Technical progress has not steamrollered us and must not be allowed to do so. It has changed the conditions of life for many citizens, mainly to their advantage. The acceleration of technical progress cannot enslave us if, together with the fundamental values of freedom, solidarity and justice, we place the human being in the centre of things, if we approach the idea of subjecting the earth to our needs in full awareness of its limits, and remember our responsibility towards our fellow men.

A sick organism can regain health if a certain remedy is supplied to it. Similarly, in the post-Christian world of our day, the element of Catholic social teaching, the principles of *Laborem exercens*, can make a decisive contribution to the recovery of society and the economy.

It falls to the Christian employer to accept the special task of setting an example, not only in his firm and professional field, but also to the best of his ability in public life. Just as in the years of reconstruction after World War II, Catholic employers and employees are now called upon to work together, so that by their example and by proposals and suggestions, they can help overcome the present difficult and many-sided crisis, and at the same time contribute towards confronting the great future tasks with the Christian courage that John Paul II has always called for from those who are active in the economy and in public life.

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Robert A. SIRICO, CSP

“BUREAUCRATIC WAYS OF THINKING” The Spiritual Cost of the Mixed Economy

The term “bureaucratic ways of thinking” contrasts directly with “a society of free work, of enterprise, and of participation”. The first is associated with the institutions of politics, which creates wasteful agencies that are centred on their own survival rather than the needs of society. The second is associated with the institutions of a properly ordered free society, which attempts to find a place within the division of labour for every person, and integrate each person’s particular talents toward the service of others.

I

The market economy and the free enterprise system have long been on the receiving end of criticism, both popular and academic. Surprisingly, this remains true even after the events of 1989 demonstrated that centrally-planned socialism is both economically undesirable and politically insupportable. Looked at from a purely empirical point of view, the virtues of the market have won the debate, yet free enterprise continues to require constant apology.

In Germany, Sweden, Britain, Italy, and the United States, measures are being taken to diminish the size and scope of welfare redistributionism, as well as to diminish the burden it places on the public purse. Yet so far these steps have been relatively minor, and most politicians and academics consider welfare reform as a resort made necessary by the enormity of the problem of class stagnation. It does not represent a desire to replace government provision of welfare with voluntary charity; nor does it represent a renewed faith in the matrix of voluntary trade as superior to centrally orchestrated and coercive forms of charity.

Neither has the collapse of socialism manifested itself in significant changes in economic policy in the West. Western governments have not dismantled the socialist structures in their economies. West Germany was ideally positioned to see the catastrophic consequences of state planning in East Germany, yet German unification ended up expanding the level of taxation and government spending in the newly united Germany. To the extent that Western governments have found it necessary to engage in market-oriented reforms, the justification usually relates to fiscal necessity, and not to a sense of the otherwise impracti-

cal nature of intervention, and certainly not from the moral imperative of the freedom of ownership, control, and trade of private property.

In the United States, every six months or so since the Soviet government fell apart and its allied socialist governments were overthrown, Congress has passed laws that favour a democratic version of the centrally-planned approach to solving social and economic problems. Such legislation in the U.S. includes the Americans with Disability Act, the Family Leave Act, a national service programme, ceilings on corporate pay, and even more progressive income taxation. This small list only begins to tell the story. The Clinton administration currently lobbies for substantially increasing the presence of the federal government in the U.S. system of medical provision, the industry which comprises one-seventh of total output.

Indeed, the propensity to control and hamper free enterprise knows no partisan bounds in the United States. Levels of regulations, taxation, and spending have increased under the leadership of both major political parties. The result has been a systematic move away from private management, private property, and private exchange, toward socialized (collectivist or state) management, property, and exchange. What partly accounts for this tendency is, no doubt, that interventionism grants perks and power to those who are in control of the central-planning bureaucracy, and to the special interests who lobby them. Yet because in a democracy government must rely on the consent of the governed, we must also point to popular opinion as a culprit. Anti-capitalism is not only an ideology kept alive in academic departments of literature, sociology, and religion; it is also a governing philosophy on the part of a substantial part of the electorate.

What, then, are the objections to the market economy, or to capitalism, which remain an impediment to comprehensive reform? Economists, theologians, and journalists widely think of the market economy, on balance, as wasteful, anarchistic, directionless, and harmful to the environment. Most of all, the market economy, even more than socialism, is considered to be a degrader of cultures and the genesis of greed, both of which war against spirituality and inner-growth. Partially for that reason, a minister of state in most parts of the world, with a salary drawn from public money, still has more moral authority and social status than a successful businessperson or a cleric. This is an informal yet reliable measure of the society's sympathy or hostility toward the market economy.

Our present bind is this: We no longer hold to the naive belief that socialism and central planning can solve our social problems; yet we are not sufficiently convinced of capitalism's merits to entrust the market to address our social problems to a greater extent than we have thus far allowed. To say we favour a mixed economy does not mean we are able to name what its ingredients should be, especially not when the recipe changes at the whims of regula-

tors and politicians. As a politically unstable system of economic management, the mixed economy is always tending toward more markets or more central control.

II

In this debate, the spiritual and moral components of alternative economic arrangements have not drawn a sufficient amount of attention. The spiritual and moral dimension of economic life was addressed in Pope John Paul II's brilliant encyclical *Centesimus annus* issued on the hundredth anniversary of *Rerum novarum*. *Centesimus annus* provides no blueprint for economic reform. To do so would neither befit the office of the Holy See nor be concordant with prior statements concerning the economic life of nations. “Models that are real and truly effective can only arise within the framework of different historical situations” (No. 43). Yet in the course of developing the Church's teaching on economic life, the Pope does provide instructive moral and sometimes practical guidelines to assist society in its quest for a just ordering of economic life. His statement is worthy of our careful consideration.

The subject which the Pope addresses in his statement impinges on choices we confront in our contemporary world as regards economics and its affect on social organization. *Centesimus annus* is an attempt to develop the social teaching of the Church in light of the historic events which brought down socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. Among other factors, the Pope attributes their downfall to a necessary “consequence of the violation of the human rights, to private initiative, to ownership of property and to freedom in the economic sector” (No. 24). “That is why,” says the Pope, “I wish this teaching to be made known and applied in the countries which, following the collapse of «real socialism,» are experiencing a serious lack of direction in the work of rebuilding” (No. 56).

The Pope is thus unambiguously hostile to the statist systems of political and economic organization which collapsed in 1989, and he reminds the faithful that the Church continues to hold to the teaching of *Rerum novarum*, which is “opposed to state control of the means of production, which would reduce every citizen to being a «cog» in the state machine.” In addition, the Pope supports the teaching of “subsidiarity” which emphasizes that the defence of the weakest elements in society, meaning the unemployed worker, the aged, the sick, and the children (No. 15) is best undertaken by those closest to the problem.

Certain attributes of work in the market economy lend themselves to a greater institutional recognition of the rights violated under those systems so explicitly repudiated by Papal social teaching. First, the freedom of work and labour is an essential part of a fruitful life of social cooperation, because “a

person's work is naturally interrelated with the work of others." Second, the community of work needs the freedom to develop largely independently of government direction because "it is through work that we, using our intelligence and exercising our freedom, succeed in dominating the earth and making it a fitting home." Third, the freedom of work is essential to fulfilling the moral duty of serving others because "work is work with others and work for others; it is a matter of doing something for someone else" (No. 31).

These three elements – cooperation, freedom, and service – are the foundation of the Pope's moral teaching as regards work and economic life itself, none of which are noticeable traits under statist systems of economic organization.

The obligation to earn one's bread by the sweat of one's brow also presumes the right to do so. A society in which this right is systematically denied, in which economic policies do not allow workers to reach satisfactory levels of employment, cannot be justified from an ethical point of view, nor can that society attain social peace (No. 43).

For this reason:

the modern *business economy* has positive aspects. Its basis is human freedom exercised in the economic field, just as it is exercised in many other fields. Economic activity is indeed but one sector in a great variety of human activities, and like every other sector, it includes the right to freedom, as well as the duty of making responsible use of freedom (No. 32).

The Church is evidently more enthusiastic with regard to the institutions of a free economy today than it has been in previous authoritative statements during the last one hundred years. This is because

there are specific differences between the trends of modern society and those of the past, even the recent past. Whereas at one time the decisive factor of production was *the land*, and later capital – understood as a total complex of the instruments of production – today the decisive factor is increasingly *the person*, that is, one's knowledge, especially one's scientific knowledge, one's capacity for interrelated and compact organization, as well as one's ability to perceive the needs of others and to satisfy them (No. 32).

The Pope recognizes that "the free market is the most efficient instrument for utilizing resources and effectively responding to needs" (No. 34). As against the pervasive reality of economic oppression, the Pope proposes "a society of *free work of enterprise, and of participation*" (No. 35). The Church "acknowledges the legitimate *role of profit* as an indication that a business is functioning well. When a firm makes a profit, this means that productive factors have been properly employed and corresponding human needs have been duly satisfied"

(No. 35). Thus, in place of socialism, the Church proposes “an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector...” (No. 42).

The Pope cannot endorse capitalism as that term is sometimes understood. He rejects any system “in which freedom in the economic sector is not circumscribed within a strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in its totality and sees it as a particular aspect of that freedom, the core of which is ethical and religious...”(No. 42). In particular, the Pope rejects consumerism, the doctrine that material pursuits need not be circumscribed by “a comprehensive picture of the person which respects all the dimensions of his being and which subordinates his material and instinctive dimensions to his interior and spiritual ones” (No. 36).

Yet this materialism or consumerism is not always associated with the institutions of capitalism. The Pope wants us to understand the ways in which government policies themselves can contribute to the diminution of freedom, and subtract from the free development of spiritual life. He cautions against “enlarging excessively the sphere of state intervention to the detriment of both economic and civil freedom” (No. 48). This is not abstract danger, but rather one that confronts the contemporary world.

In recent years the range of such intervention has vastly expanded, to the point of creating a new type of state, that so-called “Welfare State.” Its “malfunctions and defects” are “the result of an inadequate understanding of the tasks proper to the State” (No. 48).

The Pope levels a direct hit against the interventionism which dominates almost every Western economy commonly called capitalist. The Pope says:

By intervening directly and depriving society of its responsibility, the Social Assistance State leads to a loss of human energies and an inordinate increase of public agencies, which are dominated more by bureaucratic ways of thinking than by concern for serving their clients, and which are accompanied by an enormous increase in spending (No. 48).

The term “bureaucratic ways of thinking” contrasts directly with “a society of free work, of enterprise, and of participation.” The first is associated with the institutions of politics, which creates wasteful agencies that are centred on their own survival rather than the needs of society. The second is associated with the institutions of a properly ordered free society, which attempts to find a place within the division of labour for every person, and integrate each person’s particular talents toward the service of others.

In defining the terms the way he has, the Pope has made an extraordinary contribution to the conventional understanding of terms like *homo economicus*, or “economic man”, and encourages us to revise our understanding

of the nature of politics. He is suggesting we think more realistically about the way that the business economy actually operates and contrasts that with the way that political interventionism actually operates. This new understanding needs to be picked up and applied to revise specific ways in which we use terms when speaking about economic reform both in the East and West.

III

In the United States, we are currently debating a series of policies involving new and higher levels of government spending and regulation. In this debate, the opponents of more government have been put on the defensive simply because of the language chosen by those who want to broaden government's power. All new spending, no matter how small the actual number of beneficiaries may be, has been labeled as "investment." The question is put to us: do we favour more "investment" or less "investment." In the same way, new redistributionist programmes have been sold as "insurance." The question is put to us: do we want more "insurance" or less "insurance." Put that way, the choice is meant to become obvious.

The choice of terms like "investment" and "insurance" over more traditional terms like spending and welfare is a consequence of political calculation. They tap into certain popular assumptions about the relationship between government policy and markets, assumptions that the letter and spirit of *Centesimus annus* suggest we revise. Investment, for example, implies that the long-run payoff of a particular programme will exceed up-front expenditures. This is because when we spend, our resources are lost to us. But when we invest in the future, we get a greater return on our money. When politicians replace the word spending with the word investment, they are leading us to believe that government is actually more capable, in a particular case, than the market of knowing what is to the long-run benefit of society. Otherwise money would be best kept in private hands and invested in private markets.

The same implication – that the public sector is superior at conserving resources and forecasting the future – is at the heart of the term "insurance" as politics uses the term. In private markets, insurance is always designed to overcome the risk and uncertainty of the future. For example, a person may drive his whole life and never get into an auto-accident. But because no one can know the future with absolute certainty, this person buys insurance against the damage that may or may not be entailed in an auto-accident that may or may not happen. The purchase of insurance is an act we take to help guard against an unknowable future.

When we say the government should introduce a constant stream of "insurance", we are entrusting it to continuously guard against an uncertain future. Even more crucially, we are making the tacit assumption that government is

consistently more prepared to guard against the risk inherent in economic life than are private insurance companies. Consider that government insurance does not work the way private insurance does, in that government insurance does not fully take account of risk. Its operations do not rely on profit-and-loss accounting techniques; government need only focus on balancing a constant stream of receipts with a constant stream of payments. By naming old-age pensions and nationalized medical care “insurance,” politicians are tempted to play upon public fears about an uncertain future and the universal desire for security. For this reason, among others, we should take seriously the Pope’s teaching that when the state assumes a function from the market, it “must be as brief as possible, so as to avoid removing permanently from society and the business system the functions which are properly theirs...” (No. 48).

Given what we have learned about socialism from the events of 1989, and what we know about our increasingly person-centred economy, why do we continue to regard the government as being more capable than the market of overcoming future uncertainties? Why do we so infrequently grant that the market and private entrepreneurship are more far-seeing and future-oriented than government with its “bureaucratic ways of thinking?” Markets are denounced for their short-term greed all the time. But how often is government criticized on the same grounds? Or even more to the point, how often do we hear the short-term avarice of government contrasted with the long-term orientation of the corporation or the small businessman?

Indeed, the promise of security and long-run orientation is the primary promise of governments that manage mixed economies. To be sure, the promise of security is a less ambitious promise than the socialists once made. The socialists said they would insure a scientific organization of the productive forces of society (which, of course, requires almost total state ownership), and that they would insure a just distribution of the annual social income. The first promise has been broken many times over. The second promise fails because the attempt to equally redistribute wealth destroys any incentive to work and private enterprise.

The modern mixed economy does not make either of these promises in such bold strokes. Instead, it promises to be better at overcoming uncertainty, discovering the contents of the black box we call time, and being more long-run oriented than free markets can be. In this theory, markets are so blinded by immediate profits they fail to see what is in the long-term interest of people. The claim is made that government can overcome, or at least harness and redirect, the failings of Economic Man.

The promise of security, investment, and insurance from public spending is the very basis of the covenant the public is asked to make with the mixed economy. The state’s claim is that it can overcome time and uncertainty so people do not have to be held hostage to the risks associated with its passage;

this is a major source of the interventionist government's authority and status in the world today.

The great promise of the mixed economy and the bureaucratic welfare state – the one explicitly rejected in *Centesimus annus* – cannot be found in the writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin or Mao. Instead, this is a contribution of Western economic planners. In particular, it was a view made mainstream by the work of John Maynard Keynes to the political economy of statecraft. As we know, Keynes never explicitly advocated that capitalism be overthrown. In popular terminology, he merely sought to save it from its own internal failings. And what were those failings? In his mind, there were many: the price system did not work properly, the propensity to save slows economic growth, markets generate business cycles, workers would not allow wages to reach a market equilibrium, plus many others. All of those were technical points¹ that are still being debated by economists.

Much more fundamentally, however, Keynes assumed that economic man, a private actor under free-markets conditions, is likely to make more mistakes forecasting the future than would public servants and economist working for the right kind of government. Keynes never wrote more clearly than he did in the last chapter of his classic work *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*²:

The foregoing theory is moderately conservative in its implications. For whilst it indicates the vital importance of establishing certain controls in matters which are now left in the main to individual initiative, there are wide fields of activity which are unaffected. The State will have to exercise *a guiding influence* on the propensity to consume partly through its scheme of taxation, partly by fixing the rate of interest, or partly, perhaps, in other ways.

Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy or the rate of interest will be sufficient by itself to determine an optimum rate of investment. I conceive, therefore, that a *somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment* will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment; though this need not exclude all manner of compromises and of devices by which public authority will cooperate with private initiative.³

Here we have the primary conclusion of Keynes' great classic, and the most striking policy proposal in the entire book stated with clarity. The government

¹ H. H a z l i t t, *The Failure of the "New Economics"*, New Rochelle 1959; H. H a z l i t t, *The Critics of Keynesian Economics*, Lanham, MA 1983.

² J. M. K e y n e s, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, New York 1936.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 337-338, with added emphasis.

must exercise a “guiding influence” through “a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment.” Private markets, he thought, could not handle the task of investment. That is to say, the market could not take the appropriate steps to overcome future uncertainty without leading to a variety of imbalances and crises. This task must be turned over to less selfish and far-seeing public officials.

The appeal of Keynes was his conservatism, a word he uses above to describe the nature of his programme. He does not want to eliminate markets and capitalism. He does not want to eliminate private property, not even in the means of production. He merely wants to reign in the seedier side of economic man and replace him with political authority capable of correcting market errors. That is the primary contribution of Keynesian economics.

Keynes’s assumption that private markets cannot work to the general interest – certainly in the long run and certainly not to the degree that the government can – has had a profound influence on modern public policy. In voting for the government to “invest” social resources and provide “insurance” against future uncertainty, the public has accepted this Keynesian conjecture without much question. And though Keynes was the most conspicuous advocate of the view that Political Man is more future-oriented than Economic man, he was in the mainstream of contemporary thought at the time.

One year after Keynes’s volume appeared, Prentice Hall publishers put out a large volume entitled *The Planned Society: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow*, edited by Brooklyn College economics professor Findlay MacKenzie.⁴ In it, Levis Mumford, then a popular author and social critic, writes that market economics is a “theology,” a “superstition,” and “its practical results were disastrous... Now the question that confronts us today is not if we shall plan but how we shall plan...” (pp. v-vi).

Levis C. Gray, the head economist of what is today the Department of Agriculture, wrote that “planning constitutes an attempt of the American people to find an intermediate ground between *laissez-faire* capitalism and socialism” (pp. 160-161).

Rudolf K. Michels, economics professor, Hunter College, is disdainful of private initiative and its supposed short-run thinking. He writes:

In the long run, all these ends, which contribute to the highest possible material and spiritual standard of living, may be realized only as a result of long-time plans and policies which will require a change in our economic system... [It] is necessary to introduce a system in which the economic policy is carried out in the interests of the general social wel-

⁴ F. M a c K e n z i e, *The Planned Society: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow*, New York 1937.

fare rather than for private gain. In all probability such an attempt will involve more deliberate economic control and planning (pp. 387-388).

Benito Mussolini was also a contributor to the volume, being a well-respected planner throughout much of the thirties. He writes that "the state is not only a living reality of the present, it is also linked with the past and above all with the future, and thus transcending the brief limit of individual life, it represents the immanent spirit of the nation" (p. 811).

The last statement is only the most extreme statement, to regard Political Man as superior to Economic Man, and Mussolini's Fascism is now, unlike in the 1930s, widely unpopular. But have his assumptions about the short-run orientation of private markets, of the greed of Economic Man and the futurism of the State, been repudiated? Not really. Hardly a day goes by when we are not told of corporations who put short-run profit ahead of long-term investment, and of consumers who unthinkingly plan for today but not for tomorrow.

The State is still widely considered the corrective for the short-sightedness of the market. The State is constantly involved in redirecting the product of private markets towards other ends which are supposed to be more in the general interest. What politician does not claim that though his program may cost more today, it will save money in the long run? The implied assumption is that private enterprise may appear to be more efficient today, but only the State can know what is good for tomorrow.

In all these writings we find an assumption dealing with the passage of time in an uncertain future. I contend that this aspect of the planning mentality still maintains its hold over the public mind. We tolerate private enterprise so long as it is correctly forecasting the future. But on the occasion of business failure, when profits are no longer running in a desirable direction, we turn to the state for answers. When we think of the uncertainties of old-age, we turn to the state to care for us. We fear sudden sickness or disease, so we call for a medical system that elevates the state to the status of national healer. We think of the market as being only interested in short-run maximizing, and this is tolerable, so far as it goes. But when we really want to overcome the terrible fear that comes with not knowing what tomorrow will bring, we look to the government, which we hope is relatively better at dealing with the risks of social life and enterprise.

Even today, modern man assumes that private business people and consumers conduct their affairs with blindfolds on their eyes, whereas government must have a secret chamber with a crystal ball to know where destiny is taking us and special powers to marshal resources to grant us all a more secure future. This aspect of the planning mentality is all-pervasive. This is an error with grave consequences. It prevents us from applying the insight that freedom, the business economy, and responsibility for the future can be linked without the aid of the Planning State or Social Assistance.

IV

The common assumptions about the government’s ability to overcome uncertainties, and the market’s tendency to enhance them are not only wrong, these assumptions are inverted. Let us first consider whether government in the types of interventionism that really exist is indeed oriented toward the future. And in discussing this I will assume we are speaking about institutions of a modern democracy. (An entirely different argument would be required to address the problem of monarchies.)

What constitutes the interventionist state in a democracy? We use the term to identify the collective mind of those who administer its affairs on a day-to-day basis. Politicians are the most conspicuous actors in this regard. In what sense can their daily concerns be considered future oriented? Their first order of business is too often the desire to get into office and stay there. That means relying on the initial and continued support of constituents.

Politicians need not necessarily concern themselves with the general interest or the future beyond the next election season. Politicians need to provide their regional constituents with what they want so these voters will pull the appropriate lever in the next election. This mindset can even lead to “the corruption of public officials and the spread of improper sources of growing rich...” (No. 48). Scholastic economist Juan de Mariana noted “how sad it is for the republic and how hateful it is for good people to see those who enter public administration when they are penniless grow rich and fat in public service.”⁵

This is not to say that politicians never act in the general long-run interest of the common good, only that the incentive structure of their office leads them to be less inclined to serve the common good than to serve their own private interest. An entire school of economics, the Virginia Public Choice School of Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, has grown up around that insight.

Public officials whose jobs do not require voter approval face a slightly different set of incentives which still do not orientate their minds to the long-run. Being self-interested, they are not inclined to engage in actions that are in the general interest if those actions are likely to affect their job status. If, for example, every employee in the Department of Energy suddenly concludes it would be far better for the country if energy were regulated by private industry rather than the central government, the incentive structure of the agency would not suggest they resign *en masse*. It is remotely possible under the right cultural conditions that they would, but it is much more in their interest to maintain the fiction that private enterprise and the general public would be helpless without their efforts.

⁵ A. A. C h a f u e n, *Christians for Freedom: Late Scholastic Economics*, San Francisco 1986, p. 65.

The discreet choices these actors face on a day-to-day basis do not lend themselves to the thinking about the future. Their concerns are much more concretely related to their individual lives: getting along with the supervisor, maintaining the bureau's budget and ensuring its growth, getting a bigger and better office, finishing the tasks, however mundane, in the week's line-up, and the like. This has essentially nothing to do with sitting far above the affairs of enterprise and dispensing orders to the private economy more in accord with the needs of the next generations. A typical bureaucrat thinks more about quitting time than maximizing social welfare. They are guided by bureaucratic ways of thinking.

The incentives and constraints faced by the judiciary in attempting to think about the long term is far more difficult to establish and evaluate. But it would indeed be naive to think that judges are necessarily better forecasters of the future than, say, commodity futures traders. Judges are there to interpret the law and judge others' actions by them, not to create government plans for investing in the future. As far as an overall evaluation of government is concerned, the judiciary may be the least short-term oriented of all aspects of the state. At the same time, judges are an integral part of the institutional structure of the state whose predominate time frame is toward short-term ways of thinking.

Thus even in this cursory survey, we see that the state is not an amorphous spiritual being capable of knowing the future better than those outside the state apparatus. It is composed of real people, flesh and blood, who act and react to the institutional setting in which they are employed. The institutional setting of the state is primarily occupied with internal concerns and not those of the public, as anyone who has had to deal with the Post Office knows. The assumption, then, that government can and should plan for our future must immediately confront the concrete reality that actors in the government sector are not so much interested in preparing for the future of the general society as they are in satisfying the immediate needs of those who lord over their budget, namely politicians and bureaucrats in positions of higher authority.

As a consequence, the interventionist government is pervaded by the short-run orientation that *Centesimus annus* so forcefully decries. In fact, most of the adjectives commonly used to describe businessmen and investors in the private sector can be applied with equal or even greater validity to the employees of the state. If you run through the litany – which includes words like greedy, selfish, short-sighted, wasteful, and narrow – you can easily imagine how these terms could apply to employees of government. With government lacking an effective means to correct the mistakes and vices of its employees, these attributes tend to be exaggerated in the public sector. It then becomes our task to weight the relative merits of an activist government against the behaviour of market actors who are compelled by the nature of the business economy to work with others in the service of a more general social good.

V

The market economy is the network of exchange and production that relies on voluntary contract of private property for the allocation of social resources. Its most conspicuous members include consumers, producers, and workers. The producer under capitalism is frequently considered the consummate Economic Man, narrowly focused on the short-term and deliberately forgetting the long term. Yet the businessperson's profits, operating in a free market, can come about only in one way: serving the consuming public. The capitalist may indeed be pursuing profits for himself and his family only, and not intend to be charitable with his proceeds. But in order to make profits, he must be other-directed, serving and even anticipating the needs and desires of the masses of people who are actual and potential purchasers of the products of enterprise.

A producer under capitalism faces constant incentives to overcome the uncertainties of the future through accurate forecasting. The owner of the vineyard is an example. The owner must till the soil and plant the vines many years before his land produces a grape that can be turned to wine for sale to the public. In the meantime, the owner must purchase capital, pay out wages, and forego income that could have been accumulated in the meantime. The same is true of an entrepreneur in the housing industry: he or she must purchase land and materials, pay out wages, and market his product long before any profits are seen for the endeavour. Even if an entrepreneur is involved in marketing trivial consumption goods (say potato chips), capital must be purchased and wages paid long before the product goes to market.

All of this necessarily requires a forward-looking mentality. Indeed, the entrepreneur is in many ways a seer. His profession is caught up in anticipating future events. He organizes the factors of production and assumes a large measure of the risks and uncertainties of business. This does not mean he is always right; his predictions may turn out to be incorrect after all. Yet the adoption of a present orientation lends itself to incorrect predictions and therefore failure in private enterprise. Profits come to those who can put aside the concerns of the present and anticipate what the world will be like in a month, a year, ten years, or maybe much longer. Producers must even invest in property that promises no return until even the next generation. Again, economic actors may be motivated to increase their bank accounts. Before any investment turns a profit, producers must look to the future, serve the public what it wants, and constantly monitor and tend their holdings. Only in this way can value be preserved and enhanced.

The producer in the business economy is often punished for thinking only about the short-run instead of the long-run. The capital invested in a product must be written off as a loss and the producer is poorer as a result. Society as

a whole, however, is only marginally poorer because producers risk their own money or those of others who have an equal incentive to forecast the future. Government actors face no such penalty when they make mistakes, but rather society at large bears the burden of their errors; resources forcibly extracted from the public and wasted, and this pushes aside private enterprises that might have arisen and flourished in their absence.

It has often been said that the development of civilization owes much to the deferral of gratification. The uncertainty of the future requires people to constantly put off gratification, and be cautious and frugal. The same cannot be said of government actors, who are more likely to waste for immediate satisfaction because the resources under their control are not theirs but society's at large. As Professor Alexander Smith, to whom I owe this essential insight, says:

A powerful case may be made for the proposition that people are more likely to defer present gratification for future ends in the pursuit of economic rather than political activities. This argument, of course, has powerful implications for those who profess a faith in the ability of governments to engage in long-run planning.⁶

What about the consuming public? The public sometimes seems to be entirely focused on present accumulation versus long-range planning. This is one aspect the consumerism that the Pope identifies. That being so, in private markets, however, it is also true insofar as these same people participate in the political process. It makes little sense, then, to condemn consumers for shortsightedness and then advocate that these people of the same nature be given positions in government to quell the short-term orientations of others.

In a market economy, even the consuming public faces incentives and constraints that push them toward long-run thinking. Individuals must face the consequences of debt individually. Even a declaration of private bankruptcy has the consequence of destroying a good credit rating, the most valuable commodity a person can possess in a capitalist economy. An interventionist government, on the other hand, can accumulate debt to a far greater extent than private enterprise or individual consumers. The government employs a lender of last resort to back up its credit in times of emergency and to secure its bonds against default. The penalty for excessive debt is paid by the public at large in the form of inflation.

In any case, in keeping with the idea of subsidiarity, the consumer is in a much better position to forecast individual economic needs than a distant government employee. Government employees may be able to forecast their own needs. But they cannot do so for others any more than private individuals

⁶ T. A. Smith, *Time and Public Policy*, Knoxville 1988, p. 107.

can forecast the needs of someone living in the next city or even next door. The constraints of scarcity and the passage of time make it impossible for consumers to completely focus on today without eventually facing the consequences down the road. Market actors have the consequences of short-term thinking visited on them in the long run, whereas government actors are often either unaffected (they get away with not “serving their clients”) or are even rewarded for short-term thinking (resulting in “an inordinate increase of public agencies” which is accompanied by “an enormous increase in spending”).

Perhaps the best example of future orientation in the market is the stock trader. His whole life is wrapped up in gathering and interpreting every bit of information currently available that could affect the future. The bond trader has to think about a space of time between one minute and thirty years. Current market prices for all securities are immediately affected by any change in resource availability, so people can adjust their habit of consumption to coordinate with anticipated availability in the future. None of these predictions of the future can be perfect, but officials within the public sector at any level are not likely to have the means at their disposal to adjust plans so quickly.⁷ Indeed, it is the stock market that has made the Five-Year-Plan seem so anachronistic. No sooner have government planners developed their plan when the behaviour of free individuals shift the relevant data and to make the plan hopelessly outdated.

VI

Joseph Schumpeter spoke of the overall forward-looking capacity of free markets as capitalism’s “socio-psychological superstructure,” deliberately echoing Marxian terminology.

Things economic and social move by their own momentum and the ensuring situations compel individuals and groups to behave in certain ways whatever they may wish to do – not indeed by destroying their freedom of choice but by shaping the choosing mentalities and by narrowing the list of possibilities from which to choose.⁸

In a mixed economy (or Really Existing Interventionism), most sectors of economic life are touched by politics and are affected by the shortsightedness of government action. The government itself becomes responsible for lowering the time horizons of the actors in private markets. When government grows in size, it induces the public toward short-term thinking and forces choices on

⁷ F. A. H a y e k, *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism*, Chicago 1988.

⁸ J. S c h u m p e t e r, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, New York 1942, pp. 129-130.

private actors that make what former budget director Richard Darman once called “now-nowism” much more beneficial than it really should be.

Let’s consider the example of inflation, which I will assume, in deference to Milton Friedman, to be an exclusively monetary phenomenon made possible by the institution of central banking. In an economy with a stable or falling price level, people can plan for the future with confidence. Under inflation, tomorrow’s dollars are worth less than today’s, so it is in everyone’s interest to consume while purchasing power remains high. Once inflationary fervour begins to feed on itself, there is no limit to how narrow people can become. They will deliberately drive themselves into debt since the debt can be paid later in cheaper dollars. The history of hyper-inflation is shot through with anecdotes about society turned upside down. People sacrifice a lifetime of saving in a day. They spend their children’s inheritance as if it were about to vanish.

Inflation makes people present-oriented – less virtuous and more childlike as a result. This childlike state of mind is imposed on them by a governmental policy of inflationary monetary management. The Pope makes special reference to the phenomenon of inflation in the context of arguing that markets cannot function well apart from certain institutional, juridical, and political conditions. In addition to “guarantees of individual freedom and private property,” there must be a “stable currency” as well (No. 48). Similarly, Mariana warned that “if we take the liberty of reducing the fineness of gold and silver” then “distrust will characterize domestic commerce, and a paralysis of production will necessarily follow, producing scarcity, high prices, poverty, confusion, disorder.”⁹

Yet inflation is not the only policy that has the effect of shortening time horizons. Any policy that diminishes the value of private wealth also makes saving and investing for the future less rewarding, and immediate materialism and consumerism more rewarding. High taxation, especially on capital gains, is a good example of this. If correct forecasts are punished through taxation, market actors face an incentive to use up resources on consumption. “The origin of poverty is high taxes,” wrote Spanish Scholastic Pedro Fernandez Navarette.¹⁰ Policies like price and wage control make people more grasping and greedy, anxious to take what one can get now at the expense of others. The welfare state tempts people into taking leisure today instead of working for tomorrow’s economic security. The overly complicated legal structures inherent in economic regulation discourage free and open enterprise and cause despair of the future.

⁹ A. A. C h a f u e n, *Christians for Freedom*, *op. cit.* p. 86.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

All these policies are characteristic of the mixed economy as it actually exist in the real world. As our societies have undergone the slow transformation from free to regulated, from being based on private ownership to becoming Social Assistance States, from having stable money to being dominated by inflationary monetary policies, they have in general become more politicized. Being more politicized also means becoming more short-term oriented. When people are governed by a mixed economy, their behaviour becomes more characteristic of the selfish political actor unconcerned about the general interest and less concerned with the future as the profitable and socially-minded producer must be.

In a politicized society, people begin to develop an ethic of having rather than being, which is the genesis of the cultural decline. People begin to surrender a secure tomorrow for today’s pleasures, and pursue childish fancies rather acting maturely. The Pope speaks directly to this social and spiritual problem in contemporary life:

It is not wrong to want to live better; what is wrong is a style of life which is presumed to be better when it is directed towards “having” rather than “being,” and which wants to have more, not in order to be more but in order to spend life in enjoyment as an end in itself (*Centesimus annus*, No. 36).

It is also useful to think about policy disputes in modern political discussion as a dichotomy of short-run versus long-run, as Alexander Smith has argued.¹¹ When a politician lobbies for a new spending programme, whether or not he calls it “investment,” he hopes for immediate benefit for himself and the special interests he is serving. But those who are opposed to it may correctly see that the social problem may either be illusory or will solve itself in time better through private action. The opponent of new government spending may imagine the long-run good that will come from leaving those resources in the private sector, even if those benefits will not be seen until after the next election.

When the consequences of pervasive political action invade the domains more proper to private markets, it results in shortening of time horizons throughout the entire culture. If we want a society where people defer gratification, act prudently with resources, take care of property, and think about the next generation, we should be putting more social control in the hands of the private sector and its allied institutions of the family and community. We have seen how total state control of economic life has reduced whole populations to the status of hunter-gatherers, entirely consumed with having rather than being. The half-way mark between capitalism and socialism makes us all relatively more present-oriented and childlike than we need to be or would be under a properly governed and stable market economy composed of actors who pur-

¹¹ T. A. S m i t h, *Time and Public Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

sue the good while improving themselves materially. In the end, of course, morality and conscience do not allow responsibility for selfishness to be placed anywhere but with ourselves, regardless of exogenous incentives.

VII

The proper exercise of spirituality requires a proper conduct of our private lives. It requires that we think about others in our family and in our community and their long-run welfare. We should save not only for our own pleasure but also for our children and for their children. This is a proper exercise of moral virtue that comes from a serious sense of spirituality. The condition of natural liberty which results in the creation of a market economy reinforces a long-run orientation and proper ethics and spirituality.

Yet the mixed economy gets in the way of this desire to prepare for the future by taxing the proceeds of labour, inflating away savings, and excessively regulating economic opportunity. In this institutional setting, we lose opportunities for the proper exercise of goodness, generosity, and charity. By excessively intervening in economic affairs, the state can induce us toward not caring for these whom we should care for. It can cause us to fail in our obligations to till and keep the land and have dominion over the earth. Even worse, when the state assumes obligations more properly reserved to private action, we are tempted to disregard our obligations to our families and to others in need. By replacing markets with state action in many spheres, John Maynard Keynes's erroneous beliefs have exacted a high economic as well as spiritual cost.

If we continue to believe that the economic forces of the market cannot help us plan for the future, and continue to replace them with political forces under the illusion that the state can better plan for our future, we will continue to become present-oriented societies.

Let's think about the Parable of the Talents as told in the Gospel according to St. Matthew (25 : 14-30). When the master sent out his servants to use the talents he had bestowed upon them, they went out into a world open to enterprise and investment. The master praised the ones who earned a return on the talents and cast out the one who buried his talent.

Imagine the same parable under an inflationary mixed economy. We can imagine the responses of the servants upon returning. The first says, "Master, this is an inflationary economy. I spent my talents and went into debt because the return on capital does not exceed the increase in the price level." The second says, "Master, I spent all my talents on getting a license to practice business, paying my taxes, and getting past the health inspectors. There was none left to run a business, so my talents are gone." The third says, "Master, all my talents were taken by the social security system, and though I might be able to draw some money out in forty years, I have nothing now." Finally, the Fourth

says, “Master, I buried my talent and here it is.” The Master would have to regard this fourth servant, the one who buried his talent, as the wisest one given that they confronted an over-regulated, over-controlled, and inflationary economic setting.

The point is this: there is an ethical and spiritual cost to entrusting the state with functions that are more proper to enterprise and entrepreneurs operating within a matrix of free exchange. Have we forgotten this, even in the wake of socialism’s manifest failure? I believe we have. Socialism may be gone, but the myths about the market that gave socialism such staying power are still with us.

There is essentially no reason for a properly ordered market economy to be on the defensive and to have to apologize for itself. We must begin the hard work of elevating the business economy to a higher social and moral status than the economy governed by the corruptions and greed of politics. The free market is not only more efficient and productive than all alternative economic systems, it is superior in helping us overcoming nature’s uncertainties and to plan for the future, as the right conduct of spirituality would have us do.

Damian P. FEDORYKA

THE REBIRTH OR DEATH OF EUROPE?

In the Christian's dialogue with the secular world, one can no longer ignore, under the excuse of being academic or ecumenical and open-minded, that the refusal to receive one's being from God and to render it back to God as a gift, and the consequent decision to appropriate, or keep it for oneself, are the direct and sole reason for the overwhelming misery and injustice suffered by men in the contemporary world.

Increasingly, in different parts of Europe and in different contexts one hears the common term "ours." The word indicates, on the face of it, that idea that there is something common, something that is shared, something that binds "us" together. Yet the term can hide a bitter irony because even in affirming the bond that ties us into some unity, it can negate the individual in acts which separate him from what is "ours" and even "his." Perhaps the best evidence of this is the strange silence about "our" children, and hence about our *own humanity* in the midst of all the rhetoric about a common life and a common future. Because of this silence, the category of what is "our" becomes formally similar to that insistence on the individualistic, ethnic and nationalist "mine" and "ours" which has shown its consequence in the "Bosnian Evil."

Abortion is a crime not only against the individual, it is a crime against humanity. Abortion separates the criminal not only from the victim but from humanity itself. By its very nature, it forces every human into solidarity with the victim, and makes each and every human being into a victim. As such it is a symptom of the specific negation of and systematic attack against human dignity. There can be no rebuilding, no reform and no rebirth in Eastern and Central Europe, there can be no stopping of the death of Western Europe unless there first occurs a reaffirmation of the dignity of the human person. But this too is a paradox, for the salvation of Europe will not occur if the affirmation of human dignity is a means, a way of saving Europe. For then, human dignity will still be abused because it is used as a means. Our own salvation cannot be the end. But in the end, it will be the consequence of affirming human dignity as the image of God, the means of affirming God for His sake, not ours. The rest shall be given us.

There are a number of elements that enter into the foundation and affirmation of the dignity of man. They are all inseparable and all necessary. Yet one aspect of that dignity can serve as a focus that is particularly suited to highlight the unique and specific evil of the age as well as indicate the way to the affirmation of that dignity.

In the thought and the teachings of Pope John Paul II, who can be called "the Pope of the Dignity of Man," the central aspect, an echo of *Gaudium et spes*, No. 24, is constantly affirmed as an antithesis to the spirit of the age. It is the simple but profound truth that man, as a person, has a vocation of giving himself to others, and ultimately to God. Only a person is capable of giving himself.

In the encyclical *Veritatis splendor* we are taught that the heart of morality is the *response of love* (No. 10) in which the individual, in imitation of Christ, makes a *total gift of self* (*ibidem*, No. 15). This repeats a central truth of *Dives in misericordia*, in which, speaking of God's love, John Paul II adds, "And he who loves, desires to give himself" (No. 7). The decisive criterion for understanding the social dimension is the essential orientation and vocation of each individual to his "neighbour." And thus the key to the proper understanding of *Centesimus annus* is a phrase that is as brief as it is rich in significance: work is "*work with and for others.*"

Properly understood, the above truths are a scandal and an offence to the modern age because they affirm that man's vocation *is to be for others*. But they lose their scandalous character if they are given a humanitarian interpretation. For the humanitarian and the humanist is willing to be an altruist in as much as he affirms that *self-interest* has as its *consequence* a benefit for the other.

The truth about the human vocation has to be put into a perspective that is directly relevant to the age and expressed in such a way as to strip all pretence from the posture of benevolent humanism that is assumed by our age. We can do this with the simple statement: if only a person can *give* himself... so too, only a person is capable of *appropriating*.

The first – this capacity to give oneself – is the expression of the vocation to self-donation. The second – a tendency to take and appropriate – is the terrible possibility of perverting that vocation.

The first, as Wojtyła, and now John Paul II, saw¹, is an expression of the situation of man: his being is a *gift* which calls for the reciprocity of a self-donation in gratitude to the donor, who is God. It indicates, if we understand it properly, three distinct and essentially connected moments. Man is

¹ Cf. T. S t y c z e ń, E. B a l a w a j d e r, *Jedynie prawda wyzwala. Rozmowy o Janie Pawle II* (Only Truth Liberates. Conversation about John Paul II), Polski Instytut Kultury Chrześcijańskiej, Rome 1987, p. 35.

called to *receive* the gift of self; he is called to *take possession of that self*; and finally, he is called to an “exchange” of gifts in that act of gratitude, which involves a *giving of self*.

The second – the taking and appropriating – may become a perversion of the human vocation, when it *refuses to render the gift of self*. As a consequence, the act of self-possession becomes central and final, and makes receptivity impossible. In refusing to give, man also refuses to receive. Instead of receiving, the creature *appropriates*. And loses possession of his self. Yet, the gesture of appropriation is not simply impotent, in its impotence it brings destruction and death to everything touched by its appropriating grasp.

Here we see the fundamental contrast and opposition of which Christ spoke in His words, “He who would save his life” – that is, keep it for himself – “will lose it; he who will lose his life for my sake” – that is, give it to me unconditionally – “will find it.”

A sophisticated secular age promises us its “good will” if we only bracket the divine and the supernatural in our dialogue about man, about the one thing that we have in “common,” namely “our” humanity. This is its condition for allowing the Christian to participate in a common endeavour for the “good” of humanity.

But ecumenism and courtesy does not require and justice forbids silence about the so-called “mistakes,” and some may even say the necessary “cost” levied by the secular age on the road to human progress. For the human misery and suffering in their vast scope and monumental depth are not the result of an innocent mistake. They are, indeed, the price exacted for the progress of humanity, promised to all but accessible only to the few. One cannot be silent about the mendacity of a humanism that expects the crumbs of its own surfeited satisfaction to trickle down, as welfare, to those deprived of human dignity. Silence about the evil of the age will not lead to unity or solidarity, but only to collusion in evil.

The fundamental word of the secular age is “Mine,” as Wojtyła noted in a sermon on “Fatherhood.” In more technical language, we can understand the issue as one of “private property.” The decisive question, then, becomes “To whom does man belong?” Both Christ and Marx agree that this is the crucial question. It is the first and the last question. And the answer to it determines man’s beginning and his end. But only one answer is the beginning of man, of his rebirth and life; the other brings it to an end and death. Yet both answers consist of the self same identical word: “Mine!”

“To whom does man belong?” Christ’s answer is: “Mine.” Man belongs to Christ for he has been purchased at a great price, the *sacrifice* in which Christ *offered* His human life in exchange for divine life for man. Christ accomplished the exchange with one liturgical word, spoken to the Father: “Thine.”

“To whom does man belong?” Marx’s answer, in the name of man, *repeats* the same word, “Mine!” And thus, “man” *appropriates* himself, he becomes “his own” but only *by the theft* of what belongs to Christ and to his neighbour. It is singularly instructive that even while reappropriating man for himself, Marx saw fit to destroy the centre of individuality, that which is the most intimate and deepest property of man, his freedom. It was no longer the individual, but humanity that was to be saved.

In the Christian’s dialogue with the secular world, one can no longer ignore, under the excuse of being academic or ecumenical and open-minded, that the *refusal to receive one’s being* from God and to render it back to God as a gift, and the consequent decision to appropriate, or keep it for oneself, are the direct and sole reason for the overwhelming misery and injustice suffered by men in the contemporary world.

In *Centesimus annus*, John Paul II reminds this world that the *earth itself is a gift* from God (No. 37). For the secular age it is merely a condition, and therefore, only a means for survival. In the same encyclical, he reminds us that *man, too, is a gift to man*. But here too, the secular age proclaims the sovereignty and freedom and the rights of man, refusing to receive the gift and becoming incapable of giving it. Only *appropriation* remains, coming to expression in the world “Mine,” the central word in the new liturgy of consumption.

The real and awesome *power of man to possess himself* finds its true meaning only if it stands between the two “poles” of *receptivity* and *self-donation*. The requirement to be receptive is grounded in the *origin* of man. He is not merely created, he is *given* his life as a *gift* from God. The requirement of self-donation is grounded in the *goal* and end of his life, the same God, who “desired to give Himself” because He loved man. Thus, in answer to the question, “To whom does man belong?” we cannot simply *repeat* the words of Christ, as if we too were gods. Much rather, we are called to *respond* to the Word of God, who says “mine” of His own. And the “*response due* to the many gratuitous initiatives taken by God out of love for man” (No. 10), to take the words of one of the central passages from *Veritatis splendor*, – the response due is the word and the act “Thine” – the total gift of self (*ibidem*, No. 15).

Two reflections are in order. They concern the true nature of society and therefore have important implications for the political order and the current crisis. Both refer to the central and decisive notion of *transcendence*. In the last mentioned encyclical, John Paul II notes that all men have the *same* Origin and the *same* Goal.

Unlike animals of the same species, who have in each instance a *similar* origin and a similar goal, men have the *same* origin and goal. In the case of animals, there are as many goals as there individual animals. In the case of man, the one and the same goal is ordained for all men. This has radical implications for understanding the social character of man.

Being for others, giving oneself for others has absolutely no sense, indeed, it would be an absurdity if the other simply had an *immanent* end, his own self-development and self-satisfaction. It would be inconceivable, indeed impossible to find a reason why one would *transcend* himself and actively turn to the other *for his sake* if the other, in his turn, were essentially and necessarily oriented in an *immanent* direction, toward a self-actualization and self-satisfaction, or as it is often called today, the realization of human potential. Of His many creatures, it is only man whom God created for his own sake, but only so that man can give himself to “the other” for the sake of the other (cf. *Gaudium et spes*, No. 24). Two *self-centred individuals* can exchange services in the pursuit of their respective and even similar ends, but they *can never* share and *participate in each other’s* pursuit. Their pursuit can never be one pursuit, because they do not have one goal.

The Pope’s distinction, in his recent *Letter to Families*, between communion and community is decisive.² If we reflect on it, we can see that communion, the direct “I-Thou” relationship in which each becomes united to the other in order to share in one life would be impossible unless each transcended to a dimension that stands *above both*. The “being at one with the other” depends on the relation of each to a vertical dimension that transcends both. We can love an infant by virtue of the fact that he is an image of God, Who transcends him. But it would be difficult, indeed impossible to give oneself in a nuptial act to an infant, or someone like an infant who has never transcended himself. The other becomes lovable in a way that allows *communion* only if he or she *responds* to the transcendent domain of truth, goodness and beauty which transcends the individual as such. The other becomes a “candidate” for communion only to the extent, to use another concept central to both *Veritatis splendor* and *Pastores dabo vobis*, that he *conforms* himself to a transcendent reality and ultimately to Christ. The response of *conformity to the transcendent* makes the other lovable and visible in his inner personal secret. This same response to the transcendent makes community also possible, a *community* in which “*we together*” participate in each other’s response to and pursuit of the same transcendent goal. Only then is it possible to act in *solidarity*: perform a common act, to share one life, to be one body.

² Cf. *Letter to Families from Pope John Paul II* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994), No. 7. The *Letter to Families* is an extraordinary focus on and profound development of the notion of the “gift of self” that is, perhaps, the most important conceptual element of the “truth about man” and the “truth about God” that are central in the thought of this “Pope of the dignity of Man.” Not only is the theological anthropology of the “gift of self” unprecedented in theoretical literature, it also reaches a high point in the teachings of John Paul II in his *Letter to Families*.

The civil and secular order, as is abundantly evident in our secularized culture, has rejected the dimension of vertical transcendence between man and God as well as the horizontal transcendence between man and man.³ Political and social structures are articulated on the implicit and increasingly more explicit premise that man lives *for himself*, with the inevitable consequence that only the most powerful ones are able to do so with any satisfaction. Any “cooperation” resolves itself in economic terms as an *exchange*. The same structures, and the culture of consumerism which they facilitate, make it increasingly difficult to actively live for the other and to educate one’s children to do so. Thus, the overwhelming role of the concept of “rights” which allows only the unconditional “mine” of appropriation and consumption but makes it difficult or impossible to realize the “Thine” of self-donation.

The State, unlike the Church, has no direct role and no competence with regard to the inner word, “Thine,” that accompanies the act of self-giving. Its specific mission is justice, the defense and protection of that which is legitimately “mine.” But its limited competence and mission does not and should not allow it to *abolish* the dimension of transcendence that is essential to the proper understanding of human nature. In other words, because it does not have the temporal power or competence to enforce man’s obligation to receive what has been given to him as a gift and to gift to others, *does not mean that it can bracket receptivity and self-donation as if they were non-existent*. When the secular order rejects this two-fold matrix and foundation of self-possession, it radically perverts the meaning of self-possession into a simple and *unconditional* “right” to appropriation. The political consequence of this are structures that dispossess and expropriate man from what is truly given to him and is truly his own.⁴

The practical consequence of bracketing *receptivity and self-donation* as integral aspects of human existence and as the foundation of society is a strict exclusion of the *origin and the goal* of human existence from public life. And that is a crime. Such bracketing is also a strict and formal exclusion of the

³ Cf. *Centesimus annus*, No. 7, in which John Paul II indicates that atheism is one of the sources of error about the person and the “subjectivity” of society. He clearly notes that in the response to the call of God, man realizes his transcendent dignity. At the same time, a rejection of God leads to a reorganization of society.

⁴ Cf. *Centesimus annus*, No. 41, where John Paul explicitly ties the vocation of self-donation to social structures: “As a person he can give himself to another person or to other persons, and ultimately to God, who is the author of his being and who alone can fully accept his gift. A man is alienated if he refuses to transcend himself and to live the experience of self-giving and of the formation of an authentic human community oriented towards his final destiny, which is God. A society is alienated if its forms of social organization, production and consumption make it more difficult to offer this gift of self and to establish this solidarity between people.”

other as source and goal of human life. It *destroys parenthood*, which is the source of a community and common life, and it *destroys marriage* as the “embodiment” of the highest form of mutual self-giving. This too is a crime.

It has become progressively clearer that the radical divergence in the understanding of man’s vocation and destiny makes dialogue increasingly difficult between Christianity and the secular age. The criminal activity of the age is hidden behind a “human face” and a love of “humanity,” which cannot, however, disguise a hatred of God.

With the impossibility of dialogue and persuasion, the alternative is clear. It must take the way of the *response due* to God and neighbour, not only in the inner word of *conformity* to both but also in the *external action* of self-donation.⁵ This action must and can take place first on the individual level. On that individual level it will have to be an imitation of Christ, who ransomed those who were His own, exchanging His life for ours. We too are called to give up something of ourselves *in order to ransom* those whose lives are being appropriated and consumed by the secular age. Only then will the foundations be laid for a new community in which the members can also be bound in a free communion to others because they give themselves to rather than consume the others.

Lvov, 25 March 1994.

⁵ The inner unity of the inner response of conformity and the external behaviour is the specific theme of *Veritatis splendor*, written to counter the error of those consequentialist theologians who would separate them.

DISCUSSION

Jan Sieg, SJ

I truly appreciate the two lectures. First, let me bring to our minds the fact that during the times of Communism, the image we had of the capitalist entrepreneur was distorted by propaganda. In contrast to this image, Mr. Horten has presented a very optimistic model of the entrepreneur, which is a true revelation to me. Free market and free competition are starting to function in our country now, and I have gained the impression – on the basis of the experience we have had so far – that they involve mainly an individualistic mentality, and that the only motives in question are the wish for profit, egoism, and one's own interest. The lecture has impressed me so deeply because it presented a humane model of the entrepreneur.

Secondly, Prof. Damian Fedoryka presented a philosophy of love realized through a total gift of self to others. This idea is also rarely considered in the West, though it is the right philosophy for the civilization of love. Pope John Paul II once again took up the problem of the civilization of love in his *Letter to Families*.

I have noticed that the two presentations were complementary: the first one let us see the ideal pattern for a Christian entrepreneur to follow, that is, being a humanist in economy, while the other offered us an explanation of the fundamental principle of the civilization of love. I truly appreciate both of the lectures.

Josef Seifert

While listening to Mr. Horten's lecture, I experienced a kind of shock, as most of what he said so beautifully about the ideal of the Christian spirit of enterprise is also true about many other spheres – not only about the relations between the entrepreneur and his employees, but also about the Academy and its rector's attitudes to the students and fellow-professors. I think that we could have a very interesting discussion on which elements are characteristic of the enterprise and the entrepreneur, and which are essential for any community to function.

Fr. Alfred Wierzbicki

I would like to make two remarks. The first concerns Mr. Horten's lecture, and the second – the lecture delivered by Prof. Fedoryka. It seems that the essence of Mr. Horten's lecture can be expressed by means of two key notions: of market, and of solidarity. I think that a joint consideration of market and solidarity, that is, an attempt to see the market in the perspective of solidarity, is particularly important for such countries as Poland, as well as others which have already liberated themselves from the centralized economy of the totalitarian period, but are still unable to take full advantage of the mechanisms of market economy in order to promote – socially and materially – the poorest classes of society. One could be afraid that the economic stratification of society, which is a sad inheritance of Communism, may bring about the return of the so-called wild capitalism prevailing in the times of Marx. Unfortunately, it must be said that all the "Solidarity" governments after 1989 have made the same mistake in giving one-sided support to the "businessman," while at the same time neglecting the "worker," who would often become unemployed. In my opinion, a very important principle, which the lecture stressed, is the one of balance between labour and capital. We must not fail to notice that one of the reasons for the victory of the post-Communists in the last parliamentary elections in Poland was the great disappointment of the working class, which resulted from the government's concentration on the development of capital. If I have understood Mr. Horten's lecture correctly, it includes a practical clue as to how to keep a balance between the principle of free market and the principle of solidarity.

And one more remark concerning Prof. Fedoryka's lecture. First of all, I would like to thank you for the words of hope for Europe, especially for the Ukraine, which is your homeland. I noticed that your lecture was written in Lvov, which has a particular symbolic meaning as your appeal to Europe is made from a country which has been spiritually devastated to a great degree.

However, I also have some critical remarks in relation to this lecture. They concern the meaning of the word "mine." I think that there appeared too much emphasis in your lecture on man's belonging to God, who endows him with being while giving him existence in the act of creation. However, it must be noticed that being, which is a gift, is given to man, and in this sense it is "his." As man receives not only assistance, but also dignity (thanks to Revelation, we know that this is the dignity of creation in the image and likeness of God), we may also speak about a certain autonomy of man. Man can fulfill himself in a gift for others, only because he actually takes possession of his own self. It might be apt to quote here a verse by Cyprian Norwid: "You are, but so am I, though I am thanks to You."

Alphons Horten

Since 1948, a market economy which provides social security has been developing in Germany. There are two things which have contributed to this. Firstly, appropriate laws have been created, which have ensured cooperation between employees and entrepreneurs. In other countries, such steps forward as, for example, company board sessions and reports made by the economic committee on the state of the company every four years, have yet not been taken. Here, it has been legally guaranteed that a constant exchange of views and opinions should be carried on, and thus the mutual agreement made deeper. It is vital for the employees to know that they are treated seriously and that the entrepreneur is actually compelled to treat them thus. This structure is still being developed in our country. Certainly, we must not allow for any exaggeration here. For example, a vital question concerning joint decision-making has arisen in Germany lately: it was suggested that the economic decisions should be made by both sides jointly. This postulate is false in its very essence, as the entrepreneurs' initiative would be blocked in this way. Having overcome many difficulties, we have finally found a compromise in this matter: if there is equality of votes, the Chairman, who represents the entrepreneur's side, has two votes, and it is he who eventually takes decisions in such cases.

The other decisive matter here is the question of property. I myself took part in the talks chaired by the Prime Minister of Northrhine-Westphalia. He suggested that an employee who has saved one *pfennig* during a working hour, should be given another one by the entrepreneur, as a bonus. It would not be much, about 20DM per month. The fact that such regulations are working in practice can be noticed only when we, for example, see how many houses have been put up thanks to tax privileges.

It is not my intention to praise Germany here. Yet, if the question of rightful distribution of profits does appear at all, I must say that I have known only one answer to this. In the seventh century BC, Confucius said that a wise ruler should take care so that as few people as possible have too much, and as few people as possible – too little. If we analyse the distribution of profits in Europe, we can see that the differences in profit gaining are the smallest in Germany. There are not so many rich people there as, for example, in France or Italy, but there are not so many poor people either. And it comes from the fact that people possess private property and work for their property.

It must be taken into account. Thanks to these good regulations, closer cooperation among the people employed in companies has been made possible. Such cooperation cannot be achieved as a result of individual action, and it certainly requires time. I cannot estimate the relationships in Poland, but in the new German *Länder* such changes have already started on a large scale. They still need time, but it is very important for the employees to be brought to save

and to invest in their own property. So this is a great achievement, also a legal one, that agreements like the one I have presented to you, are at all possible.

Damian Fedoryka

A few words to comment on Fr. Wierzbicki's remarks. I totally agree with you. But I think I should explain that in today's lecture I intended to emphasize the fact that the contemporary world respects "mine," but is not eager to render the gift. For this reason appropriation is destructive. I have tried to stress that self-possession, which is so principal, must stand between receiving and giving. The modern world wants neither to receive nor to give, but it only appropriates, and thus Christ's words are coming true – this world is losing self-possession. So I totally agree with you: self-possession, as the Holy Father often repeats, is a very important notion. I would also like to use this point while addressing Mr. Horten's and Prof. Seifert's remarks – in my opinion it is the very concept of self-possession that makes us radically revalue not only economics, but also capitalism in the form in which it is still offered to us today. And I think that I agree with Mr. Horten on this point, but I have some reservations as to whether the next step should be taken. Traditional economics distinguishes between capital and labour. Mr. Horten rightly points that the human person is also involved here. Let us add that the fundamental obligation of the human person is that of self-possession, so that he would be able to give himself. It is from this point of view that we should consider Prof. Seifert's challenge, and say in what respect the Academy is particularly concerned here.

I would add, though Mr. Horten would probably not take this step, that the question of possessing the means of production confirms one thing in a new way. The point is not that the tension between capital and labour should be overcome, but maybe – on the basis of what Mr. Horten has said – that unity of capital and labour should be established by making it possible for the employee to participate in the property. In the age of modern technology, the employee, who is also an owner of the means of production, will not be afraid of mechanization, advanced technologies, robots, etc. Thus, everything turns out to be a question of the validity of the concept of self-possession. It has also been confirmed by the Holy Father, who says that each individual has the right to initiative and to participation, and that the highest forms of these are property and participation in ownership of the means of production, which subsequently provides a basis for justice.

Alphons Horten

One remark only – all that you have said is right. We tried very hard, but employees do not want to participate in this kind of ownership because of the

risk. The risk – they say – is to be taken by the entrepreneur, the owner. There is a psychological problem here which makes the employees take advantage of this possibility only on a limited scale. Though such possibilities do exist, and despite the incentive scheme concerning tax reductions, the common mentality is not the same as in the case of saving, house building or other kinds of investment.

Jarosław Merecki, SDS

In his lecture, Mr. Horten presented an ideal of the entrepreneur which seems to be worth recommending not only on moral grounds, but which also deserves to be propagated from the point of view of the efficient functioning of particular companies and the whole economy. However, this ideal seems to disappear precisely in the highly developed countries. The word “crisis” appears in relation to their economies more and more often. Susan Strange, an American writer, says that in the eighties we entered the phase of “casino capitalism,” of enterprise no longer based on one’s own capital, but on borrowed money. This is the age of enterprise whose success is the result of mere luck rather than of circumspection and hard work. So, to what extent is the present economic crisis related to the crisis of a certain moral ideal of the entrepreneur?

Alphons Horten

There are certainly also other causes of this crisis. Firstly, we are experiencing rapid changes now (e.g. computerization) – there have never before been such violent transformations in technology and work organization. Very many enterprises which have been functioning on the old basis must change fundamentally. An additional contributing factor here is the creation of the European Community, which – for many branches of economy – naturally means radical changes. A large market, which brings profit in optimal circumstances, has been created, but it can also bring about loss in individual cases. There are also the grave mistakes which we have made. The wage level is too high, there are too many days off, and too many holidays. For example, a Czech worker receives one tenth of the German salary. Even if salaries are raised two or three times in the Czech Republic, there would still remain a great difference. We have also created a system which depends less and less on individual achievements, or on the employee’s skills, but which grows more and more dependent on technical equipment. In this situation, the same machines, robots or computers can be imported from different countries. Such a company as Siemens imports a great deal of its equipment from Asia, as Asia simply produces it much more cheaply. The German textile industry has almost completely ceased to be com-

petitive, because the costs of production are much lower in other countries. This process is very painful.

However, the greatest burden is the excessively built-up social sphere. We must redress the balance, as we have carried the good things too far. This is the question of *caritas*. *Caritas* without justice leads to degeneration, as St. Thomas Aquinas pointed out. Hard competition and a hard market have very unpleasant consequences: we must learn how to face them, which is certainly difficult.

Leon Dyczewski, OFMConv

I do admire German economy and the progress in the social sphere in Germany. I have understood that in Mr. Horten's opinion, the tension between capital and labour in Germany has lost some of its intensity in recent years. And so I would like to ask if this is only a model, or already the reality. We can observe that the tension between capital and labour still has many negative consequences, such as growing unemployment, not only in the eastern but also in the western lands. Among the unemployed, there are more and more university and other graduates of high school education. Social services cost more and more. So the good relationship between capital and labour is still only a model.

The second question, a very short and maybe naive one, is the following: what is the percentage of income allocated for social and health insurance? What is the maternity allowance? If I am correctly informed, these sums are lower in Germany than in other countries, for example France, Holland or Austria. At present, they are higher than they used to be, but they still remain lower than anywhere else. In Germany, but also in France, Denmark and Austria, people often speak about the society of the "two thirds." It means that two thirds of the country's population provide for the whole state, and that one third not only lives at the cost of the others, but is also doing quite well. What is your opinion on this? Are there really such differences in society? My approach is that of a sociologist, not of a philosopher. Though everything seems to go on well from the philosophical point of view, I am still a little sceptical about the reality. I do admire German welfare, probably the greatest in Europe, but if we come to talk about the reality ... I can still see enormous tensions between capital and labour, be it in Germany or in Poland. There are certainly mechanisms to overcome this tension. Maybe there are more of them in Germany than in our country, or maybe they are better ...

Rocco Buttiglione

As a politician, I would like to say that philosophers and theologians sometimes think that life should or could be easy. It is just the opposite. Man's survival

is always uncertain, and societies have always been challenged to provide enough means in order to live, and they have not always succeeded. In such a case, a war during which one society takes another's property becomes one of the fundamental means of survival.

Also today, the problem of survival remains a difficult one. And even if a market economy is a form of organization better than others, it is also unable to eliminate the tragic element from the world. Its particular form is present in market economy. An efficiently working entrepreneur simultaneously provides working posts for some, and causes the unemployment of others. Why is market economy so efficient? Because it incessantly aims at greater and better production with the help of the work of ever smaller numbers of people, and the smallest possible of means. In this way, efficacy is growing, but unemployment is growing too: such is, in principle, the essence of market economy.

A traditional school economist could say: yes, but in time the dismissed will find new jobs and the welfare of society as a whole will simply grow, just because these people will be producing something new. It is all true, but nothing is said about what happens between the moment of dismissal and the moment of finding a new place of work. A great problem for our social policy is how to help the people in such a situation.

I once read a little book by Cardinal Wyszyński in which he presented all the evils of unemployment, both the moral and the economic ones. And I would say that this is the problem of the social policy in every country, though it seems to me that it does not belong to the sphere of the direct responsibility of the entrepreneur, but concerns the indirect employer, namely, the lawmaker or the politician. What can we do? There are many possibilities. One is to give people positions which are not really working positions, as the state is paying for them. The Communists used to do this, but such a subsidized economy cannot survive too long. It seems to me that the right solution goes in another direction. Firstly, we must give the unemployed money to survive, we must find some source of income for them. Secondly, we must predict the development of the labour market. We have the possibility of predicting in which economic branches there may shortly appear new positions, and we must prepare the unemployed to take the jobs there. It is easier said than done, but I think this is the only possibility which the present social policy gives us today.

Alphons Horten

Churchill once said that democracy is the worst form of government, unless the others are taken into account. It means that all forms of government and all the solutions are imperfect, since people are imperfect. The advantage of democracy lies principally in its being made subject to criticism. In England, the leader of

Her Majesty's Most Loyal Opposition receives a regular salary. His task is to criticize the government and in this way to prevent stagnation. We have seen that in countries where such critique is not present, total stagnation follows.

The same is true about economy. The only advantage of a free market is that it is in constant motion, thanks to competition. It certainly makes a difficult problem, yet it constitutes the decisive condition of the freedom of market. Of course, there are also instances of taking advantage of the market, for example speculation, etc., but they cannot be totally eliminated. This is a moral problem. Lawmakers can only create possibilities for good actions, yet they cannot make people good. In Germany, there are too few workers in many fields (e.g. in hospital service). Anyway, instances of taking advantage of unemployment benefits are ever present (in America this is the case with about one third of the unemployed). But is there a system anywhere in the world which would be more than 60-70% efficient? We must not fail to see that we are not dealing here with machines, but with people, and everything depends on them. The unemployment in Germany is also artificial to a large extent, as many people are working "black." So, we must consider the reality: any good legal act can be taken advantage of. And in this way, the question of morality arises once again.

Wolfgang Waldstein

Actually, Mr. Horten has already said everything which I had in mind. The main problem is the character of man who produces objects. Let us consider a totally different domain, for example the development of rules of the court. This law has been in continual development precisely to prevent its abuse, yet people keep finding new ways of taking advantage of it. In fact, there is not a single thing that cannot be taken advantage of, if man himself does not care to live responsibly. Therefore, I think that it is purely utopian to attempt to build up an economic, or other system which would not strive to strengthen people morally in their responsibility. It is due to such an attempt that the unemployed in Austria get, so to say, free salaries, and do not take up any job which is inconvenient for them, and that they work "black" at the same time, earning much more than they would having a steady job. Of course, there are also those who are in a truly difficult situation.

During my visit to Russia, I was scheduled to give a lecture on private property to the Russian Academy of Sciences. It was just then that the Constitutional Committee was discussing whether private ownership of land should be allowed again. It was a purely historical experience concerning what Aristotle writes in *Politics*: that wherever private property is suspended, individual initiative simply dies out. So, private property is indispensable, although if it exists, it can be terribly abused. It always happens so, and it inevitably leads

in turn to reaction against this abuse. An extremely dramatic instance of such a reaction was Diocletian's edict of 301 AD, which introduced the death penalty for abuse of property through the excessive price of goods. However, the effect of this edict was not price reduction, but a shortage of goods, which could nonetheless be bought on the black market – it resembles our post-war experience. Thus, we will never be able to handle man's violation of moral norms by legal means only. We must rather consolidate all powers in order to bring about a spiritual revival, which is certainly much more difficult.

Rocco Buttiglione

I totally agree with Prof. Damian Fedoryka, and I am in favour of larger participation of workers in the ownership of their firms. I think that it would be good from the moral point of view, and it would be good from the economic point of view, as it would imply a strong education of workers about the entrepreneurial risk. However, though it would be good, it would not solve the problem of unemployment. Let us imagine a society in which firms have been structured in the way Prof. Fedoryka suggested, and are the property of their employees. One of the firms introduces a new technical procedure, they reduce the costs of production, they succeed in producing more, better, and cheaper. What will happen? This enterprise will grow, they will hire more people, they will produce more, and many other firms will no longer find any market for their goods, and will actually be forced to introduce the same technology. However, for the first firm, the introduction of the new technique implies an expansion of their power, since if you acquire a larger part of the market, you can hire more people. The second and the third firms will have to introduce the same system and reduce the number of their employees in order to survive. It cannot be avoided unless the mechanism which induced technical progress is stopped. On these grounds, I do agree with Prof. Fedoryka: we should do what he suggests. I do not think this is a 100% possible, yet the larger the employees' share in the company ownership, the better. However, if we want to fight unemployment, we must also use other strategies, which take into account the need for mobility. One has to change the sector in which one works, and the only way to reduce unemployment and to reduce the time in which one remains unemployed, is to foresee needs and move people from one sector to another.

Translated by *Dorota Chabrajska*

THE DEMOCRATIC STATE AND CONCERN ABOUT MAN

Wolfgang WALDSTEIN

LEGISLATION (*LEX*) AS AN EXPRESSION OF JURISPRUDENCE (*IUS*)

There is an objective standard to measure what is right and wrong, which cannot be changed by the political will, even of majorities. [...] What St. Augustine said about the consequences of leaving out justice, as a result of a general and true cognition. Therefore, what he said is still valid, namely: "And so if justice is left out, what are kingdoms except great robber bands?"

I was asked to speak about legislation (*lex*) as an expression of jurisprudence (*ius*). This needs some clarification. First of all the question arises, how can legislation be an expression of jurisprudence? Is it not, on the contrary, the task of jurisprudence to deal with the laws passed by legislation? And is not jurisprudence in its work strictly bound to take laws as they are, without questioning their content? If the legislator of a democratic country, for instance of the Netherlands, decides by a small majority that in certain cases it is allowed to kill a sick person, is not jurisprudence – like everyone else – bound to accept that as the sovereign will of the democratic legislator? Our Austrian Constitution declares in its Article 1 explicitly: "Austria is a democratic republic. Its law proceeds from the people." Is there anything beyond or besides the will of a people that could determine legislation? Today, the prevailing answer certainly is: No.¹ What, then, can the meaning of my theme be?

In order to find an answer, we ought first to look at a classical definition of jurisprudence given by the famous Roman jurist Ulpian, who was killed in a mutiny of the Praetorian Guard in 223 AD. Not only is his notion of jurisprudence of greatest importance for the entire development of European jurisprudence, but this importance of Roman jurisprudence has also been demonstrated by the fact that it succeeded in developing within a period of about 400

¹ It is not necessary to list here all the witnesses for these opinions. "The pure theory of law," as Hans Kelsen himself calls it in English, or "the theory of pure law," as H. A u f - r i c h t says in *Law, State, and International Legal Order, Essays in Honor of Hans Kelsen*, The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville 1964, p. 29, may be quoted as probably the most influential among these. All the essays in this book are very informative on the mentioned opinions.

years a legal order (*ius*) which fundamentally formed all legal orders of Europe and of many countries outside Europe, even to the present day. During a stay in Moscow as a guest of the Russian Academy of Sciences, I learned that colleagues there are confronted with the task of drafting a new civil code. The catastrophe of the Communist system has left nothing that could be used for a legal order in any meaningful sense. They see now that the only possible ground on which a just and human legal order can be built is Roman law.

Secondly, we will have to turn to the notion of legislation as it has been understood since antiquity. This will ultimately enable us to see in what sense legislation, in fact, ought to be an expression of jurisprudence; or more precisely, an expression of objective justice in conformity with *ius* as the *ars boni et aequi*, the science of the good and the just, as an other great Roman jurist, Celsus, defines it. This also means that all legislation ought to be in conformity with human rights and ultimately with natural law, in order to be able to produce law, and not simply arbitrary rules in pursuit of some kind of utility. From this we can also draw the consequences which must follow if a legislator violates justice.

1. THE DEFINITION OF JURISPRUDENCE BY ULPIAN

The most famous source for our knowledge of the writings of Roman jurists is the *Digest* compiled under the reign of the Roman emperor Justinian, and published in 533 AD. In the Middle Ages this codification became the main source for legal instruction at the law schools in Italy, especially Bologna, and with time all over Europe. In this work, the writings of Ulpian play a dominant role. One third of the *Digest* consists of fragments from his works. Therefore, Tony Honoré was able to say in his work about Ulpian: "His importance lies in the part he played in the transmission of the Roman legal heritage."²

Ulpian's definition of jurisprudence was placed by the compilers at the very beginning of the *Digest*, the first section of the first book, concerning Justice and Law. This section contains famous texts about natural law and justice, and also the only definition of law by a jurist handed down to us as coming from antiquity, a definition formulated by Celsus and quoted by Ulpian: "Law is the art of knowing what is good and just."³ The definition of jurisprudence itself is contained in a fragment that opens with Ulpian's famous definition of justice⁴, followed by the statement: "The precepts of the law (*iuris praecepta*) are

² T. H o n o r é, *Ulpian*, Oxford 1982, p. 247.

³ D. 1, 1, 1 pr., translated by S.P. Scott, *The Civil Law*, first published Cincinnati 1932, reprinted New York 1973, vol. I, p. 209.

⁴ D. 1, 1, 10 pr.: "*Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi.*"

the following: to live honourably (*honeste*, which means morally right), to injure no one, to give to every one his due.”⁵ I mention all this in order to make the context understandable, as well as the importance also of the definition of jurisprudence accredited to it by the compilers themselves. It follows immediately after the “precepts of law.” I quote first the Latin text: *iuris prudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia*. Scott renders this definition with the words: “The science of the law is the acquaintance with Divine and human affairs, the knowledge of what is just and what is unjust.”

Before I enter into an interpretation of this text, I would like to mention that the entire first section was published with the first 26 books out of 50 of the *Digest*, in Russian translation by members of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1984, that means before *Perestroika* had started. I was told that the copies were out-of-print after a very short time, and that in particular the ideas expressed about justice and law, now open to a broader public for the first time since the Russian Revolution, played an important role in promoting *Perestroika*. This shows that what was seen and formulated by Roman jurists is not something of mere historical interest. It is still fundamental for every humane legal order. And these principles can help to identify injustice within a given a legal order. They demand to be respected wherever fundamental human rights or justice in general are violated. Therefore they are apt to work as a catalyst to shake up consciences. They can encourage resistance to violations of justice and oppressions.

Now to the definition itself. Scott translates *divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia* as “the acquaintance with Divine and human affairs.” It is certainly a correct translation. But here the problem of every translation becomes clear. The Latin word *res* is broader than “affair.” It includes the whole divine and natural world and its order. This can be shown by a parallel text, where Seneca says that wisdom is defined by some as: *divinorum et humanorum scientia*, the science or knowledge of the Divine and human, without any further specification.⁶ Others add: *et horum causas*, and the causes of all this. But Seneca finds this addition superfluous, because the causes are part of the Divine and the human, anyway. In any case, this comprises all possible human knowledge. Ulpian seems to have a similar view. In order to be able to know “what is just and what is unjust,” one must know the Divine, the natural, and the human order in the world. Isolated knowledge of some rules or laws is obvi-

For a detailed discussion of this definition see: W. Waldstein, *Ist das “suum cuique” eine Leerformel?*, in: *Ius humanitatis. Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag von A. Verdross*, ed. H. Miessler, Berlin 1980, pp. 285-320, with further reference.

⁵ D. 1, 1, 10 pr. – 2, translation by Scott (see note 3), p. 211.

⁶ Sen. *Epist.* 89, 5.

ously not sufficient. And in fact Ulpian stresses in the very first text of the *Digest* that jurists have the task to “cultivate justice” and to teach the knowledge of what is good and just.⁷ At the end of this paragraph, Ulpian adds that in this work jurists are “aiming (if I am not mistaken) at a true, and not a pretended philosophy,”⁸ which shows his awareness of the philosophical implications of the work of jurists. In connection with the definition of law, which Ulpian quotes in the immediately preceding sentence, this means that in doing so, jurists teach *ius*, that is to say, law. In fact, this is the content of their entire work, which is documented in the *Digest*. Therefore the *Digest* itself was called the *iustitiae Romanae templum*. In the introductory Constitution *Tanta*, passed by the emperor and legislator Justinian, the legislator himself confesses that this temple of Roman justice was built on the works of Roman jurists. And then comes the surprising fact that jurists themselves, that is, these representatives of Roman jurisprudence, are called by the Emperor *legislatores*.⁹ All this makes it clear that legislation has, in fact, been an expression of jurisprudence (*ius*). And precisely this legislation was without doubt the most important for the whole legal development in Europe until today. This now makes it necessary to look a little more closely at the notion of legislation. But I must mention already here that jurisprudence itself has, under the influence of positivistic and relativistic ideas, departed from the foundations made clear by Ulpian. We shall still see what it means when legislation becomes the expression of such ideas.

2. THE NOTION OF LEGISLATION

As already mentioned, legislation is today understood as an act of the will of a constitutionally competent organ of a certain state. Especially if this organ consists of the democratically organized people itself, or of a democratically elected representative of it, as, for instance, a parliament, the idea prevails that whatever a democratic majority thinks to be right is to be accepted as law. As long as a democratic majority respects objective justice, human rights, and natural law in general, no real problem arises. But as soon as a majority starts

⁷ Ulp. D. 1,1,1,1; here, it seems to me, the translation of Scott fails. The Latin text reads: *justitiam namque colimus et boni et aequi notitiam profiteamur*. The Latin *profiteri* means in this context to teach publicly; see: E. H e u m a n n, E. S e c k e l, *Handlexikon zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts*, Graz 1958, p. 466.

⁸ See: W. W a l d s t e i n, *Index*, “International Survey of Roman Law” 22 (1994) No. 31, esp. pp. 33-37.

⁹ See: Const. *Tanta* 20 and 20a; see also: T. H o n o r é, *Tribonian*, London 1978, pp. 139-186: *Temple of Justice: The Digest*.

to ignore all of this, because it wishes to do something it thinks profitable for itself but which is contrary to the rights of others and to justice, the question arises, whether or not this is still legitimate legislation. The answer to this question was clearly already seen in antiquity. Even democracy changes in such a case into a form of tyranny, which was called *ochlocratia*. Democracy, like any other legitimate constitutional form of the state, can only exist if fundamental rights are respected without any restriction. A recent statement by our Holy Father John Paul II, namely that “No one can proclaim his own sovereignty or execute his rights at the cost of the sovereignty and rights of his brothers,” is certainly a “fundamental moral imperative concerning politics and social life in the contemporary world,” as my dear friend Tadeusz Styczeń formulated it. But in addition, it can be shown to be founded on all the principles of justice and law known since antiquity.

Concerning the ancient notion of *lex*, I would like to first quote a relevant passage from the *Digest*, in which the Roman jurist Marcian quotes the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, who said:

Law (*νόμος, lex*) is the queen of all things, Divine and human. It should also be the governor of both the good and the bad, and the leader, the ruler, and in this way, be the standard of whatever is just and unjust for those animals (man) who are by nature “living in a community,” prescribing what should be done, and prohibiting what should not be done.¹⁰

Concerning legislation itself, Cicero especially has shown in his work what is important for law in a very clear way. I can only quote a few of the most important passages. He starts by saying:

But in determining what Justice is, let us begin with the supreme law which had its origin ages before any written law existed, or any state had been established.¹¹

In the course of his further inquiry he shows why the law of tyrants cannot be regarded as law at all. Even if a whole people should be “delighted by the tyrant’s laws, that would not entitle such laws to be regarded as just.” One of the examples mentioned by Cicero is a law allowing a dictator to “put to death with impunity any citizen he wished.” Then Cicero goes on to say: “For Justice is one; it binds all human society, and is based on one Law.” This law (*lex*)

¹⁰ See H. G. L i d e l l and R. S c o t t, *Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford 1961, p. 1435. The relevant passage in Aristotle *Pol.* 1, 9; 1253 a 3, is translated by H. Rackham in *The Loeb Classical Library* (1959) as follows: “man is by nature a political animal.” Scott misunderstood the passage of the *Digest* completely in saying: “as well as those *things* which are civil by Nature.”

¹¹ Cic. *Leg.* 1, 19; translated by C.W. Keys, *The Loeb Classical Library* (1966).

is called by Cicero *recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi*. It is, as in many other passages, not possible to simply translate *ratio* with reason. I cannot discuss this problem here in detail. But it becomes, as I am convinced, clear on the basis of many passages, that *ratio* means order, and is much more related to what St. Thomas formulates as *participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura*¹² than simply to reason. Therefore, Cicero can add: "Whoever knows not this Law, whether it has been recorded in writing anywhere or not, is without Justice."¹³ He then goes on to say: "But if the principles of Justice (he says *iura*, which means law also) were founded on the decrees of peoples, the edicts of princes, or the decisions of judges,"¹⁴ then it would be lawful to commit "robbery and adultery and forgery of wills, in case these acts were approved by the votes or decrees of the populace. [...] But in fact we can perceive the difference between good laws and bad by referring them to no other standard than Nature."¹⁵ Nature is meant here of course in the sense of natural law.

A very famous passage in St. Augustine can help to further clarify things. He refers to a well known incident concerning the Macedonian King, Alexander the Great, who had captured a certain pirate. "When the king asked him what he was thinking of, that he should plunder the sea, he said with defiant independence: The same as you when you plunder the world! Since I do this with a little ship I am called pirate. You do it with a great fleet and are called an emperor." St. Augustine uses this example to argue his statement:

And so, if justice is left out, what are kingdoms except great robber bands? For what are robber bands except little kingdoms? The band also is a group of men governed by the orders of a leader, bound by social compact (in the sense of contract, bargain), and its booty is divided according to a law agreed upon. If ... this plague grows to the point where it holds territory and establishes a fixed seat, seizes cities and subdues people, then it more conspicuously assumes the name of kingdom, and this name is now openly granted to it, not for any subtraction of cupidity, but by addition of impunity.¹⁶

These last words: "by addition of impunity" are, so to speak, prophetic for our times. The "social compact" has, in its majority, agreed on the right of women to avoid personal problems by killing unwanted children, and the legis-

¹² See: *Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 91, a. 2 resp.; in this sense also *Veritatis splendor*, Nos. 43-44 and 50. See also Cic. *Off.* 1, 42.

¹³ Cic. *Leg.* 1, 42.

¹⁴ From here on I cannot follow the translation of Keyes, because he simply identifies *ius* with justice, which is contrary to the meaning of the text.

¹⁵ Cic. *Leg.* 1, 43 and 44.

¹⁶ Aug. *Civ.* 4, 4; translated by W. M. Green, *The Loeb Classical Library* (1963).

lator grants them impunity for doing so. In the Netherlands, the majority has further agreed upon the next logical step, namely, to kill aged and sick persons under certain circumstances. But already in 1920, a famous German professor of Criminal Law, Karl Binding, simply a representative of the positivistic theories and not a Nazi, proposed the idea that incurably sick and imbecile persons should be killed in order to avoid the expenditure of national wealth and work, withdrawing it from productive purposes by using it to nurse such "ballast-existences,"¹⁷ There can be no doubt that the ideas formulated by Binding and others helped the Nazi tyranny to carry out its intentions. Robert M. Byrn has called the new ethic the "homicidal high magic of the quality-of-life ethic," into which American jurisprudence submerged itself by allowing abortion. He then says: "The magician knows best. He is going to give us *la dolce vita* even if it kills us, or at any rate, kills those of us who are so inconveniently dependent and burdensome as to stand in the way of the good life."¹⁸ In 1975 such ideas were proposed at a Symposium organized by Albin Eser, another professor of Criminal Law, at the University of Bielefeld. It was argued that new decision-making bodies like a jury should be created, which would have to decide about life and death. This could help to "revitalize" democratic decision-finding and to distribute the new responsibilities which modern science forces upon as the responsibility to "play the good God."¹⁹ This "playing the good God" assumes the right to decide about the lives of others, like God. Here it becomes obvious that such an assumption arrives at the point where democracy should turn into its totalitarian opposite, namely the *ochlocratia*, if the majority should accept these views.

There can be no doubt that positivistic and relativistic jurisprudence, which denies the existence or recognizability of any objective standards of justice, will also help legislation to disregard these standards. This is primarily and emphatically denied by those who promote positivistic theories. No one feels responsible for any crime committed by any system that adopts such theories for its purpose.²⁰ In any case, any legislation as an expression of such jurisprudence,

¹⁷ See: L. G r u c h m a n n, *Justiz im Dritten Reich 1933-1940*, Munich 1988, p. 497.

¹⁸ "America" (1973) 511; see also: W. W a l d s t e i n, *Das Menschenrecht zum Leben*, Berlin 1982, p. 94, note 287.

¹⁹ See: A. E s e r (ed.) *Suizid und Euthanasie als human- und sozialwissenschaftliches Problem*, Stuttgart 1976, p. 390; W a l d s t e i n, *Das Menschenrecht*, *op. cit.*, p. 106. In the original German version Kittrie proposes "*die Schaffung von völlig neuen Körperschaften zur Entscheidungsfindung*" which should decide "*ähnlich wie Geschworenengerichte... über Leben und Tod*". This is seen as a way "*zur Wiederbelebung demokratischer Entscheidungsfindung*" which "*dazu helfen könnte, die neuen gesellschaftlichen Verantwortungsbereiche zu verteilen, die uns die moderne Wissenschaft aufzwingt: die Verantwortung dafür, daß wir den «lieben Gott» spielen.*"

²⁰ This escape from one's own responsibility for the consequences of one's theories is

no matter whether formally democratic or dictatorial, ends up in violating the most fundamental human rights, natural law and justice.

In order to prevent single states from falling into this kind of barbarism, international declarations, and even conventions of human rights, were set up after the Second World War. In the meantime, even these international measures to safeguard human rights fail to do so in the most crucial questions. In the international organisations, the representatives of democratic states which have taken measures against the protection of human rights, especially on the question of protecting the lives of the unborn, have, in the most part, accepted the legislation of their states as legitimate. One of the most shameful things is the debate about the “definition of the word «child»” in Article 1 of the UN *Convention on the Rights of the Child* of 1989. The fact that “abortion is legal in many countries was a factor in arguing for the vague language of Article 1.”²¹ The conscience of humanity, still alive when the declarations and conventions were set up, faded away under the determined egoistical will all over the world to promote one’s own “quality-of-life” at any cost, even at the cost of disregarding unwanted human life. There is no way to avoid the consequences of a legislation serving such goals, on which we now have to focus.

rightly criticized by M. Kriele in: *Recht, Vernunft, Wirklichkeit*, Berlin 1990, who in his *Vorwort*, p. v, says that, in looking for answers to the question, how all the horrible things under Nazirule were possible, he was always led “auf das Phänomen des «sophistischen Milieus»: auf die Verführungsanfälligkeit der Intellektuellen mit ihrer fast unbegrenzten Fähigkeit, sich Versionen zu machen, sie zu verbreiten, selbst daran zu glauben und schließlich für nichts verantwortlich zu sein”. And: “Von Vernunft kann nur die Rede sein, wo das Denken die Lügengespinste der Versionen durchbricht und Verantwortung für die Wirklichkeit auf sich nimmt.”

²¹ C. P. C o h e n, *Introductory Note* to “International Legal Materials” 28 (1989) No. 6, p. 1450. The relevant passage is worth quoting in full: “During the second reading, four areas emerged as what might be called ‘hot topics’ or highly controversial issues. These were the rights of the unborn child, [...] The rights of the unborn child were an issue from the moment drafting began on the Article 1 definition of the word «child» right through to the end of the second reading. There were delegations and NGO’s which argued that the rights of the unborn were protected to some degree by the law of every State, regardless of its national laws relating to abortion, and that to ignore these protections by omitting reference to them in the Convention was patently disingenuous. The carefully worded compromise language of Article 1 which defines a child simply as «every human being...» and leaves it to the State Parties to give their own meaning to the words «human being» according to their national legislation, was not specific enough to satisfy some delegations. A further compromise was finally hammered out during the second reading, when the *Preamble* to the Convention was expanded to include a paragraph quoting the 1959 *Declaration* which refers to «appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth».”

3. CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATION DISREGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS

As much as those who think it desirable or prudent to allow under certain circumstances the killing of innocent human beings for the sake of the "quality-of-life" of others might be convinced that such measures could rightly be allowed by a legitimate legislation, they cannot avoid the consequence, that a legislator, in giving in to such demands, departs from the foundations of a legitimate state altogether. One need not be especially informed about history and human rights to know this. Humanity knew clearly already forty years ago that certain acts committed by totalitarian systems were crimes against humanity. Hitler, for instance, was not able to openly allow the killing of unborn children or incurably sick and imbecile persons, because the conscience of the people was still so strong, and this in spite of the above-mentioned theories. The crimes involved in these actions do not become better if they are now openly allowed by democratic legislators according to the wishes of majorities. There is an objective standard to measure what is right and wrong, which cannot be changed by the political will, even of majorities. This standard was already clearly seen without the light of Christian revelation. As Cicero for instance said, it "binds all human society" and is "based on one Law." And further: "Whoever knows not this Law, [...] is without Justice."²² What St. Augustine said about the consequences of absence of justice is a result of a general and true cognition. Therefore, what he said is still valid, namely: "And so if justice is left out, what are kingdoms except great robber bands?" The will of a majority is not able to change this truth. But also not a positivistic sceptical theory as for instance the opinion of Alf Ross, expressed in the words: "To invoke justice is the same thing as banging on the table: an emotional expression which turns one's demand into an absolute postulate."²³ If this were true, then all the endeavours of mankind to promote a knowledge of justice would have been in vain, including the achievements of Roman jurisprudence. What it would mean to maintain this was explained by Cicero, who bluntly states, concerning the foundations of justice: "only a madman would conclude that these judgements are matters of opinion, and not fixed by Nature."²⁴ Therefore they are valid not only for "kingdoms," but also for democratically-organized states.

Democratic organisation does not *per se* guarantee that a certain state is in reality a true democracy. This, too, was seen already in antiquity. A democratically-organized state turns into its corruption, the *ochlocratia*, as

²² Cic. *Leg.* 1, p. 42; see above next to note 12.

²³ A. R o s s, *On Law and Justice*, London 1953; see also: W. W a l d s t e i n, *Ist das "suum cuique"*, *op. cit.*, p. 285, note 2.

²⁴ Cic. *Leg.* pp. 1, 44-45.

soon as fundamental laws, human rights, and thereby justice, are violated, even by votes of a majority. As our Holy Father has shown again in his Encyclical *Veritatis splendor* (No. 50), especially “the origin and the foundation of the duty of absolute respect for human life are to be found in the dignity proper to the person.”²⁵ Vatican II has said clearly: “Therefore, from the moment of the conception, life must be guarded with the greatest care, while abortion and infanticide are unspeakable crimes” (*Gaudium et spes*, No. 51). The Latin says: *nefanda crimina*, which is better translated as “terrible” (and its equivalents such as) “nefarious,” “scandalous” or “detestable” crimes. In any case it is clear enough that no vote, even of a majority, can change these crimes into lawful acts. As Robert Spaemann has shown, to think that society could do that, would be a totalitarian misunderstanding of society which leads to the end of a free society.²⁶

Most competent representatives of German jurisprudence have throughout many years made clear that legal permission to kill unborn children, according to the wishes of the mother, is unconstitutional.²⁷ In spite of all the arguments that were produced by jurisprudence, the *Bundestag* passed a new Abortion Act in 1992, not as an expression of jurisprudence, but as the political will of the

²⁵ The Latin has: “*origo et fundamentum officii humanae vitae prorsus observandae in germana dignitate propriae personae sunt reperienda*”. The German translation omits “*germana*” and is, as in many other cases, unfortunately not adequate. But the English translation also omits it. It could be translated as “inborn”. In the same sense as the Latin text the *Austrian Civil Codex* (ABGB) says in its Paragraph 16: “*Jeder Mensch hat angeborene, schon durch die Vernunft einleuchtende Rechte.*”

²⁶ R. S p a e m a n n, *Verantwortung für die Ungeborenen*, “Schriftenreihe der Juristen Vereinigung Lebensrecht e. V. zu Köln” 5 (1988) No. 5, p. 30. See also much more detailed arguments: J. D e t j e n, *Neopluralismus und Naturrecht*, Paderborn 1988, pp. 270-279, and 639-649; also: M. K r i e l e, *Recht, Vernunft, Wirklichkeit*, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 204-235; *Befreiung und politische Aufklärung*, Freiburg 1986², and *Einführung in die Staatslehre. Die geschichtlichen Legitimitätsgrundlagen des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates*, Opladen 1994⁵, esp. pp. 121-126 and 235-272.

²⁷ The question became more acute after the fall of the Berlin wall and the following *Einigungs-Vertrag*, which was ratified by the new Article 143 GG. Concerning one article of this *Einigungs-Vertrag*, Axel v. Campenhausen said in his commentary to Art. 143 in: v. M a n - g o l d t/K l e i n / v. C a m p e n h a u s e n, GG, Art. 143 Rdnr. 23: “*In Art. 9 Abs. 2 EV heißt es, das in der Anlage II aufgeführte Recht der vormaligen DDR bleibe in Kraft, soweit es mit dem GG [...] vereinbar ist. Solches Rechts ist aber, auch wenn es in der Anlage II zum EV aufgeführt ist, von der Fortgeltung ausgeschlossen, sofern es auch nur mit einem der in Art. 79 Abs. 3 GG genannten Grundsätze unvereinbar erscheint. Das ist bei dem [...] § 1 Abs. 2 bis 4 des bisher in der DDR geltenden Gesetz über die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft, der die Fristenregelung konkret enthält, der Fall: Nach den Grundsätzen, die das BVerfG in dem Urteil v. 25. 2. 1975 aufgestellt hat, ist diese Bestimmung weder mit dem in Art. 1. Abs. 1 GG niedergelegten Grundsatz der Unantastbarkeit der Menschenwürde vereinbar noch auch mit dem in Art. 2 Abs. 2 Satz 1 GG verbürgten Recht auf Leben.*”

majority. In 1993 the German Federal Constitutional Court decided on this Abortion Act. The guiding principles (*Leitsätze*) which the Court formulated, contain almost everything one ought to say concerning the protection of human life, and especially that of the unborn. These principles even include the one stating that the state is not free to renounce measures of penal law for the protection of human life.²⁸ But obviously social pressure forced the Court to accept a deadly compromise. Although the Court recognizes abortion after consultation (*Beratungslösung*) as illegal, it allows the legislator to withdraw the protection by threat of punishment for the unborn child. In spite of all the well-meant statements of the Court concerning encouragement and help for the woman to carry her child to term, it will in practice have the effect that people will think that if it is not punishable, it is legal. In any case the legislator is now free to renounce the only possible protection the state could effectively give to every unborn child. Because people just want to get rid of unwanted children, some way must be found to allow it, even at the cost of the lives of others. Why, then, should one not also allow the killing of others who can often be much more burdensome than a child? One can already see clearly enough that one day those who had allowed the killing of innocent persons can and most probably will be the victims of their own principles, and all of us with them, if not..., yes, if the human conscience cannot again be awakened from its widespread egoism to the full recognition of the demands of justice.

In this situation it gives real hope that two members of the German *Bundestag*, Norbert Geis and Manfred Carstens, proposed a draft bill containing unrestricted protection for the unborn child.²⁹ It seems to have found unexpected support among members of the *Bundestag* and the public. If this proposal should be successful, it could really start a new era of returning to human rights, natural law and justice, and by this, to the foundations of a really humane future in human solidarity. The vision of our Holy Father concerning the future of Europe consists in the true spirit of Europe, and is expressed outstandingly in his Encyclicals and other documents but, I think, in the most important way in his Encyclical *Veritatis splendor*. May this light, this splendour of the truth reach the spirits and hearts of humanity. It contains the real foundations of a humane future. In any case, we have to work for that as much as we can. For the rest, we can only hope and pray.

²⁸ "Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts" 88 (1993) No. 21, p. 203 ff.; the principles concerning penal law measures are Nos. 8-11, p. 204.

²⁹ This proposal I found published in "Kirche heute" 1994, No. 3, p. 6.

Andrzej SZOSTEK, MIC

THE (Catholic) UNIVERSITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC STATE

The university has been the place to search for truth, and it is also trying hard today to remain such a place. [...] If the ethos of truth disappears from among people, if the conviction that the search for truth for its own sake, as well as the necessary faithful obedience to truth – disappears, then the fundamental condition for the correct functioning of democracy will be lacking.

The title of this lecture deserves a little commentary. If anyone were to interpret it as a suggestion that the state and its aims should be considered as the reason for the existence of the university, then I am ready to explain that supporting the state is not the main aim of the university. Of course, the university (also a Catholic one) may take on a vital role within the state (within a democratic state, too), but only on condition that it properly fulfills its other due tasks. So, as first in the course of this lecture, we should recall briefly the responsibilities resulting from the original idea of university (§1), and also the grounds which justify the creation of Catholic universities (§2). Only against this background will it be possible to recall some elements essential for the democratic state (§3), and to point to the particular role of the university in it, especially of the Catholic university (§4).

1. THE UNIVERSITY: A COMMUNITY OF THOSE SEARCHING FOR TRUTH

I need not remind my respected audience that the first universities originated on the initiative of the Catholic Church in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, in the flourishing years of the Middle Ages. Since that time, they have undergone a considerable change, yet they have not only survived until the present times, but despite the manifold particular differences, they have also created a specific character which differentiates them from other institutions of higher learning. I would like to draw your attention to three features which contribute to this character.

Firstly, the fundamental reason for the existence of the university was and has been the search for truth: about God, about man, about the world. In this sense, one could say that from its very beginning, the character of the universi-

ty has been a theoretical one.¹ In their classical structure, which was comprised of four faculties: *artes liberales* (together with philosophy), medicine, law and theology, the universities also took up practical issues (medical, moral, political, etc.), but they put them in the theoretical – mainly philosophical and theological perspective. It is no wonder then that it was in the Middle Ages that those disciplines developed. Since that time, however, the nature of universities has changed so much, that it is difficult to speak about a uniform and clearly theoretical orientation of university studies in our day. Nonetheless, many universities are still making an effort to preserve their fundamental theoretical orientation and to educate experts in particular fields of knowledge, whereas in polytechnics, academies, or professional training colleges, science is pursued in order to prepare specific professionals: engineers, artists, etc.

Of course, every truth – even the most theoretical one – also has its practical significance; lofty philosophical ideas, as well as abstract mathematical analyses, have always exerted a substantial influence on the course of culture and civilization. The question is, however, whether the value of these ideas and analyses is measured only by their practical significance, or whether they are already considered valuable as an expression of the cognitive passion characteristic of man. In other words: whether truth is worth grasping, because it gives man power over the world, or whether it is worth pursuing and discovering for its own sake, which simultaneously gives man a chance to confirm and strengthen in himself the deepest essence of what he really is, namely of a rational being. It seems that the medieval scheme of university studies managed to propose the highest level of theoretical cognition, which universities today are still not eager to give up.

Secondly, from its very beginning, the university has cultivated the unity of science: *universitas omnium scientiarum*.² There were, and still are, numerous attempts to realize – in many different ways – the meanings inherent in this postulate. One of these ways has been the specific arrangement of faculties which once were tied closely together to form a structure which aspired to embrace all disciplines. That structure used to be a hierarchical one, with theology at the top. Today, no university can afford to embrace all the disciplines and all the fields of science, and the individual faculties have become more autonomous than before. Nevertheless, the university remains potentially open to all disciplines: if not all of them are present there, it is because of various kinds of limitations (e.g. lack of space or teaching staff), and for some funda-

¹ Cf. A. W a w r z y n i a k, *Postowie. O filozofię uniwersytetu* (Epilogue. For a Philosophy of University), in: M.A. K r ą p i e c, *Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet* (Man – Culture – University), Lublin 1982, pp. 479-481.

² Cf. M. A. K r ą p i e c, *Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski* (Catholic University of Lublin), in: M. A. K r ą p i e c, *Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet, op. cit.*, pp. 384-386.

mental reasons which, for example, eliminate the possibility of studying Polish philology in a polytechnic. The tendency to embrace the widest possible spectrum of various intellectual disciplines which are nonetheless linked to one another also finds its expression in the creation of faculty or inter-faculty research institutes. Finally, the sign of unity of particular branches of science is the academic senate, in whose sessions representatives of all faculties and of other university departments meet. The senate of the university has traditionally exerted a significant influence on the range of the university's interests, on the directions of its development, as well as on other spheres of its activity.

It does not seem that the idea of the unity of science is an anachronism inherited from the times when one man was capable of grasping the whole of knowledge contemporary to him. The postulate of unity is rather an extension of the search for truth which I have mentioned before, and which – in a way – defines the university in its fundamental dimension. Particular elements and aspects of reality are interdependent and complementary, such that the one who does not respect these dependencies does not get to know the complete truth about this reality. It is rather difficult today to become an expert, even in a narrow scientific discipline, yet, it is symptomatic that the drift towards narrow specialization has reached an impasse, and that the significance of the so-called subsidiary disciplines and of interdisciplinary research has been growing. These disciplines help not only to solve the problems which do not fit within the scope of one particular line of specialization, but above all, they also help us to realize that reality, despite all its complexity, constitutes a oneness. In this sense, they show how important it is to see each truth concerning this reality in a context as broad and as deep as possible. The university emphasizes this context by its openness to all branches of human knowledge, by the mutual scientific and teaching exchange which connects particular faculties and institutes with one another, and finally, by offering the possibility of complementing the main line of study with participation in classes from other areas of study or specialization.

Thirdly, the university is both a research and a teaching unit; by that, it differs from research institutes on the one hand, and from teachers' colleges on the other. The deep union of the two functions – of the investigative and the didactic – is manifested by the unit typical of university, namely, the research seminar. The seminar creates a specific community of professors and students, and thus helps to give them a specific intellectual formation which, in turn, influences the character of science pursued thereby. The students, encouraged by partnership in the origin and growth of scientific ideas, receive a lesson in reasoning which cannot be replaced by books or lectures. For their part, they inspire their professors to a communicative transmission of their output, and also to a constant openness to the influx of new ideas and critical comments. And despite the fact that the results of scientific research have an objective,

factual character by nature, the very community of the research seminar helps one to see the truly humanistic dimension of all knowledge, namely the significance of all knowledge for a better understanding of man, and the influence of knowledge on the process of maturation. In this sense, the seminar – in its broad academic context – helps one to see the results of particular instances of research work in a wider and universal aspect.

2. THE ORIGIN AND THE BASIS OF CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES

The medieval model of the university did not survive the period of the Reformation. There were many reasons for this fact, e.g. the development of natural sciences, which were impossible to put among the *artes liberales*; controversies between scholastics and humanists, which made the latter leave universities and found academies of their own; and finally, the birth of the Protestant religion, which caused a split in the thus far homogenous theological doctrine.³ The universities, however, did not lose the basis for their existence, and it was even possible for them to gain greater social significance, because of their “practical” orientation, namely, because of the adaptation of the studies and of their programme to social needs. Not only the rapidly developing mathematical and natural sciences, but also economy and administration, as well as teaching and pedagogical or even polytechnical studies found their way into the university. The universities started to take up mostly those issues for which there was strong social demand, and were educating a wide range of specialists according to the specific needs of a given country. However, the price of the pragmatic tendency was, among others, the disintegration of the universities and their growing dependence on the state. It was not a merely financial dependence; in a way it also concerned the research work, since in many countries the state authorities preserved the right to confer professorial titles. A clear manifestation of this process was the reorganization of the school system under Napoleon in France. The place known as *universitas studiorum* was replaced by a system of specialist schools, financially dependent on the state.

The French reform determined the fate of many European universities, including the ones in Cracow and Vilno, which were changed into “High Schools.” Although the reform was introduced authoritatively, it resulted from the spirit of the French Revolution and of the whole Age of Enlightenment. Overflowing with the worship of human reason, the people of the Enlighten-

³ In this section I have drawn on Rev. M. R e c h o w i c z's article, *Uniwersytety katolickie* (Catholic Universities), in: *Księga jubileuszowa na 50-lecie KUL* (The Jubilee Book on the 50th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Catholic University of Lublin), Lublin 1969, pp. 13-19.

ment were ready to erect temples in its honour. Yet, it was also during that age that reason's ability to cognitively grasp the earthly reality which surrounds man was questioned (e.g. by Hume and Kant), and that human reason was deprived of its relation to the divine transcendence. As a result, domains of knowledge such as metaphysics and theology fell into disfavour, and reason was "left" with practical issues only, such as state reorganization (based on social contract, not on the idea of divine justice superior to it), and the improvement of everyday life by means of technical progress. It is no wonder, in this context, that such was the direction of the reforms taken up by Napoleon, and that making university studies "practical" was generally accepted in so many countries outside France.

It was then, in the nineteenth century, that Catholic universities started to spring up; the first one, as far as I can remember was founded in Louvain in 1833. Their origin also had a practical background. Modern universities became totally secular, so there was no longer the possibility for the Holy See to establish a university, or maintain the ecclesiastical post of Chancellor, or institute a hierarchical structure of university studies with theology at the top. Moreover, there was no longer any room for the ecclesiastical domains of knowledge within the university, so there was no longer the possibility of educating future priests, catechists, or curia clerks. Up until 1875, there was not even a single theological faculty in such a Catholic country as France. Spain was a similar case. However, founding exclusively ecclesiastical faculties did not suffice. The optimal educational institution needed to be put in the broad context of science, of both natural science and of the humanities. Thus, there started the growth of Catholic universities, where theological and ecclesiastical faculties existed side by side with secular ones.

Behind the Church's practical motivation to create Catholic universities, one can also trace an attempt to return to the original idea of the university, and to reshape this idea. Far-reaching specialization in science, resulting mainly from the development of the natural sciences, has taken place. Such an advance is simultaneously an expression of the naturalistic tendencies in science, which has been concentrating on the worldly reality (also on the worldly existence of man), and which has put aside – or even totally ignored – reflection on its ultimate sense, or on the fundamental relationship with God. The more we learn about the world, the less we understand it; the case is similar as far as man's self-knowledge is concerned. According to the project of some Enlightenment philosophers – and some of their successors (e.g. Marx) – man was to take the place of God. However, he got lost within the senseless world of objects. At this point I cannot help recalling A. Robin's poem with the telling title "The Programme of a Few Centuries," where the poet concludes:

The Faith will be destroyed in the name of Light, and then, the light will be destroyed. The Soul will be destroyed in the name of Reason, and

then reason will be destroyed. [...] For no reason man will be destroyed; man will be destroyed in the name of Man; there will be no other name. That is where we have just arrived.⁴

In this context, the restoration of the position of philosophy and theology within the academic structure, as well as the attempt to harmonize them with the so-called secular – humanistic and natural – sciences, has a deeper meaning, and cannot be accounted for by the immediate needs of the Church. What is meant here instead concerns an attempt to regain a deep, and even maximal, cognitive perspective, the necessity of which has also been acknowledged by some modern philosophers, starting with Hegel. After all, the point is not to destroy man, but to restore his right to grasp the truth which strengthens his personal humanity, the truth which – in the ultimate dimension – is the everlasting truth of God. From this stems the general humanistic orientation of Catholic universities: they develop a range of sciences about man which is as wide as possible, they show his unique rank in this world as well as the sense of his life which transcends his worldly existence.

3. DEMOCRACY – PARLIAMENT – MAN'S FREEDOM

One of the lasting consequences of the French Revolution, and of the whole Enlightenment proclamation of freedom, has been the advancement of democracy, which today – although perhaps it is not considered the ideal – is still the best possible social system. I am not going to describe the democratic system here in detail – it would be a separate and rather complex issue. However, I suggest we should dwell on its two important aspects, namely, on the importance attached to man's freedom in democracy, and on the role of the parliament. I believe that a special role of the university in general, and of the Catholic university in particular, is manifested by its close link to these features of democracy.

Some elements of the parliamentary system can be traced even in monarchy (e.g. the royal councils). Some appearances of this system were also kept up in some variants of totalitarianism (cf. the so-called People's Democratic States). What truly distinguishes the democratic societies from the undemocratic ones is not so much the will of the people (as the etymology of the word "democracy" would suggest), but rather the position of majority opinion, which in other systems has the significance of a pressure group at best, but which in the case of democracy plays the decisive role. The forum for majority opinion (usually expressed by the representatives) is the Parliament.

⁴ A. R o b i n, *Program kilku wieków* (The Programme of a Few Centuries), "Znak" 1979 No. 6, pp. 605-606.

The foundation of a democratic parliamentary system does not merely mean having considered a given community (rather than any divine being) the only sovereign. A significant motive power of democracy is the conviction that man is a free being, and that freedom determines his outstanding dignity which obligates others to respect it. The motto of the French Revolution: "Freedom – Equality – Fraternity" is formulated in a particular sequence, which is not freely interchangeable. Freedom makes people equal and is the basis for their fraternal unity. However, although these lofty statements were already being cynically denied during the Revolution, the ideal which they represented has turned out to be more permanent than its original, cruelly perverted incarnation. Up to the present day, the democratic states have been particularly sensitive to human freedom, and they have considered the abuse of freedom a serious violation of human rights. The law regulates relationships among citizens so as to give everyone a chance of growth, and simultaneously not to let anyone threaten the freedom of others. Apart from this, it does not intervene in the private aspirations of particular people, even if they were to take up actions leading to self-destruction. Therefore, murder and drug-traffic are punishable offences, while taking drugs or suicide are not subject to punishment.

It is easy to notice that the parliamentary system of majority rule does not provide itself with a sufficient guarantee for the freedom of the individual. It is not impossible that the people, by the votes of the majority of citizens, introduce a radical law limiting the rights of certain other citizens. In such a case, by their use of a formal democratic instrument (i.e. voting), they impair a significant and "essential" element of democracy, namely, its respect for the freedom of man. Is democracy, then, respected in such a case, or is it violated?

This is by no means a so-called academic question. A number of events which have taken place recently have pointed to its topicality. It was not so long ago that the parliamentary elections in Algeria were won by the Moslem fundamentalists who are openly against the "democratic" equality of all citizens, regardless of religion or sex, and this case has placed the world powers in a difficult position. A little later, they expressed somewhat embarrassed approval of the actions taken by B. Yeltsin, since, yes – in order to strengthen democracy, – though by the use of military means, and allowing blood to shed, he dissolved the Parliament which, on the basis of its constitutional rights, deprived him of power. In Poland, we have in turn participated in the still unfinished parliamentary battle for the protection of conceived and as yet unborn babies, but the result attained last year did not satisfy anyone, so that on both sides there are opinions calling for its revision. One could say that the last example is not pertinent to the problem, since conceived but unborn babies can hardly be considered as citizens of the state. Indeed, but we must not forget that the basis of the rights for citizens – with the right to freedom at the forefront – as seen by the proponents of democracy lies in the very fact of being

a human, and not in the fact of having gained the status of being a citizen of a given state. Precisely for this reason, criminal law protects children, as well as those who cannot declare any citizenship. Why, then, should only the unborn be made outlaws?

4. FREEDOM – TRUTH – THE (Catholic) UNIVERSITY

At this point, we approach the problem of the university and of its role within the democratic state. How do we know that man is a free being, that this freedom distinguishes him from other beings on this earth, and that it constitutes the basis for all his other rights? There is some truth about man which – as long as it is treated as obvious, and is acknowledged by the majority of people – guarantees the correct functioning of legal and social democratic structures. However, when this truth is ignored, these structures turn out equally efficient in the legalization and strengthening of the violence of some people against others: of the majority against the minority. The above examples show how real the danger of legal positivism is. This danger therefore means putting the “manner” of the formal law-making democratic procedure above the “spirit” of democracy, which is the real protection of freedom belonging to man as man.

I have already mentioned that from its very beginnings the university has been a place to search for truth, and that it is also trying hard today to remain such a place, despite conditions which are not always favourable. It is necessary, or even dramatically important, to preserve this character of the university so that the correct functioning of democracy may be rescued. If the ethos of truth disappears from among people, if the conviction that the truth should be sought for its own sake, as well as of the necessity of faithful obedience to truth, disappears, then the fundamental condition for the correct functioning of democracy will be lacking. I must stress that this condition cannot be replaced by any form of “reasonable egoism,” supported by regulations which reward pro-community actions, while punishing those in opposition. Although the system of privileges and punishments refers to the drive to pleasure and the fear of unpleasantness – deeply rooted in man’s nature – this system itself is also subject to parliamentary voting and can easily be overused to the advantage of the lobby with a sufficient parliamentary majority. Not long ago, we had a model example of such a situation in the Polish Parliament when, against all the factual arguments, the privileges of the former political and civic police were maintained, simply because the members of parliament who earlier had been closely connected with these organizations voted so.

There is no way of replacing the ethos of truth with any legal regulations. Parliament, which derives from the word *parlare*, that is “to speak,” has been conceived as an institution in which the people speak about themselves through

their representatives, in which they want to correctly recognize their own needs and to choose the right ways of satisfying these needs. Members of the parliament reason with one another, and to do that they must refer to some arguments, so finally they refer to truth – about which they are convinced, and about which they intend to convince others. And yet, they are ready to change their views if others succeed in convincing them about their arguments, that is about truth. If such a discussion is substituted by a play of powers calculated to increase the number of electoral votes, then this is a sign of corruption of the whole system, a corruption which is difficult to root out. Universities can do little to help this situation directly, even though they belong to the few circles in the contemporary “democratic civilization” which set such a high value on truth. Determined to search for truth in every area, not only in the ones which are socially beneficial, universities fulfill their fundamental didactic function, and they indirectly strengthen the ethos of truth among the people. “When I address you, dear Ladies and Gentlemen,” said Pope John Paul II in the Hall of the Catholic University of Lublin in June 1987, “I can see all those circles, all the communities where the service to knowledge – the service to Truth – becomes the foundation for shaping man.”⁵

From its very beginnings, the university has striven to grasp the whole truth about the whole of reality. Though the Catholic universities were founded not so long ago, they have returned to the former idea of the unity of science, and have tried to elucidate the reality of the world and God in it in every aspect, so as to show its transcendent divine dimension. Of course, no mortal is in possession of the monopoly on truth. Because of this, the ethos of truth is expressed by the readiness to enter into dialogue with those who have different opinions.⁶ The identity of the Catholic university is expressed not only by the advancement of ecclesiastical doctrine, but also by its openness to dialogue with others.

As I have mentioned, this dialogue requires mutual openness, whose important element is the conviction of one’s own imperfection, and thus the readiness to correct the points which in the course of the discussion have proved to be false. The dialogue also requires honesty. The opposite stance would imply not only a lack of earnestness in presenting one’s own position, but also a taking advantage of the interlocutor’s weaknesses or of any loopholes which allow escape from the truth which one actually sees but finds inconvenient. Finally, it requires patience, because in spite of all appearances, we do not usually talk

⁵ J a n P a w e ł II, *Do świata nauki* (To the Academic Community), “Ethos” 1988 Nos. 2-3, pp. 11-12.

⁶ Cf. A. S z o s t e k, *Prawda a zasada pluralizmu w dialogu społecznym i organizacji państwa* (Truth and The Principle of Pluralism in the Social Dialogue and in the Organization of the State), “Ethos” 1992 Nos. 2-3, pp. 17-28.

the same language and cannot immediately know and feel into the world of our interlocutor's meanings. A research seminar, and all scientific discussions of this kind, should provide training in such a dialogue. In this respect, the university is the "school of life," even if the topic of the seminar debates seems to be far removed from real life.

Of course, the theoretical orientation of the university does not mean that the scholars (professors and students) do not care for matters vital to the people. This orientation is manifested by the way particular subjects are treated, not by the choice of subject. The contemporary university should be absorbed in the matters in which all people are engaged, and which are so vital to them. Yet, when the university merely prepares the cadre for different professions (teachers, tutors, clerks, etc.), it does not differ in any respect from all other schools of various professions. Preparing the cadre is very important, and in everyday life absorbs all the members of academic community; however, the material aspect of the academic training does not bring to light the specific character of the university. High education in general, and university education in particular should be distinguished by formal training, which consists in transmitting (or acquiring) the ability to think in an organized way, to distinguish between different aspects of a given issue, to make decisions, etc. A well-trained graduate (in the formal aspect) should also turn out to be efficient and useful in the field in which he was not actually educated. Another advantage of the theoretical profile of the university education comes to light here. A specialist trained in narrow fields is of little use in the community, which is flexible in its essence, and which shapes its character according to various factors and circumstances which are difficult to predict. This thesis is important for every society, especially the democratic one, which is distinguished from others by a much greater political and economic mobility.

Having put such strong emphasis on formal training, Catholic universities must also take care of preparing a well-educated Catholic intellectual élite. It is obvious that this task is very important for the Church, but we must also stress that this élite is necessary for society, also by the democratic one. Firstly, cultural reasons point to that. All the contemporary democratic states have grown in the Christian tradition (which is worth mentioning in this context, since it is repeated now and again that Christianity is, in principle, hostile to this form of government). This tradition comprises, among others, the conviction of the particular dignity attached to the rational and free human being, and we have already mentioned here the big role which this conviction has in strengthening the "democratic mentality." The educated Catholic élite is also needed by the democratically governed state for one more reason (and perhaps the chief one), namely because of the Catholic social teaching. This teaching encourages Catholics to cooperate with every form of government, provided that it does not violate basic human rights. The Catholic University of Lublin,

which for half a century of Communist domination in Poland, was an oasis of intellectual freedom and the symbol of resistance to the totalitarian government imposed from outside, gave a particularly clear expression of the social doctrine of the Church: it defended man from the system which turned out to be basically and incurably ill. The Church has, as a whole, taken a reserved attitude towards all forms of government in this world, since none of them embodies the full ideal of the Kingdom of God. Thus, the democratic form of government needs the cooperation of Catholics, as well as their criticism.

One more remark to conclude my presentation. We have talked about the place and the function of the university (especially the Catholic one), in the democratic state. So far, I have been talking rather about the tasks which universities have to face, than about the conditions which must be fulfilled if they are to meet these tasks. I would like to mention only the principal one, namely, the postulate of the autonomy of universities. Only if this autonomy is preserved, can the socially valuable research and teaching standard of particular universities be maintained. Only then can truth be sought for its own sake – freely and honestly, and only in this indirect way can the university be of service to the state. However, this autonomy can be, and has been violated in many respects: for reasons of financial policy, by limiting the number of students, by giving government officials the sole authority to fill academic positions, etc. Autonomy does not mean removing all control from the university, or the right to make excessive financial demands which the state often cannot afford. Instead, the control should be assumed and decisions made by professionals, which in this case does not mean officials, but scientists.

The university is not a democratic institution by nature. Its hierarchical structure can be justified not only historically, but also essentially: truth is not subject to voting. The university is autonomous in the sense that it serves what (or rather: who) the state is also supposed to serve – 'though in a different way. It serves man as it serves truth, and through this search, man – a rational being – finds his identity and strengthens it. Democracy refers to this relationship between man and truth in a different way: when the ethos of truth breaks down, the whole democratic system turns against man and his freedom. It happens even faster and more irrevocably in this system than anywhere else, since democracy has no other effective protection from legalizing violence than the majority vote.

Translated by *Dorota Chabrajska*

DISCUSSION

Damian Fedoryka

I am American, and there has been a violent debate concerning compromise in America now. I totally agree that sometimes we need to talk about fatal compromises. However, I would like to ask Prof. Waldstein to comment on the following extract from his lecture: "Although the Court recognizes abortion after consultation as illegal, it allows the legislator to withdraw the protection by threat of punishment for the unborn child." I would also like to raise the topic of yesterday's discussion once again: if I remember correctly, there is a statement within the pronouncement concerning abortion, in which it is said that the state is in a way at liberty whether to punish certain criminal acts. The state cannot, however, grant the right for abortion. This statement seems to point that on the one hand, the state must consider every act of abortion as an unjust one, and thus a crime; yet, on the other hand, it has a certain liberty concerning penalization. I do not mean to reduce the whole problem to a merely theoretical question whether there can exist any criminal law without penalization of criminal acts, but it seems to me that if you agree that the judge might make a use of this liberty, you can see some positive consequences for the civil law having pronounced abortion a crime. For example, as there exists a right for abortion within the civil law system in America, health insurance can be used in order to cover the costs of abortion; also government funds can be exploited for this end. However, if abortion is pronounced a crime, the use of all the civil options will become impossible. Moreover, there may also be civil means to fight abortion. Thus, my question is the following: Do you consider that there should be severe and rigorously administered punishment for abortion; or do you think that if, let us say, the mother's life is in danger, the question of punishment should be left to the judge's decision?

Wolfgang Waldstein

The question is: does the state have to preserve the liability for penalty in every case? The experience gained throughout time teaches that the only protection of a legal right which the state can guarantee is liability of a given act to penalty. This situation has never been different, and up to the present day it has

been impossible to find a system which would protect legal rights by any other means. We must not forget that penalization is not an aim in itself. The intention is not to punish people, but to protect legal rights. Everyone must know that if he violates the law he is liable to punishment because he has violated a right.

It is still another question whether such a distinction is present within the project presented by two parliamentary members in Germany. Guilt, which has been the basis for punishment, may vary as to degree in various cases. This fact has also been taken into account. The mentioned project provides that if the mother is in extremely difficult circumstances, the court may suspend the punishment. Yet, the principle of abandoning punishment in such cases does not hold for persons concerned who were not under the influence of these circumstances, but still participated in the crime. Perhaps this problem needs to be considered separately, as the question of guilt has always been of major importance to civil law, and so it is not easy to give a detailed answer here.

However, I think that a state which treats violation of a legal right, such as the right to live, as principally exempt from punishment is itself violating the very basis of jurisprudence.

Josef Seifert

My question concerns the meaning of penalty, e.g. for abortion or other crimes. Prof. Waldstein has stressed the role of penalty in the protection of legal rights, of human life in this case. He has said that there are no effective means to protect this right, since the mere statement that it should be respected does not suffice if it can be so easily violated. However, there appears a question whether this fact constitutes sufficient basis to consider the problem of penalty. Let us imagine the case of a madman who endangers legal rights, as his madness drives him to kill people. Though he must be detained for the sake of protecting of others, he will not be put in prison, but in a mental clinic. And despite the suffering he will experience, it will not be punishment. It seems that an additional element, which is not present here, is involved in the case of penalty.

Wolfgang Waldstein

It is clear that we cannot discuss the theory of penalty at great length here. We are only considering the question whether the state can act in such a way that it no longer protects certain rights by penalizing their violation. The answer is: of course it cannot. If the state does so, it cannot avoid the consequences of such a policy, regardless of the motives in question. The state ceases to be a jurisprudent one then, at least on this fundamental point.

As far as the general aim of penalty is concerned, it would hardly be possible to give a comprehensive analysis of this question even if we spent the whole symposium on it. Since ancient times, the aim of penalty has always been to execute due retribution for a free act which violated the law. The due retribution has also been seen as the perpetrator's chance to compensate for what he did and to restore the order of justice. Apart from this, penalty also has other aims, the preventive one above all others. Its essence is to deter people from committing criminal acts. This is what general prevention means. Individual prevention consists in hindering individuals from repeating the same criminal acts in the future. There are many other aims of penalization, yet the nature of retribution is based on the presumption that people are endowed with free will. And this recognition is by no means common in current theories of penalty. If the free will of those who are committing criminal acts is questioned, they can only be treated as madmen. In such a case, penalty is considered as a mere means to protect society, and it is deprived of its true nature which consists in retribution. Thus, also the possibility of compensation for the penal act is taken away from the perpetrator.

Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS

While approaching this problem on the grounds of ethics, above all we must note that it is by no means the role of the criminal law to fulfill the function of an avenger. Its task is to protect fundamental human rights against their violation on the side of the aggressor. By protecting them – in the name of his care for the person of the victim – the legislator indirectly protects also the person of the perpetrator. While trying to thwart his act of harm towards another person, the legislator simultaneously protects him against having done the greatest possible harm to himself. A fatal blow against someone else's physical existence is simultaneously and inevitably a suicidal blow towards oneself. This is why the lawmaker – by defending the victim by both legal and penal means – protects also the rights of the very perpetrator who is making an attempt on the victim's life. If the law stops the perpetrator from an act of murder, something truly significant for the would-be killer is saved, together with the life of victim-to-be: he will not become a murderer. We must not forget this! It is not the legislator's intention to punish crime, but to prevent it, to protect the victim in the first place, but also the perpetrator, immediately in the second place. Therefore, penalization must not be abandoned by the legislator if protection of the fundamental rights of the human being is to be maintained; penalization must be sustained lest protection against crime should become a fiction. Otherwise, the legislator will miss his vocation in a jurispudent state, as he will enter a game with himself to preserve his image, which will make him grotesque.

Wolfgang Waldstein

I can only say that I totally agree.

Rocco Buttiglione

I wonder whether Prof. Waldstein is treating what he is saying seriously enough. He seems to be moving between two ideas. Namely, he maintains that we have abandoned jurisprudence (*Rechtsstaatlichkeit*). The concept of jurisprudence refers to the great tradition in which there was a union between the political power of the state and justice. The state was considered to be partaking of the dignity of God Himself, and it was supposed to defend and promote justice within the human society. I would like to recall not only Ulpian here, but also Gaius, or rather the medieval interpretation of Gaius. It is probably Bartolo who says that the *Institutiones* comprise all the law, since law concerns persons, things, and acts. This interpretation is an attempt at understanding the law as a reality whose centre is man, as something which regulates the person's acts and relationships with the surrounding world. I have the impression that on the one hand, Prof. Waldstein is saying that today's states have abandoned this concept of jurisprudence, but on the other hand, he does not accept what he himself has said, as he still hopes that the state will remain a jurisprudent one.

However, if we realize this, the problem becomes a political one and the question is, how we can approach it in a new way so that the state could become jurisprudent once again?

It seems to me that nowadays not only abortion, but also the development of modern law is directed against the tradition of the jurisprudent state. This is no longer law centred on the human being. The domain of law applies no longer to actions taken by individuals in which personal responsibility is always present. On the contrary, it seems to me that modern jurisprudence attempts to take control of reality in order to achieve certain results and to maximize them. It no longer seems to care about justice, that is, for due responsibility for actions. If none of us can be held responsible, or if responsibility is optional, then there can no longer be any jurisprudence. I think that the great tradition coming down from Cicero has been broken, and I am not quite sure where and when this break started. Let me recall a statement about the law which, I am sure, all of you know very well: *lex est regula et mensura humanorum actuum quae servata societatem servat, corrupta corrumpet* (the law is the rule and the measure of human acts which serves society, if obeyed, and which corrupts it if corrupted). Prof. Waldstein, I think that in the political continuation of your lecture you should point out that though we can manage very well without the principle of justice and can control social reality in some way, even with good

results, in the end, if we have given up the measure of justice and if we have started to reduce the human being to the merely material dimension, society must collapse. There is a principle for the collapse of societies, and although our society seems to be enjoying the zenith of its power, welfare, etc., actually, the downfall has already started, as in the case of the Roman Empire at the time when Ulpian was formulating his great maxims. And maybe it is the task of culture, exactly as it was the case in the first century AD, to preserve the principles of justice for new generations which will appear after the end of our spiritual world, when the new one is born...

Wolfgang Waldstein

Rocco Buttiglione's remark hurts me deeply, as it proves that he has totally misunderstood my standpoint. I always treat it as a grave reproach to be accused of not being serious about what I am saying. Actually, I have had quite a few publications concerning the subject in question, in which I expressed – to the best of my power – my objection against the state of affairs which we are discussing here. But what is one supposed to do in such a country? Emigrate? Where to? To a country where the situation is exactly the same, or maybe to the moon? You can finally follow the Stoics and commit suicide, but this solution can hardly be called proper. So what to do in such a situation? You simply have to live on and try to do whatever you can. In my opinion, the only thing which we are capable of doing is to do one's best in order to make the new evangelization work. There is no other way. If people do not change, the situation will not be changed, either. It will not change as long as today's society preserves its fundamental egoistic qualities which have been promoted by most institutions. For example, let us take into consideration what is going on in schools: how the young are being systematically misled and spoiled. How can such people later on be expected to be at all capable of comprehending ethical and Christian ends? We are living in times worse than pagan antiquity when, though the situation was catastrophic, there were ones who would not abandon the faith handed down to them not so long before. Today, it has become much more difficult to make the young approach the faith, as it has been destroyed even during religion classes. The teaching given in the context of religious education no longer evangelizes young people, but presents attitudes which lead straight to atheism. Already in 1970, opinion polls showed that as many as 80% of religion teachers, endowed with the *missio canonica* by the Catholic Church, did not respect all the principles of faith. So how can religion classes be supposed to transmit the faith?

Thus, we are now facing the situation whose disastrous consequences we are unable to estimate. Yet, we have to live on, and to do something about this situation. Let everyone – in his own circle – do what his knowledge and abili-

ties allow him to. However, I think that we need to pay attention to one more point related to this encouragement. According to the Second Vatican Council, the uppermost aspect of the Christian vocation, on which no other council has put so much stress, is the universal vocation to saintliness – the whole of Chapter V of the *Lumen gentium*, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, concerns the universality of this vocation. The Council's call for universal saintliness shows what is really meant here: we cannot go through life at little expense, we must be ready for everything – for total submission to the will of God. Such has always been the only possible way of revival. For example, the situation was analogous in the times of St. Francis when everything was begun by one man who was living out his devotion to God. And what was the result? An enormous movement of spiritual revival. The case was similar with the Cluny reforms, and even earlier in St. Benedict's times, when a virtually total collapse of Roman culture took place. And again, one man was able to make way for a revival. Today, I think, we must consider our Holy Father as one of those who not only can bring about the revival by their individual action, but who have already been doing so in some way. For example, the fact that we can be here together, and that there is no secret political police agent among us, is, in my opinion, a result of this influence.

Josef Seifert

Once again, I would like to raise some questions. The first one concerns the importance which both Prof. R. Buttiglione and the Rev. Prof. T. Styczeń attach to the aspect of protection of man, for example by the law, by means of obligatory penalization of abortion. I certainly agree that protection of the legal rights of man, especially of the rights of the unborn, is necessary, and that it constitutes one of the basic reasons for administering punishment. However, I would like to repeat what I have already said before: in my opinion penalization does not suffice as a protection of these rights. We must protect them also from the mentally ill, who cannot be punished. Therefore, I think that while administering punishment, we assume the criminal's freedom. Otherwise, the punishment would have no sense. We assume that punishment is the thing which he deserves, that it is the due response to his action. I think that it must be also stressed that when Prof. Waldstein speaks about the aspect of retribution, it seems as though he were speaking about some revenge, about the revenge society takes for an attack against itself. I think that the idea of the relationship of dues, of the just response to the crime, is a totally different one and this difference must be noted here. Therefore, I would also like to accentuate the need of protecting the rights and life of the unborn through penalization of acts which violate them; though I do not think that it is related to the essence of punishment.

This problem may be related to my second remark, which refers to the title of today's session: *hominum causa omne ius constitutum est*. I have deep doubt about whether to agree with this standpoint. Firstly, it seems to me that in principle law can concern not only man, but any person (except God). Let us consider, for example, angels: they can also be subject to the law. There are also laws referring to goods which are not persons, e.g. the laws which forbid the torturing of animals. I think that there are good reasons why the law should protect the due interests of animals. In other words, the order of justice, which should be respected, will never be exhausted.

To conclude, I have a few remarks concerning jurisprudence. Although Prof. Waldstein has been stressing so strongly that we have lost jurisprudence due to the legalization of abortion, and although I totally agree with him, I think that we need to see the loss of jurisprudence as a gradual process. It can be said that it is not illogical to keep being active in a state which has its fundament in law and justice, although in some respect is no longer jurisperit: there are groups of criminals who have been violating everyone's rights, there are those who violate the rights of the unborn, and there are those, as is the case in Germany, who are stressing that though the unborn have rights, violation of their rights is not penal. In my opinion, there are many stages here and, for example, we must not put a Nazi state on an equal footing with a state where abortion is pronounced illegal, though not penal. Not everything pertains to one domain here. Thus, it might be logical to consider the characteristics of Germany, Austria, and other states, which pertain to their jurisprudence separately from other aspects which testify to something quite different.

And finally, I would like to give some thought to the need for evangelization which Prof. Waldstein has stressed so much, pointing to its being the only solution to the present situation. As a Christian and a Catholic, I certainly agree that if we take into account the ultimate good of humanity and the ultimate foundation of justice, both in the state and in human life, it is evangelization that constitutes the deepest level of revival. Though, it seems to me that in relation to the problems of today's democracy (e.g. the attacks on jurisprudence), we must not limit the reform or the powers of revival to those who are striving for saintliness in the religious sense. I would like to say for example, that Victor Frankl, who is not a Christian, is one of the greatest thinkers of the spiritual revival which is by no means grounded in the idea of evangelization in the strict sense of the word. In Switzerland, there have been groups which, in my opinion, excel in the moral and legal respect, and which do not consist of Catholics or Christians exclusively. I cannot help thinking here about three students from the IAP in Liechtenstein, who are in many respects the noblest of all, although they are not Christians; whereas the Christians happen to behave terribly. Therefore, I think that if the question of the survival of the state is at stake, we must take up a broad ecumenical initiative

in which all the good powers unite for the sake of the state, and which will not be considered as an exclusively Christian or Catholic one. We need to gather all the powers in the state which have preserved certain basic educational values.

Wolfgang Waldstein

To begin with, I want to stress that I clearly said that retribution actually happens to be wrongly conceived as revenge. However, I also said that retribution is the just response of the legal system or, in general, the response of justice to the injustice which has been committed. If the motto of today's session is: *hominum causa*, I do not think that the right way to interpret it is to consider *hominum causa* as only what concerns man in the sense of affecting him directly. Is torturing animals not forbidden by the *hominum causa*, because the person who commits it becomes inhuman? For this reason such actions must be forbidden and, as such, prosecuted by the law. The addressee of the norm is a free person. This is also true with regard to sacrilege. When a free person acts sacrilegiously, he acts unjustly, and that is why the norm is addressed to man. I do not deny that a state which has legalized abortion can subsequently allow for just trials concerning the matters of property, theft, etc. – it is one of the aspects of jurisprudence. There are many aspects of jurisprudence which also remain preserved in such a state. The former Minister of Education in Austria expressed it in the following way: in an occupied country there can still function some mechanisms of the jurisprudential state, but despite this, the state is actually no longer sovereign. The case is similar here: in principle, jurisprudence was rejected the moment the border was crossed. However, it does not mean that it cannot be still functioning in many respects. Of course, it is impossible to present all these aspects during such a short lecture.

I was fully aware that while quoting the document by the Second Vatican Council about the universal vocation for saintliness, I did not address non-Christians, non-Catholics, or people indifferent to religious issues. As Catholics, we are offered additional assistance, and if the call for saintliness is answered, it will become a source of impulse, and thanks to this impulse also other important values will come into prominence. I said that a new era must come, when we return to human rights, to the natural law, and to justice, and that these will become the basis for truly human solidarity. Republicanism consists in respecting the rights and values which are essential to any human society. I wanted to be understood so, and I fully agree with everything that was said by Josef Seifert, all his remarks correspond with my views.

Damian Fedoryka

This is neither a question, nor a critique of Prof. Waldstein, but an attempt to develop one aspect of his lecture. Prof. Waldstein spoke of *notitia divinatorum et humanorum*, and I would use this as a basis for a comment on the reasons for the affirmation of the person. I certainly agree with Prof. T. Styczeń that the person has to be affirmed for his sake, but I would like to add a distinction that we can affirm the person not only for the sake of his value, but also because of the fact that he belongs to himself, and also to God. The basic and the most fundamental reason for defending the person is neither his value as a human being, nor even his right to this value; but I think we have to be explicitly aware of the fact that we also have an obligation to defend the person as that which belongs to God. I have used an expression in one of my writings that dogs would defend what belongs to their master. Are we not more than dogs? What serves to express the sovereignty of God must assume the proper forms here.

Why I am saying this? Many of our opposites in America would say: do not introduce God into the discussion. In my opinion the question of abortion concerns the deepest basis of the human rights. It is not simply an accidental rejection of the right to life. Since the opposing side has assumed the role of God, I cannot accept their objection, and leave God out in the course of the discussion. Who, if not I – a Christian – is obliged to affirm the sovereignty of God? Every human being belongs to God who gave him life, and therefore no one else is allowed to take this life. This is why my first duty is to defend what belongs to God.

Secondly, I should defend the person as belonging to himself. Why is that so? Because he is called to give himself to God.

And thirdly, I should also defend the value of human life. I consider it worth stressing, especially during ecumenical discussions, as the opposing side will question God's sovereignty and then probably say "but we do affirm the value of the human being." But the value of a criminal, as the value of the human person, is equal to the value of an unborn baby. Then they will say "How can you be for capital punishment, at the same time defending unborn life? This is incoherent!" I will answer: if we concentrate only on the value of human life, then the life of a criminal and the life of an unborn baby are equal. But there is an additional element here: an unborn person belongs to himself and to God, while the criminal has lost the right to his life. This truth was known already by the ancients, as they knew that it is *divinatorum*, and concerns God and His sovereignty.

Jan Sieg, SJ

Our argumentation is a good philosophical one, but only for the élites. However, we are living in a democratic society and we must also have another way of argumentation for the community at large. People experience a great need for peace today. The terror of war, of mass killing, predominates. But can a society which allows the mass-killing of unborn babies by their mothers, fathers and doctors, be preserved from war or mass killing committed by its enemies? One could quote the Bible at this point: those who fight with the sword die by the sword. And another analogy: David was God's friend before and after the sin against Urias. He remained God's friend also after the sin, because he repented it. Yet, the consequences of the sin remained and the punishment remained, too – David's kin suffered the sword until the next generation. Thus, we should also be afraid that in democratic society, where responsibility and tolerance are common, the same rule will prove true. Such a society cannot hope for peace, or freedom, if it is itself mass-killing unborn babies.

Andrzej Szostek, MIC

I would like first of all to ask a question which I address to Prof. Waldstein. I would like to ask about the relationship between morality and law. It is often repeated that the efficacy of the legal sanctions which are enacted to protect otherwise accepted values, is a condition for the introduction of these sanctions.

Some say: I am against abortion, but introducing an anti-abortion act will not prevent the evil, but provoke other problems resulting from society's being unable to see the rank of this evil. Instead of introducing rigorous legal regulations, we should first bring up the society so that it can grow mature enough to see the necessity for these regulations, and it is only then that the law can be made. It is worth remembering that the condition necessary for the social approval of a legal act is not that its introduction should be dependent on its being commonly obeyed, but that there is a common agreement as to the need of introducing it – even (and in particular) when the act is being notoriously disobeyed. There have never been too few thieves in any society, but this fact cannot change the common conviction that theft should be liable to legal sanction. However, the opinion is different as far as abortion is concerned: many people consider it wrong, but they do not find it necessary to introduce a relevant legal and criminal sanction. Myself, I do not share the opinion which I have presented, but I would appreciate it if such an expert in this domain as Prof. Waldstein would be so kind as to comment on it.

Wolfgang Waldstein

It is a truly difficult question, because the efficacy of the law depends on many factors, and considering the inefficacy of a given law as the criterion which allows its withdrawal would mean the total disintegration of the law. On the moral level it would mean reformulation of ethics according to opinion, as a professor of the Catholic University in Eichstädt has expressed it. And this is the end of all ethics. Shaping the legal order according to the criterion of its actual efficacy means the end of the legal order. One could certainly say, and it is often repeated, that if a law cannot be executed efficaciously, its preservation impairs the authority of the very legal order to a greater extent than would the actual abandonment of this law. This argument seems rational, but in fact, if we extrapolate, it leads to a negation of the law in general. If we consider the acts of theft committed in shops or supermarkets, we cannot say: the law which protects property and prosecutes theft can no longer be executed, so let us abandon it. Yet, there is actually no difference whether this attitude is taken in relation to human life, or to a legal right, such as the one to property. Yet, when property is at stake, there are certain restraints on an easy suspension of the law, as it would lead to total disintegration of any social life; if property is not protected, everyone must be afraid that, sooner or later, they may lose everything. The reason is that if a given group of people is deprived of some legal right, this situation may not affect everyone directly, yet ultimately, the consequences turn out to be overwhelming.

So, in my opinion, this argument is false, though it has been so widely accepted. Now, it can only be fought against, and this fight is not very successful because the arguments we quote are no longer certain today. The rationalism which lies behind the attitude prevailing today "devoured" itself already in the seventeenth century. The Enlightenment finally announced that man is incapable of any cognition. This statement was documented and expressed in a particularly clear manner by Christian Thomasius, who concluded that only absolute authority is able to define what is to happen. Thus, democracy changes into the totalitarian power of an individual. The disintegration of democracy leads to dictatorship. Instances of degeneration, such as oligarchy or tyranny, have already appeared in the course of the development of different forms of government. And it is for this reason that in the present situation we can do nothing but continually show the consequences of the acceptance of these principles, and strive that the law remain the law. Certainly, if even the very supreme institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, appointed to protect the law, are not able to say what the law is, but give verdicts guided by public opinion, norms valid from the point of view of the constitutional law are ineffectively applied by them, as was the case in the Constitutional Court. In this way, the effectiveness of the law is broken and the point is reached where the

law cannot be practically executed. However, it should by no means make us say: all right, let us abandon the law. It would mean capitulation in front of the lawlessness which actually takes place. But to capitulate in theory would be another act of lawlessness, which – I think – we must not do.

Andrzej Póltawski

I would like to question one of the minor points of Prof. Szostek's lecture in order to approve of the whole. You said that it is hardly possible to imagine a literature course at a polytechnic. Not only is it imaginable, but such has been the case, even in Warsaw. I, myself, happened to become a member of the board of the Institute of Social Studies at Warsaw Polytechnic.

And another thing: in the part of your lecture in which you were talking about dominion over the world you spoke about practical significance, but of course, we need to think about higher practicality – and this dimension is present in the whole of your lecture – about the practicality that enables man to act morally. This is also practice, is it not?

Andrzej Szostek, MIC

Just one question to understand well the first remark: do you mean that there is a faculty of arts at the Warsaw Polytechnic?

Andrzej Póltawski

It is not a faculty, but courses which can to be chosen as electives. There is a tendency today to found polytechnics which would fully comprise the arts.

Fr. Alfred Wierzbicki

I would like to refer to the opening paragraph of Prof. Szostek's lecture. While saying that the topic of his lecture was somewhat marginal in relation to the subject of the session, he seemed to be unjustly underestimating the role of the university in the vision of Europe. In my opinion, the reverse attitude is right: the topic should denote the actual focus of the present conference. Let me remind you that we started with Prof. Seifert's lecture on truth and on the search for truth; then there was Prof. Salij's lecture, also devoted to truth, manifested in the person of Jesus Christ. Prof. Salij began his considerations concerning truth exactly at the point to which we had been led earlier by Prof. Seifert, who pointed out to the transcendence of the person in truth. In my opinion, the question of the university appears to be one of the central topics during a session devoted to the vision of Europe. I do not have in mind purely

historical reasons for this, although they let us see that the spiritual development of Europe precisely followed the advent and development of universities. Moreover, one could speak here about the expansion of universities from Europe around the world. The university truly belongs to the rich historical event which Europe constitutes. Universities appeared only during the Christian period of European history, because the Christian vision of man as a rational being fully justified the existence of a free institution which was occupied with the search for truth, and which – as *alma mater* – contributed to the development of the person in truth. We must note that the assimilation of Greek philosophy, as well as the christianization of the Greek and Latin tradition, prepared the ground for the foundation of universities. Epistemology, oriented on veracious cognition turned out to be of particular significance here. In my opinion, the Platonic distinction between *doxa* and *epistème* essentially prepared the shaping of the university, since it has been the institution which – thanks to research and critical effort – takes up the task of distinguishing objective truth from mere opinion.

And a few more words on the autonomy of the university. I have had the impression that the autonomy of the university was considered in the lecture mainly in the sense of the autonomy of its organization. Would it not be advisable to point first to the basis of the organizational autonomy, which is in the independence of the research work? I think that the already quoted distinction between *doxa* and *epistème* turns out to be significant here also. A university is a community which helps an individual to gain knowledge, it is a community of those devoted to truth. I see the autonomy of the university not only in the sense of its institutional independence of the state, but also, and above all, in its independence as far as the method of the search for truth is concerned. Organizational independence from political influences is only a condition of a far deeper autonomy concerning the method of research, which respects the primacy of truth over power. *Plus ratio quam vis* has been the motto of the oldest Polish university. We must also consider the independence of the university in the aspect of its relationship with, and its primacy over the media. This primacy – which is of epistemic nature – *plus ratio quam vis* – does not exclude cooperation between these institutions. On the contrary, the relationship between the university and the media turns out to be very significant nowadays, as today the media serve the opposite of *epistème*, spreading opinion or sophistry, in addition to the manipulation which is so characteristic of it. Another factor which is important here concerns the understanding of democracy as the rule of majority opinion. Even Alexis de Toqueville saw a danger for democracy in the rule of majority. Thus, is it not the case today, when the freedom of the person is impaired by social pressure expressed by means of the mass media, that the role of the university, as the environment for life in truth, shows itself even more clearly?

Wolfgang Waldstein

A small remark as to the point which, although not central, seems important enough for me to say a few words about it. "It is difficult to consider unborn babies as citizens of the state." According to Roman law, man acquires legal status at the moment of conception, which means that he is a legal subject possessing all civil rights. A child would acquire civil rights at the moment of conception in a valid matrimonial union. This legal reality may have receded into the background nowadays, yet I would like to draw your attention to it. It may be worth reminding ourselves – in the course of this discussion – that in Roman law a conceived baby was already considered a subject of the law.

And now my essential remark, in which – having agreed with everything Prof. Szostek said – I would like to emphasize one problem. In Austria and in Germany, as well as in other countries, the so-called democratic university reform was begun with the demand to democratize universities, but in consequence universities were not democratized but destroyed. Instead of serving society as sources of objective information, instead of having become centres in which truth is propagated, instead of helping society to find just bases for rightful decisions made according to true criteria, they have created confusion and they have been acting as a poisonous fungus, as the centre of contagion. It can be clearly seen here that these institutions acceptance of the ideology which uses democracy as a means of manipulation, not only leads to the destruction of education, but also makes the functioning of democracy impossible. Here lies the point where the university and democracy enter into contact with each other. If universities are not considered as institutions which serve the search for truth exclusively, if they are not seen as institutions which are free from any influences, they cannot serve democratic society either.

Andrzej Szostek, MIC

I appreciate and thank you for all your remarks and I will try to comment on them, preserving their chronological order.

Firstly, I would like to refer to the presence of Polish Philology at the polytechnic. I am certainly aware of the fact that some humanistic subjects are present and have their significant role in this type of school – I myself used to give lectures at the Lublin Polytechnic. Still, there is a difference between the polytechnic, which may and should find a way to introduce additional training in humanistic subjects, and the university, which is essentially open to all lines of study. In other words, though a decision to open a new line of studies (e.g. a polytechnical one) at a university is normal, a decision to open the Artistic Faculty at a polytechnic, and to treat it equivalently with the other faculties, would be somewhat strange. Or it would be strange, if it was decided

that technical studies should be introduced into the International Academy of Philosophy in Liechtenstein, which I know and highly esteem as an academy with a well-defined, strictly philosophical profile. If it happened, we would have to ask the question whether, and in what sense, these schools still deserve the name of polytechnic, or academy of philosophy, respectively. The difference seems to be noteworthy. A university student is principally supposed to choose one line of study, but as these studies are pursued in a place which is principally open to all branches of knowledge, this circumstance significantly influences the way in which the chosen specialization is treated.

Secondly, in relation to Prof. A. Póltawski's remark, I must say that I have often heard and even myself repeated the maxim that a good theory has the greatest practical bearing. It is not only true about particular spheres of the human life, but also about *praxis* as such, which badly needs a good grounding in *theoria*. And this theory can be honest only on condition that it is directed by the search for truth for the sake of truth, and that it attempts to grasp reality in the most adequate way possible, regardless of the practical merits which come from it. Pragmatic justification of all the cognitive efforts, of the attempt to comprehend the world, changes the essential sense of these activities; it questions the sense of the search for truth for the truth's sake and, in consequence, it influences negatively the understanding of the practical dimension of the human life.

I would like to thank the Fr. A. Wierzbicki for having attached such importance to the set of problems about which I spoke. Yet, I would still tend to treat it rather marginally. Of course, the search for truth for the truth's sake is by no means a marginal activity (I have myself just spoken about it), but from the point of view of the structure of the whole session, where we have been discussing man and his rights within a diversely structured society, the university is neither the only institution, nor the most important one compared to, for example, the value of the family, the Church, etc. But I know that an analysis of the institutions which are not of primary significance can contribute to the general understanding of man's place in society, to the protection of the fundamental rights of the human being, etc.

As far as the postulate of autonomy is concerned, I agree that the autonomy meant here is the one concerning the search for truth, and necessary, lest even the domain of research work, not to mention its results become exclusively dependent upon any institutions outside the university. And such autonomy is possible only on condition that the university, as such, is autonomous.

I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Waldstein for all his remarks, especially for the second one. I was not aware that the Roman law recognized the civil rights already of the unborn. Yet, the reason for which I made use of this example remains valid: even if an unborn person – or any other person – were deprived of any civil rights, he would still not cease being a man and –

because of the fact of his humanity – he would not cease deserving all the fundamental rights, with the right to live above all, the rights which no legislation can ignore.

Finally, the last remark, which I also find important. The so-called process of democratization of the university can easily lead to the destruction of the very idea of the university. An element of this process is the right – given to students – to influence decisions concerning the curriculum of the studies. It used to be the essence of school education that teachers should know the discipline they teach better than students. At present, this principle happens to be practically questioned. The next step, already taken in some schools, is making professorial posts dependent on the students' opinion. The students' postulates, their expectations and abilities can, and must certainly be taken into account (as much as it should be in schools of lower order), yet the respect for the students' rightful postulates and expectations must not "internally" violate the academic process of searching for truth, and of education.

Jarostaw Merecki, SDS

Prof. A. Szostek was speaking in his lecture about the place of the Catholic university in the democratic society. It seems that the situation of the Catholic universities in today's democratic states happens to be difficult, because the very fact of their being Catholic is often the reason why they are accused of not being autonomous. It also happens to be the case that the university itself considers its autonomy impaired by the authority of the *Magisterium* of the Church. For example, soon after the encyclical *Veritatis splendor* was published, there appeared opinions, even of well-known theologians, holding that the encyclical impairs the autonomy of theological faculties at universities, also at Catholic ones. This situation is certainly related to the frequently described quality of the "democratic man," who only very unwillingly subordinates to any authority. If it is his constant characteristic, one may easily conclude that the Catholic university will always be in a somewhat "awkward" situation within a democratic state.

Damian Fedoryka

I would like – by Prof. Szostek's leave – to emphasize one problem which he touched upon in his lecture. You said "no mortal is in possession of the monopoly on truth." And two sentences later: "The identity of the Catholic university is expressed not only by the advancement of the ecclesiastical doctrine, but also by its openness to dialogue with others." In my opinion, this statement gives the impression that you were making every effort to convince the world by saying: "Look! The Catholic university is open to dialogue with others."

Let me remind you of the other side of the matter and say that today, in today's world, in Europe, and I think also in America, the only true universities are Catholic ones, since all the rest, as institutions, are not dedicated to truth. They keep repeating "We are seeking for truth," and professors, as individuals may well be saying so, yet the institutions, as institutions, are not dedicated to truth and such dedication is not at all possible in a lay university today.

On the other hand side, in a Catholic institution we may say that we possess truth, or even the monopoly on truth, and in this sense this institution can serve a number of truths which we – as teachers – can not only be absolutely sure about, but which we – precisely as teachers – have an obligation to defend. I think this is a crucial issue for the Catholic university, yet I would like to stress it even more, and to challenge European and American universities. The identity of the Catholic university is expressed by the fact that it is obliged to be thus committed as an institution, and therefore its professors are not free to reject this truth. The students are certainly free not to accept it, if they cannot see it, yet professors must not reject it in the name of academic freedom. In this sense, I am saying that this is in some way a crucial issue, that the university must commit itself to some fundamental truths without which it cannot remain itself.

It is precisely in the same way that the state must not serve freedom as such, but serve justice. I am saying so, because for 10 years I have seen 230 declining universities in America. All of them still exist, all claim academic freedom, and hardly any of them has been bound up with the teaching of the Church. I would like to emphasize one thing, which – in my opinion – should be said categorically: our task is not to assert our openness to dialogue. Besides, our manifesting certitude does not mean that we are not open to dialogue. The point is to be on the offensive, not on the defensive side; and not just to keep repeating that we are seeking for truth. We have generally found the truth and we are confident of this truth.

Martin Cajthaml

We have discussed the search for truth from the side of the university, or as an essential mark of the university, and on the other side, there is the problem, I think, that society – or the state financing the university – also has the tendency to say that there are certain social needs and demands which should be fulfilled by the activity of the university, and in this context there arose the situation in Prague, at the Charles University, that there were about forty places for students of philosophy, and there were so many people interested that they could accept only every twentieth person. And this is impossible, there is no objective criterion as how to choose. [...]. I was talking to one professor of philosophy about this problem from the point of view of the students, and he

told me: "But society does not need so many philosophers." I see that on the one hand it is true that it is an impossible society where everyone will be a full philosopher. But the problem is – and I do not know the answer – who is competent to solve it. I think that democratic institutions are, in a certain way, incompetent; for example, parliament does not have competence to say that it will give the university so much that they can have, for example, forty students of philosophy every year. So, I do not know if parliament is competent; I do not think so. Who might be responsible?

Rocco Buttiglione

I must thank Prof. Szostek for what he said. While I was listening, I was reminded of the time when I was a university student, and I became aware of how bad I was as a university student. But still, remembering those years, I think there is one point that we should all stress, and this point is the university as a community. Why a community? Why should we be interested in truth? When I was eighteen, nineteen, I was not emphatically interested in truth. One can say: because you did not know what is meant. Of course, but how does one become conscious of the central meaning of the search for truth in human life? I think that one becomes conscious of it when one meets a person who has made the search for truth the central concern of his life, or when he meets a group of friends who equally – because of the attraction exercised by this person – have made the search for truth the centre of their human existence. Thus, there is a university really wherever there is a master and wherever there are students. I think that this is the soul of the university. And also historically, universities were born in this way: there was somebody who at least thought he found truth, and exposed the truth he had found, or he thought he had found, and proposed it to others as a hypothesis that could also be true for their lives, inviting them to carry out an experiment: come, study with me, participate in my life and you shall see. So, I think that there is a specific role for the community of students and professors, and that from this point of view there is a certain analogy between the pastoral mission of a priest, especially in the Catholic university, and the mission of the professor, of the philosopher. For a university, the cafeteria is equally important as the conference room. Most of what I have learnt, I have learnt from Del Noce – no, not in the cafeteria, because Del Noce never went to the cafeteria. He went around the city and I went with him as his chauffeur, always talking about philosophy. I remember once we were stuck without petrol in the centre of traffic in Rome, and we got out of the car and started pushing it towards the nearest filling station – and we kept on talking about philosophy. As long as we have men who feel like this, we have a university. When we no longer have men like this, then we can have the biggest organization, the biggest financing, but this

will no longer be a university. And students will never understand what the search for truth is if they do not fall in love with truth through the witness given by persons who already are in love with the truth.

Andrzej Szostek, MIC

Thank you for these suggestions. I appreciate all of them, and I think that each one of them deserves some comments, though now I can only make them briefly. Perhaps Fr. Wierzbicki was right that the topic committed to me in this session was more vital than expected at the beginning. The course of the discussion, for which I would like to thank everyone, made me change my opinion about the vitality of this topic. I see that the longer the discussion is, the more difficult the topics which are coming to the table.

It is true that universities were not the first schools where teachers and students (“academics”) were searching for truth together. The other day, Dr. Klauza told me that you can trace back analogous institutions and traditions, for example, also in the educational system in China. And I presume that also in Egypt you could find even more of them. If man is a rational creature, which he never ceases to be, no matter the place or time, it is no wonder that in different times and places analogous characteristics of his nature can be exemplified. Yet, we are talking here mostly of the European tradition in which the institution of medieval university played a crucial role.

Fr. Merecki’s observation, in a way, corresponds with the observation made by Prof. Fedoryka, though it approaches the problem as if from a different side. Fr. Merecki is asking in what way can a university be both Catholic and autonomous, while Prof. Fedoryka holds that the only truly autonomous universities today are some of the Catholic ones. I appreciate Prof. Fedoryka’s observation, and I share in his concern, though I would not be so pessimistic about it. I started my studies at the M. Kopernik University in Toruń, and I started to study history, not philosophy, and I must say that I remember the atmosphere about which Prof. Buttiglione was speaking. You can still find a true and deep cognitive passion in many academic centres, and therefore I said that in spite of all these changes and obstacles, universities (not exclusively the Catholic ones) are trying to realize their original ideal. The university’s being Catholic does not hinder the realization of this ideal. A Catholic should be rather convinced that all the search for truth is ultimately the search for God, and that there is no truth which would be contrary to the One who said about Himself “I am the Truth.” It may happen that someone leaves a Catholic university in the name of truth, because he thinks that the Church rather hinders than enhances the search for truth. If he honestly thinks so, he is more Catholic than someone who remains in the Church (in its organizational structure) no matter whether the Church is – according to him – right or not.

Now I want to address the very last observation made by Prof. Buttiglione. Perhaps it should be added to my lecture. *Veritas in caritate* is the sentence which symbolizes – in a particularly accurate manner – the community of friendship based on joint search for truth. Such a community does belong to the essence of university and of academic life, yet it is unthinkable without a deeper commitment to truth and to the search for it, for its own sake.

As far as the number of philosophy students and its relationship with the number of future work posts are concerned, it is worth recalling the distinction between material and formal education. The first gives the student the training which is essential to pursue a given job. The other teaches him to think in an organized way, enables him to take up further education, to adapt to changing conditions and to use his abilities according to current needs. The “formal formation” can be achieved only against the background of studying a particular “material” subject, but in the ultimate dimension, it is the formal education that proves more useful in the social sense. The point is that not every philosophy graduate has to pursue philosophy further; many of them deal with totally different matters. However, philosophical studies, more than any other studies, shape the ability of logical thinking, of correct formulation of problems and of the analysis of ways to solve them. These studies also ensure broader cultural erudition which turns out quite unexpectedly to be crucial, in circumstances impossible to foresee. Let us take a random example: right now our university is participating in a French programme whose aim is to educate managers, and which is open to graduates from very different subjects, including philosophy and theology. What is important is the fact that they have already completed some studies and in this way prepared themselves for participation in this programme.

Once again, I would like to thank all the participants in the discussion for their remarks. I am aware that with my answers I have rather provoked further discussion than closed it; but I suppose that such is the role of lectures and discussion.

Translated by *Dorota Chabrajska*

Rocco BUTTIGLIONE

A RECAPITULATION OF THE SESSION

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends. I think it has been a real experience for us to have participated in this meeting because from its very beginning we have felt that we participate in a real community, and I think that all of us have a duty to acknowledge this and to thank Father T. Styczeń. All of us who came to Lublin from different countries have a duty to recognize it and to thank with full gratitude the members of the Institute of John Paul II, the Rector of the University here in Lublin, Father Styczeń – who has been the soul of this meeting – for what they have done for us. They have given us a particular privilege, a privilege that can seldom be enjoyed in our times, the privilege of participating in what a university really is: I would call it a friendship of free men, a community of free men that is directed towards the ultimate truth about man, and it is, by the way, the experience that I have always had when I have come here to Lublin, or when I have met people from Lublin elsewhere in the world. A deeply-felt human friendship that recognizes in itself, in its utmost profundity, a call to bear witness to truth, to the truth about man and to the truth about God. I wonder whether this could be a definition of friendship according to Aristotle: there is a kind of friendship in which one is not only interested in the good things one can derive from one's friends – for instance, the excellent cooking here in the *Unia* Hotel – one is interested not only in the fact that it is agreeable to spend time with them, and share wonderful jokes, but one is interested in the fact that, with them and through them he enters more deeply into the truth about man. And I think that this thought has entered into all the contributions and also into the planning that governed our meeting.

We started with *homo homini res sacra*: man is sacred to the other – it is not difficult to find here a reminiscence of the thought *homo homini lupus*. There is an original experience of man which is the starting point of everything. If one has not had this experience, if one has never experienced the other man as a sacred object, if one has the experience of the other man as a wolf against which he has to defend himself, then it is not even possible to begin with philosophy. Philosophy, at least philosophy as I have discovered it here with my friends in Lublin, and with Professor Seifert in Liechtenstein, is precisely this, just an insight into this experience of the sanctity of man, and this friendship leads to a direct experience of this sanctity.

And here we find the *Introduction to the Symposium* by Father Styczeń. I wanted to quote from this introduction, but then I found a sentence in another contribution by the same Father Styczeń that could better summarize all that we have tried to do: “Is it possible that history could go against the raising of conscience?” – a quotation of a quotation taken from Karol Wojtyła’s “*Myśląc Ojczyzna*” (“Thinking about the Fatherland”). “Is it possible that history could run against human rights?” I think that this question gives us a good introduction to all that we have done, but particularly to Professor Seifert’s lecture – perhaps an introduction to all the philosophy of Seifert, and not simply to this one contribution to our symposium. This philosophy is anything but an attempt to defend man against the pretension that history should be able to determine what man is. The personology of Seifert, at least in one sense, is the intuition of this dignity of man that does not stand powerless against the flow of history, but which can rule history. This intuition of this dignity of man is rooted in the fact that man can grasp truth in itself, can incorporate truth in itself, can make his life a witness to the truth. This seems to me to be Josef Seifert’s central idea which recurs again and again in different forms and is in one sense also the soul of his philosophy, making it so classical and at the same time so modern, so essential and so existential. This is *diligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus*, to love all truth in all things, not only in all men, but in all objects, to understand the vocation of man to be a microcosm, to reflect the whole truth of reality in his own soul through acts of living devotion to each specific object, recognizing the value of the object, and forming his own soul according to the value that inhabits this object.

In this sense, we enter into a new and specific domain of human existence: I truly become myself through the recognition of the other – of the other man first of all, of the other person – but also of all other values that are present on the horizon of my experience. I truly become myself through this act of self-donation: recognizing the value of the other, giving the other the respect and the love that is due to him, means discovering what I really am, what I was created for, namely to participate in the life of the other, but at the same time to participate in the life of God, to participate in the care and in the love of God for every other human being. And this last remark leads us from the lecture of Professor Seifert to that of Father Jacek Salij – to the God-man perspective. I was particularly moved by one quotation which, I think, again is the centre of the lecture: “The Church has given Poland Christ: that is the key to understanding this great and fundamental reality, namely, man.” What personology, the philosophy of the person and of truth gives us in an essential framework, has become flesh and becomes existentially present in the history of one nation, of all nations, but in each nation in a particular way. And in the history of a nation it becomes present in the history of each particular human

community, in the history of each friendship between men and of each family, because there is no friendship among men so close and so rich as the friendship of the man and the woman who share their lives and create a family. For “Man cannot be fully understood without Christ; or rather, man cannot fully understand himself without Christ. He can neither understand who he is, nor what his due dignity is, his vocation or his ultimate destiny. He cannot understand any of this without Christ.” These are the words of John Paul II in Victory Square in Warsaw. The essential truth, the *logos*, has become flesh. And of course, we can still know the *logos* through the *semina verbi* that are contained in the world around us, in values, but this cognition has, in a sense, the function of making us aware of the greatness of the task of recognizing value as value, God as God. Whoever recognizes the full extent of this task cannot pretend to be saved through philosophy. He recognizes that what is demanded of man is more than he can do; he recognizes that the real answer to the value of the world, even more so than poetry and philosophy, is prayer, prayer to God that He come and that He make me capable of responding, of giving that answer of full self-donation which, for man with his unaided nature, is impossible. And here one can quote Plato – Plato in the *Phaedo*: at a certain point it is evident that we can go no further; how beautiful it would be if one would come from the other side of the Sea of Being to enlighten us. We have had a wonderful discussion on just this point: the relationship between philosophy and revelation. St. Augustine described this relation as the relationship between the old law and the new. The old law shows what should be done, the new law gives the insight, the energy and the love to actually do it.

The second session was dedicated to man and society. Can these principles – the recognition of truth, the discovery of the value of the human person, the existential presence of this value in that community which we call the Church – can all this shape our everyday lives? What relationship does this have to the human power of working, of wresting from the earth that which is needed for the subsistence of the human family – this was the theme of Mr. Alphons Horten: *Ipse sibi et alii providens ex providentia divina*. Who is this *ipse*? Oneself taking care of oneself and of others out of God’s providence. I think that this “oneself” is everybody: everybody has responsibility for other men, the “oneself” is the father and the mother – I beg your pardon – the mother and the father of a family who care for their children, but this means also in a very specific way the entrepreneur, the man who has from God the specific gift of seeing the natural resources, of seeing the human needs that can be satisfied through these natural resources, of putting the natural resources together – and of the natural resources, of course, the most important is always the labour of man – and of taking upon himself the risk of experimenting with hypotheses about production, that is, of believing that these resources really can be used,

can be brought to satisfy these human needs – and of ensuring that the men who have these human needs can really pay for the merchandise produced. The act of caring for the other is incorporated, in the lecture of Mr. Horten, into the idea of the entrepreneur: the entrepreneur is one who must care for others *ex providentia divina*, but no man can do this if he does not experience at the same time that God takes care of him, and in his own solicitude participates in a higher one, namely, God's care of us. The assumption of risk – and to be an entrepreneur means assuming risks – cannot be fully accepted without confidence in divine providence. And this also gives that interior generosity of heart which allows one to be just to others; and Mr. Horten has shown us that also in the field of enterprise we have a human relationship – that enterprise is a human relationship, a community, a society of capital in one sense, but in another sense it is a community of persons, a way of caring, the one for the other. He has stressed more the obligation of the entrepreneur to take responsibility for others, but one could say that there is also a reciprocal task and duty of the workers toward the entrepreneur and the enterprise that all may succeed together in achieving the common purpose and the common good. And the common good is ... well, our families are closely bound to it: that the people whom we love may live.

Damian Fedoryka, in one sense, gives us the existential presupposition of what Mr. Horten has illustrated. There is one thing that I wish to quote: "The practical consequence of bracketing receptivity and self-donation as integral aspects of human existence and as the foundation of society, is a strict exclusion of the origin and the goal of human existence from public life. And that is a crime. Such bracketing is also a strict and formal exclusion of the other as source and goal of human life. It destroys parenthood which is the source of a community and common life. And it destroys marriages as the embodiment of the highest form of mutual self-giving. This truly is a crime." I would add: it also destroys enterprise. But it has already been added by the forcible intervention of Fedoryka in yesterday's discussion. What are receptivity and self-donation? The person affirms himself only through the recognition of the other; and the recognition of the other always implies the recognition of an objective truth that is not dependent upon me, or rather, it may be dependent upon me, but first of all I am dependent upon it, and only if the first kind of dependence on objective truth is recognized can the other be dependent upon me. If this is recognized, we then enter into the dynamism of the human community. What is the reason why men work? Men work in order to protect the lives of their families, that they may nourish their children; and this is the dynamism of interpersonal relationship which also enters into the economic life. If this is broken, if the recognition of the value of the other is not the first and fundamental value recognized, then any community among men becomes im-

possible. There is only the calculus of reciprocal utilities, and no society based on this calculus alone can last for long. T.S. Elliot wrote in the Choruses of "The Rock": "What the Stranger says: 'What is the meaning of this city? / Do you huddle close together because you love each other?' / What will you answer? 'We all dwell together, / to make money from each other'? / or 'this is a community'?" Is the modern city a place that is based upon mutual recognition as the motive force constructing a community, or just a partnership of people who live near one another in order to profit from one another? And if the latter is the only reason for a community, can this community last for long? Of course, I am not saying that profit is not in itself good, or is, rather, in itself bad. I only say it is not an adequate reason for the existence of society. Profit is the indication of the good health of an enterprise, but in the end neither the entrepreneur nor the employees work for profit: they work so that their families may live. They have families if there is this recognition of the value of the other, otherwise they have no families, and society disrupts. So here we find, I think, the personalistic foundation of all human activities in the social sphere.

We come now to the second day *Hominum causa omne ius constitutum est*, "because of man has every law been constituted." Professor Waldstein has explained to us the double-meaning of "because of man." Law and State are an expression of concern for man. The existence of the Law and of the State is possible because there is man, but even more so because there is an eternal law, as well as a natural law; in one sense, these do exist for the sake of man. This is so not only in the sense that the law is directly useful for man, but also in the sense that in the beginning, God created the world in order to enter into a loving relationship with the human person. And each human person has been intended by God since the beginning, as well as all values which are not immediately related to man but which are nevertheless mediately related to man – God created them so that man could embody them in himself through an act of recognition and of gratuitous love. This does not mean that God does not also love them for their own sake, but simply that he wants man to participate in this act of gratuitous love. Professor Waldstein shows us that legislation should be understood as an expression of jurisprudence – jurisprudence is the human search for truth, for truth that regulates the life of the human community. And in this sense he has given us a tremendous presentation, or rather a tremendous refutation of the positivistic principle: *ius quia iussum*, the law is the law because it has been established, because someone with the authority to do so has established it (*quod principii placuit, legis habet vigorem*, all that the prince establishes must have the force of the law). Now, in the place of the prince we have a democratic community. (By the way, I do not think that such

was the true meaning of the Latin sentence, but this is the way in which it has been interpreted for seven centuries, more or less.)

The position of Waldstein seems to run quite in the opposite direction: *ius quia iustum*, something is law because it is itself true, because it corresponds to the nature of things. Then, the task of the lawyer, of the man of law, of the judge, is to say what is in itself just. It cannot consist simply in the interpretation of the existing law. I remember something else. I beg your pardon for my Latin quotations, but I studied law like Professor Waldstein, and jurists love this kind of quotation: *nulla videtur esse lex que iusta non fuerit*, an old saying, also repeated by St. Thomas Aquinas: There can be no law that is not just, because if it is not just, it is not law. In light of this, one understands the heavy burden that Prof. Waldstein puts on the shoulders of the judge: he cannot be happy because he succeeded in finding a solution which keeps him from entering into an absolute conflict with the opinion of the majority or with the existing law, because such law is not law at all if it is not just.

And I must say that here our discussion reached one of its culminating points, perhaps one of its most serious points, and I think that it should be linked to the introduction by Prof. Styczeń. In the introduction, Prof. Styczeń spoke of the judgement of the German Constitutional Court: What would the one most concerned here, namely the unborn, say to this verdict if he were given a chance not only to scream silently, but to speak openly on the matter which is to decide on his life or death? Would he say: "I thank you?" – that you found a way to salve your conscience, and perhaps also a way to take one more step towards the possibility that in ten, fifteen, or twenty years a better law is made – or would he rather say: "I Accuse!" As a politician I understand how difficult it is to make a good law or to change the law for the better in the matter of abortion, but on the other hand we should never forget that it is not only a matter of quantity or of strategy. Each human life is an absolute value in itself, and many hundreds of thousands of such lives are lost every year, or many millions, rather, I should say. And whatever the division of responsibilities among different subjects, there is always someone who suffers an absolute wrong. This is the most important political issue of our time, which compels us again and again to question our consciences. Whatever we do is not enough. Here again, Christians must return to the position of prayer which was indicated in the beginning. When one knows that he should do more, and knows he cannot, then he should ask the Lord to send him the strength, the energy, the ideas that he does not have.

I shall not give you a summary of Father Szostek's lecture for two reasons: firstly, because true beauty cannot be summarized, secondly, because it is still in your ears. I can add a third reason: because it is too late. I wish only to point out one thing: as long as there is a university there is a chance for de-

mocracy; as long as a university committed to truth, to the authority of truth, exists, we have one of two fundamental institutions that preserve the authority of values, the authority of truth as such. The other is the family. Of course, without families – no universities. But also without universities – no families, because what the family begins the university fulfills, brings to perfection: the construction of the human personality in the service of truth, of love, and ultimately of God.

THE EUROPE OF TOMORROW

A ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

Abp. Kazimierz MAJDAŃSKI

INTRODUCTION

Praised be Jesus Christ!

Let us turn to the Father of Light, to the God of Love and Life in the Lord's Prayer.

"Our Father..."

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Dear Friends!

1. The birth of a man is the moment of a special agreement between the Creator and the mother of the child. The Saviour of the world tells us about her pain, which is quickly relieved and gives place to "joy that a human being has been born into the world" (Jn 16 : 21).

The joy we experienced on 18 May 1920 has, with time, spread far beyond Wadowice and has now embraced the whole Church and the whole world.

There was the royal city of St. Stanislaus, Cracow, on his way, too. There was also the distinguished Catholic University. Then, on 18 May 1920, we cherished the "joy that a human being has been born into the world." Today, on 18 May 1994, we celebrate the fifteenth-anniversary of his pontificate, though the sixteenth-anniversary is already approaching, and the "joy that such a human being has been born into the world!"

2. Here, in the *milieu* of our Alma Mater, particularly in the John Paul II Institute, we felt a need to share in the Pope's concern about the future of Europe. This need was expressed during the three-day academic session, and today in the closing of the debate, in which we take up the following topic: "The Europe of Tomorrow."

Our speakers today will deal with this topic; they are eminent figures, chosen from all the countries of Europe. Europe is therefore one. And if it is still not so, let it happen. They will soon talk about Europe in a while, as well as about this *genius loci*, this, as it were, charisma of Lublin, a town standing as a bridge between the East and West of Europe. May this bridge widen and strengthen. May the words of Pope John Paul II come true through the ministering in this town, now and forever. We remember his address delivered on the Feast of Pentecost in 1979 in another town, a town also endowed with its

own unusual charisma, which possessed its own prominent *genius loci* as well, namely in Gniezno. The Pope said then: "Does not Christ want it, or the Holy Ghost ordain it, that the pope-Pole, the pope-Slav should right now unveil this spiritual unity of Christian Europe, a unity which consists of two great traditions: that of the West and of the East?" (3 June 1979).

3. "The Europe of Tomorrow" – this is a great topic. May "the Spirit of Truth" govern your words, dear speakers.

There is among you a common friend, Father Professor Tadeusz Styczeń. I would like to ask him to preside over your eminent panel.

May God bless him and you all, distinguished representatives of Europe!

Translated by *Jan Kłós*

Alicja GRZEŚKOWIAK

THE EUROPE OF TOMORROW

Three questions must be posed if one wants to speak about the Europe of tomorrow. The first asks – what was Europe like, the second – what is it like, and, finally, the third – what will it be like. The answers given to these questions will determine the shape of the Europe of tomorrow.

The first question is “what was Europe like before we, the contemporaries, appeared?” This is a question about the past of Europe, about the Europe of our fathers, the Europe as a deposit of values and goods assembled and passed on from generation to generation, till it has finally been inherited by us, the people living in it today. But this must also be a question about the roots of Europe, for they determine its shape: what has it grown out of and on what foundations has it evolved? Thus, “what was it like” is also a question about the foundations upon which past generations have been building up Europe throughout the centuries.

The second question is “what is Europe like today?”. It is a question about the Europe of today, the one in which we live. The question about today is also a question about what we have done with the heritage of past generations: have we destroyed what our fathers built and have we begun a different process of constructing Europe? Have we cut ourselves off from its roots, and what have we done with its foundations? Or perhaps, have we added our own segment to the Europe of our ancestors, without destroying the deposit? What is Europe like? The question also deals with what will remain after us and what we shall leave for those who come after us. What heritage shall we leave and what will our children take from it in the future? It is also a question about the foundations on which we build – is it a rock or is it sand? Ultimately, it is a question about our own identity.

And finally, the third question is posed with a note of warning – what will Europe be like? It is a question about the future of Europe, but must be answered by us who are creating it now, for we are erecting the framework for this future Europe. It is a question about a vision of Europe, although its actual builders will be those who will come after us.

But the question “Which Europe?” is also dramatic in its meaning for it expresses our responsibility for the Europe of tomorrow. And while we imagine, programme and lay the foundations for the Europe of tomorrow, we do not

know that subsequent generations will not reject this vision and start building on the ruins of the Europe of today.

Thus, the Europe of tomorrow is a sum total of all these "Europes," the one from the past, the one of today, and the one we would like to pass on to the future.

What was Europe like?

For centuries Europe was perceived as a great family of nations and states, combining various cultures and traditions of the West and the East and transmitting the common Christian spiritual and cultural heritage which created its identity.

It is to Christianity and to its values that the history of Europe was bound most closely. In it we find the roots of European civilization. Christian values determined the spiritual and cultural unity of Europe, although it should be borne in mind that it retained its dual nature, eastern and western, equally contributing to the creation of its identity and constituting its richness. Europe lives with "common Christian and human values, such as the dignity of the human person, deep attachment to justice and freedom, hard work, the spirit of initiative, family love, respect for life, tolerance, desire of cooperation and peace."¹

With the passage of time these values, historically introduced by Christianity, turned into a common heritage for all of Europe and acquired a universal, pan-human character. And when today some people reject Christian values, one should pose the question: What would remain of Europe, of its culture and history, if we reject everything that was introduced and created by Christianity?

What is the Europe of today like?

Does contemporary Europe still represent in its common heritage a unity rooted in Christianity? Is the identity of modern Europe still pervaded with Christian values? What is the Europe we are now creating like? It seems that modern Europe is first of all the Europe of a battle – a battle for the soul of man, and thus also a battle for its own soul. Europe has declared war on the values that for centuries have shaped its identity. It does much to annihilate its Christian heritage. The Europe of today wants to regard Christian values as a closed chapter, as the "yesterday" of Europe. In trying to reject Christian values, Europe wants to reject fundamental values, to reject the truth about the human being, his dignity and his destiny.

Already in the Europe of today one can see a decline in many elementary values, those which have so far constituted "an unquestionable good not only for Christian morality but simply *for human morality, for moral culture*: these values include respect for human life from the moment of conception, respect

¹ J o h n P a u l I I, *The European Act* (Santiago de Compostella, 9 September 1982), „L'Osservatore Romano” 4 (1983) No. 2, p. 29.

for marriage in its indissoluble unity, and respect for the stability of the family” (*Dives in misericordia*, No. 12).

The Europe of today is not only a Europe of wickedness, egoism, nationalism, war, bloodshed, and death; it is also a Europe that has declared war on the fundamental values which constitute its richness and foundation of its identity. It is the Europe of drugs, AIDS, terrorism, corruption, despotism, injustice and poverty, the death of millions of people, including children whose faces are not even seen by their mothers for they are killed before they are born, the Europe which demands the right to kill conceived but “unfit” children. The Europe of today is also the Europe which holds cheap culture and the identity of the nations that constitute it. Hence, it is the Europe of two great crises, the crisis of truth and the crisis of love.

Through the absolutization of freedom, the Europe of today strives to break with the demands of morality. It seems unaware that the rejection of Christian values means not only a break with its own heritage, a destruction of the foundation on which it stands, but also ultimately a denial of the truth about the human being, and a denial of God Himself.

In his address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg in 1988, the Holy Father said:

if the religious and Christian foundation of this continent is deprived of its influence on the morals and the formation of societies, it would mean not only a negation of the whole heritage of European past, but also a grave threat to a future worthy of the inhabitants of Europe – of all its inhabitants, both believers and unbelievers.²

What will the Europe of the future be like?

Modern Europe wants to lay the foundations for a Europe that will be completely different from the one existing so far, the Europe which is to change its identity by rejecting the heritage of past generations. The very assumptions accepted by the new constructors determine the shape of the Europe of the future. They begin with the premise they will construct a Europe without God, living as if Christ had not existed. This means that the Europe of the future is to abandon Christianity. The world of the new Europe would then be a world without values, founded on moral relativism, which begins from the so-called privatization of values, which in turn is a result of the “privatization” of belief in God. Faith as a teacher of values – and thus, these values themselves – should remain within the private domain of the human being. Europe would thus be freed from constant and unchangeable values, from those values which had constituted the building blocks of its identity.

² J o h n P a u l I I, *At the Threshold of the New Stage* (An Address to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, October 11, 1988), “L’Osservatore Romano” 9 (1988) Nos. 10-11, p. 11.

The standard which determines the difference between good and evil would then be found not in moral criteria, but in rules accepted on the basis of the agreement or consensus of parliamentary majorities. Consensus ethics – as has been stipulated in a draft of a document of the Council of Europe, based on the consent of the majority – would determine moral principles in the spirit of compromise. Such norms would replace Christian values and become moral norms. Thus, with the consent of a majority, evil could be called good. The process has been begun with the permission to kill the unborn and the ill, with recognition of homosexual unions as marriages, and permission for couples living in such unions to adopt children. Will it be a Europe of the civilization of life or of the civilization of death, of destructive anti-civilization?

With time, some want Europe to become a Europe-fatherland rather than a Europe of fatherlands, as it has been thus far. It would become a Europe blurring cultural and national distinctions, obfuscating the national identities of the states that compose it, introducing a uniformization of culture, language and customs. It would become a Europe that no longer constitutes a multicoloured mosaic with a harmonious pattern.

What will the Europe of tomorrow be like? What will we make of it? What do we want it to be?

Will it be an aggregate of totalitarian states, evolving from the new red of a repainted communism called socialism, through fascism, to the new enslavement by a misunderstood, uninhibited freedom and moral relativism, unified by a territory which abolishes all national distinctions? But will this still be Europe? Or will we defend Europe for Europe, for the future generations, so that it remains as Europe also tomorrow, when we no longer exist?

If the Europe of tomorrow is to remain Europe, then it can only exist as a Europe characterized by freedom, responsibility and solidarity, aware of the values that have shaped its history and of the fundamental role of culture and consciousness, hence, also of the future; for memory is the hope of the future.³

The Holy Father said that Europe could not discard Christianity like an accidental travel companion who has become a stranger to her, much like a man cannot abandon the foundations of his life and his hope without suffering a dramatic crisis.

The Europe of today and the Europe of tomorrow need Christ and the Gospel because therein lie the roots of all its peoples.

Translated by *Patrycja Mikulska*

³ Cf. J o h n P a u l I I, *The Missive to a Special Gathering of the Council of Bishops concerning Europe and addressed to all the Leaders of the Continent*, "L'Osservatore Romano" 13 (1992) No. 1, p. 40.

Mieczysław A. KRAPIEC, OP

FOUNDATIONS OF A CIVILIZATION OF LIFE AND A CIVILIZATION OF DEATH

In the teachings of Paul VI and John Paul II, the Holy See proclaims to the world a “civilization of love” as the only deliverance from the menace of a “civilization of death.” The manifesto of the civilization of love is the well-known fourfold way of 1) the primacy of the person over the thing, 2) the primacy of ethics (morality) over technology, 3) the primacy of “to be” over “to have,” and 4) the primacy of mercy over justice.

The civilized world, including Poland, is in a deep crisis which, in a sweeping generalization, can be called a “civilization of death,” the exact opposite of the “civilization of love.” For man, in the personal dimension (of his cognition, morality, and creation), is in many ways being turned into a mere instrument by other men and by institutions of public life. Everyday matters of *enjoyment* and of materialistic *profit* are taking precedence over human dignity (the person is an end and never merely a means of human action). This finally leads to killing others, even unborn human beings. This leads to small scale theft – to pick-pocketing – and to large scale criminal mafia-like theft called, because of the banks, “financial scandals.” Financial interests and the political interests subordinate to them (Machiavellian politics) take precedence over the dignity of the person, whose rights are openly scorned in the name of tolerating evil. But everything that stems from man, his cultural artifacts, are *things* with respect to man, for they are *signs* we created in order to transmit to other persons the means to facilitate and to enhance human life. Man in his personal life – cognition, love, and creation, dominates all his creations and finds his final, personal, fulfillment beyond the world and its material objects.

Real scorn for man is expressed most fully in the practical contempt for morality, which replaces real good with non-real “values” such as psychologically-experienced motives and “objects” (constructed according to Kantian *sollen*) of human action. Among values so conceived, the principal value is *making it possible to achieve* everything a “free man” wants. And he is made to want by manipulated television, radio, advertising, and by mirages of technology. All that, when released from the restraints of real morality, which differentiates between good and evil, introduces a tyranny of amoral technology and the possibility of the total annihilation of man. It is sufficient

to point to the modern arsenals of nuclear and laser weapons, to genetic manipulations, and to the devastation of the environment...

In our actions we ignore the imperfect, weak, and contingent status of man, who – to maintain and augment his life – needs real love, which acknowledges the fragility of human existence. This real love for others is, by its very nature, love-mercy, for it requires us to love weak and unstable entities. It does not rule out justice which requires giving to one what one deserves – but in a humane manner, with the primacy of love-mercy, and not just as a dry, material measure. Material and “banking” justice led poor and indebted nations (by means of loans which made rich nations even richer) to poverty, causing riots, crime and war. So-called “value” justice for the living pushes the unborn, who could in fact become benefactors of humanity, into the pit of death. But the value of “use” and of a comfortable life shuts down one’s mind and love for one’s own child.

All this leads to the fundamental alienation of man: to a reversal of the hierarchy of ends and means, which expresses itself in the demand for more “*having*” than “*being*,” in the refusal to transcend the world of ever-changing, flowing matter.

Why is this happening to today’s civilization?

One can point to human contingency and weakness as explanations. We are not to blame for our weakness, but we are to blame for its deliberate perverse realization. The perversion and error of reason result from human *thought* being detached (“free!”) from the laws of reality — of being as truth, good, and beauty. At the foundations of the deformations of human actions there lies a deformation of human thinking “freed” and “liberated” from the rules of good and truth — or from taking into account reality, which somehow “evaporated” from human thought after Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. There come to mind the harsh warnings of St. Paul (2 Tm 4 : 3): “The time is sure to come when people will not accept sound teaching, but their ears will be itching for anything new and they will collect themselves a whole series of teachers according to their own tastes; and then they will shut their ears to the truth and will turn to myths.” This has been taking place in our civilization. It began permanently in the autumn of the Middle Ages when, with the advent of nominalism, *universale metaphysicum*, i.e., the general and necessary knowledge of being through universal concepts, was denied (cut by Ockham’s “razor!”) to human cognition and when, following nominalistic thought (accommodated later in Protestant theology), cognitive sensations – ideas – became the point of interest of the subjective philosophies of Descartes, British Empiricism, Kant, Hegel, and of post-Kantian philosophers of phenomenological, existential, and hermeneutical orientations. *Cognitive signs* (ideas, concepts, imaginations, feelings, and sensations), instead of reality, became objects of analysis, and reality itself became either unreachable or unnecessary, for signs became “objects” – substi-

tutes for reality. Moreover, mere signs of signs (i.e. language signs as signs of ideas-sensations), that is merely the domain of language, became a major, if not the only, “object” of analysis. At the same time, language itself, as a set of conventional signs of natural, transparent signs (ideas), when considered from syntactic and pragmatic sides, turned out to be a more or less complicated *game*, whose deep and superficial structures were to be uncovered, even to the limits of absurdity in the structuralism of C. Lévi-Strauss. Thus, man as a real subject was denied; human subjectivity became merely an interiorization of the grammatical subjectivity of language. Rational structures were eventually to be explained by the rule of randomness. Nonsense was to turn out to be the father of sense.

But earlier, in subjective post-Cartesian and post-Kantian philosophy, cognition of reality (good, truth, beauty) was replaced by *thinking*, i.e. by an operation on formal signs (transparent ideas) and later, on conventional signs or language operations. Man became “free” from the rules of reality (being-truth-good-beauty) while the rules of reality themselves were exchanged for the sphere of *values* – the *sollen* conforming to the aims of actions, which do not have to take into account the reality of really existing beings. The various forms of human action were now understood to derive their *value* from intentionally planned and somehow realized *values* accessible only as a *sollen* – in the psyche of man, who could not know reality in itself. Ever since then, ethics, culture, and aesthetics became peculiar realizations of “values” and thus they introduced rational order into a world bereft of reason. The intelligibility of being “disappeared” and was to be replaced by “human rationality,” which judged the whole of reality before its tribunal.

So, different forms of human actions are values of “objects” created by the subject. Such “objects-values” can be either good or evil, for sin, too, is a “value” belonging to the *sacrum*. And the *sacrum* itself is a “value,” even without God. Man is merely a *Wüdrträger* – a bearer of “value”, and its creator. He is some “axiological I,” a non-subject devoid of any substantial identity of being. Therefore, man is a “something-somebody” without any sense as a being, since values are not being. Without an existence as an identical subject (substance), man cannot be held responsible for his actions, for they are dependent on a real efficient cause (i.e. on the being that decides to act). There are also no grounds for existence after death, for what is there to last? Man then is “freedom” for himself and is a freedom for realizing his subjective “values,” which can be a real menace to other people. This freedom, if it is taken to be a basis of values and a value in itself, can destroy the lives of other people (killing unborn babies in the name of one’s own freedom). It does not have to take into account the right of other people to live and to possess property, for they can prove to stand in conflict with the “value” of my actions.

A divorce from reality in the domain of cognition, and the locking of oneself up in the domain of merely “valuable” actions, can justify anything, for one has thus lost the measure of real truth, good, and beauty. And without these, man is only a “human-like” creature, even if he is called an “axiological I” – *ego valoris subiectivi*.

If the reality of the really existing world is life-giving, then a departure from such reality and locking oneself up in the world of *sollen-values*, which are not being-reality, amounts to locking civilization up in a death chamber. For the freedom of creating values for oneself, which are not being, is the freedom of non-being. A civilization based on value-freedom – measured only by subjective “needs” – is a civilization of death. That this threat is not always, and not for everybody realized, follows from the inconsistency of pure subjectivity (and also from its impossibility). For man is a real being in a real world which exists and develops through real truth, real good and real beauty. A total departure from reality is not possible. For one has to eat real food, sleep and breathe. We take all this from a really existing world for a really existing man. And this reality, stemming from God and ordained to God, provides – whether man wants it or not – truth, good, and beauty... But “the plague is here!” (A. Mickiewicz, *Konrad Wallenrod*).

Translated by *Marek Kowalczyk*

Rev. Michel SCHOOYANS

THE DANGERS OF EUROPE'S POPULATION DECLINE

Practically everywhere in Europe the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is below the level of population replacement. The TFR is the average number of children per female. In the richest countries, an average of 2.1 children is required for replacement.

According to *Eurostat* (1993) – the most authoritative source on this subject – the TFR was 2.61 in 1960, and 1.51 in 1991. All the countries of the EC, except Ireland, are below the threshold of 2.1 children. Here are some telling examples: U.K. – 1.82; Belgium – 1.62; Germany – 1.33; Spain – 1.33; Italy – 1.26; France – 1.65. The decline is still more evident in some countries outside the EC.

In former East Germany, the TFR has declined to 0.83 in 1992: an historical record; in Russia, within two years (1990-1992) it declined from 1.9 to 1.56; in Poland and in Slovakia it reached 1.95 in 1992.

Let us have a look now at one particular case: France. What happened there in 1993? We can observe the following negative records:

1. The number of births was the lowest since 1945.
2. The birth rate was the lowest since 1945: 12.3 per million.
3. The TFR was the lowest since 1914: 1.65 children per female, whereas, I repeat, 2.10 children are required in the rich countries to replace the population.

4. The reproduction rate of 0.79 is the lowest ever reported. This means that if the fertility rate remains static at 1.65 children per female, only 79% of the population would be replaced. This also means that without considering other demographic phenomena (such as migration), the population of France would decline to 21% of its current population within one generation.

5. The proportion of people below the age of 20 is the lowest ever reported. Thus it is evident that France is losing its demographic vitality. And so is the whole of Europe.

The causes of this population decline are, of course, very complex. However, one of them deserves to be mentioned as a case in point for our exposé. Indeed, for contraception, abortion and sterilization to be accepted in poor countries, Europe has to set the example for such practices. This was considered as a condition of credibility for the Third World.

As early as 1973, René Dumont, a French agronomist and close advisor of François Mitterand, wrote:

Authoritative steps to contain birth rates will become more and more necessary, but those steps will be acceptable only if they are taken, first of all, in the rich countries and by educating the poor ones.

The European example had the effect of being imitated in the Third World but, most of all, has had a boomerang effect in Europe itself. This is a new version of the story of the gardener watering himself. Europe has been and still is the first victim of the “anti-life” practices that she was willing to export to the Third World for the purpose of controlling it.

Of course, in the USA we can also observe a demographic decline. The TFR is 2.0: too low for replacement. But despite appearances, the American situation is quite different from the European one. First of all, the TFR of 2.0 is clearly higher than that of the EC where the rate is 1.51. Besides, it is frequently emphasized that in the USA the fertility rate varies according to ethnic groups. For example, TFR is higher among black people or among hispanic people than among white. We can also observe that the population pyramid is more balanced than in Europe, and that the proportion of young people is also higher than in Europe.

We must also underline that “pro-life” movements are much more active and better organized in the USA than in Europe. Their influence on the media, political leaders, abortion clinics, and pharmaceutical firms is very effective.

The difference between the situations that we can observe in Europe and in the USA gives rise to a very important question: Should the population decline in Europe be of special concern for the USA?

The answer to this question will reveal the ambiguity of the relationship between Europe and the United States.

From one point of view, the USA and the Anglo-Saxon countries have been pioneers in contraception, sterilization and abortion. The main Malthusian and Neomalthusian arguments are always being spread from centres based both in the States and in the United Kingdom. Europe, being influenced by those countries, shares their concern for what I call “demographic security” in the Third World, the expansion of which is feared by all rich nations. This community of interests drives Europe and the USA to organize a common front with the aim of being able to contain what they call the population pressure of the poor nations. This is why the USA and Europe do not hesitate to resort to international institutions to achieve their aim. They are even looking to the new North-South antagonism for a new cohesiveness which can no longer be found in the East-West antagonism.

But from another point of view, the community of interests that we have just examined disappears. Indeed, it becomes more and more clear that the

USA, obsessed by its security, is willing to prevent the emergence of new rivals, no matter who this may be.

In the long run, the Third World in general is a potential rival the rise of which must be checked. Let us consider two examples:

– China was “granted aid” to check its population growth. The bulk and efficiency of this aid have been recently denounced by authoritative specialists.

– Mexico, a developing country situated at the very southern border of the USA, had to submit to closer control. This goal was achieved by integrating this country with a “free market” consortium of Mexico, the USA and Canada.

Although the progress of developing countries is of great concern for the USA, much more bothersome in the prospect of a reinforced European power and the organization of a dynamic and enlarged European community.

Hence some questions arise:

1. Should Europe itself not destroy its capacity in the Third World's favour? Consenting to its demographic fall, Europe would give a free hand to the USA. Ahead of the USA, Europe is able to offer an alternative partnership with the poor countries, but has itself been trapped.

2. There is still another question: Should the US government not rejoice over the demographic collapse of Europe? Since Europe is perceived as the main rival, the answer to this question is evidently affirmative. It is only logical that the USA should be pleased with the aging of Europe's population. Given time, however, there will be no one to stand between the onrushing hordes of Muslims.

We must now consider some consequences of the fertility decline in Europe and the developed countries. It is evident that the demographic collapse of the North will cause a decline in the overall vitality of mankind. Two consequences, however, are especially relevant.

1. The first consequence is that the demographic decline of the rich countries will reinforce the migratory trends in the poor people of the South. This is already evident in the USA, and the arrival of new Hispanic blood is a sign of hope. But on this point, Europe has adopted a position quite different from that of the States. Europe is not prepared to welcome immigrants. This is particularly true regarding North Africans. Since European manpower is diminishing, the North African population – younger, more fertile and sometimes inspired by a spirit of crusade – will exert an increasing pressure upon Europe. This issue will become increasingly serious, the more so since Europe – in contrast to the USA – did not favour the integration of the North African population already established on its territory.

2. The second consequence is still more harmful. We must mention here the weakening and the vanishing of our cultural and scientific tradition. Man is indeed the unique bearer of culture, knowledge and religion. Thanks to man, and only thanks to man, this rich patrimony of mankind is transmitted and

enhanced at the same time. Mankind's memory is a living one; it invents, discovers, creates. Written documents are dead realities if nobody exists to investigate them, to conduct dialogue with them, and to proceed further. Due to the decrease, the greatest risk for Europe is that its culture may weaken and disappear.

The consequence of this trend for the Third World will be tragic: poor countries will stagnate in their underdeveloped state.

Alphons HORTEN

THE DUTIES OF A CHRISTIAN IN A DEMOCRACY

Reverend Fathers, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I begin with words of the deepest, heartfelt thanks that on this day, the birthday of our Holy Father, in this room I can, as a German, speak about the future of Europe. Above all, I thank you, Your Magnificence, as our host, and my friend, Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń, whose idea this was.

This hall is permeated with the spirit of Karol Wojtyła and Stefan Wyszyński. In a quite special way it heightens our awareness of the significance of the pontificate of John Paul II. No other pope has so decisively influenced world history through his personal engagement as he has done – with a clear perception of political reality, with courageous determination and tireless activity, above all, with boundless trust in God. In the judgement of leading Europeans, Americans and Russians, the fall of the Soviet empire and its philosophy of life would not have happened so quickly or so peacefully without his admirable activity in Poland and in many other areas.

In accord with the “basic law of our Church,” as Edith Stein says, “the unfathomable secret of the cross,” this wonderful turning point was only possible because, in the foregoing decades, together with many other confessors and sufferers, great martyr-cardinals had, as real leaders of their peoples, bravely stood up for freedom against violence and suppression:

- Stepinač in Croatia
- Mindszenty in Hungary
- Beran and Tomašek in Prague
- Wyszyński in Poland.

To these names we should add Korec in Slovakia and Todea in Romania, who are still alive today.

The fall and disintegration of communism provide a commentary on Christian truth, serious and unique in world history. Marx and Lenin were uncompromising atheists. They had a false perception of mankind and consequently succumbed to the temptation of the snake in the garden of Eden: “You shall be as God.” The terrible devastation of the state, of society, of the economy and of nature, the deliberate destruction of the highest human and spiritual values that came about under communist rule show where man ends when, in presumptuous pride, he believes he can behave like God. New facts come to

light daily, showing the previously unimagined extent of the general destruction, most of it the visible result of transgression against the Christian moral code as foretold by Dostoyevsky in the previous century.

The free world has lost its most dangerous enemy. Yet it finds itself in a serious, life-threatening crisis. To quote Robert Spaemann, "banal nihilism" is now the dominant philosophy. Prevailing public opinion has lost its relationship to the supernatural. The relevance of human activity is considered to be limited to this life. Present day ideas usually replace the expectation of divine, immortal life with hopes of better conditions of life on earth. Everything that should be of a serious nature to man is regarded as illusory. This "banal nihilism" was characterised by Nietzsche a century ago in the chapter on the "last man" in his *Zarathustra*: "What is love? What is creation? What is longing? asks the last man, and blinks. The earth has become small and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small. A little poison from time to time gives pleasant dreams; at the end much poison provides a pleasant death. One still works, for work is entertaining, but one takes care that the entertainment does not become a burden. Who wishes to rule or to obey? Both are too troublesome. No shepherd and no sheep. Everybody wants the same things. Everybody is equal. There are pleasures for the day and pleasures for the night. But health is valued. «We have found happiness», say the last men, and blink."

The past few decades show with frightening clarity that the free world is approaching the state foretold by Nietzsche with worrying speed. If the Church in Europe is to demonstrate its decisive strength, as the Holy Father wishes, we are confronted with enormous tasks.

The limited extent of this speech compels me to choose from the many-faceted theme of religious renewal in Europe a single but important aspect, namely the tasks and duties of a Christian as citizen of a democracy. If Christianity regards itself as a formative principle of European culture, then it must pay close attention to the field of politics.

Per me reges regnant (kings rule through me). These words taken from the *Book of Wisdom*, are inscribed on the imperial crown of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, as statement of the divine right of kings. In relation to an authority which, according to these words, is based on and thus legitimised by the supernatural, the ordinary citizen appears as a subject, obliged to obey and therefore with limited responsibility for the common good.

After a thousand years of development and tradition under this order, the Catholic Church has only very slowly come round to an understanding of the phenomenon of democracy, a form of government in which there is no single ruler, but in which the free citizens are "the sovereign," as they are called in Switzerland.

The full significance of this change for the relationship between church and democracy is only slowly becoming clear. The last Vatican Council generally

welcomed “the development of political structures that give all citizens a greater possibility to participate freely and actively in laying the legislative foundations of their political community, in directing political events, in determining the fields of activity and purposes of different institutions and in electing their governments.”

However, the importance of this statement and its implications for the democratically ruled states are still not sufficiently understood and evaluated.

Neither does the new Universal Catechism go beyond the statement of the Council, but is limited to generalised formulations, without clearly indicating the serious duty of each and every Christian to do his or her best for the common good in the immediate community and in the state as a whole.

The fact that, together with the right to free expression of opinion, democracy also legitimises open opposition to the government, naturally makes governing more difficult. Therefore, democracy only functions well if its citizens show tolerance, civil courage and a sense of responsibility for society as a whole. Thus it is not enough for a Christian to limit his activity to doing his duty as voter and taxpayer, but otherwise to regard politics from the standpoint of a more or less interested onlooker. On the contrary, to the best of his ability, he has a duty to shoulder the burden of co-responsibility for political events; if necessary, he must bravely oppose recognisable abuse of the law and possible endangering of state order.

Under these conditions it is a prime duty of Christians in a democracy to ask themselves constantly how they can carry out their task as citizens and thus discharge their co-responsibility for the common good. Democracy lives from the consent and joint activity of its citizens. It is therefore not enough for the citizen merely to complain about a particular abuse or state of affairs. He must also feel a responsibility to participate, as far as he is able, in rectifying them. He must understand that the often unexciting daily life of a democracy also offers the possibility that each citizen in his place and in the forms open to him, can collaborate with the government and so help to correct negative developments and guide matters to a better conclusion. There are many ways of doing this:

- Information among friends and fellow citizens of topical questions of politics, as seen from the Christian point of view.
- Reader’s letters to the press and television institutes, with reasoned protest against incorrect depiction and accounts.
- Influencing one’s own parliamentary representative so that he knows the standpoint of a convinced Christian, and takes account of it.
- Active cooperation as member of a political party, in order to present the Christian standpoint when discussing and preparing important decisions.
- Participation in public or written discussions.

- In important cases, the institution of legal proceedings to clarify or amend incorrect conditions.
- Finally, acting as a deputy in communal, regional and national parliaments.

Educated and experienced Christians bear a special responsibility in this many-sided representation and defence of the Christian standpoint, but individual engagement is indispensable in today's mass democracy. Otherwise there is a grave risk that it could change into "onlooker democracy," that is, a growing section of the electorate could lose its sense of personal responsibility, and all too readily make superficial judgements without any attempt at more thorough examination and evaluation of the available alternatives.

For the sake of the common good, Christians with a sense of responsibility must do their utmost to prevent such dangerous tendencies; they must search their consciences for that which can be personally undertaken to counteract "the good man's resignation" frequently lamented by Pius XII. This is a state of mind that leads to the non-use and loss of important opportunities for positive development. The great mediaeval theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas in *De regimine principum*, defined the duties of the Christian ruler in great detail. Similarly, present day moral theologians have the important task of defining, exactly and comprehensively, the Christian's duties as citizens of a democracy. This is particularly important in states which, after many years of communist rule, must now build up a new, sound, democratic order. What is needed is the personal commitment of the individual, something that usually involves much additional effort, not least for the family as well.

We daily face the fact that we live in a post-Christian society, in a world that has largely lost its order and sense of proportion, a world in which principles and basic values diverge increasingly and evermore significantly from those that are fundamental for our faith and life. But precisely because, as Christian realists, we entertain no illusions, we also recognise that strong, positive healing forces can radiate from our own position and attitude: a sick organism can recover its health if it receives a certain medicament in very small amounts. In this way, even in the post-Christian world of today, the Christian world-view can make a decisive contribution to the healing of society and the state. There are many encouraging examples of this. Thus, after World War II the Italian *comitati civici*, a non-partisan movement initiated by Pius XII, averted the imminent Communist majority. Even today minorities of Christians, aware of their responsibility could change or at least favorably influence the political climate of their country with possibly significant consequences.

At this point it is with particular pleasure that I thank Rocco Buttiglione most heartily for the example he has set by his endeavours in the political life. His effort to regenerate a party with Christian principles is no easy task. We

hope it will have a lasting effect on the political and moral recovery of his country. Thomas Aquinas says in Dante's *Divine Comedy* that wisdom in action surpasses contemplative wisdom. The highest form of human activity is the exercise of government, and that, in our democratic world, involves active cooperation in politics and society. Thus the philosopher Buttiglione has, as a leader in politics, attained the higher rank of an active wise man.

In conclusion, let me add a few words on the relationship between Poland and Germany in view of the new Europe that is to come. In 1962 Romano Guardini said:

The new Europe is not yet a reality; it presupposes, above all, a new attitude. Each European nation must re-think its history in terms of the great new European form of life that is to come. This vision calls for a high degree of self-conquest and profound thought.

After the dark decades of their relations in this century, Poles and Germans must recognise their conjoined destiny on the road to a peaceful Europe that embraces all its peoples, and can concentrate its still splintered and conflicting forces on the accomplishment of great, common tasks.

All this can only be achieved on the basis of our western Christian culture. Our future can only be assured on this foundation, not on mounting national gross product, technical progress, greater welfare.

At the time of the great change, the Poles and Germans may consider it a grace that a Polish pope is actively influencing spiritual developments. In addition to Benedict of Nursia, the elevation of Cyril and Methodius to patron saints of Europe is an illuminating sign that Europe is unthinkable without the Slavic nations. It is only jointly with the Slavs that Europe can attain the rich abundance of its creative strength.

John Paul II has repeatedly called on us to preserve our great historical inheritance and to make it visible in our public and private life. Thus, on his last visit to Germany, in front of the cathedral of Speyer he said:

Europe's rich human and spiritual heritage is a warning message for Europeans of today and tomorrow. Only if we recognise the lasting value of our Christian history and develop it for our present tasks, is it possible, as a spiritually united Europe, to herald a liberating message to the world, proclaiming a future worth striving for, encouraging the nations to make it worthy of mankind and helping them to overcome their trials and problems.

In Strasbourg in 1988, John Paul II, very seriously but with great confidence, challenged Europeans to use today's unique chances for a united Europe, but simultaneously to resist the prevalent spirit of hedonism and materialism and to bear in mind the fundamental truths. He closed with the words: "Europe, return to your highest values; Europe, retrieve your lost soul."

Rev. Stanislav ČEHOVNIK

Honourable assembly, most respected Ladies and Gentlemen!

I am happy that I, as a Slovenian, have the opportunity to convey to you the message from Carinthia where I live and which is my home. This is the most southern province of Austria, on the borders of which three cultural circles – Germanic, Latin and Slavic – meet and strive to live together in friendship.

Today, the question of the future of Europe engages our minds there more than ever because it is becoming less predictable than ever. One can see that it would be extremely one-sided to consider Europe and its future exclusively from an economic, or even social and political point of view. Jacques Delors said the other day that either Europe must have a soul or it would cease to exist. I would permit myself to appropriate his thought, but also to alter it a little by saying that Europe must have a deeply human soul. And we Christians are responsible that this soul be awake and alive, and not plunge into a dangerous, deadly sleep.

This is why it seems to me essential that the question about the contribution of Christianity should be put to the fore in the context of all the interpretations which stress economic problems and processes. We should constantly live Easter time, and therefore it is understandable that we call to mind those challenges which the Resurrected gave to His disciples: unity, love for one's neighbour, and proclamation of the good news.

The idea that all of us – as God's children – are brothers, is the bond which unifies Europe and can give it lasting peace. *Opus fraternitatis pax*. But we can enter the path of peace only if we consider a unity which is founded on Christianity and its moral principles rather than on human power. We must be astonished and appalled when we see how little unity there is in the neighbouring country of Bosnia, how few promises have been kept, even those negotiated with best of intentions, and see the consequences of fanaticism and of pursuit of power. The case of Northern Ireland is an example of the same problem, only in a different geographical location.

What can we, as the Church, do here? I think that it is not sufficient that only the West unites in peace. From the beginning, Christianity and its Church assumed the task of "building bridges" – for the sake of peace; of building bridges towards those countries in Eastern Europe which are not yet present in

European thinking, or which appear there only occasionally and marginally because they were forced to live under a different ideological power for so long. When we speak about Europe we must learn to see this great social and political reality as one whole.

In a noteworthy declaration of the Diocesan Council of Carinthia, which is a representative body for Catholics of the diocese Gurk-Klagenfurt, our bishop, Dr. Egon Kapellari, referring to the widely-discussed topic of the unification of Europe, said: "Christians should also work at the «building-site of Europe»." He also quoted the words of John Paul II that our European home extends from the Atlantic to the Urals, and from the North Pole to Sicily. "Thus" – he continued – "there is still a lot of work on this «building-site of Europe»."

Obviously, bridges need foundations on which they can be solidly built in order to resist floods. I would like to recall the words of Theodor Reuss, who was the first German President after the war. He said: "Europe is supported, as if by columns, by three mountains simultaneously: by the Acropolis in Athens, the Capitol in Rome, and the hill of Golgotha in Jerusalem." If the Acropolis is a symbol of culture, then Rome could be interpreted not only as historical tradition, but also as the Church whose origins could be found at a certain hill in Jerusalem. Golgotha, however, was not the final station. The resurrected Jesus gave His disciples an order to carry the good news and faith to the world. But he also gave them time so that they could learn to deal with their own past, which they were able to understand only after Pentecost. We, too, as Christians learn to understand and reflect upon the European past in order to shape the future from it. We must know how to forgive each other and forget. This is the essence of the Christian message, which is the only one which can be a source of lasting peace. We should be friends in order to give this Europe the strength to cope with its past. It is the condition which must of necessity be fulfilled if the danger is to be diverted. The disciples did not stop for long to follow with elated sight their Lord who ascended to Heaven. Very soon, angels sent them to the tasks assigned to them. We need not gaze enchantedly at the sky, we need rather action springing from faith and from the consciousness that we in Europe are responsible for the countries of the Third and the so-called Fourth World. For this, we need spirituality which would teach us anew to understand how important it is to share. It is not looking into the more or less glorious past that will help us, but a courageous glance into the future which will allow us to see the misery of mankind. Easter commands us to direct our eyes towards the future from the very heart of the present. For Jesus' disciples, the future was the place where the Holy Ghost was sent to them.

Today, much fear is being spread. There are different reasons for this, and most often related to the way people think about material things. Some of those fears cannot be ignored, but they must not become the norm for action either.

Christians in Europe must have the courage to let the Spirit of God guide them. The Spirit is always there where, instead of discrimination, love of neighbour is shown, where community interest has priority over individual interest, where there is room for ecumenical thought, and where other people are brothers in God.

Culture, art and economy have their value only when they draw their transcendence, their bond with God, from Christian faith. Only this, and nothing else, will save Europe and keep it alive. We must transform into the future what Christianity conveyed to us as a heritage. Every century had its great figures, men and women who, out of conviction, shaped other people. We must not only complain that also today we are desperately in need of such people. We should rather support those among us who are gifted with great spiritual energy and thanks to this can construct bridges between the results of scientific research and the mystery of faith. One should begin with small steps, and we must see the possibilities to do this. I come from a small country which is in the course of preparations for finding its place in the heart of Europe. And to date we have already attempted, precisely in the neighbouring countries of the Alps and Adriatic region, to realize together the attitude determined by Christian values.

“One never is a Christian, but one should be always becoming a Christian” – these words come from Kierkegaard. This means, according to the words of the Church, that we should seriously take *omnia instaurare in Christo*. This is the only way in which the future of Europe can be built. In many cities so-called European Houses have been founded today. They must not remain merely the impulses for thinking. Europe itself is a home where there should be room for all people; it is a common home where people help each other to love and to hope. Only in this way will Europe have a soul and will become not the power of authority, but the force which is able to unite because its basic values are peace, freedom, love and justice.

Translated by *Patrycja Mikulska*

Rocco BUTTIGLIONE

The situation of today's Europe is not rosy. The Europe of economic interests, the Europe of Maastricht, keeps dissolving in a frightening way. On the way to unity there appear obstacles on all sides which seem to be insurmountable. At the same time, economy gets weaker and we – in the richest countries of the continent – tend towards a direction in which there are no new places of work, and in which one cannot see any noticeable improvement in employment.

While the Europe of the rich is tottering forward, the Europe of the poor is tainted with the tragedy in Bosnia. The fall of the enforced balance – the result of Yalta – has made it so that Europe, to a greater extent, has reverted to the times of the treaty of Versailles. Such a situation contains in itself a lot of data for a new conflict among the nations in the heart of Europe. In the Balkans and along the Danube history has mingled many nations, leaving them without any safe and defensible borders. It gave them no clearly geographically defined areas, which could ensure them some degree of economic independence. These nations live in a state of uncertainty and mutual suspicion; they mythologize the times in which they could lord it over other nations of the same region; they feel animosity towards one another and wish to avenge the times when they had to bear the supremacy and oppression of other nations. That which happened in Bosnia may easily be repeated elsewhere. The helplessness of the international community is conducive to violence and all forms of ethical and national egoism.

In such a situation as this, there is a need for a great political initiative. John Paul II once wrote that when one wants to achieve a good synthesis of interests and when one wishes to act for his duly understood interest, then one should also raise one's eyes to the heaven of values. This recommendation is particularly relevant in today's Europe. De Gasperi, Adenauer and Schuman, while laying foundations under European Community, had to fight against the representatives of the direct interests of their nations. They won because they saw the current problems in the light of a higher ideal; they ensured peace and enabled cooperation among the nations of Europe. Today, however, we need:

1. a grand plan which would help the economies of post-communist Europe within a sensible period of time to join in the economic process of unifying Europe; such a plan would have a beneficial impact on the economic growth of the developed countries;

2. a system of common European safety which would be able to eliminate war from Europe as an instrument of settling international conflicts, achieved through submitting conflicts among individual states to a binding arbitration, and which would allow intervention in order to conquer and punish the aggressor who abuses the rights of particular individuals or nations.

If we do not find in ourselves and in the Christian sources of European culture this power for such a great project, then perhaps history will not offer us another chance similar to that which we have today. We may learn how to think about our own good and the good of our nation while standing not in opposition to, but in unity with the good of all nations and the whole of Europe. May Mary, the Queen of Peace and Mother of European culture, help us.

Translated by *Jan Kłos*

Abp. Kazimierz MAJDAŃSKI

TOTUS TUUS!
A Recapitulation of the Discussion

Totus Tuus – Totus Eius!

Totus Tuus – these are His words.

Totus Eius – these are our words about Him, the Rock of the Church.

We shall not uncover the deepest mysteries of the heart. We have no right to do so. We are allowed, however, to read out that which is the wealth of the whole Church.

*

*Quae est ista quae progreditur, quasi aurora consurgens,
pulchra ut luna, electa ut sol, terribilis ut castrorum acies ordinata?*

“Who is arising like the dawn,

fair as the moon,

resplendent as the sun,

formidable as an army?” (Sg 6 : 10)

Tota pulchra es, Maria! – You are all beautiful, Mary!

Ave, gratia plena! – Full of grace! (Lk 1 : 28)

And Jesus’ words about her, His testament from the Cross: *Ecce Mater tua* –

“This is your mother” (Jn 19 : 27)

The man answers: *Totus Tuus!* – “And from that hour the disciple took her into his home.” (Jn 19 : 27)

*

The Episcopate of Poland took part in a retreat at Jasna Góra. It was conducted by the then Cardinal Karol Wojtyła. He started the retreat kneeling before the miraculous icon, at the throne of the Mother and Queen of the People. He then simply and humbly turned to all the bishops, asking for their blessing. Simply and humbly, as if it had always been so at the beginning of retreat, though it had never been so. Thus it was in his heart: *Exaltavit humiles!* – He has “raised high the lowly” (Lk 1 : 52), and “accords his favour to the humble.” (1 Pt 5 : 5) He received favour.

He might have received it especially then, when delivering a talk about the Mother of the Son of God. The conference room was already empty, but the Primate of the Millennium Card. S. Wyszyński was still there, very moved by what he had heard. These two great spirits were bound together and filled with elation: *Tota pulchra!*...

Certainly there was yet another great spirit with them: her knight, Maximilian Kolbe. Such was the Marian Triumvirate of our times.

Providence had led the humble retreat master to the throne of Peter. Then he canonized blessed Maximilian. And he gave the following testimony about the third:

Venerable and Dear Father Primate! Let me tell you simply my mind. There would not be this Polish pope at Peter's See, this pope who, filled with the fear of God yet at the same time full of confidence, begins this new pontificate, if there were not your faith which had not given-in to imprisonment and suffering, your heroic hope, your trust, without any reserve to the Mother of the Church (24 October 1978).

*

Inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem – “I shall put enmity between you and the woman, and between your offspring and hers” (Gen 3 : 15) – this was in the beginning of the history of man, in the first book of Revelation. And in the last one we read: “the dragon stopped in front of the woman as she was at the point of giving birth [...] Then the dragon was enraged with the woman and went away to make war on the rest of her children who obey God's commandments and have in themselves the witness of Jesus” (Rv 12 : 4 and 17).

This war is still going on.

“The woman was delivered of a male child [...] the child was taken straight up to God and to his throne” (Rv 12 : 5).

When a child is born, a family is born.

On 13 May 1981, on the anniversary of Fatima, it was supposed and intended by the pope to be a great day for families. At last, after many ages there was established a separate Council for families and a classic document was issued, *Familiaris consortio*, a pastoral-theological *summa* for the ministry to the contemporary family. In the capital of Christianity a learned institute was set up as a symbol of this necessity which has grown in the world and in the church, the necessity that the contemporary organized sciences should minister to the family.

“Then the dragon was enraged...”

The shots were heard in St. Peter's Square. The pope was badly wounded. The assassin could not understand why the pope was not killed. Indeed, his employers were even more surprised. And the church gathered to pray for

Peter. The Primate of Poland, who was dying then in Warsaw, asked people to pray no longer for him but for the Head of the Church.

*

Invidia autem diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum. At the beginning of the history of man “death came into the world only through the Devil’s envy.” Thus says the Book of Wisdom, adding: “as those who belong to him find to their cost.” (Ws 2 : 24).

The tempter lied: “You will not die!” (Gen 3 : 4). The reason why he lied was precisely so that they should die: “death came into the world only through the Devil’s envy.” When he “stopped in front of the woman as she was at the point of giving birth” he was totally blind to the beauty of “a woman robed in the sun”; he was immersed in a hatred which concentrated on her motherhood and on her Child who had not yet been born.

The dragon was and is powerful. He threatens the whole earth: he hurled down to the earth a third of the stars (see Rv 12 : 4). His threat is virtually cosmic.

*

Nos est nobis colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus [...] mundi rectores tenebrarum harum... – “For our struggle is not with flesh and blood but with the principalities, with the powers, with the world rulers of this present darkness, with the evil spirits in the heavens” (Eph 6 : 12).

At the end of 1993 John Paul II said:

Dear brothers and sisters, the apostle says: “This is the final hour” and at once adds: “the Antichrist is coming, and now many Antichrists have already come; from this we know that it is the final hour» (1 Jn 2 : 18). This same apostle reminds us that the world “is in the power of the Evil One” (1 Jn 5 : 19) [...] We cannot turn a blind eye to everything which surrounds us. We cannot not perceive that Christ and His Gospel is still “a sign that will be contradicted.” We cannot not feel that along with the civilisation of love, which is the civilisation of truth and life, there is spread yet another civilisation. It is the latter civilisation which St. John has in mind when he says: “the final hour.” The apostle writes: “many Antichrists have already come,” and then adds: “They have gone from among us, but they never really belonged to us” (1 Jn 2 : 19). [...] “This is the final hour.” John, who brings this truth to our minds, says at the same time to the addressees of his letter: “the anointing that comes from the Holy One, and you all have knowledge [...] you know the truth” (see 1 Jn 2 : 20-21). [...] We know that “the anointing that comes from the

Holy One” means the inner power, the power which Christ bestows on us. Two thousand years have passed since we first saw His glory, “the glory that he has from the Father as only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth” (Jn 1 : 14). On this is our hope grounded, and this is why we deeply believe that “sky and earth will pass away, but [His] words will never pass away” (Mt 24 : 35). [...] We are going to encounter new times while being aware of that power in the Holy Ghost which Christ has brought to us (Homily of 31 December 1993 in St. Ignatius Loyola’s church).

This is the struggle: against death – for life against sin, because it is through sin that death comes to all (see Rm 5 : 12) – for love; the struggle with the one who “was a murderer from the start, [who] is a liar and the father of lies” (Jn 8 : 44).

The murderer stands before the woman as she was at the point of giving birth“ with all his hellish hatred towards her and her not yet born Child. This is not enough. The murderer is also the father of lies. Hence he says that his hatred is called the “freedom” of the mother. He also says that killing is a law; it is enough to pass it and thereby killing ceases to be a transgression. Not to be a Cain – this is a transgression! And thus the history of the Holocaust, the saddest history of mankind, which began in this age, goes on.

Who is going to count all the crimes of the world? Who is going to tell the truth? Who is going to fathom the ocean of lies? These lies impose silence on the truth or propagate falsehood: the falsehood about man brought down to the level of “to have” and “to use”; “the falsehood” of sentimentalism which speaks about the “poor mother Earth” and about “her disastrously fatigued carrying capacity”; the falsehood about demography; the falsehood about armament and war; the falsehood about tremendous wealth amassed in the hands of few, and about the forsaken poverty of the many...We are not able to count all the falsehoods. Let us simply say, “the father of lies” has spread his power over the contemporary world and makes people blind.

And yet man must be saved. He was created to live in the truth. Let *Veritatis splendor* trace his route! There we find the truth taught with extreme clarity and power.

*

What is the price of the struggle against death for life, against sin for love, and against falsehood for truth?

On 13 May 1981 in St. Peter’s Square, the power of the enemy and the power of the rock were revealed: *Non praevalent* – “The gates of the underworld can never overpower it” (Mt 16 : 18). This is what Christ says.

This is the same Christ who tells about a grain of wheat which falls onto the earth (see Jn 12 : 24), and that they will “take you where you would rather not go” (Jn 21 : 18).

On 13 May 1981, it was the Mother who saved him. She saved him so that he should *Totus Tuus* belong to her Son. Then, when she saved and healed him, he gained the following intuition: everything should remain the same as before, i.e., audiences as before, as on that day, 13 May. He should continue his apostolic trips despite numerous warnings and reservations.

He continued Peter’s extreme efforts every day, as before. John Paul II’s teaching takes up half of *Enchiridion Familiae*, a bulky six-volume encyclopedia which contains the Teaching Office of the Church about the family from the most ancient times until now.

“The family is the road of the Church” – he wrote only recently. He also wrote: “The Year of the Family which we celebrate in the Church creates an opportunity to knock on the door of your homes. I wish to meet you all and convey to you a special greeting” (*Letter to Families*, No. 1).

How is he following this unusual route to encounter the family of mankind and each individual family?

On 29 April in the present Year of the Family, during the thanksgiving Service for the preservation of forty-nine years ago, a mass was being said in the sanctuary of St. Joseph in Calissia, and a procession of Polish priests who survived the concentration camp was advancing through the holy basilica. Suddenly a whisper electrified the congregation: “The Pope has again had an accident.”

Again! Such an outstanding skier has had a trifling accident! So many trips and so many adventures, and the accidents: one in St. Peter’s Square and now another one so close. Not while skiing, not on trips, but at home, in the apostolic Home whose windows overlook the same square. An accident once again!

And over St. Peter’s Square one can see the symbol of sacrifice and rescue, the mosaic of the Mother of the Church.

Totus Tuus – Totus Eius!

*

Holy Father, the Pope of the family, together with the Mother, save the families of the world! Save them together with her, with the Mother of the family.

The whisper about John Paul II’s new trial encircled the survivors from Dachau in St. Joseph’s sanctuary. There is the whole Holy Family there. You wrote about it, Holy Father, at the end of your *Letter to Families*. In the Year of the Family you wrote that the Holy Family is an “icon and pattern of each human family” and you wished us: “May Mary, the Mother of beautiful love,

and Joseph, the Protector of the Saviour, accompany you with their steadfast care” (No. 23).

Will you allow us, Holy Father, to say: may they grant their steadfast care to you, the Guardian of Love, of Life and Truth, and the Rock of the Church, at the immense price of your afflictions “for the sake of his body, the Church” (Col 1 : 24), of those “who are listed in the Lamb’s book of life” (Rv 21 : 27).

Translated by *Jan Kłós*

ROCCO BUTTIGLIONE –

HONORARY DOCTOR OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LUBLIN – 18 MAY 1994

Tadeusz STYCZEŃ, SDS

LAUDATORY ADDRESS IN HONOUR OF
PROFESSOR ROCCO BUTTIGLIONE
ON THE OCCASION OF THE CONFERRAL UPON HIM
OF THE DOCTORATE *HONORIS CAUSA*
BY THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LUBLIN
The Great Aula, 18 May 1994

“But the wise shall shine brightly
like the splendour of the firmament,
And those who lead the many to justice
shall be like the stars forever”
Daniel 12:3

“...we preach Christ Crucified,
...[who] is the power of God and
the wisdom of God”
I Corinthians 1:23-24

Your Excellency, the Distinguished Reverend Archbishop and Grand Chancellor
of the Catholic University of Lublin!

Your Magnificence, the Distinguished Reverend Rector!

Academic Senate of Our Institution!

Distinguished Sister Dean and Colleagues of the Faculty of Philosophy!

Your Magnificence, the Distinguished Rector of the International Academy of
Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein!

Distinguished Professors, Rectors, and Friends of Rocco Buttiglione, his wife,
and his four charming daughters!

All Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen!

Distinguished Professors of Our Institution!

Beloved Students of the Catholic University of Lublin and of the International
Academy of Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein!

18 May 1994. This date has a special eloquence for everyone who makes up the academic family and community of the Catholic University of Lublin. It has that significance for three different reasons, reasons which overlay and mutually complete each other. Today, to these three reasons, there is added a fourth.

Rocco Buttiglione. That name is the fourth reason for the significance of this day, on the occasion of the awarding to him the highest honour and distinction which a University can confer upon a man of learning: the title of doctor *honoris causa*. But what are the three other reasons behind the special significance of this day?

18 May is, first of all, celebrated at this University as an especially festive day. It is the birthday of Karol Cardinal Wojtyła, professor of ethics at this University since the 1953-54 academic year, and since 16 October 1978 the Holy Father Pope John Paul II.

Secondly, this particular birthday is especially festive for our University community because it falls during the fifteenth year of this extraordinary pontificate.

Lastly, this is a day particularly important and festive for our University because it falls during the seventy-fifth anniversary year of this institution's founding, in this city, in Lublin, the "Jagiellonian City," a city of the Union of 1569, unprecedented in human history entered into less than forty years after the famous Augsburgian *cuius regio, eius religio*. It was here, in this place, that seventy-five years ago a University was born. It was a University for this city but not only for this city. It was born for Poland, for Europe, for the world. It was born as a University of culture, teaching to everyone that royal service of God and country, *Deo et Patriae*. That University came into existence at the same time that, after century-long years of servitude, our most illustrious Polish Republic was reborn, a state erased from the maps of Europe and the world by the rape of her neighbours.

And today, amid these three-fold extraordinary reasons for celebration there arises a fourth. The eighteenth day of May 1994 becomes, as a result of an act to take place in a moment, the birthday of a new doctor *honoris causa* of our University. By virtue of this act there will enter into the circle of our academic family a proven friend of this University, to remain inscribed there in the birth registry of the Catholic University of Lublin. He is one of the most distinguished of contemporary philosophers, a genuine man of wisdom, a lover of truth and one of the most distinguished statesmen on Italy's political scene. He is a politician, an expression of the supremacy of the cause of truth over force in all human relationships. That philosopher and politician is Rocco Buttiglione.

Why did we choose this particular day as most fitting and appropriate to confer the title of doctor *honoris causa* upon Professor Rocco Buttiglione? Why have we waited with this "good wine" until now? Because there are truths which, like a priceless treasure, one cherishes in the depths of one's heart. That

mystery grows ripe and waits to be revealed. It waits for the one day when one uncovers it, when it can shine with the brightness of its truth, enriching all and not just the residents and friends of the home. But now the moment has come and the reason is upon us to remove the veil from that truth. We wanted to offer to Professor Rocco Buttiglione, along with this highest honour that as a University we can offer him, the precious and rich fullness of this day which is so special to us. We also note, in the eloquence of this day, that it was Rocco Buttiglione himself who pointed out to us the rich significance of this date. Was it not Rocco Buttiglione himself who makes us aware of the demands of truth to rule over force – *plus ratio quam vis!* – in the midst of different and diverse pressures from opposing forces, material and external, from East and West, providing that silhouette which the profile of Polish history casts upon the background of the history of Europe? Who has more profoundly interpreted the eloquence of that question posed to the whole world from this place by Karol Wojtyła in his poem “Thinking about the Fatherland”: “Can history flow against the currents of conscience?” Who has captured more deeply than him the eloquence of the poem “Stanisław,” on the role of witness as the greatest argument in the scale of arguments of wise men, teachers, and genuine leaders of nations and societies? “The word did not convert; would the blood?” Oh professor, friend of our University! Oh when will this Aula, bearing the name of the great Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, ever forget your lectures delivered in it? This Aula remembers. And those who were not present for them can always reach for the introduction to your magisterial work, *Il pensiero di Karol Wojtyła* (Jaca Book, Milan 1982), or to texts subsequently published in the quarterly journal “Ethos.”

Thus, today did this hour strike, an hour dictated by the logic of the heart. It is the logic of the heart which determined the time to try to do the impossible: to try to pay the unpayable debt of gratitude which we owe to you. The manner of paying the unpayable has something about its chronology which we might call the logic of time. It is precisely the logic of time which points out to us that we should make this day, 18 May 1994, already triply eloquent for us, quadrupally so. It requires us to choose this day as the only day which could be most fitting to confer upon you, Professor, the title of doctor *honoris causa* of the Catholic University of Lublin. “This is the day that the Lord has made.” Even more so: This is the day that the Lord has chosen, directing the voice of the logic of time to the voice of the logic of the heart. He who loves, understands.

Of course, on the day when you enter into the circle of our family as the youngest doctor *honoris causa* in its history it is hard not to keep in mind everything which, with the Creator God at the forefront, had a role in the mystery of the birth of a boy who came into the world on 6 June 1948 in the home of his parents, Pasquale and Liliana Pedone Buttiglione, in Gallipoli,

a small town in sunny Italy, formerly New Greece. A boy who came into the world to the great joy of his two older sisters, Angela and Mariana, today distinguished ladies and figures in the Italian mass media. It would also be hard not to call to mind Professor Buttiglione's own family, which today makes its home in Rome near the Villa Borghese, a home whose beginnings reach back to a walk along the golden seashore in the town of Rimini when a young dark-haired philosopher-lawyer met a girl by the name of Pia, a girl with flaxen hair who seemed to have been born not so much from the azure waves of the Adriatic as – it is hard to explain this miracle of Rimini – from the cold emerald waters of the Baltic. We Poles associate the beauty of the blonde Pia with the women of the amber coast, girls with hair the colour of the dunes and beaches upon which the Baltic waves from time to time cast the resinous gold of amber. And the family of Rocco and Pia: all girls, girls with inimitable faces which show forth the living traces of both parents. They are: Benedetta, followed by Francesca, after which comes, of course, Chiara. And who cannot not be, who must of course obviously be: Beatrice.

Rocco Buttiglione, now a Roman, residing on a street with the charming name Via delle Tre Madonne, sees his cultural patrimony in the forefathers of the great culture of his native Italy. Among them are the great Florentines: Dante Alighieri and the post-war Mayor of Florence, the Servant of God Giorgio La Pira. There is also, too – but not as *secundum quid* – another Florentine, Niccolò Machiavelli. Among those who gave birth to Rocco Buttiglione, the philosopher and politician, are his immediate teachers: the great Italian philosopher Augusto Del Noce, a Roman, and earlier the distinguished lawyer from Turin Norberto Bobbio. Among the other columns, columns of philosophy and religion, were the spiritual youth leader and founder of the *Comunione e Liberazione* movement, Father Luigi Giussani, and the radiating spirit of wisdom, the late-lamented Father Francesco Ricci. And finally there was Father Karol Wojtyła whose book *The Acting Person* was discovered in Polish by the young Rocco in Cracow while the book's author was still a Cracovian (though engaged already for many years with Lublin and, more precisely, the Catholic University of Lublin). This Rocco Buttiglione became author of the best monograph published to date on the thought of the Polish Pope, *Il pensiero di Karol Wojtyła*, known already today in various translations.

I must now give expression to the voice of Rocco Buttiglione himself:

If we were to have a different mother or father we would certainly be different people. Those among us who are married would certainly be different people if we had met a different woman or man. We discover the value of our femininity or masculinity in large measure through our encounter with another person, a person whom we love or a person who has loved us. Nights spent over the cradle of our children or in the company of those close to us tell us a lot about ourselves. Our masters, those

whom we have taken as models, likewise have impressed their stamp upon our lives (R. Buttiglione, "Introduction" in: T. Styczeń, *Urodziłeś się, by kochać* [You Were Born to Love], Lublin 1993, pp. xvii-xviii).

It was precisely under the influence of his Roman master, Augusto Del Noce, that Rocco Buttiglione began his studies in the history of Marxism, dedicating his first works to the so-called "critical theory of society" (*Dialettica e nostalgia*, Milan 1987; *La crisi dell'economia marxista e gli inizi della Scuola di Francoforte*, Rome 1979). His attention was reforged on the well-known statement of Karl Marx: "Previous philosophers have only interpreted the world differently, whereas it is rather a question of changing it." But can one build a better world, asked the young philosopher, if one has not first come to know it in its truth, goodness, and beauty? The basic error of Marxism therefore, according to Buttiglione, was not its emphasis on exalting human praxis but its neglecting the fact that authentic human praxis is the result of a moral decision of man, i.e., a decision in which he chooses obedience to the truth, goodness, and beauty that he has come to know. On the basis of these convictions Buttiglione developed a critique of Marxism which retains its validity even after the fall of the systems of real socialism. Its essence is the statement that man is not just an object of economic life but is at the same time and in a way more important for his essential self-fulfillment – the subject of ethical life, the servant of "the normative power of truth."

A servant. Undoubtedly man constitutes himself in the role of master of himself only through that service. He concerns himself with his self-constitution, he discovers the truth about himself and rules himself only when, in recognizing the truth about himself, he guides and governs himself by that truth through his own choice to which he subjects himself and to which he gives himself in service. By serving the truth about one's self, one governs one's self and reigns over one's self. And in the service of that truth one encounters on the road to one's self every other person as a second "I" (*L'uomo e il lavoro. Riflessioni sull'enciclica "Laborem exercens"*, Bologna 1982; *Metafisica della conoscenza e politica in S. Tommaso d'Aquino*, Bologna 1985).

These convictions naturally led Professor Rocco Buttiglione to an encounter with the thought of Karol Wojtyła. In the philosophy of the human person, which sees man as he who discovers himself and returns to himself only in recognizing the truth about himself and by free choice becoming its servant and lover, Buttiglione simultaneously perceives both the chance and necessity of rescue precisely on the grounds of a realistic philosophy of being – which is an accurate intuition of contemporary philosophy. Because of that discovery of truth recognized by man, the world, the truth of being, being the occasion to discover within its compass someone wholly extraordinary, who also recognizes that world, who nevertheless as the subject of that knowing and at the same time the subject of knowing one's self, ceaselessly transcends everything that

is in this world and which can only be the object of knowing, i.e., a thing and not, like man, a subject in this world, i.e., a person. Buttiglione sees that it is precisely that metaphysical and epistemological realism which causes the philosophy of man to open itself up completely upon its subjective reality, upon its subjectivity, and in the name of the demands of the objectivity of truth about man. Being is surprised at itself when it personalizes itself and becomes a person. In man, being attains to the level of making itself aware of itself. Likewise, in man the truth of being, by the power of its recognition, acquires its witness and in a certain sense its trustee. This is precisely where the philosopher of being and the philosopher of man is born, i.e., simultaneously the lover of the truth of being and of the truth of man. It is therefore not accidental that the seal of the International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein (whose vice-rector is Rocco Buttiglione, and whose rector, His Magnificence Prof. Josef Seifert, is among us), carries the Platonic *Dilligere veritatem omnem et in omnibus*; so classical and at the same time so contemporary!

The meeting at this point of two paths, the philosophical path of Prof. Rocco Buttiglione and the path of the Professor of the Catholic University of Lublin Karol Wojtyła could have, independently of all other possible or factual influences, only one final source. It is the profound bending over of man on the world surrounding him and the profound surprise of man at the greatness within him, a greatness which could only be – and is! – a reflection and gift of Him who is not of this world, a gift and reflection of the face of the Creator Himself, the Father of man. Hence the philosophy of Rocco Buttiglione as a servant of the truth of being: of subject and object, showing the lack of a base to an anthropology that styles itself “the dialectic of master and slave,” sees the highest and only adequate way of expressing that truth by the expression of man’s gratitude to His Creator, thankfulness for the gift of being sons and daughters of such a Father. It is also gratitude of being at the same time brothers and sisters who are equally amazed at and proud of the glory of their “royal dignity,” of their divine patrimony. Thus, for Rocco Buttiglione to live is to philosophize and to philosophize is to remain in thanksgiving (*Über die Dankbarkeit im Denken Karol Wojtyłas* in: J. Seifert, ed., *Danken und Dankbarkeit. Eine universale Dimension des Menschseins*, Heidelberg 1992, pp. 211-233).

Is it permissible for the wise man to hide the results of these discoveries beneath a bushel basket? Should not the discovered treasure rather be shared with everyone? Can the wise man surrender the mission of proclaiming the truth and guiding its fate within the histories of the free decisions of individual peoples and of nations?

This is why Rocco Buttiglione, who in many ways can be recognized as a wise man, who sees what is eternal and at the same time extraordinary in

man; this is why Rocco Buttiglione became a statesman. He is today a member of the Parliament of the Italian Republic, a politician with the insight of a master strategist who knows when to throw the switch to begin certain initiatives and when this best ought to take place so that the train of history can carry people in the direction of giving concrete embodiment to what is eternal in man (*Il problema politico dei cattolici. Dottrina sociale e modernità*, Casale Monferrato 1993). He knows that only in this way will the ideal not be left suspended in the realm of the abstract or buried in books on philosophers' desks. Since the ideal is the truth which is written in the very being of man, so that he who builds himself up one day by the act of its discovery can choose it and transform his acts by it into living truth, that he be born again and so fulfill himself by leading his being to the fullness of its perfection! That is what the ideal is for, so that it can be embodied in reality, touched by the concrete, that it might in the true Norwidian sense of the word, so to say "hit the street."

The Catholic University of Lublin knows who is bestowing more upon whom and who is enriching whom as a result of today's selection. Let us not be ashamed to admit it openly: we want to profit at the same time from this gift, knowing who it is to whom we give it. We count on your help in interpreting the full eloquence of the summons of Divine Providence, a summons which in this particular moment is written upon contemporary European and world history. We count on it in interpreting the whole eloquence of the place in which Divine Providence situated this Catholic University of Lublin, as if assigning to it the role of the heart of Europe and simultaneously the keystone between East and West on the Continent. I shall never forget the words which the "Padre bianco" (as Pia Buttiglione calls the Holy Father) spoke in the Aosta Valley after reading Rocco Buttiglione's paper, *Suverenność narodu przez kulturę* [Sovereignty of the Nation through Culture]: "I do not know if there is anybody in Poland who would know how to write better, or at least as competently and profoundly, about these matters than has Rocco Buttiglione." At the time nobody besides me heard this. Perhaps Mont Blanc, Monte Bianco, heard it. But so what if, as Pascal put it, the Mount does not even know its own elevation? Could it not also be therefore that this day was given to us so that we could speak those words in this distinguished circle? I do not know what weighed more heavily in the Holy Father's assessment: his thankful admiration for the young philosopher from Italy or a touch of sadness that someone from beyond their own country has to show this to the Poles, who so often do not recognize their own prophets. In a lively connection with those remarks the Holy Father years later spoke thus at the Royal Castle in Warsaw, 8 June 1991:

The legacy of the Constitution of the Third of May revealed and still reveals the path towards our Polish identity in Europe: our identity as a society and as a political community. This is important on the thresh-

old of the Third Republic when “thrust upon ourselves” we continually still seek the road towards “ourselves,” towards a political and economic form of that sovereign subjectivity which is our proper share.

Allow me once again to quote the words of a contemporary thinker, not a Pole but an Italian, which with special penetration enter into our Polish subjectivity:

Poles can either enter directly into a consumeristic society, taking last place in it before it definitively closes its doors to newcomers, or they can lead to the rediscovery of the greater, deeper, and more authentic tradition of Europe, proposing to it simultaneously the alliance between the free market and solidarity (R. Buttiglione, *Jan Paweł II a polska droga do wolności*, [John Paul II and the Polish Road to Freedom], in: “Ethos” 1990 Nos. 3-4, p. 49).

In the person of Rocco Buttiglione our family is given today by Divine Providence a master of discernment and a demanding teacher. He is one who knows how to tell us “you do not know what you have” but who also knows how to say “why are you giving up the pearl of great price for the swill that they feed elsewhere to the swine?” He is one who knows how to observe: “He who endured persecution and the solidarity of the oppressed and then goes over to the mentality of the victors, to the logic of force, he is in a certain sense the more guilty” (R. Buttiglione, *Introduction* in: T. Styczeń, *Solidarność wyzwala* [Solidarity Liberates] Lublin 1993, p. 21). Can we not see in the words of Rocco Buttiglione the message which is conveyed to his fellow countrymen on this, his birthday, as a gift from the concerned heart of the author of such epochal documents as the encyclicals *Centesimus annus* and *Veritatis splendor*?

May therefore the concern of Rocco Buttiglione that mutual love join all peoples together as one be made our concern. From now on let our mutually borne concerns be a lighter load, a lighter weight and, perhaps even as Christ assures, a sweet yoke. Let the voice of our world today above all sound forth joy in the discovery and common experience of our friendship, of that *idem velle et nolle*, to want and to not want the same things. In the midst of its concerns for our contemporary world and our mutual concerns, may the heart of our University live today to speak out words of joy! In this moment let there sound forth *Carmen Patriae* that hymn of joy, *Gaude Mater Polonia prole fecunda nobili!* Let our hearts today beat with the joy of a mother when she gives birth to a child, with a mother’s joy that her family is enriched by the gift of such a son! Indeed, a mother knows best who it is who bestows whom with the gift of life. That is why it is she who sees best whom it really is who enriches her family by the birth of a child. And therefore: “*Gaude Mater Polonia prole fecunda nobili!*” – “*Raduj się, Matko Polsko!*”

May this distinguished audience pardon me for not having attempted a summation of many other important dimensions and priceless threads in the

extraordinary philosophical synthesis whose author is our new doctor *honoris causa*. This is not due to cowardice or fear. If it is fear, it is the fear of honour, of respect for the master, *timor reverentialis*.

Therefore, let the master himself complete the summit of this hour of our joy on 18 May 1994 here in Lublin! Let him speak to us himself! Let the works of the Master praise him! I know the creativity of Rocco Buttiglione at least that much to be certain that he is the master of revealing the whole from freely chosen fragments. He knows how "to speak about the whole through the parts," speaking in the language of the poet of Lublin. Let us allow him the freedom to pick those pieces himself!

I now ask His Magnificence, the Reverend Rector, Professor Stanisław Wielgus, as well as the honorable Sister Dean, Professor Zofia Zdybicka, to carry out the ceremony of conferring upon Professor Rocco Buttiglione the title of doctor *honoris causa* of the Catholic University of Lublin. I then ask Professor Rocco Buttiglione, as our doctor *honoris causa*, to speak to us.

Lublin, 18 May 1994

Translated by *Dr. John M. Grondelski*

Rocco BUTTIGLIONE

TOWARDS AN ADEQUATE ANTHROPOLOGY

Wojtyła's anthropology contains an exceptional methodological potential. This should not be repeated but rather developed further and it should enter the debate which is taking place today concerning the method adopted by the Humanities, Law, Economics, Sociology [...] Indeed, a correct understanding of the nature of the human subject is of necessity reflected in the method of understanding the different aspects of human behaviour and the motivating structures which are connected with it.

1. Your Honour, The Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, Dear Professors, Students, Ladies and Gentlemen.

It is not without a sense of excitement that I begin to speak on this occasion, in which I find myself standing before you to receive an Honorary Doctorate from the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin. The granting of an Honorary Doctorate always brings with it a unique sense of excitement into the life of a scholar, all the more so considering that this distinction is being conferred by such a prestigious faculty as the one of this University, famous for the works of great scholars such as M. Krapiec, S. Swieżawski, J. Kalinowski, J. Z. Zdybicka and many others, to whom I apologise for not being able to name personally. This faculty played a role of exceptional importance in remembering, reaffirming and defending the rights of man and the truth about the human person in a period difficult and at the same time glorious for the history of Poland and the world. However, the sense of excitement which I feel somehow takes on a new and completely different dimension because I was, albeit at a distance, a pupil of this University and it was here that I was given a decisive stimulus in the development of my personal vocation as a philosopher by one of its masters. I am referring to Prof. Karol Wojtyła who held the Chair of Ethics at this faculty. As all men of our age, I admired and followed the great testimony which he bore to the truth about God and man and to the presence of God in the history of man. As a Catholic I am grateful for the firmness he demonstrates in defending and spreading the faith in Christ. Furthermore, I owe, together with many of those present in this hall, a debt of gratitude to Wojtyła the philosopher for the new avenues which his thought has opened for the investigation of man. In joining his school of thought, I met others who had begun to follow him as his pupils

before I did and who were a source of guidance for me. My special thanks go to them. In this context I also remember Mons. Francesco Ricci, a remarkable promoter of cultural life who, fascinated by Polish culture, translated and made known K. Wojtyła's texts together with other works of the free culture of this land towards the end of the sixties in Italy. It is to him that I owe the first stimulus that enabled me to get to know your culture, as a part of this the Catholic University of Lublin, and finally, in Lublin, Wojtyła. Mons. Ricci was the first to encourage me to write a study about the then Cardinal of Cracow. Next, I must say of a word of thanks to Prof. Stanislaus and Mrs. Ludmiła Grygiel, whom I met in those years and who introduced me to the ethos of that friendship of free and faithful men which had grown around the philosopher Wojtyła and which spreads as an ideal, as happens in every friendship based on the Christian communion, so much that it somehow includes all men. Finally, I am particularly indebted to Father Tadeusz Styczeń who played the part of the elder assistant to his younger colleague, guiding me with discretion towards an ever deeper understanding of that mystery of man around which the whole of Wojtyła's philosophy is developed.

It is for this reason that today's situation is a little paradoxical: those conferring this degree on me are people from whom I have truly learnt much, and so I have real reason to turn my eyes to this *Alma Mater Lubliniensis* as a source from which I have drawn considerably. Therefore, my situation is similar to that of an ordinary student who, coming to the end of the course of his studies, is told by his professors, "Now that you have learnt enough, you are one of us," rather than to that of a famous foreign scholar about to receive an honorary title.

For this reason I am similar to a student of this faculty and yet different, something which certainly none of you can fail to notice, as you listen to the strange and slightly barbaric manner in which I pronounce the words of your most beautiful language: a Westerner, an Italian who comes to take lessons from Poles. What is the meaning of this? At that time I adopted the conviction of the unity of European culture and, even more so, the idea that fundamental values which we were forgetting in the West were being rediscovered in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe under the burden of Communist oppression.

2. What could have driven a young Italian scholar in about the mid seventies to become interested in Polish philosophy, and that of Lublin in particular? There were two philosophical options which were most often open to those beginning to study philosophy at that time: one of these was Marxism, the other Nihilism. Marxism was the final product of Western Rationalism, i.e. the conviction that man is capable of changing the world completely through his own efforts in such a way that the brand of original sin, death and the alien-

ation of one man from the next and of man from nature, could be done away with forever. History would then be read as a process of the progressive self-revelation and self-realization of the truth. I dedicated a large part of my first years as a philosopher to the study of the Frankfurt School, considered by us as the critically most advanced form of Marxism. The conclusion which I reached was that the Frankfurt School should rather be considered as the great self-critic of Marxism and Rationalism in general. There exists no guarantee that history can bring man closer to the Ideal. The history of man has always run along the edge of the abyss, and any acquired value, any good which finds expression in this, is always temporary, is always in danger. W. Benjamin once wrote that redemption could manifest itself at any point in history. However, the manifestation of an absolute regression is just as possible. What are the totalitarian ideologies of our century if not the clear manifestation of the possibility of such a regression which has always accompanied history? If there is no positive sense which can be ascribed to history, then it does not suffice to agree with the sense of history in order to be on the side of good. Philosophy cannot be swallowed up in a general science dealing with the sense of history, as Marx would have wanted. If the flow of history can turn in the direction of evil, then we need men who know how to put up resistance to the flow of history, to oppose it and try to guide it. But where will we find the criteria which will enable us to oppose the flow of history if this flow turns towards evil? Where will we find a criterion to distinguish between good and evil? Modern Rationalism has replaced the transcendent criterion for determining the truth about man with an immanent criterion. Now, if this immanent criterion incorporated in the ambiguous word "progress" fails as well, the simplest conclusion we reach seems to be that man is left without truth.

It is not by chance that for the youth of my generation, the true, great alternative to Marxism was Nihilism and the criticism of all values. I remember that among the first things which I discovered in Polish literature, were two verses by Jan Lechoń:

There is no heaven, no earth, no abyss nor any hell.

There is only Beatrice, and she actually does not exist.

Who is Beatrice? Beatrice, as is known, is theology, the knowledge of divine matters, the guide to plumb the depths of the truth. And at the same time, Beatrice is a woman, love, that existential encounter in which a passion for ourselves and for the truth is inflamed. Indeed, the first truth that has to be discovered is the one that we ourselves were created for the truth. This truth however manifests itself in the other. And it is by discovering ourselves reflected in the gaze of the other who loves us that we become profoundly interested in the truth.

Is it possible to dispense with the "sense of history" without falling into Nihilism? If so, we would then require a true idea of man according to which

the progress and regression of history could be measured. Nevertheless, there exists an obstacle deeply rooted in the whole of the Enlightenment tradition which leads us to reject such a positive idea about man. Here we are dealing with the fear that starting from a positive definition of man, a claim could arise to impose those obligations deriving from a positive theory about man on the historical, concrete, real man. It is a fear that a metaphysical vision of reality could define the position of man in the cosmos without leaving anything out, reducing him to being simply one of the elements in the cosmos and denying that what constitutes him most essentially: his freedom, his capacity to transcend any definition or limit which is imposed on him from the outside. It is not by chance that Th. W. Adorno, in his *Negative Dialectic*, speaks of a "negative anthropology," i.e. of such a way of describing man which contains, on the one hand, a sufficient degree of positivity to protest against any progress which destroys man, but which on the other hand, does not contain enough positivity that man could be reified by being incorporated into nature – thereby turning him into a possible object of possession. Classical anthropology is weighed down by the conjecture of conceiving man simply as an object in the world, placing him in a hierarchy of created beings within which – no matter how high the position granted to man may be – that which characterizes him most deeply, i.e. his capacity to be himself, to be his own creator to a certain extent, is cancelled out. Here we are touching upon the axiological roots of modern atheism: God cannot exist because if God existed, man could not be free – he would be swallowed up by the natural world. If, on the other hand, one accepts the assumption that man himself creates his own essence because his existence, i.e. the act of his choosing precedes, essence and determines it, it then becomes difficult to protect him from others or even to speak of a common human essence in a strictly logical sense. If every subject creates its own essence freely, one cannot exclude a multitude of human essences incompatible and at conflict with each other, each of which will be the bearer of duties in relation to the others which cannot be determined *a priori*. At this point it appears necessary either to accept a multitude of human essences, or to maintain that it is not the individual but the human species which determines its own essence by virtue of its own existence. But the existence of the human species is history and if one chooses this option, existentialism, which arises as a protest against Marxism, ends up by returning to the latter, as was indeed the case in Sartre's philosophy.

3. The problem facing us can now be formulated in the following terms: is it possible to conceive of man without reducing him by reifying him, and at the same time without allowing his freedom to establish itself in such a way that it can threaten the rights of other men? And then why should we be interested in the other? Only for fear of reprisals that he could avenge himself for the

injustice committed against him? If this is the root of our interest in the other, then it may be possible to establish a domain of justice among men, but this justice will only be for the powerful. This form of justice will be based on a utilitarian calculation and everybody will have, in effect, as much right as he has power. Justice will then limit itself to anticipating the result of the fight between the powerful; in this way it will enable them to reap the benefits of that which everybody else would have gained by means of a hard struggle without bearing the costs which a struggle would have entailed. This type of justice is certainly compatible with Nihilism; moreover it provides it with a socio-political expression. It is probably not inappropriate to connect a certain apologetic ideology of Capitalism with this form of Nihilism. Capitalism is seen here as a system in which every man pursues his own aims, considering other men exclusively as a means to realize his own aims. The market is a place which firstly gives no qualitative judgement as far as these aims are concerned; secondly it guarantees a set of conditions so that anything that is done by those involved in order to achieve their aims is not in contradiction to, but compatible with the activities of every other member of society. The Sophist Trasimaco already affirmed something not very different from this in Plato's Book I of the *Republic* and gave expression to the basic idea of a theory of justice as a convention. What is suitable to the powerful, is just. It suits the powerful to oppress the weak and reach an agreement so as not to be oppressed by others who are powerful. Since no human being and no group in society is absolutely powerful, and on the other hand, no human being and no group in society is absolutely powerless, the life of such a society is characterized by a continuous and trying conflict between groups and individuals who try to take advantage of each other to reach their own aims. But is it really true that nobody is absolutely powerful and nobody absolutely powerless?

Let us see. In Books 8 and 9 of the *Republic*, Plato presents a cyclic theory of political regimes which includes some very sharp criticism of democracy, or at least of that type of democracy which has united with ethical Relativism – Sophism being the most complete expression of this during Plato's lifetime. Citizens no longer care for their institutions and institutions no longer have any prestige attached to them. The logic of the market goes beyond the confines of the domain where it is legitimate, i.e. of the production and exchange of vendable goods, and consequently invades all areas of life. Love and honour, contracts and court verdicts are all sold then. Paradoxically, the market economy itself also enters a state of crisis at this point. The market requires goods and services which have to be produced outside the market, which should not be "bought and sold freely." For example, the market needs the security of justice and thus also of judges who cannot be bought or sold. But the security of justice is not guaranteed by judges alone. What could an honest judge do in a system in which there were no honest witnesses, in which the duty of being

loyal towards the truth were not written into the conscience of at least the vast majority of citizens and those running the economy? The market needs Law and Ethics as well, and not only in the limited domain from which we have taken our examples. Put in more general terms, we could say that no society is conceivable without at least an element of selfless recognition of the truth and a minimum dedication to the common good. A system which destroys this and allows a Nihilistic principle to triumph in an absolute manner, ends up being unable to function. People suffer under the burden of the never-ending struggle between the different interest groups, which recommences as soon as one of the social groups believes that it is capable of obtaining better conditions for itself. Moreover, the discord between social subjects enables a group with a minimum of internal cohesion or with a leader who succeeds in arousing a minimum of personal loyalty among his followers to seize control over society, and thus gain a position of absolute power. In particular, the spread of the Nihilistic mentality leads to the situation that differences in power within society arise, thus opening the way for the transition from democracy without any values to tyranny. And it is this aspect which is not considered in a certain popular version of Popper's political philosophy (which does not coincide with Popper's authentic thought), or in certain forms of Liberalism which see in the market the sole regulator of social processes.

We have seen that it is not impossible for there to be a qualitative difference in power between one individual or social group and all the others. The individual or group having absolute power would then enjoy the privilege of possessing absolute rights and would be above good or evil. In a conventional system good and evil should always be bargained over, and bargaining can only exist if there is a relative balance of power.

But is it then true, if we go to the other extreme of the social scale, that there exists no-one who is completely without power, who is also excluded from the sphere of justice because he finds himself in this case not above but below the level of justice? Our thoughts are directed almost automatically to the child, and in particular to the unborn child in this case. Here we come across the clear model of a subject who is completely powerless and thus excluded from any form of bargaining. Apart from its objective, moral gravity, the question of abortion is also a measure of the anthropology and the self-consciousness of a nation, of the quality of the concept of justice on which a nation would like to build its existence. This is however not the only example. The example of the elderly is similar. They, too, gradually lose their power and with this, according to a conventional concept of justice, also their rights. In the final stage of life they end up stripped of both of these. Furthermore, we can compare the sick and the handicapped to the elderly.

If we do not want to accept these consequences we must take a second look at the Nihilistic model of understanding human relationships, acknowledging its

antinomic character and the fact that in the end it contradicts itself. We can see this in a similar way in *The Dialectics of the Enlightenment*, as described by Horkheimer and Adorno. Extreme individualism triggers off a reaction which in the end swallows up the subject within an indifferent community, reducing him to one of many elements in the human mass governed by a power which imposes itself from the outside onto the subjectivity of every member.

4. If we want to avoid these consequences, if we want to take into consideration the immanent self-criticism of both Marxism and Nihilism, we have to return to the problem of negative anthropology. Does there exist an anthropology which, on the one hand, is capable of establishing the transcendent dignity of the human person, and on the other hand, does not reduce man to being simply an element in the cosmos, irrespective of how great his value and dignity are? I came across Wojtyła's way of thinking exactly at that moment when I was asking myself these questions together with so many other young philosophers of my generation. We were then fascinated by the idea of a "critical theory of society," i.e. a concrete philosophy which is capable of intervening in the course of history of man and of society, criticising the present injustice and showing the way for a more human and more authentic way of life. This had to be an interdisciplinary philosophy capable of maintaining a dialogue with the Humanities and capable of re-uniting their contributions to the service of man. But how can this be achieved if the idea of man is missing, if the concrete form of the human person who should serve as a regulatory criterion in the task of social criticism is absent?

It seemed to me then, and it stills seems to me, that I found in Wojtyła's anthropology exactly that "negative anthropology" which we were looking for. I could try to summarize in the following way what struck me most about this and what I consider to be crucial: the recognition of being, the acceptance of truth is not a limit to human creativity, whereby this is only relative and different from the creativity of God which is absolute. On the contrary, receiving oneself through the mediation of another, existing as a result of a pure gift, and obedience to the truth which is present in the other, are all part of the deepest rhythm of divine life itself. There is here, I think, a hidden theological tendency which runs through the whole of Wojtyła's personalism and renders it fully understandable only from a perspective that is at the same time both Christological and Trinitarian. The Christian God is not an absolute and arbitrary freedom. The Christian God is love, and before being this in His relationship to man, He is this in Himself, in the relationship of one person to the other in the Holy Trinity. The construction of one's own self-awareness, starting from the presence of the other, from the recognition of the gift of the other, is the fundamental law of personal existence; it is the law of freedom. Man's creativity is always set in motion by the gift of the other. The gift of the other,

on the other hand, does not define man in such a way that it limits him, but rather it opens his subjectivity towards the outside, it frees his creativity. Man is creative in as much as he is concerned with his neighbour, with his being in general, with himself, since his own being is a gift. Being concerned means going beyond what has been given, but at the same time it means accepting and respecting it. Seen in this way, the philosophy of *The Acting Person* is really an exposition of the anthropology of the Second Ecumenical Vatican Council. This anthropology is negative in the sense that it does not pretend to define with one concept what the good and what the truth about man is. The truth of each man is defined in his lifetime in an endless and unforeseen dialogue with other men, with the natural world and with divine providence. Nevertheless, one can define negatively certain obstacles which have to be removed so that this dialogue can take place, so that the person can begin to be himself by opening himself up to the other and discovering the richness of the other. Although it is not possible to give a definitive definition of what good is (this stems from the personal character of Goodness), it is however possible to say what evil is and to define the dynamism of the recognition of the other in the truth which guides the development, growth and self-understanding of human freedom. It then becomes impossible to oppose obedience to truth to freedom. Man discovers himself in that relationship to the other in which the other is recognised and accepted as a value which deserves to be affirmed for itself. For this reason, it is quite unthinkable that a person can freely create himself and deny this recognition of the other. This is then seen rather as a non-creation, a move in the direction of nothingness.

Thus, the person is simultaneously and indivisibly both an individual and a community. The affirmation of justice towards the other corresponds to the truest interest of the person as a person, an interest which is not based on defending one's own personal benefits, but rather on the affirmation of the world of values, which the person discovers in his relationship with the other and within which he also discovers himself as a value. Such a view of justice takes us beyond the opposition between conventional concepts and metaphysical concepts, in which the primary source of justice is to be found in a system imposed on man from the outside. Here the existential experience of the encounter with the other is indeed the place in which the metaphysical force of the concept of justice manifests itself. The existential order is recognised because it is lived and experienced, thereby revealing itself as a personal way of life. Is this perhaps not also the intention of St. Thomas when he speaks of the natural law as *participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura*? The *lex aeterna* is in fact the divine plan over the world which manifests itself in the natural order, but which is then developed in history in an infinite dialogue with every single human freedom. Respect for this original, natural gift does not exhaust the way of the human search for good, but rather stands at its beginning and guides it.

The understanding of the person as an individual and as a community takes us beyond the opposition between the collective and individual dimension of human existence and beyond the possible absolutism of one or the other. If we consider this from the point of view of social philosophy, we can see that society cannot exist without a market, i.e. without the individual moment; in such a society the subject would be swallowed up in an amorphous collectivity. But at the same time a society cannot function if all that it has is only the market. The market is an institution which is rendered possible by virtue of the fact that it is surrounded and sustained by other institutions which support and limit it. Without the moment of self-determination of freedom which decides for itself, the gift of the person himself would be impossible. But a form of freedom which rejects this gift and condemns itself to infinite solitude destroys itself. Social responsibility and individual self-determination interconnect with each other again and again, and in a way that must be rethought and redesigned continuously in the construction of every human society.

The philosopher Karol Wojtyła studied this reciprocal connection particularly within the first human community, within the family. Moreover, as we have already said, the deepest inspiration of Wojtyła's anthropology is Christological and Trinitarian in nature, but his method is strictly philosophical. In the natural order, the truth surrounding the communal nature of the human person reveals itself most clearly if we take a look at the dynamism of falling in love and then at marital love. Falling in love means discovering the other and discovering oneself in the other; furthermore, it means finding the whole world reflected and rendered clearer in this love. Moreover, pregnancy is the human experience in which one man is carried within another human being and is entirely dependent on him. It is not too difficult to see in this a symbol of the dynamism of every form of love and of every true human relationship, which means taking on the responsibility of carrying the other in one's own heart to give birth to him for the truth and good, and at the same time to accept that one is carried in the heart of another in order to be born from him. As a philosopher of the person, Wojtyła was at the same time a philosopher of marital love and the family. As we have seen, there is a need for a method in this: sexual inclination is the natural place in which the dynamism of interhuman relationships is undertaken with the utmost clarity. At the same time however, the philosophy of the family is the starting point for the philosophy of society. Every person is indeed created spiritually out of love, and if in the name of the freedom of the person we weaken that primary structure in which this creation-process has its origin, we contribute to the construction of a society of incomplete individuals, for whom it is inevitably difficult to become aware of the nature of their own freedom. If we direct our thoughts attentively to this fact, then it becomes possible to understand the connection existing between the crisis of the family and the spread of Nihilistic philosophy: the Nihilistic world view is similar to an incomplete personality which had no possibility of learning the dynamism

of the self-conscience and the self-realization in an existential way. In this context, the essential function of the family as a community which passes on culture and plays an educational role according to a measure of the truth can be understood even better.

5. All these things which I am repeating to you today, I learnt at the school of a Polish philosopher, from a professor of this University. Through him I became the pupil of many of those who were his masters and colleagues and whose way of thinking is interconnected with his. As I mentioned earlier, I am a pupil as you are, but still I am a little different from you. Different because I am an Italian, a citizen of a country which has had a different history and a different cultural and philosophical tradition. It is this very difference which enables me – having learnt so much from you Poles – to say something to you which my different historical/cultural perspective perhaps allows me to see more easily. Wojtyła's anthropology contains an exceptional methodological potential. This should not be repeated, but rather developed further, and it should enter the debate which is taking place today concerning the method adopted by the Humanities, Law, Economics, Sociology. Indeed a correct understanding of the nature of the human subject is of necessity reflected in the method of understanding the different aspects of human behaviour and the motivating structures which are connected with it. The problem which the Frankfurt School exposed but left unsolved is that of a concrete philosophy, of a philosophy which can explain the decisions man makes – and not only in the private sphere but also in the case of a collective decision, a political decision. The philosophers of the Frankfurt School distinguished various links at the level of an attempt to connect the different Humanities. Their undertaking came to a halt because they lacked an adequate anthropology which could supply the language necessary for the different Humanities to be able to communicate with each other, and to come together on the practical level of rendering a service to the human person. Wojtyła, who drew from and then in an original way reinterpreted the philosophy of the person elaborated right here in Lublin, offered in a certain sense the very methodological basis which could go beyond the failure of the Frankfurt School and enable the construction of an authentic "critical theory of society." This enables man to resist becoming a mere slave to social mechanisms and guides him towards the construction of a society in which – in as far as this is possible – each man's way towards his own destiny is facilitated. Such a concrete philosophy or political philosophy, which would allow us to consider the market and solidarity in a common context, is what the nations of Europe and the world urgently need today.

Translated from Italian by *John Buczak*

Jean-Marie MEYER

O, ANTIGONE! YOUR SILENCE IS MY JUDGE

Antigone gazes upon us once more and asks: "O Europe, what are you really saying when you speak? You no longer even know how to tell where evil lies, or even that evil is evil. You, the homeland of human rights, prefer to speak of 'interruption of pregnancy' so as not to call things by their real names: the murder of the innocent."

Antigone: I wanted to tell you this morning. . . [about the] little boy that we might have had

Haemon: Yes.

Antigone: You know I would have defended him against the whole world. Jean Anouilh, Antigone (Paris, 1946, p. 40).

But Jesus spoke nothing (Mt 26:63)

There is still one virgin whom Europe recognizes and who is at the same time a witness to life. Her name is Antigone. She is a model for us. Mother of our Europe, sister of us all, her fate was tragic because in the face of the written law of Thebes ruled by Creon she persevered unto death for the law of conscience. Forced to choose between obedience to the civil law and the respect for the dead which religion required that she, a woman in a city-state ruled by men, showed that conscience does not command what the state says. It is conscience, and not judges, who place us before the ultimate law even when the city-state, in betraying the Good, issues judgments that lead to death.

In rejecting the prohibition against burial of a rebel brother in the city and in showing us that, for a loving sister he was no evil brother, Antigone teaches us a lesson about how to look upon man, everyman: as a brother. The eloquence of her deed and of her death shows us that equality, if it is not to be an empty word, demands from me equal respect for all.

"Europe, my daughter, I accuse you," Antigone might have said. "I accuse you because, with your adult eyes you do not recognize those who stand at the two opposite poles of life. Because they do not look like you, you deny them life. You betray both the light of intelligence (which reaches beyond mere phenomena to the essential) as well as your vocation to recog-

nize the brother in everyman, in those human beings in the shadows of the boundaries of human life.”

Conscience – Antigone’s and our’s – ought to judge according to what is right, any written laws notwithstanding. For us today Antigone is that love which hastens to the aid of the man betrayed by human laws. Brother and sister, Antigone and Polyneices, each in his own way reveals the shape of the tragedy Europe is experiencing today.

Just as the life and death of Polyneices threatened the ancient city-state so today there are many children denied the light of life and excluded from our cities. Just as a long ago time and a far away place Antigone was denied the light of life, closing off her way to the gods, so today children killed because of despair, or even just thoughtlessness, must go to the grave deprived even of a decent burial.

Being a model for Europe, Antigone could also be Europe’s anti-type. That beloved fiancée allowed herself to be laid in the grave, giving up motherhood. In that way she bore witness that love is greater than life, that even death can be fruitful. Our Europe, on the other hand, is going to the grave giving up motherhood while being ruled by the absurdity of sterile life.

Antigone reveals the whole depth of the contemporary tragedy, casting suspicion upon our words and our silence. She gazes upon us once more and asks:

O Europe, what are you really saying when you speak? You no longer even know how to tell where evil lies, or even that evil is evil. You, the homeland of human rights, prefer to speak of “interruption of pregnancy” so as not to call things by their real names: the murder of the innocent. O, how can you, daughter of the word (*logos*) call abortion illegal but not criminal (*rechtswidrig aber straffrei*)?

Yes, our words are empty and our silence heavy, because our society denies life so as to hide in the face of death. Because it blinds itself so that, unlike Rachel, it will not have to weep over children that are no more. Because it organizes amusements so it will not have to help women tempted by abortion.

And the man, the father: he is frequently the great absent one as a heavy silence settles over his no-longer-living child and its ruined mother.

Translated by Dr. John M. Grondelski

Jan GALAROWICZ

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES OF KAROL WOJTYŁA

"We experience that man is a person
and the reason why we are certain about this
is that he performs acts."

Card. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*

1. TRUTH IS BORN AND LIVES IN HISTORICAL REALITY

Truth is rooted in history in a double sense. "Being" – says Aristotle – "appears in its full splendour in many ways." The truth is revealed and embodied in a concrete, i.e. historical, cultural, national and individual situation. When it is unveiled, it has its addressee and recipient.

The truth about man, as it is presented in the third edition of *The Acting Person*¹, has also revealed itself and taken shape in a concrete historical entity. To simplify this thought slightly, one could say that this fundamental anthropological work was parented by two events of the twentieth century, events characterized by radically opposite axiological marks: Communist totalitarianism and the Second Vatican Council.

The priest, and then the Bishop Karol Wojtyła, watched with concern the twentieth century crisis of Christianity in the West. He rejoiced when he received the announcement of the Council. He saw the latter as a crucial response to that crisis.

This is why he was so deeply involved in the work of the Council. Bishop Karol Wojtyła, after the Council's debates, felt it necessary to provide a philosophical elaboration and development of the concept of the human person as it was contained in the Council's documents. The *Acting Person* is, in a way and to a certain degree, a response to the obligation he experienced.

This crucial experience merged with the painful experience of the demise of humanity under the Communist regime. In this context, could he, a pastor and a Christian thinker, feel exempted from a confrontation with such a reduced and crippled vision of man? Bishop Wojtyła took up the challenge, opposing this vision of man with a reliable and firm conception of the human person. He presented this conception in *The Acting Person*.

The relation between the actual addressee of his great anthropological work, however, and its real influence, is much more complicated. The original recipient of *The Acting Person* was the thinking Christian after Vatican Council II, as well as the creators of the Polish culture in the 1970s and the succeeding years. When Card. Karol Wojtyła was elected pope, the range of the impact of *The Acting Person* widened considerably. Since that time, its contents have been present in John Paul II's encyclicals and in his teaching in general. Obviously, the life of this main anthropological work of Karol Wojtyła does not end. If today, nine

¹ Karol Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne* (The Acting Person and Other Anthropological Studies), Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 1994, 543 pp.

years after the previous edition, a new edition of *The Acting Person* is brought out, it is worth considering what problems and needs can benefit from what it contains, and what role it should play in the present situation. Rocco Buttiglione deals with this problem in an interesting and thorough way in "A Few Remarks on the Way of Reading *The Acting Person*" (pp. 9-42).

2. KAROL WOJTYŁA
AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL
THOUGHT OF CATHOLICISM IN POLAND

The new edition of *The Acting Person* presents a good opportunity to think about the role Karol Wojtyła played in the forming of the Catholic philosophical *milieu* in Poland, and about the chance his work provides for the development of Polish Catholicism.

Karol Wojtyła became prominent in the Catholic philosophical *milieu* due to his definite philosophical and methodological stance. It is impossible to characterize it exhaustively. One can only point to its essential elements. For Karol Wojtyła, philosophy is one of the principal ways of seeking truth. Philosophy, in his view, is closely related to the existential experience of man. He is aware that philosophy stems from life and serves life. Karol Wojtyła is a thinker, and he shows what it means to be a thinker. Karol Tarnowski is right when he says "what strikes one on reading Wojtyła's texts is the absolute uniqueness of his thought, a thought which is responsible and seeks its own path; it is a thought he does not strive to impose on others."² By

his phenomenological approach to research, Karol Wojtyła has regenerated Catholic philosophy in Poland. This thinker cherishes a belief that truth bears a manifold character which is being unveiled gradually. Accordingly, he is open to anything which constitutes a synthesis of various aspects. This explains why he values tradition so much, and why, for instance, he combines Thomism with phenomenology.

Karol Wojtyła has influenced the philosophical thought of Catholicism in Poland as well the range of problems it addresses. First of all, he turned our attention to that which was underestimated in Thomism, e.g. to the importance of the subjective dimension of reality (the dimension of experience and consciousness). Secondly, we find an idea in Wojtyła which has already brought forth fruit in the work of Fr. J. Tischner, namely, that the crisis of civilisation has its source in the crisis of inter-personal relations. It is clear, however, that what is most important is that which was pinpointed in a certain discussion by Fr. Jan A. Kłoczowski, i.e., that it is in Karol Wojtyła that we find an epoch-making proposal of how to transform and renovate philosophical thinking on the basis of anthropology (I shall return to this later).³

Rarely, though, does one notice that Karol Wojtyła unveils his philosophy in a dual manner, i.e., "not only through his publications, but also through his actions, which were meant to serve this philosophy."⁴ It is thanks to Card. Wojtyła that

² K. T a r n o w s k i, *Rola Karola Wojtyły* – Jana Pawła II w kształtowaniu się krakowskiego środowiska filozoficznego (The

Role of Karol Wojtyła – John Paul II in the Forming of the Cracow Philosophical Milieu), "Logos i Ethos" 1993, No. 1, p. 295.

³ See *ibid*, pp. 293-294.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 289.

such institutions as the Philosophical Faculty of the Pontifical Academy of Theology in Cracow and the Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna were established. Card. Wojtyła managed to create an atmosphere of freedom and confidence.

Today, the thinkers and Catholic *milieu* in Poland has yet to face another essential question: what is implied in fidelity to Karol Wojtyła, a thinker?

Some think that the most appropriate form of fidelity to the work of Wojtyła is to continue his work by way of commenting on it, deepening it and making it more precise. Such is the answer of the Lublin community of Fr. Prof. Tadeusz Styczeń and his fellow-workers. The John Paul II Institute at KUL (Catholic University of Lublin) has made a conscious decision that it is going to continue the thought of Karol Wojtyła.

On the other hand, the intellectual community of Cracow, gathered above all at PAT (Pontifical Academy of Theology), and in particular around Fr. Prof. Józef Tischner, holds that Card. Wojtyła desired not so much to have faithful disciples, but he had rather something more profound and more fundamental in mind, i.e., to set up conditions and create an atmosphere such that everyone could pursue his own discipline and pursue it in his own fashion.

As a result of these two different approaches to Karol Wojtyła's work, two philosophical centres have begun to function in Poland, i.e., the John Paul II Institute at KUL in Lublin and the Faculty of Philosophy at PAT in Cracow. The fruits of their activity vary considerably. Does this mean that one of these intellectual communities is faithful to the work of Karol Wojtyła and that the other betrays it? In this case, this variety of interpretation should not be seen as a drawback. Fidelity bears many a name. From what

I know, John Paul II is glad that there are two schools of thought which draw on his work in different ways.

3. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF KAROL WOJTYŁA'S PHILOSOPHY

First and foremost, Karol Wojtyła was and is a pastor and a man of faith. He took up philosophy, seeking to understand the contents of his faith. Accordingly, his philosophy assumed a precisely defined form. Usually, the Christian thought which is rooted in the soul of an ardent Christianity concentrates on God and man. The philosophical thought of Karol Wojtyła is anthropological, and it is anthropological in a dual sense.

The philosophy of Wojtyła is anthropological because man is at the centre of his research and because the core of this thought is philosophical anthropology.

However, the anthropological dimension of Karol Wojtyła's philosophy cannot be reduced exclusively to that. It has already been noted that there appears in this thinker's work an epoch-making proposal to *reform philosophy on the basis of anthropology*.⁵ Wojtyła intended to diagnose the situation of religious thinking, and such was his point of departure. Today, the debate about religion as a debate about God has been replaced by the debate about religious man. Karol Wojtyła asks the following question: How shall we re-introduce anthropological thinking into the context of religious thought? And such is the subject matter of his great works, and above all, of his *Love and Responsibility* and *The Acting Person*.

The latter work is the most mature fruit of Wojtyła's anthropological thought.

⁵ See: *ibid*, pp. 293-294.

One may distinguish three stages in the philosophical writing of Karol Wojtyła. The first stage, preparing the formation of this conception of the human person which is contained in *The Acting Person*; then the culminating stage in his anthropological research, i.e. the writing of *The Acting Person*; and, finally, the stage of deepening and making his conception of man more precise. This conception has been presented most thoroughly in *The Acting Person*.

The first edition of *The Acting Person* was published in 1969 by the Polish Theological Society in Cracow (editor: Fr. Prof. Marian Jaworski). This publication found great response, the first instance of which was a debate about the book organized at KUL.⁶ Then, after the author had been elected pope, *The Acting Person* was translated into foreign languages: English (1979), German (1981), Italian (1982), Spanish (1982) and French (1982). In 1985, the same publisher brought out the second Polish edition, revised and updated with Prof. Andrzej Póltawski as editor.

Shortly after the election of Card. Wojtyła, the John Paul II Institute in Lublin began bringing out a collected edition of the philosophical works of Karol Wojtyła. The whole series is properly called *Man and Morality*. Thus far, the following works have been published: vol. I, *Love and Responsibility*, vol. II, *Lublin Lectures*, vol. III, *The Question of the Subject of Morality*. This year, the

fifteenth anniversary of the pontificate of John Paul II, *The Acting Person* has been issued for the third time as the fourth volume of the above series.

4. AN ALMOST COMPLETE EDITION OF KAROL WOJTYŁA'S ANTHROPOLOGICAL WORKS

The most recent edition of *The Acting Person* differs from the two previous editions in that, in addition to the main work, several other anthropological texts written by Wojtyła have been added, along with two commentaries – one by Rocco Buttiglione in the form of an introduction to *The Acting Person*, and the other by Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń, in the form of an epilogue to the anthropology of Karol Wojtyła. The book concludes – and this, too, is a novelty – with an analytic index and an index of names.

The texts added to *The Acting Person* come from various periods of Karol Wojtyła's writing (the majority of which were written after *The Acting Person*), and deal with many different questions. Each of these texts has a different significance. They are not arranged chronologically, but thematically. Some of Karol Wojtyła's other anthropological studies, presented in the publication under review, form, in my opinion, four groups differing from the classification by the editors.

The editors aptly introduced *Other Anthropological Studies* with "A closing word after the discussion on *The Acting Person*". This text written by Card. Karol Wojtyła touches upon almost all the most important problems of *The Acting Person*. This stands as a sort of epilogue to *The Acting Person*.

The second group of texts together constitute what may be called an introductory programme to the issues which

⁶ This debate was published in "Analecta Cracoviensia" 5-6 (1973-1974) pp. 49-263. The final word of K. Wojtyła after the debate was reprinted in the volume reviewed here (K. W o j t y ł a, *Słowo końcowe po dyskusji nad "Osobą i czynem"* (A Closing Word after the Discussion on *The Acting Person*), *op. cit.*, pp. 347 – 369. [Editor's note])

enable a better and more profound understanding of Karol Wojtyła's anthropological standpoint. In this group I would place the following studies: "Man is Person" (the text in which the author explains the reason for his research in anthropology), "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man" (the work which shows in a formidable way Wojtyła's stance, i.e. his tendency to synthesize different aspects of reality – in this case, of human reality), and the address "Theory – Praxis: A Universally and Christian Topic."

These studies should be followed by two works which are closely linked to the central issue of *The Acting Person*, i.e. with self-determination. Here we have the paper entitled "The Personal Structure of Self-determination" (the text which, in fact, is the author's summary of the theory of self-determination) and the text "The Transcendence of the Person in Action and the Self-teleology of Man."

Other Anthropological Studies should be completed by two texts, constituting a development and supplement of the last part of *The Acting Person* entitled "Participation": namely, "The Person: Subject and Community" and "Participation or Alienation?"

Does the volume in question contain all the anthropological studies of Karol Wojtyła? Unfortunately, it does not. I do not know why two important texts are missing, i.e., "Human Perspectives – an Integral Development and Eschatology"⁷ and "The Problem of Constituting Culture Through Human Praxis."⁸

5. TWO COMMENTS

Many studies⁹ have been written on Karol Wojtyła's philosophical thought. Thanks to a new edition of *The Acting Person*, two important commentaries have been added. They were penned by Rocco Buttiglione and Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń, both prominent specialists and commentators on the thought of Karol Wojtyła and the teaching of John Paul II.

"A Few Remarks on the Way of Reading *The Acting Person*" written by Buttiglione is undoubtedly one of the best introductions to *The Acting Person*. This interesting text, however, is not without some controversial statements. Due to lack of space, polemic is replaced by a mere listing of reservations.

Buttiglione is right that the phenomenologies of Ingarden and Wojtyła are not identical. Does not this difference, however, consist in that Ingarden (as well as Hildebrand and Seifert) wants to prove in a phenomenological manner that man is a person, yet Wojtyła intends something else, he seeks to "show by way of phenomenology how man is a person"? (p. 15).

Buttiglione shares Gilson's view that he who starts as an idealist (i.e., begins in examining consciousness), must end as an idealist (see p. 26). But if this were so, one would have to ascribe idealism to such thinkers as Franz Brentano, Nicolai Hartmann, or the representatives of transcendental Thomism.

According to Buttiglione, Wojtyła claims that "person is not only substance

⁷ "Colloquium Salutis" 7 (1975) pp. 133-145.

⁸ "Roczniki Filozoficzne KUL" 27 (1979) fasc. 1, pp. 9-20.

⁹ See J. G a l a r o w i c z, *Człowiek jest osobą. Podstawy antropologii filozoficznej Karola Wojtyły* (Man is Person. The Foundations of Karol Wojtyła's Philosophical Anthropology), Cracow 1994, pp. 252-274 and p. 312 ff.

(*subiectum*) but also a relation" (p. 21). I regard this introduction of Hegelianism into the interpretation of Wojtyła's anthropology as unjustified. Wojtyła has put much effort (see his texts on the philosophy of intersubjectivity) into showing that a person is a substantial being bearing a relational character, and enters into relations with other persons (but himself is not a relation!).

And finally two questions: does not Buttiglione identify the personal structure of self-governance with the psychological (acquired and gradual) skill of self-control (see p. 33)? Does he not reduce self-determination (and autoteleology) to the fact that man is his own first and most important object of care (see p. 18)?

Fr. Tadeusz Styczeń's epilogue "To be Oneself is to Transcend Oneself – On the Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła," elicits a number of comments. Allow me to present two.

In his commentaries on the thought of Karol Wojtyła-John Paul II – in addition to the things mentioned above – one can notice a certain formalism. According to my way of thinking, Fr. Styczeń has a tendency to read the rich and many-sided anthropological thought of Karol Wojtyła in terms of a certain schema. This schema is just one aspect of Wojtyła's anthropology, i.e. the thesis that freedom is realized through its connection to truth. This is a very important thesis, but not the only one. Fr. T. Styczeń's formalism has another side to it. This is what one may call a speculative approach to the issues. The phenomenologist proves that by referring to intuition, he describes that which he can "see." Fr. Styczeń refers also to the principle of insight or inspection. The reader understands what he means when he writes about the relationship between freedom

and truth; but cannot "see" it. I would put it this way. If the power of Fr. Tischner's texts lies in their phenomenological dimension, and their weakness in their analytical dimension, it is the opposite in Fr. Styczeń.

The following thesis appears in Fr. Styczeń's texts, namely, that man may learn the truth about himself, but may not recognize it. Two remarks come to mind here: a) it seems that in a "common" man it is as follows: he learns the truth and at the same time recognizes it; knowing the truth, he automatically recognizes it. b) According to me, the problem of contemporary man does not consist in – as Fr. Styczeń holds – that he does not want to recognize the truth which he has discovered about himself, but it consists in something more primary – in a difficulty to know this truth. To put it in a different way, contemporary man is not so much a creature with an evil will, but a creature immersed in illusions, a creature who has difficulty in freeing himself from them. That is why the thinker's task today is not to reproach the bad will of contemporary man, but to show him his illusions, their roots and the way of liberating himself. Does not this tacit argument between Fr. Styczeń and Fr. Tischner consist in this: that one of them begins by reproaching and the other by uncovering?

FINAL REMARK

Wojtyła's anthropological studies appear at a crucial moment of Polish history: at the moment when there is a great need for a reliable anthropology. Thanks to the encyclical *Veritatis splendor* there has been an increase of interest, following upon a period of certain indifference, in the thought of Karol Wojtyła.

In like manner, the publication of *The Acting Person and Other Anthropological Studies* may play a prominent role. The intellectuals of Poland face a great chance, let us hope that it will not be wasted. Will the new edition of *The Acting Person* contribute to a firmer grounding of ethical personalism in the philosophical culture of Poland? Will it gain an eminent and permanent place therein?

Questions such as these must arise. We observe with concern how easily the good is destroyed in our homeland through irrational strife between different intellectual communities, through backbiting, etc. This, unfortunately, refers to the Catholic communities as well.

Translated by *Jan Kłós*

Ireneusz ZIEMIŃSKI

REASON BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL OF FAITH

The main foundations of the European culture are – as it is usually considered – Athens (philosophy), Jerusalem (religion) and Rome (law). The spiritual history of Europe – and by analogy the history of mankind – can be described (at least partially) as the *history of reason* looking for the essence of being and seeking to unveil mysteries (E. Husserl), or, as the *history of faith* as the dialogue between man and God, dialogue supported and saved by the infinite and providential Creator's love (St. Augustine), or finally, as the *history of freedom* in its different dimensions and manifestations (G. W. Hegel). In each of these perspectives the history of Europe appears as the field of struggle for man, and precisely – as the struggle *for saving his dignity and humanity*.

This is the way in which Leo Shestov, the author of the book presented¹, interprets the history (and the spiritual foundations) of Europe. The main subject of his analysis is the problem of the conflict between the realm of necessity and constraint (in Shestov's language – reason) and the realm of freedom (faith). According to Shestov, the main purpose of his book “is to research the claims of human reason or the speculative philosophy to the truth” (p. 82). Even more, the matter is to “rouse oneself from the au-

thority of soulless and indifferent truths, into which the fruit of the forbidden tree are transformed” (p. 83), that is – to put it another way – to free oneself from the tyranny of knowledge and reason. In Shestov's own terms – the matter is to release oneself from the bondage of Athens and to return to Jerusalem.

The sources of the problem “Athens or Jerusalem” (reason or faith) go back to the early stages of Christianity (St. Paul, St. Justin, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria), but the problem is still alive and fundamental, not only to Christianity but also to every other religion. The question is whether reason can be useful for the man who, by the grace of faith, has come to the supra-natural and redeeming truth. What is more, it asks whether it is suitable to judge the truths and mysteries of faith by purely rational and natural principles.

But man rises against blind faith, against blind obedience to authority (even God's authority). Man wants not only to believe, but also to *understand* the contents of his belief. What is more, he wants to be sure that his faith is justified and true. According to Shestov, this attitude follows from a prejudice deeply rooted in European spirituality, the prejudice that reason is the essence of man. That prejudice, according to Shestov, arises from Greek philosophy which was supported by two principles formulated by Plato. The first one (from the dialogue *Phaedo*) proclaims that there is no worse misfortune for a man than to be the en-

¹ L. S z e s t o w, *Ateny i Jerozolima* (Athens and Jerusalem). Translation with introduction and comments by C. Wodziński, Wydawnictwo Znak, Cracow 1993, 484 pp.

emy of reason. And the second principle (from the dialogue *Eutyphro*) proclaims that something is holy not because of being the subject of a god's love, but conversely, gods love something because something is holy.

All attempts (for instance by Socrates and Plato) to go beyond the plane of reason to another, higher knowledge – in Shestov's opinion – failed. The Greek worship of reason is so deeply rooted in the human mind that even *faith* is conceived as a kind of knowledge. For Celsus, for example, the greatest danger (and even evil) of faith is the lack of its justification by reason. In Scholasticism, the central principles of thinking are: *Credo ut intelligam* and *Fides querens intellectum* (which resulted in the sentence by Matthew of Aquasparta, quoted by Shestov: “It is blameworthy to believe against reason”). The God of reason, the God of philosophy, is not the Living Person known from the Scripture, but a dead *letter*, the absolute set in his perfection and plenitude, the absolute directing of the world according to secular, necessary and invariable principles. In Shestov's opinion, Tertullian has already shown that it is impossible to reconcile Athens and Jerusalem, and furthermore, to understand and justify Revelation by reason.

Faith is the only way to God (and the only way of redemption), faith which – as S. Kierkegaard wrote – “starts just where thinking is finishing.” Faith does not look for proofs, it rather excludes them. It is not a kind of knowledge, but the avoiding of knowledge. Knowledge is the realm of necessary, infallible and compelling principles (starting with the law of contradiction as the foundation of thinking). “Truth does not know differences, compels everybody similarly: both the great Parmenides and a simple worker” (p. 105). Revealing the truth,

reason reveals what is possible and impossible, that there are the boundaries of human (and even divine) freedom; and what is impossible can never be realized. What is more, necessary, secular and invariable truths cannot be conciliated, they demand – as Shestov emphasizes – the complete agreement of man with his lot, the acknowledgement of one's defeat. “In the world ruled by reason, the struggle with the «data» is an evident madness. Man can cry, can curse the truth known from experience, but nobody – and he knows it well – can overcome it; it must be accepted” (p. 275).

In Shestov's opinion, Scripture brings the invalidity of “the realm of necessity.” God, revealing to Adam the vastness of misfortunes proceeding from the tree of knowledge, gives in history the only, genuine and consequent “critique of pure reason.” “According to the Scriptures, knowledge – which excludes faith itself – is the *kat'eksochen* (*par excellence*) sin, or the original sin” (p. 281). The essence of this sin is to accept what there is, it is human reason's discovery and reading of “the necessity of being.” In other words, the essence of this sin is the reduction of freedom, and the restriction of ability – which flows from the faith – of “doing what is impossible.” Faith is not a source of knowledge – emphasises Shestov – but a source of life, not a confidence in authority, but an “inconceivable creative power, a great, the greatest, incomparable gift” (p. 352). The logic of faith is the logic of freedom, the breaking of all boundaries and impossibilities. God *can do everything* (and this should be understood as literally as possible). He is not an invariable mechanism, blindly observing determined rules, but the omnipotent and free Creator, the Source of laws and principles. “However [...] terrible it may

seem to us, God of the scriptures is not restricted by any rules, any principles: He is the source of all rules, all principles, He is their Ruler" (p. 370). In Shestov's opinion, this truth was noticed by few, and those to whom it was obvious were either were not understood at all (as Tertullian or St. Peter Damian,) or were not able to grasp the full sense of it (as Descartes).

It is difficult or even dramatic for man to know these truths. Man – as Shestov shows – is frightened (simply by instinct) by freedom flowing from the faith, and he draws some boundaries for God Himself (even Duns Scotus and S. Kierkegaard claimed that God could not create a contradictory being). "Freedom [...] is not in contrast to what we think today – the possibility of choosing between good and evil. Freedom is the power and the might which does not allow evil to come into the world. God, who is the freest Being, does not choose between good and evil" (p. 282).

The return to this primary freedom is possible only by radical questioning, radical "criticism" of the claims of reason, and by the release from the illusion that knowledge can save. "«Your eyes will open» – said the snake. «You will die» – said God. [...] If God spoke truly, then death would come from knowledge; if the snake spoke the truth, knowledge would make man equal with the gods. The first man was in such a dilemma, and we are in such a dilemma now" (p. 306). But the Promised Land – Shestov says – is not for the man who follows the Socratic way, blinded by the longing for knowledge, but for the man who will follow Abraham's footsteps, who will go in the darkness of faith. The way to God does not lead through Athens, but through Jerusalem.

The title and problem of Shestov's book has had two different solutions in history. Shestov, like Tertullian, St. Peter Damian, Luther or Pascal, thinks that the act of faith cannot be justified in any purely rational way. Others, like Clement of Alexandria, St. Augustine, St. Anselm or St. Thomas Aquinas, thought that reason should prepare, justify or even strengthen faith in Revelation. Both solutions, though extremely different, stem from the same tendency to preserve the truth about Christ as God and Saviour. We should interpret the two stances in such a context, even if we do not consider one (or both) of them as fully justified. Shestov's book should be interpreted favourably as an attempt to preserve faith, faith which is not a *conviction* concerning states of affairs or propositions, but the *freedom* and power of "making impossible things."

We can disagree with Shestov that truths of reason, necessary and invariable, subjugate man. And we can really be afraid of the practical consequences of a religion which stresses first of all God's Omnipotence, and not His Love for people. But we should notice and appreciate the great effort by the author of *Athens and Jerusalem* to rescue *God's transcendence*; the transcendence which cannot be expressed in any *human language*. "«The most important» is beyond the boundaries of the intercourse admissible by the use of language and word" (p. 419). Shestov warns against idolatry, against the worship of "rational distortions" of the true God. "The philosophers' mortal sin is not their seeking the absolute, but when they are convinced that they have not found the absolute – their agreement to accept as the absolute anything created by people – science, State, ethics, religion, etc." (p. 416).

Shestov, the penetrating observer of human history, notices the progressive paralysis of the European spirit by the increasingly more predominant failure to recognize the dimension of *Mystery*. Not simply knowledge and reason are the subject of Shestov's attacks, but also the blind faith that reason is the *sole* mark of human dignity. Man strives to replace all mysteries by clarity and certainty. But Shestov asks rhetorically: "Should not one, quite on the contrary, try to prove that even where everything seems clear and understandable, everything is, as a matter of fact, mysterious and enigmatic?" (p. 464). "But people" – Shestov points out sarcastically – "need the metaphysics which consoles and fortifies, and religion which consoles and fortifies. And nobody needs the truth which one cannot know in advance and what it brings, and nobody needs religion which uncovers so far unknown areas before us" (p. 439).

We can only see that Shestov, similarly to Husserl, criticizes the European spirit ("European humanity"). Shestov, however, demands first of all respect for

the dimension of mystery and faith, while Husserl reminded us of the particular dignity of reason as the light of truth. There is no need here to make a synthesis of these two visions of Europe and its spiritual illnesses. (The ground for such a synthesis could be the concept of freedom, the concept valued by both authors, though defined differently by them.) We should, however, emphasise that both faith and reason, both inaccessible mystery and bare truth are decisive for the *full and final* face of Europe. In this context – in the context of the *fullness of humanity* – we should see the contemporary visions of Europe, and among them particularly, the vision represented by John Paul II. It seems that in the future the latter may bring about not only a "philosophy of Europe" which, like any philosophy, explains certain aspects of reality (like the models proposed by Shestov or Husserl), but will succeed in providing something we have needed for a very long time – a complete and consistent *theology* of Europe.

Translated by *Renata Ziemińska*

Wojciech CHUDY

OUR TWENTIETH CENTURY

Although *A History of the Modern World* by Paul Johnson (born 1928)¹ was published in Polish six years ago, and the London edition appeared twelve years ago, it has not become outdated. It reads almost like a detective story, and many a historical situation of today becomes much easier to understand thanks to the perspective created by a reading of Johnson's book.

The main title of the book, *A History of the Modern World*, sounds a bit suspicious, but the subtitle – *From 1917 to the 1980s* – makes it clear that it covers the twentieth century. Nevertheless, reading this hefty volume, one may still find some justification for the main title, so broadly formulated. For our century seems to be both deeply rooted in the past, yet also open to the future. In spite of the many revolutions that have occurred during this century, there still live and find expression in the actions of peoples and nations archetypes and burning interests painstakingly cultivated through the centuries, so that the line from T. S. Eliot's *Four Quartets* – “All time is eternally present” – reveals itself as surprising apt. Despite this specificity of the century, called “the atomic age,” “the age of scientific-technological revolution,”

“the age of totalitarianism” (Johnson himself calls the period *the age of politics*, p. 730), we find in it the operation of certain historical “invariables” through which man has defined himself in the course of history. Speaking most generally, this “eternal perspective” is constituted in history through the domain of moral values, through the repeated victory of disinterestedness, nobleness and devotion to truth in the course of history, and a simultaneous denunciation of violence, duplicity and cynicism. All these aspects are present in Johnson's book.

The author himself is a distinguished English historian of conservative make-up, well known throughout the world. From time to time he incites uproar in the predominantly leftist circles of historians by formulating hypotheses which go against the principles of relativism current in the interpretation of history today and progressivism. In Poland at the turn of 1989, Paul Johnson's book entered the market in which Marxist historians and their disciples prevailed like an antidote. Apart from the work here reviewed, there soon appeared more of his books, such as *A History of Christianity*, *History of the Jews* and *The Intellectuals*. Other translations are in progress.

THE CONSERVATIVE OPTION

Johnson's book belongs in the category of political history, that is, it describes the dimension of the world in which the interests and powers of states, govern-

¹ Paul Johnson, *Historia świata (od roku 1917)* ed. by “Polonia”, London 1989, 807 pp. [*A History of the Modern World (From 1917 to the 1980s)*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1983, 734 pp.]. All references are to the English version.

ments and ideologies interplay. In this type of historical writing, the central point of investigation is carried out by the analysis of data from the military, social and economic domains. The author pays special attention to the latter field, drawing from it conclusions of a strongly explicatory character. The demographic factor as well, so one-sidedly interpreted in leftist historiography, including Polish historical writings, becomes in Johnson explanatory of much that is considered historically significant today.

However, what seems to constitute the specificity of the book is its axiological and personalist aspect. Throughout Johnson's colourful and dramatic discourse, there breaks through the historiosophic message that history has an essentially moral character and that the loss of this character in the consciousness and acts of those responsible for the fate of the world constitutes the principal flaw and curse of our century. This main thesis – never formulated explicitly – runs throughout the book in the form of innumerable examples, both positive – such as the figure of Sir Winston Churchill and the political motives for the reconstruction of Western Europe by the governments of Adenauer, de Gasperi and de Gaulle, or the role of Poland in the events in the history of the modern world (the outbreak of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War) – and negative (which are more numerous), for instance in the operation of the amoral “Gresham rule,” the fathers of contemporary totalitarianism, or the transformations of the political ethos in America (from millenarianism to degradation).

Johnson convincingly unravels the axiological background of political, social and economic phenomena. One of the examples still actual today is the political instrumentalization of the human sense of

guilt, that “corrosive vice of the civilized during the twentieth century, which we shall meet in many forms” (p. 41). Throughout the century, the mass sense of guilt was being manipulated in order to win political concessions through a kind of blackmail that took advantage of concepts such as “colonialism,” “racism,” “imperialism” or (especially in Poland) “anti-Semitism.” There appear in *A History of the Modern World* examples indicating that significant progress in history always has a moral character. One such example is the period 1910-1929, the most prosperous period in the history of America (pp. 225-226) when, under the rules of such presidents as Harding and Coolidge, the citizens of the United States, on the basis of their faith in traditional values, achieved well-being and a peculiar harmony of democracy. (This example is discussed in a chapter entitled *The Last Arcadia*.)

Another significant feature of Johnson's methodology is the biographic approach which expresses a conviction that the human individual plays an important and often decisive role in history. In *A History of the Modern World*, the great “landmarks” are not socio-economic movements or great ideologies, but persons. The individuals who by their will and temper impose a direction on the course of history and who also constitute – to some extent – its reflections are “representatives of the spirit of the age.” There is hardly any need to offer arguments proving this assertion with respect to figures such as Lenin, Hitler, Stalin or Mao. But Johnson has something more in mind. His analysis often takes as its subject the culture of an epoch or a country. It is on the cultural climate that the fate of a nation often depends. It was so in the case of the anti-Semitic madness in Germany in the period of the Weimar

Republic (cf. pp. 116-123), or of the moral crisis in England produced by the decadent moods of circles such as the Bloomsbury group (Chapter IV). Participation in a given culture and the co-creation of this culture depend on the choices made by every man. In numerous examples, Johnson shows how interests, tempers, families and habits bred at home actually constitute historical facts. *A History of the Modern World* contains several scores of short, brilliantly sketched biographies of the people who determined the course of our century. In this book the profiles of J. M. Keynes, F. D. Roosevelt, M. Gandhi, M. Luther King, J. Nehru, J. F. Kennedy and others, show faces slightly or radically different from those we have thus far known from propaganda stereotypes or history handbooks.

SUCH HAS BEEN THIS CENTURY

The book is divided into twenty chapters, covering a total of 734 pages. Each chapter is provided with a rich choice of bibliographic references. The division into chapters is based on chronological-geographic criteria; each chapter covers some closed period and concerns a particular region of the world.

Chapter I, entitled *A Relativistic World*, outlines the presuppositions forming the climate of the whole century, in which the principle of relativity reigned supreme. The harbingers of this principle, prominent especially in political life, were by no means politicians, but a physicist, psychiatrist and a philosopher – Einstein, Freud and Marx. The last chapter carries the title *Palimpsests of Freedom*, and contains historical data from the beginning of the 1980's. It is a chapter abounding in question marks and speculative hypotheses. They concern, among

others, the phenomenon of religious revival, of the destiny of the Soviet Union ("the unsolved anomaly"), and of sociobiology, in which Johnson perceives the science of the future. And what does he find within these terms which circumscribe the borders within which the history the twentieth century will play itself out? What substitutes for the unknown variables in the work with which Johnson outlines the beginning of the age of relativity and timidly suggests its decline, or the breakdown of relativity? What has this century been like?

It opens with the Russian revolution of 1917 and the construction of the communist state whose first moves were the establishment of terror ("Cheka") and the destruction of democracy (Chap. II). Perhaps the most important feature of the totalitarian Communist state – the author claims on page 81 – is the proliferation of nomenclature. (The accuracy of this observation is confirmed by our situation today, for instance that of our economy.) The beginning of this century in Europe was connected with the radicalization of sentiments. In the next chapter (Chap. III) Johnson tries to understand how Hitler won the democratic elections in Germany. The transvaluations of the beginning of the century also disturbed the colonial order, especially those of France and England (Chap. IV). "Colonialism" has become a popular slogan in political fights. In itself, "Colonialism was important not for what it was, rather for what it was not" (p. 161). The relativism which was then the main instrument of breaking with the inherited order also revealed itself in the most radical form in the Far East. In Japan, political assassinations and "the shark instinct" ("attack the weaker!") prevailed as principles of ruling (Chap. V). The whole world was slowly reaching the state of desired disorder.

der and today, from some temporal distance, it is not surprising that war became the factor which restored order.

The history of the United States in that period is particularly fascinating. After a period of prosperity (Chap. VI), the great crash of 1929 brought Americans to the state of utter confusion (cf. title of Chap. VII). Although the crisis was subsequently overcome (Johnson undermines the myth of Roosevelt's merits in this respect), there still remained a sense of the relativity of values, eagerly fostered by leftist centres. In the thirties, the opinion-shaping circles made sympathy for the Soviet Union a trend, and the Five-Year plan became the most popular subject of intellectual conversation (Chap. VII). "America was and is a millenarian society where overweening expectations can easily oscillate into catastrophic loss of faith" (p. 260) – this statement from Chapter VII gives the modern reader much to think about.

Anyway, the moral chaos continued to spread. It constituted a realization of the "holistic principle" according to which "political events and moral tendencies have their consequences throughout the world" (p. 176-177). Johnson describes the surge of violence in the two totalitarian states, and the common inspirations of Stalin and Hitler in this respect. Both won great successes: the former – a propaganda success, the latter – an economic success (Germany was the first country to overcome the great crisis) (Chap. VIII). The growing tendency of the West not to look beyond one's own borders ("symptoms of decadence" p. 349) and the "splendid isolation" of America combined to generate moral acquiescence to the preponderance of violence. The decade of the thirties was a period of "international banditry" (p. 309). The victims of aggression are, in turn, China, Abyssinia, Spain,

Czechoslovakia, Austria, and – in 1939 – Poland (Chap. IX). It was a time of open proclamation of the principle *plus vis quam ratio* ("force is more important than reason") in political relations. Johnson's critique and moral sensitivity are manifested here too, in his recognizing as a manifestation of the moral collapse of old Europe in the order issued by Churchill in the summer 1940 to bomb German cities (Chap. X). Civilian population was thus turned into military hostages until the *hecatomb* of Dresden, Tokyo and other towns. The most upright civilizations had thus embraced the principle of terror.

The World War is discussed in three chapters. Hitler's victories (Chap. X) are followed by the year 1941, which the author regards as "pregnant" (Chap. XI). The events which Johnson perceives as turning points in this particular year, for the course of the war and of the world, provide an opportunity to consider the role of rationality in history, since the breakthroughs (Pearl Harbor was one of them) were largely determined by irrational decisions. And as far as the rational aspect is concerned, thanks to which the war was won, one cannot avoid mentioning economy and technology.

The postwar perspective of *A History of the Modern World* differs in many respects from that of the Polish reader; after all, postwar Poland is also a post-Yalta Poland. As Johnson writes, after the war "it was, indeed, all too easy to forget Poland" (p. 432). Two elements – as it turns out, by no means different from the sentiments prevailing then in Poland – predominate in the chapters that follow, namely, fear and expansion of Communism. There prevailed fear of war (Chap. XIII) and the expansion of the Left in various forms, which continued winning victories in spite of the cocky

assurances of Western governments about the “Cold War,” the “Iron Curtain,” etc. The long-lasting ideological work of conquering empires by means of the Leninist concept of “colonialism” was bearing fruit. The Kremlin quickly found accomplices in the bloc of the so-called non-involved states (Chap. XVI), while Africa was covered with a network of tiny states in which the Marxist phraseology of the new rulers disguised their incompetence and a “reborn barbarism” (Chap. XV; p. 536). A distinct and constant theme of these chapters is the *leit-motif* of the twentieth century – terror in its political function. It accompanied the process of decolonization (e.g. Algeria) and the beginnings of new states (e.g. India and Israel).

Against the background of this world insanity, which seems to be reinforcing the bad habits ingrained during the War, one is struck by the extraordinary return of Christian values to the political stage of Western Europe. The chapter about the reconstruction of Europe by Alcide de Gasperi (Italy), Konrad Adenauer (Germany) and Charles de Gaulle (France) (Chap. XVII) is one of the few chapters in this book which show the constructive dimension of history. At that time, political formations based on traditional values restored not only the economic and democratic order, but also the sense of life of their citizens. Perhaps this thesis shows most emphatically the difference in the perspectives which occurred after the war between Western societies and Polish society and those societies whose situation was similar to ours.

The last chapters of Johnson’s book are somewhat chaotic and marked with pessimism. They reflect the unresolved character of the main threads in the history of our century. Discussing the mistakes committed by presidents J. F. Ken-

nedy and J. Carter (Chaps. XVIII and XIX), the author – writing in 1983 – could not know anything about the terms of Ronald Reagan and George Bush, very prosperous for America. Nor could he know about the course of the agony of the colossus, the Soviet Union. Neither could he read the numerous signs of the importance of John Paul II’s pontificate for the world. And most certainly, the data from the last two decades are necessary to see what this century has been like.

From the temporal perspective covered by Johnson and with respect to the history of politics (“the age of politics” as he says on p. 730), the twentieth century is marked by certain specific features. Most of them Johnson simply calls “the plagues of the twentieth century”. We have identified six of them.

The first is the sanctioning of political violence – terror as an instrument of politics – precisely in this century.

The second is widespread manipulation of political language (for instance, “colonialism”). This is the century of the absolute debasement of language.

The third feature points to the caste of professional politicians that has been formed during this century, that is, people educated exclusively for the purpose of winning power and ruling.

The fourth feature concerns social engineering, widely applied (by professional politicians) in the Soviet Union, Republic of South Africa, Cambodia, China, Iran, Afghanistan and other countries, and the *hecatombs* of victims it entailed.

The fifth is statism, that is, the progressively all-pervasive role of the state.

The sixth feature concerns the domination of social sciences which – in the twentieth century – became infected with Marxist ideology.

AGAINST STEREOTYPES

Paul Johnson's *A History of the Modern World* makes one aware of the complexity of historical development and of the difficulty of passing judgements on particular figures and events or of formulating an estimate about the meaning of short periods of history. Johnson's book abounds in numerous revisions of historical stereotypes, questionings of the "dogmas" of historical writings, and queries about persons beloved by popular literature.

As a good example of Johnson's historical discourse one can use the brilliant analogy he sets up between the thirties and the seventies. In the latter decade, the Western world was experiencing a fairly precise repetition of economic depression, unemployment, armament and aggression; however, it failed to learn its lesson from the great crash of the thirties (p. 685 ff).

In turn, the greatest civilizational achievement of America in this century is perceived by Johnson in ... the use of the occupation of Japan after World War II (p. 719). Contrary to what is popularly regarded as Americanization of the country (McDonald, Micky Mouse and Rock'n'Roll), Johnson shows how America – General MacArthur was then the governor of Japan – managed to push Japan out of the age of irrationality and political chaos into the developed democracy and culture of the twentieth century.

From the books of Józef Mackiewicz we know of a chilling incident from the end of World War II, when the British handed over to Stalin the Cossack troops who had fought for Hitler and who, after their surrender, were seeking asylum under the wings of a humanitarian and democratic state. Johnson presents a similar crime of omission and abandonment

for political reasons, committed by the French who – after their withdrawal from Algeria in 1963 – left behind to certain death over one hundred thousand Moslems who had served them loyally in the war against the National Liberation Front (pp. 504-505).

Among the numerous figures who people the pages of *A History of the Modern World*, the Polish reader will encounter several gravely contested mythical reputations. The profiles of Gandhi, Nehru, Roosevelt or J. F. Kennedy, immaculate in our history handbooks, suffer considerable discredit. On the other hand, we also meet some statesmen, such as Churchill, General Franco or Adenauer, in a positive light – and we are not used to that.

The book also contains numerous Polish anecdotes. Johnson mentions Poland both positively and negatively. In the context of World War II – as he states – "Poland was the cause of the war ... and Poland terminated the war" (p. 432). (The latter sentence alludes to the "elections" in Poland which, according to the author, began the confrontation between the West and Russia.) But in the context of the reckoning which followed World War I, he notices with some irony that Poland proved most covetous. He mentions the participation of Poles in the deciphering of the "Enigma" (p. 400), the Polish Pope (pp. 699-700), and the Jewish pogrom in Kielce (p. 482,) and there are some other instances when Poland is mentioned. In *A History of the Modern World*, we are neither the Christ of the nations nor the "peacock and parrot" of the nations, but our existence has been quite significant in the course of the twentieth century – as participant, witness and factor in history.

STYLE

Finally, a few words should be said about the way in which the book is written. I have already said above that it reads like a detective story. This is not an exaggeration. Paul Johnson is an impressive writer. He feels the pace, metaphorical qualities and drama of modern language. Besides documents, accounts and monographs, the source materials in his study also include *belles-lettres* and works of culture. Among others, he makes use of the writings of the English novelist Evelyn Waugh (Polish translators have mistaken him for a woman, but on the whole they need not be ashamed of their work).

Here is one example. At the naval conference in Washington in 1922, the United States pushed for a treaty which practically meant the dismantling of the naval power of Great Britain. "When Admiral Beatty, the First Sea Lord, first heard the details, an eyewitness said he lurched forward in his chair «like a bulldog, sleeping on a sunny doorstep, who has been poked in the stomach by an impudent foot of an itinerant soap-canvasser»" (p. 174). The internal quotation

comes from an eye-witness present at the conference in 1922, which Johnson from a work on British-American relations published in 1959. This passage is very characteristic of the style of his book.

The characters in this history are authentic and red-blooded. Facts are good or frightening, consoling or sad, bringing hope or negating human dignity. They manifest rationality or raise suspicions that everything is in the state of chaos. The history described and interpreted by Johnson is alive.

This way of writing easily provokes objections against its emotionality and arbitrariness, and I have already heard such critiques. However correct in details, certainly *A History of the Modern World* is not a history to be numbered among the abstract schematizations of theory, as often happens in books that are still being issued. It is living history, vividly felt, while its message makes one place the task of the person known as *homo historicus*, that is, each of us, among the highest tasks that challenge man in every period.

Translated by *Leszek Kolek*

Cezary RITTER

THE EUROPE OF TOMORROW – WHAT CAN WE EXPECT?

The International Congress, *Europe of Our Dreams. The Common European Good in Theology, Ethics and Economics*, held in Hanover, 24-27 October 1991, was organized by three academic institutions from three countries: Germany, France and Poland – Forschungsinstitut für Philosophie Hannover, Institut Catholique de Paris and the Catholic University of Lublin. Apart from representatives of these institutions, scientists, journalists and social workers from Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and Great Britain also participated in this meeting. This was one of the numerous symposia about Europe which, in recent years, have taken place in Europe. In this period of ongoing rapid changes, the Europeans diligently investigate the identity of their continent and its inhabitants. And, as usual, the interested readers also received the fruits of their study in the form of a book.¹

TWO TURNING POINTS

October 1991, when the Congress was held, fell between two symbolic dates in the history of contemporary Europe. The first of these was autumn 1989 – the autumn of the nations of Central Eastern

Europe, the symbolic message of the breaking down of the Berlin Wall, the end of the era of Real Socialism and of the order of Yalta. And the second date: 1 January 1993, when – as P. Kosłowski wrote in his *Introduction* to the aforementioned book – “the integration of Europe will become a reality and one common economic space will emerge, and because economics strongly affects everyday culture, a space of common culture will come into existence” (p. 9).

Which of these two dates is more important for the future of Europe? Is it the former, the unexpected, great in spiritual and socio-moral significance, and rich in consequences never before dreamt of in this part of Europe? Let us recall the words expressing this great surprise, the words with which the President of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel, greeted John Paul II in Prague in the spring of 1990: “I do not know if I know what a miracle is, but I know that this is a miracle...” Or is maybe the date of full integration of the European Union – planned long ago in the congress halls and offices of Brussels and Luxembourg – more important for the future of Europe?

Many ask themselves the question whether the events which have taken place in both parts of our continent will have equally important influence on the future shape of – as it is sometimes named – the United States of Europe. Will Central Eastern Europe share the lot of the former GDR (with all its positive

¹ *Europa jutra. Europejski rynek wewnętrzny jako zadanie kulturalne i gospodarcze*, Peter Kosłowski (ed.), Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1994, 370 pp. The book has also appeared in Germany and France, in these languages respectively.

and negative consequences), which has simply been "annexed" to the FRG?

The above questions spring from the differences between the experiences of the inhabitants of both parts of the continent. These differences found their expression in the slightly different emphasis made by the representatives of the institutions which organized the Hanover Congress, published in the reviewed book under the general title *Chrześcijaństwo jako pomost między narodami* (Christianity as a Bridge between Nations). In his presentation, Rev. Prof. Stanisław Wielgus, Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, stressed that it is necessary for Europe to return to its spiritual roots, and particularly to the "Christian understanding of freedom which takes into account the superiority of the unchanging moral law given by God over all other laws – in opposition to the more and more widespread conceptions in which man is not a lector, but a creator of moral norms – that is, someone who stands beyond the Decalogue" (p. 200). Warning against the possibility of "transforming European Christianity into the dominance over the minds or into the almost political power which has at its disposal the means of pressure and constraint" (p. 206), Prof. Michel Quesnel, vice-director of the Catholic Institute in Paris, pointed to the meaning of the ecumenical threads in the Christian tradition: "Christianity really fulfills its task when it builds bridges" (p. 207). The practical problems (mainly related to nationalities and economics), which follow from the process of the unification of Europe were indicated by Prof. Peter Koslowski, Director of the Philosophical Research Institute in Hanover.

Despite the above-mentioned differences in experience, all the authors of the book *Europe of Tomorrow* have no doubt

that the new period in the history of Europe has begun. The task, then, of intellectuals is "to create together a Europe of the future, a Europe which will be not only a dream about Europe, but a Europe of dreams" (P. Koslowski, *Wprowadzenie. Wyobrażenie przyszłej Europy* – The Picture of Future Europe. Introduction, p. 28). This "historical optimism" of the editor of the book, P. Koslowski, can be also found in papers by many other authors. "Europe of Tomorrow" is not only a fact that should be recognized, but is primarily a fact in whose creation one should collaborate or should – in a way – serve. This requires the creation of a new ethos of Europe, the revision of many traditional concepts such as "sovereignty" or "nation", and the founding of new European institutions. "Therefore, the nations of Europe" – writes Koslowski – "should create Europe in their imagination" (*ibid.*).

"ENTANGLED WITH HISTORY"

"The history of my personal life is a fragment of the history of your life – of the history of my parents, my friends, my enemies, and many unknown people. We are literally «entangled with history»" (P. Ricoeur, *Jakiego nowego ethosu potrzebuje Europa* – What New Ethos does Europe Need?, p. 104). Despite the fact that the Congress participants, and the authors of the book, fundamentally "think towards the future," their reflection often turned towards the past and common tradition. In this light it is easier to answer the questions of what Europe is today and what are its current needs.

Europe – this is a neighbourhood, the interweaving of human ways, lots and interests. This was depicted in an interesting way by the historian Karl Schlögel

(*Powszechne dobro w Europie po przezwycięzeniu jej podziału. Poszukiwania w nowym obszarze doświadczeń* – The Common Good in Europe after the Overcoming of its Division. Investigations in the New Field of Experience). According to him, the history of Europe may be looked at through the prism of inter-human contacts which originated, for example, on an economic basis. The symbol of this is the map of Europe criss-crossed by trade routes going in all directions, often far beyond its frontiers. The period of the continent's division broke this natural mutual communication between people, which favoured the creation of Europe's welfare. At present we are entering the second *Gründerzeit*: "What today often seems a utopia has already happened once before. Students of Moscow and Kharkov in Heidelberg and Tübingen – we have seen it before. German engineers in the Donbas – they are not there for the first time. Fast trains between Berlin and Prague were once faster and more comfortable. St. Petersburg was an international city, a New York of Europe – maybe it will become so once again. Dubrovnik as the link between Bizance and Venice – maybe it will become one again, if it survives the bombing. A weekly ferry connection between Kiel, Riga, Tallin and St. Petersburg – maybe we will soon catch up with 1920. The Jagiellonian University as the intellectual centre of a universal Europe, unified by language, extending from Padua to Salamanca? Why not? At the end of the twentieth century we discover how far we have remained behind Hanza from seven centuries ago" (p. 149). In other words, we are on the threshold of the possibility of regaining wasted time. To realize this we need exchange in Europe. The principle of a new Europe should be, as Ricoeur shows, "the principle of universal

translatability" of languages and of cultures. It should be followed by the principle of the exchange of traditions, and, on this basis by "mutual help in liberating the vital and regenerative forces." All this should lead up to the "model of forgiveness." "It is true that forgiveness in the full sense of the word goes far beyond political categories; it belongs to a certain order – to the order of love – which surpasses the order of morality. Forgiveness pertains to the economy of gift, whose logic of superabundance surpasses the logic of mutuality" (p. 107).

POST-MODERNISTIC EUROPE

According to J. B. Metz (*Chrześcijaństwo i klimat duchowy Europy* – Christianity and the Spiritual Climate of Europe) and J. Van Gerwen (*Europa sensu i nonsensu. Szkic europejskiego obszaru społeczno-kulturowego* – Europe of Sense and Nonsense. The Sketch of European Social and Cultural Region), many traditional notions connected with Christianity should be interpreted in such a way that they could be included in the landscape of the Post-modernistic culture, characteristic of contemporary Europe. "When one hears the interpreters of sceptical humanism, such as Rorty or Glucksman, one is confronted with the ethics of negation, with the ethics of suspicion, which is defined through tolerance, through the critique of totalitarianism and dogmatism, the principle of non-violence, the desire to avoid cruel and criminal behaviour. It seems that there is nothing in this conception which could not be accepted by the Christian view. Even more, it is very useful to apply this post-modernistic critique to Christianity, stressing, for example, the mystical and non-discursive character of our relationship with the Highest Being.

This is right in the same measure as the critique of facile statements of universal ethics, indicating the concrete limits for identification of each of them with others, and suggesting the recognition of the unconditional ban on cruelty or on doing harm to life, as the foundation of social morality" (J. Van Gerwen, p. 297). The long quotation above renders well – I believe – the attitude of the great part of Western authors whose main intention is to adapt Christian tradition to the requirements of the "dominating" post-modernistic culture. In the opinion of Van Gerwen, and similar authors, the point here is not only to merge into this culture but also to participate in shaping it. The crisis of Europe is seen here as the actual measure of what it means to be European.

UNITED EUROPE: THE CONTINUATION OF SOCIALISM?

The history and the current situation of the Old Continent can be seen through the prism of the development of its characteristic institutions. Many authors stress precisely the fact that Europe owes its exceptionally dynamic development to big institutions, which it has successfully created. It is in Europe that institutions of market economy such as banks, stock exchanges, or modern industrial enterprise were born. Also in Europe, legal ideas were put into practice through a system of modern bureaucracy without which the state of law cannot exist. There is no doubt then, that what comes to the fore in the debate about the shape of the "Europe of Tomorrow" is the new shape of European institutions. The possibility of creating new European institutions is also often postulated or imagined in the book presented here. Among these postulates there is, for example, a "post-national

state" (P. Ricoeur), or a new type of national state – "the democratic power Europe" – whose sovereign would be "the nation Europe" (J. Rovin). In this context the ongoing cultural transformations in Europe (L. Dyczewski, *Kultura europejska a kultura narodowa* – European Culture and National Culture) and the historical necessity of these transformations were also considered.

While discussing economic problems, some authors such as J. Molsberger (*Europa otwarta czy Europa twierdzą gospodarczą* – Open Europe or Europe as an Economic Fortress), indicated the necessity of setting the European market in order. This should be favoured by an appropriate customs law which would unite the "Region Europe" (which is the goal of the European Union), but which at the same time would not discriminate against the countries situated outside of it. However, the Molsberger proposal and a similar text by F. Furger (*Gospodarka rynkowa w Europie skoncentrowana na pracy, ekologiczna i odpowiedzialna przed światem?* – Market Economy in Europe, work-centred, ecological and responsible to the world?) give an impression that the realization of the future European economic order requires so many pan-European institutions, departments and offices – endowed with vast competence – that only some new variation of Euro-socialism would be an adequate system here. Because the difference between a market economy and the Socialist one consists in the fact that in the former the most important subject of economic life is an entrepreneur, in the latter, in turn – an official.

THE LOST GOOD – FAMILY

Perhaps the total absence of the topic of family (especially in those parts of the

book where European institutions are discussed) – a topic fundamental for Europe – is an unintended expression of the Congress' inclination to socialism. If we observe the spiritual crisis of Europe, it is, in the first place, the crisis of the family in Europe: of the family as a community of love between people and as a basic institution of social life. The Europe of a post-modernistic culture is in large measure, a Europe of a post-family culture.

If Christianity has something to offer to today's Europe, it is first of all the vision of man who is able to realize all his potentialities through life in a family. The family is the key to the proper understanding of a common European good, to a correct understanding of economy and of the purpose of all European social and political institutions. The new leader

of the Italian Christian Democrats, Prof. Rocco Buttiglione, has recently put forward a political slogan: "The crisis of the family is the crisis of the state's budget," indicating that an appropriate pro-family policy may create a chance to overcome current defects of the Welfare State. One should rather let people care for the welfare of each other within the family, supporting families with an adequate tax system, family salaries, etc., instead of placing citizens directly under the protection of the state, because the family is the first school of social and economic behaviour (to start with, a simple ability to save money). At the same time it is the special community in which everyone is accepted "for oneself" (see: *Letter to Families*, No. 9 ff.).

Translated by *Patrycja Mikulska*

Dorota CHABRAJSKA
Maciej RAJEWSKI

THE ANATOMY OF ENSLAVEMENT

Is there a clear borderline between a reasonable compromise, which, while allowing for the preservation of moral integrity makes allowance for the circumstances in which one acts, and an action which turns into a betrayal of values and of the ideals that one fosters, into a betrayal of people, who frequently happen to be one's friends, into a betrayal of truth, to which everyone is a witness? This question, formulated in many different ways, arises in many publications today. In some of them, the authors place it in the context of the concrete historical and social background of the Poland of the post-war period, considering the attitudes of the Polish intelligentsia to the suddenly changed conditions in which they suddenly had to live and work.

But what provokes the question about the meaning of their compromise today? In what way does this question concern the situation of the Poland of the nineties? The collapse of the Communist system has made us face the truth about the Polish culture of the past decades. The fact is that many (maybe most?) of the ones who fostered this culture were living in symbiosis with the totalitarian regime externally imposed upon the Polish nation. The fact is that they offered all their abilities and faculties to this regime in return for certain privileges and a chance to pursue their literary profession. Though many of them have now sunk into oblivion, some were and still are considered as great writers or poets. They enjoyed be-

ing labelled as authorities (in the moral sense as well), their literary output invariably remains on school reading lists, and their works often become the basis of film screenplays. Finally, these writers, active up to the present day, frequently do not limit their undertakings to the purely literary. They are continually present in the mass-media, they speak on problems of vital moral importance to the Polish people, and they often consider themselves as the spiritual leaders of the nation.

Can (or maybe should?) we forget the fact that these same people were similarly present in Polish cultural life during the past decades, when the official interpretation of what was true was so very different – not only from truth itself – but also from what is generally assumed as true today? Was their public presence – commonly referred to as a “compromise” – during the years of an absent, silent majority of Poles not so much a compromise, but a loss of face (disgrace)? Or could their attitude perhaps be qualified as a reasonable golden mean, thanks to which Polish culture received a certain chance during those dreadful years, if not to develop, then at least to survive?

One common answer to the question about the limits of such a compromise seems to be suggested by three recent publications on the problem of the collaboration of Polish intellectuals (men of letters in particular) with the totalitarian Communist regime. These books are:

Homeland Disgrace by J. Trznadel¹, *Between Compromise and Betrayal* by S. Murzański², and *Charms of the Court* by W. P. Szymański.³ They offer the reader a presentation of the historical context of the Stalinist and post-Stalinist period in Poland, and an analysis of the sources and motives of the mental enslavement of the intellectuals, together with a certain definition of it. While taking up the problem of submission to the pressure of the system, the authors point to the varying extent and form of enslavement in the respective cases of different intellectuals. They simultaneously make an attempt to address and evaluate individual cases of collaboration with the regime. Finally, they show the consequences of this enslavement for culture, for the national awareness of Poles, and for the writers themselves.

Although both the style and the form of these publications are different (historical and literary narrative in the book by Murzański, quasi-literary approach in the case of Szymański, and a series of interviews with the actual participants in the event by Trznadel), the three authors seem to draw similar conclusions, so their books can be treated as a whole.

COMPROMISE AS HISTORICAL NECESSITY?

The condition of Polish culture after 1954 was a direct result of the previous German and Soviet occupations of Polish territory. Both occupations were cruel,

and brought about enormous devastation of the Polish population and cultural heritage. One effect of this devastation was seen in the growing deterioration of the structures which had been used to serve society in the exchange of views and circulation of ideas. The situation was ultimately confirmed by the collapse of the Warsaw Uprising. Thus, the war contributed to the annihilation of the normal functions of society, which in turn was a result of the extermination of the Polish intelligentsia, the loss of such cultural centres as Vilnius or Lvov, and mass migration. The deciding factor, present throughout those changes, was the imposition of a satellite Communist government on Poland. Its scheme of enslavement included purging of libraries, closing of the frontiers, introducing an embargo on free ideas, and relentless persecution of the patriotic segment of society. After the war, the Polish people, who were longing for normal life, received instead the post-Yalta order, together with an existence of no hope and no perspective.⁴ Many writers interviewed by Trznadel describe that situation. Z. Kubikowski says:

“We were listening to their conversations, and they were simply conversations about keeping up on the job. They were saying that one had to live on something. That it would last. That it could last forever. In Russia it had already lasted for 40, no, for 30 years by then... That meant you had to be set up in life, because it was the world that would last, and no other world would be given to you. The point was to be set up so as to defile yourself to the smallest extent

¹ Jacek Trznadel, *Hańba domowa. Rozmowy z pisarzami*, Lublin 1990, 339 pp.

² Stanisław Murzański, *Między kompromisem a zdradą. Intelktualiści wobec przemocy 1945-56*, Warsaw 1993, 272 pp.

³ Wiesław P. Szymański, *Uroki dworu (Rzecz o zniewalaniu)*, Cracow 1993, 125 pp.

⁴ See: Trznadel, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-39

possible ... So you started the never-ending compromises.”⁵

Even Z. Herbert, one of the few who did not give in to the pressure of the system, states:

“During the Stalinist period I thought it would last longer than my lifetime. I was absolutely convinced of it. So was [Leopold] Tyrmand, and so were those few, two or three friends I had in Warsaw, to whom I could talk. So you had to emigrate spiritually [...] it did not require much effort.”⁶

The question appears in this context of how much talent was lost, how many were murdered, how many were simply wasted due to external factors, such as submission to the atmosphere of helplessness, spiritual emigration or acceptance of compromise in order to secure a living. How sad J. Trznadel's statement sounds – that he is not at all sure that the greatest talents were active in Polish post-war literature and culture.⁷ Gombrowicz seemed to share this opinion, saying that he knew some writers who collaborated with the regime, who were mostly persons of mediocre intelligence and narrow horizons.

“It was easy for them to fabricate a moral and ideological countenance ... Driven into a tight corner by the historical moment, they promptly assumed the new image, they smoothly assimilated the new faith.”⁸

SOURCES AND MOTIVES OF ENSLAVEMENT

It seems that most of Trznadel's interlocutors, as well as the intellectuals about

whom Murzański and Szymański write, represent various personality types; the particular motives on which they were acting were not identical, either. However, one can trace a certain similarity in their attitudes and in the choices which they made. Their original alliance with the new reality inevitably changed into subservience to the establishment and its ideology, which frequently resulted in the writer's loss of individuality and in his entrance into the uniform government structures.⁹ As A. Braun explains: “There was a growing pressure on young penmen to reject their Home Army tradition and praise a new situation [...] There was pressure in it, and we must take heed of that moment depriving us of our authenticity. We were made into regime writers, impersonal writers. For example, my poem should not be different from Wiktor's. Or Borowski's short story from that by Wygodzki.”¹⁰

Thus, the effect of the attitudes adopted by these intellectuals was far from what they intended. Though the basic source of enslavement in many cases was the fact that writers were terrified of the prospect of remaining outside the literary market, the paradoxical result of this attitude was their loss of independent thinking. In this way, they lost the very basis of what constitutes the writer's vocation. According to Trznadel, the disgrace of these writers is not their wish to be present in public life, which is characteristic of any penman, but the price they paid for that presence: the fact that being a presence in society and in the literary market – controlled more and more by the authorities – required a compromise with and a bowing to deceitful and des-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁸ M u r z a ń s k i, *ibid.*, p. 182.

⁹ T r z n a d e l, *ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

otic reality, for the mere reason that it surrounded the writer from the outside.¹¹

However, the very mechanism of enslavement was not this clear, particularly for those subjected to it. Though psychological factors were certainly at work, they were accompanied by an intellectual fashion for leftist ideologies, prevalent all over Europe at the time. According to Murzański, the psychological factor which most likely dominated these individuals was the tendency, when unable, or lacking enough courage to face reality, to take a course of action which projects one's own image of the reality, to choose from the reality that which one actually wants to see in it, and thus creating the image of the reality which is most suitable at the moment.¹² This to an extent natural tendency to escape from what is difficult was at that time complemented with the growing popularity of leftist ideologies, with the praise of progress carried by history, with the "Hegelian bite," which resulted in the introduction of the dialectical category of historical necessity in place of the classical conception of truth and falsehood. Also, the phenomenon of radicalism characteristic of the Polish intelligentsia, many of whom had been subject to leftist influences already before the war, favoured this passage over to the side of the Communist government. It is no wonder that in the light of this radicalism, the programme introduced by the communist regime not only seemed acceptable, but even created a certain mood of progressiveness. The failure of the writer to participate in this progressiveness would condemn him to remaining behind, to missing the meeting with reality. As W. Wirpsza says: "The

second problem was the radicalism of the Polish youth in the thirties, which became even stronger during the occupation. The more so as the Communists proposed a programme of social reforms, e.g. land reform, education reform, nationalization of pivotal industries, etc., which were considered as badly needed by most people in Poland, even by the liberals. There was no defiance here, it went on as smoothly as cutting butter with a hot knife."¹³

In this context, Murzański wonders whether the enslavement of the *literati* was not, to a certain extent, also a kind of seduction, if even Cz. Miłosz, a man of such great calibre, comments on the tragedy of the soldiers of the Polish underground Home Army, which took place right in front of his eyes, by calling it – in his book "The Captive Mind" – "an example of the ironic jokes of history." It was easier for the writer to eliminate human tragedy both from his own and from his reader's mind and to present the situation of post-war Poland as the struggle of particular interest groups, than to face the substance of a national tragedy.¹⁴

Apart from the leftist movement widespread all over Europe at that time, there were also other factors which seriously influenced Polish intellectuals. As J. M. Rymkiewicz says, the propaganda was one-sided, censoring everything which concerned western culture; e.g. you could read and hear a lot about Sartre, yet Orwell was never mentioned.¹⁵ The omnipresent propaganda was accompanied by the element of intimidation in the case of those to whom it was not convincing enough. "There was an awareness of oc-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹² See: M u r z a ń s k i, *ibid.*, p. 9.

¹³ T r z n a d e l, *ibid.*, p. 107.

¹⁴ M u r z a ń s k i, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

¹⁵ See: T r z n a d e l, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

cupation, of a worse occupation, since during the time when Poland was partitioned you were free to travel. And this time the annexation of Poland was accompanied by occupation. Another type of terror, but undoubtedly terror [...] of arrests at the workplace, of people who would disappear, of crowded trams, and of the nightmare of everyday life. There was pressure at every point.” (Z. Kubiowski)¹⁶ However, not everyone actually submitted to the propaganda and intimidation. Some were actually convinced about the rightfulness and independence of their attitudes. W. Woroszyński states: “I had the feeling then that it was really we who did everything. I did not feel that I was somehow forced into it, or prompted in what to do; I did not feel as if I were a puppet. Such an attitude would have rather caused my protest.”¹⁷

There was also a deeper background to the far-reaching compromise between the Polish *literati* and the regime. It was provided by the conviction, inherited from the period of modernism, that there is a type of intellectual (writer, scientist, artist) in the Polish reality who considers himself wiser than the common people, who is different from them by his life-style, and on these grounds demands special appreciation, respect or fame.¹⁸ J. Bocheński stresses this very point in particular, saying:

“My father represented the approach typical of modernists; his relationship to the world was such that he considered himself someone better than the people surrounding him, as was often the case in the nineteenth century. The artist, the «spiritual giant», embodied the under-

standing of something totally inconceivable for the dwarfs who surrounded him. I was raised in such an atmosphere, I was saturated with it [...]. So, also for me, the world was divided into the ones endowed with higher spiritual abilities on the one hand, and common earthly-minded bread-eaters, incapable of understanding the individuals of the former kind. As if God's Spirit was embodied in some, and not in the rest. It was obvious to me that a special mission was to be fulfilled by artists, writers, philosophers, etc. Also deeper wisdom and the true values were to be manifested by them. As if the fundamental conflict in human communities was between the chosen ones, endowed with the spirit, and the earthly-minded bread-eaters. And there is only one step from here to the discovery that the bread-eaters are maybe not the whole of society, but the bourgeoisie, this disgrace to the society. They represent dumb narrow-mindedness, greed, the striving for profit, the qualities hated by artists and intellectuals and ascribed just to the «terrible philistines». However, a chance for the mythical »working classes« appears.”¹⁹

In its striving for legitimization from the intellectuals, the new government in a way met the writers' expectations by keeping up the image they had of themselves, and by taking advantage of their desire to hold a position above all the rest of the society. According to Szymański, their wish to be present at Court led to their frequent exploitation by the Court for political aims. In this way, they often became the government's tools, which they were not always aware of.²⁰ Also Z. Herbert ironically confirms this

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁷ Trznadel, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

¹⁸ Szymański, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁹ Trznadel, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

²⁰ Szymański, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

opinion saying: "The artists were excited about the new government, as it was so simple, so easy to approach, so familiar. An invitation to the Warsaw Belvedere Palace, prizes, a conversation with Bierut. A strict master, yet a just one; made mincemeat of the underground army, but loves us [...] This «vanity fair» is certainly inherent in the atmosphere of the Varsoviette [...]. Those social contacts, one's own table at the State Publishing Institute Club, large editions, book signings, a flower in cellophane wrapping, public meetings, five thousand drowsy workers coming to applaud comrade writer. The conceit was growing. Nowhere in the world of real capitalism were writers doing so well. [...] For the writers' life was idyllic, though certainly based on the fear that one could slide down to the level on which ordinary people were living. Clubs, retirement homes, high standards, Mrs Nałkowska's literary salon, trips abroad. Breza joining diplomacy... [...] What did this government offer? Divine rank, the role of a demiurge. [...] So they suddenly felt the wheel of history in their hands, they felt that in a way it paid to lie to that dumb nation which deserved nothing but scorn."²¹

DEGREES OF ENSLAVEMENT

The question arises whether the writers really were unaware – until the very end – of the actual condition of Poland; whether the benefits which motivated their choices were really more important than the moral dimension of those choices. The more unaware they were, the greater the enslavement. Actually, there were different degrees of the writers' involvement in the service to the new

government. The older generation of writers, especially the ones who had returned from the Soviet Union (e.g. Putrament, Ważyk) as well as those who had already experienced the Soviet occupation earlier (e.g. Herbert), were conscious of the moral nothingness of the system, of its injustice, and of the enslavement it brought. On the other hand, the younger writers – not realizing so well what was really going on in the State – were attracted to the system by older writers who propagated it. J. Trznadel recalls this situation: "It concerns the influence exerted by such people as Kott or Żółkiewski on a certain circle of young people. This influence was strong. Our doubts about Stalinism or Soviet Russia were moved to the background by living authorities of this kind. Terrible harm was done."²² Rymkiewicz adds: "The older ones, today I can say «my friends», were guilty; yet it did not concern merely the writers. Thus, the whole Polish liberal intelligentsia was actually guilty [...]. It was guilty because it let itself be deceived, and, what is more, it deceived children like me."²³

Also the fact that the older generation of writers saw Fascism as the source of all the evil that affected Poland was conducive to the younger writers' submission to the enslavement. Due to this, the injustice of the Soviet system, scrupulously concealed by the institution of censorship, seemed also not to exist. The drawbacks were excused by the historic moment, and the young writers deluded into believing in the Polish way of building Socialism, or in the Polish way to Communism. Today, some of them (e.g. Strykowski) claim that they were unaware of

²¹ Trznadel, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 117.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

the evil of the system, that the disclosure of its iniquity in 1956 was a tragic surprise to them.²⁴

THE ESSENCE OF ENSLAVEMENT
IN THE BETRAYAL OF THE WORD

T. Murzański, J. Trznadel and W. Szymański do not confine themselves to a presentation of the writers' compromise with history. They also suggest a univocal moral judgement of this compromise. This is most clear in S. Murzański's book: he accuses the writers of the Stalinist period of having betrayed the Word, the free Word whose task is to grasp and comprehend the truth, and to make it the only law. It is a conscious betrayal of the Word, of truth, which in his opinion means true enslavement. This betrayal ultimately determined the attitude of the majority of Polish intellectuals after 1945 as a betrayal of the ethics of their professional ethos. Undoubtedly, one of its manifestations was the elimination of national problems from the literature of the historical period in which their presence was so badly needed, by means of an overwhelming mental coercion which was meant to deprive the nation of its identity. The betrayal was in the obliteration of the national experience through literature, and in the abuse of the nation's most precious concept, namely, patriotism. Thus, the truly patriotic attitudes of the younger generation, dedicated to the underground Home Army, were reduced to unhealthy emotions. Simultaneously, the literature of the day was profuse in patriotic phraseology in order to attain some immediate political aims.²⁵

The betrayal of the Word in describing the reality which directly surrounded

the writers, though bad in itself, was not the only result of their compromise with history. This betrayal affected also the very essence of the ages-old motivation of literature, namely, the grasp of moral problems. One of the symptoms of this situation was the "controversy about Conrad" in the Polish literary press. The protagonist of Conrad's works constitutes a kind of archetype of any literary protagonist: solitarily facing his vulnerability and the conflict between his will and the moral law, he is aware of his weakness, but in consequence puts truth above pragmatic self-interest and remains heroically faithful to this truth. Such a protagonist was incompatible with the propagated collective personality; his concern about internal rectitude and faithfulness to ideals, suggested rather the image of the young people involved in the underground resistance movement than the "Socialist man" aggressively propagated by the writers of the period. So, with substantial cooperation of the latter, an attempt was made to remove the true meaning of Conrad's works from the literary horizons of the young generation. Murzański says that the writers were aware of the actual ends for which their work was used, and despite this, some of them were even overzealous in their cooperation. Therefore, if we encounter attempts to explain such attitudes by historical necessity, or by an intention to rescue Polish culture, the conclusion irresistibly follows that betrayal of the Word turned out in their case to be the betrayal of the very reasons for which they made the compromise; it turned out to be a betrayal of their own identity and a betrayal of literature.²⁶

²⁴ T r z n a d e l, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

²⁵ M u r z a ń s k i, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-54.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-53.

CONSEQUENCES OF ENSLAVEMENT

The long-lasting compromise between Polish writers and the alien ideology imposed on the Polish people had its consequences both for the writers and for society. Many of the writers active during that time have not written anything valuable since their break with the past (e.g. Dąbrowska), while almost all of them consider those years as wasted for their literary output. The very first victims of the lies were some writers of the younger generation, deluded by their older friends and subjected to the hard mechanism of uniformity.

S. Murzański, J. Trznadel and W. P. Szymański add that it was ultimately Polish society that suffered from the writers' betrayal more strongly than the writers themselves. While serving the Communists, these writers provided an intellectual framework for the system which – for such a long time – succeeded in concealing its moral nothingness. While humiliating the Polish tradition and the Home Army in the eyes of the nation, they simultaneously compromised the idea of resistance, or of any attempt to protest against the Communist lawlessness, all of which contributed to giving this system the appearance of legality and justice.

According to the three authors, the political crises of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980 turned out to be the time of awakening for many intellectuals. Influenced by the experience of the events which were taking place, many of them joined the political opposition, suddenly noticing that their service to the system could not have been anything but enslavement, for enslavement turned out to be a constitutive element of this system. It was then that many of them also started a new chapter in their presence in

the culture of the post-war Poland, by writing critical works about the official interpretation of Marxism, by publishing independently in unofficial printing houses, by signing letters of protest addressed to the government, and finally, by founding organizations to defend civil rights and freedom (the most dominant of these organizations was the Workers' Defence Committee). These intellectuals became active participants in workers' protest demonstrations, often serving as advisers. By opposing the regime in such a clear way, some of them freely condemned themselves to permanent absence from the mass-media, to persecution and repression by the government. All this must not be forgotten. Deprived of any possibility of public statement or rejoinder, they were often publically defamed and accused of common offences by the propaganda. M. Brandys says: "The persecutions which my family and my home were subjected to by the police during the years 1976 – 80 were much more brutal than the ones from before the war. And the short period of unemployment which I experienced before the war was nothing compared to the fact that today, after having pursued a literary career for forty years, I am practically deprived of the right to practise my profession"²⁷ (interview in 1985).

It seems as though the facts themselves were speaking: the penmen decisively turned their backs on the system which, at its rise, had so easily subdued them. Their previous capitulation to the enslavement for the sake of enslaving others was now replaced with a commitment to unmasking the system. These are facts with which it is hardly possible to argue. However, it is also worth confront-

²⁷ Trznadel, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

ing S. Murzański's opinion on the intellectuals' change of attitude during those crucial years. He proposes the hypothesis that if their withdrawal from the regime had been authentic and wholesome, it would have resulted in the very authors' confronting the Communist period in literature. However, such a confrontation has not been carried out: either from the moral or from the sociological point of view: "No book has been written which would honestly, or even merely to a certain extent, answer the questions asked about that gloomy time. Those who are actually *obliged* to clear the way for the truth about that evil period, about evil people and evil actions, either keep silent or talk in circles. One of the reasons for it is that it was the time of their illusory triumph and actual downfall."²⁸ Despite all the respect due to these Polish writers for their involvement in political opposition, we must not fail to note the fact that their internal change still lacks something, since it has in fact left no trace in literature. Many intellectuals simply stopped their literary career, others gave up national issues in their works, moving towards problems, called a bit euphemistically, "universal." Simultaneously, Murzański reminds us that "despite the change of their option, many intellectuals, bewitched with the dia-mat (dialectical materialism), were actually advancing from stage to stage in the way that school children advance from grade to grade, with marks for their conduct which are sometimes better and sometimes worse. One or another of them got rid of their Communist Party identity card at a subsequent turning point in history; however, no cases of medals being returned have been noted; they renounced

the views, but not the academic degrees, posts or privileges given to them in return for spreading those views. No one has withdrawn the falsehood or corrected the lies."²⁹ Z. Kubikowski, one of the authors active during the Communist period, seems to share Murzański's opinion: "What I dream about is detailed and searchingly accurate memoirs of the ones who didn't adopt the right attitude to protect themselves from the evil of the system. Of those who were ready to do it. For various reasons. I dream about books, stories, memoirs, about an attempt at reconstruction. Only then will we be able to comprehend more. Because, until now we have only learned that everyone was right. But why was everything not right? The answer is because certain people were actually not right. Why? How did it happen? Finding answers to these questions is a crucial matter, with which any healthy functioning of Polish literature, of Polish literary and historical awareness, must begin."³⁰

ADMONITION

Reading *Home Disgrace* by J. Trznadel, *Between Compromise and Betrayal* by S. Murzański, and *Charms of the Court* by W. P. Szymański is a sad experience. The facts and the anatomy of the writers' compromise with the post-war reality give an univocal answer to the question posed at the beginning: the borderline between compromise and betrayal is not clear. Actually, there are matters in which any compromise turns out to be betrayal, even if it were to be made with most noble intention. The literary men of the post-war period seem not to have remembered this principle, and many of them

²⁸ M u r z a ń s k i, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 217.

³⁰ T r z n a d e l, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

made use of the rule which states that the end justifies the means. However, the result of this attitude turned out to be contrary to its very noble end, namely, saving Polish culture.

The three books by Trznadel, Murzański and Szymański are a warning for the intellectuals in today's Poland. They teach that any kind of public presence, every appearance in the press, radio, on television, or on the literary market, means addressing millions of people, and carries an enormous responsibility, and that the awareness of this must not disappear.

Being constantly, and in a way, professionally present in the intellectual or cultural life of the nation, intellectuals can easily start believing that they actually occupy a privileged position: that they are authorities who know all the right answers. Such a loss of responsibility can only be prevented if the intellectuals display a constant disposition to truth, and an attitude of humility towards it, which is what Trznadel, Murzański and Szymański seem to advocate.

Jarosław MERECKI, SDS

OPEN SOCIETY AT THE CROSSROADS

After the acclaimed book of K. R. Popper, *Open Society and its Enemies*, the claim of absolute certainty in ethics is often dismissed as unfounded and even dangerous to democratic order. What is more, in some currents of liberal thought the very notion of truth is rejected as at least potentially oppressive, e.g. for postmodernist thinkers freedom and truth are irreconcilable. To put it in the words of R. Rorty: democracy should be prior to philosophy. In this perspective, sophists rather than Plato are the patrons of modern society.

The new collection of essays *Absolute Ethics and Open Society*¹ by Ryszard Legutko – one of the most interesting political philosophers in Poland – is mainly focused on the modern version of the controversy between Plato and the sophists. The author does not conceal that his sympathy is rather on the side of Plato; his questions are similar to those put once by the Founder of the Academy: Can a free society really do without absolute ethics? Can we discard the notion of truth as far as our social life is concerned? These questions – as ancient as political philosophy itself – are particularly alive in societies on the road of constructing (or reconstructing) their democratic order. They also have a distinctive face here, due to the background of a totalitarian past; for this reason an anal-

ysis made from this perspective is particularly valuable.

The principal thesis of Legutko reads as follows: liberal society needs some elements of non-liberal culture in order to function properly, and among these elements is the set of absolute moral values acknowledged as indisputable by the majority of citizens. In other words, liberal society is indebted in the non-liberal sphere of culture. But, on the other hand, the actual dilemma of liberal society consists in its natural tendency to question everything that claims to be indisputable. This was the diagnosis of Plato regarding democracy – according to his analysis, put forward in the *Republic*, democracy naturally tends to associate itself with moral relativism, and in this way it undermines the conditions of its existence. Interestingly enough, towards the end of his long life, Popper – who in the book by Legutko is remembered as espousing the view of society based solely on commonly accepted formal procedures – came to the conviction that formal procedures can function only if supported by non-liberal morality. “Moral relativism is one of the most dangerous poisons of democracy; democracy exists only if there is law, and law is based on ethics, not on permissiveness” (in: R. Buttiglione, *Il problema politico dei cattolici*, Piemme 1993, p. 316).

Legutko would probably not identify himself with any of the common political classifications, though it is clear that the

¹ R. Legutko, *Etyka absolutna i społeczeństwo otwarte*, Cracow 1994, 209 pp.

conservative perspective is much closer to his philosophical standpoint than the liberal one. His main objective, however, consists in “making both parties perceive each other” and in analyzing arguments of both conservatives and liberals. On the other hand, and not without certain concern, he observes that contemporary culture is marked by the progress of the liberal mentality. As a result of that process, the domain of non-liberal culture is shrinking, which also means that there is always less room – if any at all – for elements of absolute ethics. While the equilibrium of different traditions (since synthesis does not seem possible) would be the best for social life, it seems that today this balance is prejudiced in favour of liberalism. The least dangerous consequence of that situation is the progressing impoverishment of public discourse.

One of the most interesting essays (in my opinion it belongs to the classic texts of contemporary political philosophy) is dedicated to the evolution of the understanding of the notion of tolerance (*On Tolerance*). As a rule, the more a word is used, the more vague becomes its meaning, and the word “tolerance” belongs undoubtedly to the most widespread notions from the vocabulary of liberal philosophy. Tolerance – according to the supposition of Legutko – is probably the only undisputed value of liberal society. His brilliant essay leads us through the winding roads of the theory of tolerance – from its first theoreticians to its contemporary advocates. It is interesting to note that for its classic proponents (Locke, Wolter) tolerance referred to the questions difficult to solve with the use of the criterion of truth; its first realm was the realm of religion where disagreements among people of different denominations often led to violence. Since it is difficult to say who is right, it is better to

let everybody believe what he thinks is true. It was – as Legutko calls it – “negative tolerance,” since nobody was obliged to change his convictions. On the other hand, tolerance did not mean that people should give up classifying any view as true or false; from the fact that some questions cannot be determined as true or false does not follow that any question cannot be settled according to these categories. But this is exactly what some contemporary advocates of tolerance seem to demand from us. In some versions of liberal philosophy the very category of truth is regarded as repressive, and therefore contrary to the attitude of tolerance. Such a version of tolerance – Legutko calls it “positive tolerance” – requires an essential change in our perception of reality, since it involves the rejection of the most fundamental category of Western philosophy. It is certainly not a minor requirement, and in contradistinction to negative tolerance, it does not leave human convictions intact. What is more, such a notion of tolerance requires the creation of an utterly new type of human. Says Legutko: “Now it turns out that in order to be tolerant we should become liberal, and essentially reshape our mode of perceiving reality. What is more, we have to do it not because it turned out to be false, but because its very structure is politically and socially discriminating. To say it in other words, such an understanding of tolerance involves a more or less explicit programme of thorough social re-education.”

Some interesting remarks are also dedicated to the American counterculture of the sixties. What is the meaning of that phenomenon? It proves that an affluent and seemingly stable liberal society is no less liable to the revolutionary ideas of new ideologues than other types of society. New revolutionaries, unlike the

old ones, do not try to radically change the structure of economy; their ideas refer rather to the sphere of culture. But new types of social utopia are no less dangerous than the old ones. A society which is losing its certainty about the criteria of what is good and what is bad, a society which does not know what can be accepted and what should be rejected, is especially susceptible to experiments which in the end can undermine the foundations of its existence. (It is sufficient to remind ourselves of the characteristic myth of the flower power movement counterculture which claimed that one could have consumption without production.)

Finally, to this short survey of the content of the book, I would like to add two remarks. First, the question of what is conservatism. In his essay *Three Conservatisms* Legutko distinguishes versions of conservatism according to the type of reality which should be preserved. Thus, we can have conservatism interested in preserving eternal reality (conceived as Platonic ideas or as the unchanging hierarchy of moral values), conservatism referring to reality created in the long historical process (a culture), and conservatism interested in preserving the present situation. It might be worthwhile asking what is the relationship between the first form of conservative thinking and the remaining two. As Legutko rightly notes, conservatism which defends the unchanging hierarchy of moral values is not necessarily obliged to defend present institutional forms of their realization. It may – in the name of unchanging values – strive for institutional change or the change of power relations. The contrary is also possible – we can have, for instance, a conservative party which is mainly interested in preserving the existing power relations and respective privi-

leges. On the other hand, there can be a party of reform that is interested in changing existing power positions, or a party of reform that strives to change the value structure of the society. Thus, value conservatism and vested interests conservatism can be directly opposite positions. One can allow great cultural changes to preserve one's vested interests (it seems often to be the case in postcommunist countries where the rejection of communist ideology frequently goes together with the preservation of the privileged position of old party functionaries), or one can try to disrupt power positions in the name of unchanging values. Cultural conservatism can bring forth political reformism and *vice versa*.

The combination of conservative metapolitics (as the sphere of unchanging values is sometimes called) and non-conservative politics is perhaps difficult, but not impossible. Of course, it will be criticized by anti-conservatists as another version of fundamentalism, but it may still count on the support of voters – which in this case is not a minor merit. This seems to be the message of the midterm elections in the United States; people who wanted change in the economy did not necessarily want change in the value structure of their country. The mistake of Democrats – at least in part – consists in mistaking political reformism for a cultural one.

Secondly, it is worthwhile saying a few words about the role of religion in society. Legutko does not dedicate much attention to this question; it seems that he takes for granted an ever diminishing role of religion in the liberal society; the crisis of religion would necessarily accompany liberalism. It is undoubtedly true that in Western Europe, traditional religious institutions (Christian Churches) are today in crisis in terms of the number of

their members, though I am not quite sure if the same is valid in the case of American society (even if some signs of "Europeanisation" are present there, too). Nevertheless, I would not agree with the supposition of the author that we witness the decline of Christianity in Europe. It may be true that a certain form of European civilization – Christendom – is in crisis. We certainly cannot rule out that this form of civilization will one day disappear in Europe. But it does not mean that Christianity as a religion will disappear. The sense of religion is too deeply engraved in human nature to be erased from it one day. And Christianity will always remain a promoter of non-liberal elements in culture (e.g. it will always be a reminder of absolute moral values), even if cultural trends will not favour such a defence. A great interest in recent papal documents – the Universal Catechism, the encyclical *Veritatis splendor* and the book *Crossing the Threshold of Hope* – points to the fact that even people who do not identify themselves confessionally with Catholicism see the Catholic Church as an important moral authority.

Theoretically – but only theoretically – we can also imagine a situation in which all the non-liberal elements of culture are eliminated, and, as a result, private and public morality are also totally liberal. In such a case, the diagnosis of Plato from his *Republic* seems to be still valid today. According to Plato, in a society in which the sphere of morality is totally liberalized, human life is at first pleasant. But gradually, and inevitably, corruption begins to take its toll: all norms of social life are put into question, words are used in a completely arbitrary way, concepts do not express truth, law is no longer observed – in the end, human life becomes impossible and people

are ready to give all power to a strongman. That, of course, is the end of democracy. A perfect illustration of such a diagnosis is provided by the current political crisis in Italy. The only viable alternative to a kind of dictatorship is a return to moral and civic virtues, and it is the Church which still teaches these.

Maybe this is the actual intention underlying the model of society elaborated by Plato in his *Republic*. A role which Plato ascribes to the republic governed by a philosopher-king is fulfilled in great part by the Church. The creation of a new man and a new culture is the proper responsibility of the Church and not of the state. If the state possesses the means of coercion, and in this sense it represents the principle of power in social life, the authority of the Church is not based on power. Of course, the abuse of such authority is also possible – we know this from history in the form of alliances between the throne and the altar; but it need not discredit the positive cultural role of the Church as guardian of the absolute sphere of culture and the educator, on the condition that the principle of separation of both authorities – that of the state and that of the Church – is observed. For instance, in totalitarian states the Church was sometimes the only institution to defend the autonomy of culture and of social structures independent of the political power. In this respect, the role of the Church in liberal society does not change; only the forms of its realization are different. And only such a Church, i.e. a Church that defends absolute moral values – and not a Church that assumes all the characteristics of liberal mentality, following it rather than judging it according to her own criteria – is a true ally of a free society.

Rev. Jerzy SZYMIK

THE SPLENDOUR OF CATHARSIS

(ON KAZIMIERZ KUTZ'S FILM *ŚMIERĆ JAK KROMKA CHLEBA* [DEATH LIKE A SLICE OF BREAD])¹

"There may come a time in which a lot of people will feel a need to look closer at the recent saints who have given their lives for Poland. I think this will happen sooner than we all suppose."

Kazimierz Kutz

"Kazimierz Kutz's film makes us aware that we have gone far away from the Poland which has recently been. It is awful to think that this is the same country, the same people, and yet today's reality is different. [...] The film paralyses with its truth. It shows what we were, and brings to mind how much we have lost of the gravity and dignity with which we struggled for freedom. After victory everything has sunk into oblivion. Kutz's film plucks us out of our forgetfulness of that atmosphere."

Krzysztof Zanussi

At the outset allow me to make a very personal and, I think, important, remark – I am Silesian. Kazimierz Kutz is Silesian, too. Strictly speaking then, our "I" is not of Mickiewicz's *Dziady*, nor, the more so, of "Disneyland." I am of hard working ancestors from the fields of Wodzisław-Rybnik, of their work in the dim abysses of Silesian and Westphalian coal mines, of their prayer before the miraculous icon of the Smiling Lady of Pszów – the patroness of my home parish, of their faithfulness to God and land.

Kutz is from Szopienice, from smoking cinder tips, from *familoki* (red and grey houses made of brick and in the past inhabited mainly by miners).

I do not intend to impress you here with a cheap and in fact false mythologization of tradition. The latter is such as it was and is, i.e., grey, human, a mixture of heroism and weakness, beauty and ugliness, virtues and vices. Nevertheless, without a creative memory of tradition, man would be like a plant without roots; dry and able neither to make, nor watch, nor experience the film about which I am going to speak.

Obviously, I do not claim (God forbid!) that Podole, Kuyavia, Piedmont or Bavaria are anything worse than Silesia. Absolutely not. Yet, neither are they something better. No fear! I am not against patriotism within the parameters of Europe (on condition that it does not grow into nationalism, that is), nor am I against the idea of being European, (again, if this does not grow into "McDonaldism"). Quite the contrary, I think that Polish and European characters are possible only then when they grow out of a love of one's own village, district, parish, regions; of a love for one's landscape, cut short by the line of horizon, of the tie with one's "little homeland." With the stipulation again that it is a true love, devoid of narrow-mindedness, xenophobia and rapacity. Such love expands the capacity of the heart and widens one's vision. It helps to

¹ *Death like a Slice of Bread*. Polish production. Year of production: 1994. Screenplay and direction by Kazimierz Kutz. Music by W. Kilar. Director of photography W. Zdort. Starring: T. Budzisz-Krzyżanowska, J. Gajos, J. Radziwiłłowicz, and J. Trela.

love and respect that which belongs to one's neighbours, which is different.

All Kutz's works – not only his recent film – promote this view. His “film” love of people is most often expressed by way of images about our common “little homeland.” Let us recall the titles of the trilogy of the sixties and seventies: *Sól ziemi czarnej* (The Salt of the Black Land), *Pęta w koronie* (Jewel in the Crown), *Paciorki jednego różańca* (The Beads of One Rosary). This director has always been able to show – as hardly anyone else has – individual heroes in various interrelationships with the environment, which in turn moulded them. Most often it was the folk culture of Upper Silesia, penetrated by their own particular spirit, a spirit whose foundations rested on religious piety, diligence, fidelity, and simplicity.

I was stunned when I saw Kutz in a television programme (*Kariery, bariery*), face-to-face with the Warsaw social élite. There we had a director who had invited his friends to the studio, a folk group from Ruda Śląska which tremendously embarrassed the capital's high society. The boys from *familoki* sang in their incomprehensible idiom (subtitles appeared on the screen) and about incomprehensible matters. An important question loomed large in the studio: is it snobbery to show off fellowship with the “common man”? Can there be anything in common between film culture of the highest standard and the ballad *I am riding my motorbike*, in which we find the sentence: “my pants are fastened by a safety pin”?

There is much in common, I would say.

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Put briefly, the film is an epic about people who took a firm stance against evil to

defend the most important values. Nine of them: Józef Czekalski, Józef, Giza, Joachim Gnida, Ryszard Gzik, Bogusław Kopczak, Andrzej Pełka, Jan Stawisiński, Zbigniew Wilk and Zenon Zając, paid the highest price for this defence.

The screenplay was based on oral and written reports, diaries, materials gathered by authors who had written books about the crushing of the strike, and on talks with witnesses of those events. We have therefore a cinematic reconstruction of the events which took place in the period from 13-16 December 1981 at the “Wujek” coal mine in Katowice. It was filmed at the exact site of the tragedy.

The film assembled the leading Polish actors (including Teresa Budzisz-Krzyżanowska, Janusz Gajos, Jerzy Radziwiłłowicz, Jerzy Trela), but it is not the figures they played who were the heroes of *Death Like a Slice of Bread*. Wiesław Zdort, the director of photography states: “The actors play authentic and real people who are alive, who lived through all that. Thus there is a priest, members of the mine's «Solidarity,» yet these people are like islands in a rough sea who emerge for a moment from the pressing crowd, and then disappear.” The main hero of the film is the multitude of people, and speaking even more precisely, a human fellowship dramatically gathered around values.

“With his film about «Wujek,» Kazimierz Kutz has achieved the extraordinary, something in whose accomplishment almost nobody believed. He brought us back to the experience of martial law in its pure form” – wrote Tadeusz Sobolewski. Exactly. The film is crystal-clear in its picture, ascetic, “true” in the sense in which a work of art may, and should, render the truth. Martial law, the years 1981-89... For quite a long time, the tradition of those days and the people con-

nected to them have been continually viewed with suspicion: there appear derisive comments, people mock at "veterans," "ethos makers," the audiences throng cinemas and have great fun watching a solidarity underground activist posing as an security officer.

It is in this sense and against this background that Kutz is very brave. He is not afraid of supercilious smiles, charges of backwardness, various kinds of pressure from leftist political trends, of standing counter to fashionable nihilism, and of noise made by the advocates of the former Polish People's Republic. Kutz is brave in yet another sense. He stages a scene in which the striking miners gather around a cross. Before the viewer's eyes there is a passion play with its piercing realism and suggested analogy. Yes, we are at the Golgotha, along with ZOMO officers (Riot-Squads of the People's Militia), and the emperor's soldiers who take part in the Mystery of the Altar. It is enacted on their behalf as well. Let us quote Sobolewski once again: "Such is the sense today of the film about martial law."

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Many viewers setting off for the cinema were filled with apprehension. What would it be like? It seems that the time for this film, made twelve years after those events, is not the best – perhaps is even the worst. Some amount of "ethos," a small dose of "miners' strike" deserve at best irritated acceptance, or a grimace of indifference. At the same time, as the most penetrating criticism has noted, Kutz's film, created as it was counter to the rules which govern Polish cinematography, is not intended to evoke immediate emotional reaction in its viewers. The director seemed to aim at a long-term

effect, at some purifying transformation. Perhaps it is here that its main value lies.

As viewers we are confronted with that which occurs during the strike, with gestures and words, of people about whom we know little. We must either get to know their religious and cultural background, or imagine it. The film lacks the background of domestic, Silesian ritual which Kutz recreated with care in the former "Silesian" films. Only the way in which miners turn to each other remains. Everything is devoid of euphoria and extraordinariness. We merely observe a chain of effects caused by of something which is beyond words, beyond the screen.

"It just can't be like that" – says one of the miners when they learned that the Militia (former police) had arrested their legally elected leader. This short sentence is a wonderful expression of that which we, in a scholarly manner call "to reveal moral obligation." "Man has a duty towards himself of which nobody can relieve him, the factors of external violence notwithstanding" – the priest explains at the Eucharist celebrated during the strike.

Everything is depicted in a monumental fashion, from a distance, as it were, with Wojciech Kilar's elegiac music in the background, music which combines church chorale with Silesian melody. Throughout, there is an interplay of many unobtrusive symbols. Perhaps the most profound of these and the one which gave the film its title: bread transubstantiated during the Sacrifice, and slices of bread which a young miner gives to a hungry soldier. It was not revenge that they had in mind, nor hatred. Kutz reveals this truth unswervingly. The film is a profound reminder, a pure return. And it proposes the return to purity.

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One thing more, which cannot be omitted from our reflection and which cannot be left aside. Wojciech Kilar, the composer of the soundtrack, says: "Kutz, this agnostic and atheist, gives us examples of such understanding of the matters of faith that it seems that the existence of God is obvious to him. A couple of days ago while on a walk, I dropped in on the parish house of Father Bolczyk, where some scenes were shot. Together with actors I listened to Kazik's beautiful harangue, while he was explaining to them the matters of faith, one's relation to God, etc. Walking me to the door, Father Bolczyk asked me how it was possible that such a man, in fact a heretic, could so beautifully and truly speak about these things. That which we – people of faith – ponder, observing its principles and tenets, e.g. fasting on Fridays, attending Sunday Mass, going to Easter confession, is so natural and comprehensible to him. And I do not know who is closer to God, I with my breviary and rosary, my intimate relation with the Church and church hierarchy, or Kazik [Kutz] – a nonbeliever."

This is rather imprecise and controversial, but wise (because it is humble) and profound, and it poses an important question. Is the observation which it contains right? Whatever the polemics about the film, they deal with details and the so-called "remote areas." Everyone is convinced as to the "evangelical charac-

ter" of the film's message – including me, as I have tried to present it above.

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The first recorded Polish sentence was written in Silesia in the famous Book of Henry. This is a well-known fact. But, as we are reminded by Bishop Alfons Nossol, it was said in Polish by a villager of Moravian descent to his Polish wife, and recorded by a German Chronicler in (as the Opole ordinary pointed out) the "ecclesial context," that is, in the monastery Chronicle of the thirteenth century. It still moves us with its kindness: "Why don't you rest and I'll toil": this is the essence of the Silesian character, though it is certainly not exclusively Silesian. Here we have the whole phenomenon of the Silesian land: a melting pot of baptized cultures bearing fruits of evangelical wealth and humanistic culture.

Therefore, one should not be surprised when Kutz says that the source for his screenplay became the metaphor of a simple inscription in the "Wujek" cloakroom: "Keep clean," that is, do not make a mess in your heart and mind, discern good from evil, fight, but do not give in to hatred.

The splendour of the truth, the splendour of Catharsis. May it help us to see better.

Translated by *Jan Kłós*

Rev. Sławomir NOWOSAD

THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD BEFORE CAIRO¹

Long before it started, the UN conference on population and development stirred interest, provoked discussion and criticism of some of its underlying presuppositions and proposed solutions to demographic problems on the global scale. After many months of work the Preparatory Committee published *A Project of the Final Document – Programme of Action* of 24 January 1994. The Preparatory Committee continued its work, which is why a few alterations were later introduced into the original text. These alterations, however, did not introduce any essential change.

Among the principal objections to the project of the Cairo document, its peculiar "lack of religiousness" comes to the fore. While discussing the demographic questions of the contemporary world and pointing to the ways of solving current problems, the document completely omits the fact that religion and faith are part of the life of both individuals and of whole societies. On the one hand, population policy fails to notice the necessity of respecting religious values, traditions and religious customs, and differences between particular religious traditions, as well as the place which religion occupies in man's life in general. On the other hand, the document failed to benefit from the potential of human religiousness as

a resource for solving the demographic problems. The latter does have a fundamental significance for all the peoples of the world. In opening man to the supernatural, religion confers a new dimension to the demographic questions and is a considerable support where it is morally admissible to influence the lives of particular people or of whole nations.

It is exactly this circumstance which has created the need to organize a meeting of the representatives of the greatest religions of the world, to criticize and, as it were, "supplement" the project of the UN document. The American Park Ridge Center for the Study of Health, Faith and Ethics in Chicago prepared such an international and interfaith consultation for the 4-7 May 1994, in Genval, Belgium. The consultation was held under the motto: "The Religions of the World and the 1994 Conference of the United Nations on Population and Development." One must add that meetings of a similar character, though on a smaller scale, took place earlier in the USA.²

The consultation held in Belgium gathered around thirty representatives from the greatest religious traditions of the contemporary world. There were

¹ A report from the international symposium entitled *The Religions of the World and the 1994 Conference of the United Nations on Population and Development*, Genval, Belgium, 4-7 May 1994.

² Cf. e.g. *Religious Perspectives on Population, Consumption and Environment. A Report of an Interfaith and Interdisciplinary Forum, 11-13.2.1994; Roundtable on Ethics, Population and Reproductive Health. Declaration of Ethical Principles*, New York City, 8-10.3.1994.

among them Christians (Catholics from Peru, Columbia, USA and Poland, Protestants from the Republic of South Africa, Canada, Brazil, Zaire and Germany), a Jewish woman (from France), Muslims (from Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India), Hindus (from India and the USA), a Buddhist (from Thailand), a Confucian (from China), a Shintoist (from Japan), and representatives of traditional African religions (from Ghana). They were not official representatives delegated by the superiors of particular religions, yet they all were entrusted with the task of presenting and explaining the official stance of their own religion towards the problem under discussion. Some admitted having ideas differing from official teaching. There took part in the consultation the representatives of the United Nations Population Fund, The Park Ridge Center, the Ford Foundation and Pew Global Stewardship Initiative, which sponsored the endeavour. Among the Catholics, there were lay persons and two clergymen (apart from the author of the present paper, a Jesuit from Columbia).

Four-day debates concentrated around the main questions of the project of the Cairo document. The fact that believers joined the discussion on the contemporary questions of demography stems from the conviction that such realities as population and development are also essentially rooted in religion. The believer feels obliged to present the religious perspective of the demographic questions. It is important here to understand the values and the role which each man plays as a person created by God and in the image of God. As a work of God, man should never be treated as an object or instrument. This is important at the close of the twentieth century, when in some countries there are repressive methods to hold down the birth-rate, methods which

are opposed to the dignity of man (India, China, or even Brazil, where in some regions 75% of women undergo sterilization).

The participants of the Belgium consultation unanimously stressed that any international debate concerning social policy should take into account the importance of religion and the role of religious fellowships in society (in the nation). Such basic human rights as the freedom of religion and conscience must be guaranteed. The governments and other organizations responsible for population policy cannot enforce the realization of their programmes against the will of a particular people. On the other hand, religious communities should be prudent and sensitive, since they are free to lead their faithful according to the tenets of their faith and morality. They should be open to fair criticism, if it should happen that some of their views or practices infringe upon fundamental values, such as the sanctity of life and human dignity.

An exchange of opinions among people coming from different cultural and religious circles of the world allowed us to state that one can speak about a population development crisis in our world. All participants noted that this problem was very complex, the interrelations among its various elements many-sided, and that is difficult to formulate one solution which all could accept. Undoubtedly, there must be cooperation between all international communities, in which one would listen to and take into account the input of small and poor nations as well. The members of the African countries pinpointed that the conception of development alone demanded a detailed definition of its contents. These countries usually associate it with the period of colonial exploitation, hence it ceases to bear a positive character, carrying rather

quite the opposite. One of them underlined that for them, this exploitation has not ended at all. Therefore, in speaking about development, one should take a firm stance against any forms in which the poor are exploited by the rich. One should stress firmly a profound respect for justice and equality, sensitivity to local culture, and a broad understanding of human nature and its needs.

All religions emphasize a necessity to put more value on human labour and on a fair access to the means and fruits of development. The present state of distributing natural resources and produced goods is tainted by an unjust disproportion, which is particularly visible between the rich North and the poor South of our planet. This should mobilize to a radical change in this state of affairs. The inhabitants of the developing countries in particular appealed for this mobilization. Every religion turns its attention especially to people in need, and calls for openness and sensitivity towards them. Here we find a special point of cooperation between various religions, societies and lay organizations, in order to help people living in countries at war, the poor, the homeless, immigrants, etc.

An important question arises in this context. It is a question about the world of nature and the whole natural environment, which is the environment of man's life. A religious outlook on nature recognizes in it the work of the Creator and perceives it as Holy. The majority of sacred texts within particular religious traditions perceives in nature an inherent value. Therefore, not only man, as a unique creature, is holy. Nature is holy too. Man should discover in this his task as responsible governor and warden of the whole of creation and its riches. One should also spurn that attitude to the

world of nature which leads to its inordinate and unjust exploitation.

Much time in daily discussions of demographic questions was devoted to the woman, her role and rights in contemporary society. Some participants of the consultation put such a strong stress on this that at times it was almost impossible to address other questions, for instance, the problems of the family. This feministic bent characterized primarily, though not exclusively, the majority of women – both Christians, Muslims and Hindus alike. One has to admit that in some regions of the world, women have in the past, and in the present as well, been treated unfairly in their private and social lives. Accordingly, it is important to stress that they are equal to men in dignity, and should have the same rights which are accorded to men.

However, some disputants seemed to tip the scale the other way, and conceived the question of women's rights in a manner which could not be reconciled with the principle of equal dignity for all. Such an understanding of women's rights includes also the right to abortion and grants a woman the exclusive right of decision in the matter. The author of the present text was not of the general opinion on that matter, and demanded that the right of the non-born child to life be taken into consideration. The sweeping majority of disputants did not accept the principle of the sanctity of life from conception, and argued for the availability of abortion to a greater or lesser extent. The arguments which were put forward referred, for instance, to the importance of the health of mother and child now and in the future, possible threats to the mother's life, and respect of women's rights to act fully as a moral subject (!). Such arguments, among others, argue for abortion in many contemporary religions

and justify it in chosen circumstances. Apart from the Catholic teaching, some Muslim traditions decidedly reject abortion (the majority of Islamic traditions allow it within 120 days from conception).

One could notice a related standpoint, characteristic of the individualistic philosophy. It was clearly manifested during the debate on the question of sex education and the question of contraception. For the majority of participants, the project of the Cairo document was worthy of support in its proposal of general access to contraception. The author of the present paper was of the opposite opinion. While perceiving especially among affluent societies the attitudes of liberalism and moral permissiveness, some disputants, instead of seeking to change such behaviours, rather supported various theses of the Cairo text, which condones the dissemination of sex education in the form of instruction in so-called "safe" sexual activity. Catholic instruction, based on a defined anthropological vision, discovers the true and full sense of human sexuality in the context of love, marriage and family. It seems, however, that though other religions in the majority officially call, for instance, for the preservation of sexual continence before marriage, the majority of disputants in Genval practically accepted an individualist understanding of the so-called reproductive and sexual rights, and of reproductive health (which accepts sexual activity before and outside of marriage).

The problems in question are bound closely with the understanding of the structure and function of the family. The Cairo document speaks about a crisis of the traditional family and therefore promotes the so-called contemporary forms of it which, as it were, better correspond to the aspirations of today's people. We

mean here, for instance, the right of a single woman to have a baby or the right to establish families without marriage. Such understanding was confirmed by a representative of the UN. The majority of participants, however – excluding perhaps the representatives of feminist groups – defended the traditional form of the family and its rights. Only the family is the proper place and environment for a new life to come into the world and receive the love that it needs and the upbringing to moral responsibility, including preparation for responsible parenthood. In spite of the fact that some participants accepted the liberal attitudes that young people adopt, they were all anxious about whether non-family *milieus* or organizations could provide young people with a proper upbringing to responsibility and maturity, especially in the delicate area of sexuality. All unanimously stressed that children's upbringing to responsibility in this matter is a matter of right, but is at the same time the duty of every family. The Catholic delegation made a point that only spouses have the right and duty to freely decide about the number and the time of the conception of their offspring. That is why any national or international programmes which here limit the parental freedom must be discarded.

On the periphery of the discussion, it is worth noting how contemporary philosophical and social tendencies influence the change in the teaching of particular religious communities. To give an example, among representatives of Islam one could notice distinctly different interpretations of the Koran as to the question of the position and role of the woman in social life. There were also differences as to moral permissibility of abortion. The Catholics from North and South America present at the meeting in Genval, while

presenting Catholic moral principles, almost unanimously did not take advantage in a positive way of the documents of *Magisterium Ecclesiae*. Rather, they expressed their own opinions or the opinions of their *milieus*, which at times often clashed with the doctrine of the Church. That is why it is important and pertinent to repeat what John Paul II wrote, i.e., "The unity of the Church is demanded not only by Christians who reject or distort the truth of faith but also by those who disregard the moral obligation to which they are called by the Gospel" (*Veritatis splendor*, No. 26), and which *Magisterium Ecclesiae* interprets and gives as morally obligatory (see: *ibid.*, No. 110).

The meeting in Belgium allowed for the emphasis and confirmation that the greatest religions of the world are crucially interested in discussing and finding solutions for contemporary demographic problems. It showed also that religious communities can and should creatively contribute to the forming and putting into practice of the resolutions of population and development policy. Undoubtedly, the multid denominational and multicultural context of the meeting met the need for understanding and collaboration in these areas. All present agreed that one must support the initiatives to organize such meetings on the international, national or local scale.

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Today, after the Cairo Conference, one can see that the course of its debates confirmed previous fears. The Conference maintained its principal thesis on the necessity of limiting birth-rate as the main way to solve demographic problems. The proposal to basically revise the socio-economic order of the world and the very model of development was not articulated

loudly enough. The present model of unjust development (which should read: the development of some parts of the world, and underdevelopment of many others) leads to specific threats to mankind, to an unjust distribution of natural resources, and in like manner to an increasing and blatant disproportion between the wealthy North and the poor South. Such being the state of affairs, we may speak about global injustice. The delegation of the Vatican See adopted an active and firm stance. A number of Catholic and Muslim countries did the same, with the effect that some alterations were made in the wording of the final text of the Conference (*Programme of Action*), a text which had aroused the greatest fear. Among these alterations one must above all mention the statement about non-permissibility of promoting abortion as a method of family planning ("In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning," *Programme of Action*). This does not mean that the Cairo document rejected abortion in any way. In some places though, the tendency of the documents was changed for the better, by turning negative theses into positive ones (e.g., rather than as in the original text in the project in Chapter VIII B: "Infant and child mortality," we have: "Child survival and health"; VIII C: "Maternal morbidity and mortality" changed into: "Women's health and safe motherhood"). It is important that the document decidedly condemned any forms of constraint in population policy. Generally speaking, however, the Cairo text in its final version, among other problems, does not accept the principle that human life is inviolable from its conception, it accepts extramarital sex, calls for the popularizing of contraceptives, and apparently promotes and extends the concept of family into other relationship.

The final report from the meeting in Genval (*World Religions and the 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development. A Report on an International and Interfaith Consultation*), in accord with the promise made by a consultant member on behalf of the UN, was sent to all delegations of the Cairo Conference. The author of the paper, who was a participant in Genval, expressed his fears in the above report. His fears were confirmed in many points of the final version of

Programme of Action of the Cairo Conference. It is encouraging, however, that perhaps the positive changes which have been mentioned came into existence also thanks to the Belgium discussion. Certainly a fruit of the meeting is the rule introduced in Chapter II (*Principles*), which states that there is a necessity "to fully respect various religious and ethical values" while putting into practice the *Programme of Action* in individual states.

Translated by *Jan Kłos*

Patrycja MIKULSKA

IN THE SHADOW OF CAIRO
SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION
FOR FAMILY LIFE PROMOTION, SEPTEMBER 1994

The Sixth World Congress of the International Federation for Family Life Promotion was held at the Catholic University of Lublin on 16-24 September 1994, in which almost 300 participants from 77 countries participated. They came to talk about natural family planning in its bio-medical, psychological and social aspects, present the latest scientific achievements in this area and share experiences in field work. The timing of the Congress was also important – it began the day after the Population Conference in Cairo and some participants arrived in Lublin directly from Egypt.

Local organizers of the Congress were: the University Medical School in Lublin (whose representative, and at the same time an IFFLP member, Radziszław Sikorski, was the head of the Local Coordinating Committee of the Congress), the Catholic University of Lublin, the National Institute of Mother and Child in Warsaw, and the National Natural Family Planning Teachers' Association.

The Lublin World Congress took place on the 20th anniversary of the foundation of the IFFLP. This organization was created in order to give support – scientific, moral, managerial, and financial – to all those who deal with scientific research related to natural family planning and its popularization. The IFFLP members – over 100 organizations and private persons from almost 80 countries – meet every few years (recently, once every five years) at congresses

which are working sessions with intensive information exchanges and training. Previous congresses were held in Columbia, Ireland, Hong Kong, Canada and Kenya, and each choice of country was connected with some practical advantage. This time, by organizing the Congress in Poland, the IFFLP made it easier for people from Central Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union to attend.

The first three days of the Congress were devoted to workshops, the last two days to scientific sessions; the participants also worked two days on organizational problems. (There was a so-called cultural day too, devoted to excursions and a celebration of the IFFLP anniversary.) This structure of the programme corresponded to the two levels of the IFFLP activity, for the sake of convenience called practical and theoretical.

The workshops concentrated on practical matters: the participants presented their experiences in founding organizations for the promotion of natural methods of family planning, in making those methods known in different countries and societies, and in teacher training. They also talked about the motives for accepting or rejecting natural family planning, its efficacy, difficulties and advantages. New training methods, didactic aids, as well as new technological means for assisting natural family planning were presented. For some participants – especially for those coming from the former Soviet

Union – the Congress was also an occasion to take examinations with specialists from Poland and Great Britain for the natural family planning teacher's certificate.

In the scientific sessions, numerous communications about recent scientific developments related to the IFFLP field of interest extended to the following topics: efficacy of natural family planning (NFP), breastfeeding and lactational infertility, training and teaching of NFP, technical monitoring of fertility, pregnancy outcome, NFP programme monitoring and evaluation, innovations in NFP, psychosexual aspects and characteristics of NFP users, post-pill NFP.

WITHOUT PUBLICITY

The Lublin Congress was an important event for specialists in natural family planning. It might also have attracted more of the general public and have had a greater impact, if only the mass media had spoken about it as much as it deserved. Despite the fact that the journalists reporting from the Congress eagerly described it as an "alternative to Cairo," it was given little publicity.

What was said at the Lublin Congress called into question the current general opinion about natural family planning. Firstly, the image of natural family planning methods was attractive – which is quite rare in the Polish non-Catholic mass media. It was enough to meet the participants in order to get this positive impression: people of every age, married couples – also accompanied by their children – single persons, religious and lay people – in one word – everybody who may be a member of a multi-generation family, came to the Congress. The majority, however, were those most concerned:

married people in the so-called "reproductive age." The energy, cheerfulness and beauty of all those people were striking, and it seems that they themselves were the best publicity for natural family planning.

Natural family planning proved to be a dynamic field, making use of advanced scientific research and modern technologies. This has very little to do with the so-called "rhythm method" which is still often presented by the mass media if not as the only natural family planning method, then at least as a symbol of the shortcomings of natural family planning. The organizers of the press conference which took place during the Congress thought it necessary to finally make journalists aware that the rhythm method is "meritorious but historical," and is no longer taught today. There is no way of telling to what degree this information was accepted. Some of the articles published in the local press showed that the readers' attention was drawn rather to the vicissitudes of the participants arriving from the farthest parts of the world, while the journalists were absorbed in gossip that the Polish President, who stood as a patron of the Congress, would appear personally in Lublin.

THE FIRST THIRD WORLD

The Congress presented the opportunity to survey and compare the motives of natural family planning users, and the acceptability of these methods in developed countries and in the so-called Third World. The participants from the developed and rich countries stated that natural family planning was becoming ever more popular as the expression of growing ecological awareness, or even fashionable for ecology. People are becoming aware that

the slogans which call for respect for natural environment and for the "return to nature" also refer to human reproduction.

In particular, the testimony of the participants from the Third World was important, especially against the background of the Demographic Conference which ended on the eve of the Congress. Research shows that in the Third World countries natural family planning is readily accepted and considered a competitor to artificial contraceptives. The fact that natural birth control methods do not conflict with the users' religion and culture (and do not antagonize neighbouring Christian and Muslim communities), avoid an artificial – and therefore disliked by many – intervention into the body, and are cheap – they do not strain the users' finances because their costs are mainly restricted to the costs of teacher training – these were the most frequently quoted reasons for the choice of natural family planning. In addition – contrary to the opinion that these methods are difficult and easily liable to failure – they proved viable for uneducated, often illiterate people. One of the Congress participants, an Indian woman, who has developed and successfully implemented the natural family planning training programmes for rural communities, said that in the field of birth control, the division of the world was today different from that in the field of economy. The Third World – especially in respect to the development of training methods, their adaptation to various cultures and communities, and making use of local customs and institutions – definitely takes the lead.

We should not think, however, that the Congress propounded natural family planning as a wonder-working cure for the demographic problems of the world

or for the family, and marital problems of individuals. Although the role of technological assistance to natural family planning is growing, the natural methods are not technological devices themselves and their efficacy depends in great measure on the commitment of the user. Precisely for this reason, the Congress gave so much attention to the problems of teaching natural family planning to people from different cultures; it was discussed how to reach them with the information, awake the proper motivation and assure continual assistance. It was clearly seen that in order to use natural family planning, more knowledge and effort is required than, for example, when one takes a contraceptive pill.

EITHER – OR

"Life style" was a frequently recurring phrase during the Congress. It was stressed that the choice of natural family planning is connected with the choice of a particular life style. This also means acceptance of a certain vision of man, which is then realized in the understanding of oneself, of one's own goals, of the mechanisms of one's development and one's bonds with other people. It became explicit on the background of the slogans repeated in the context of the Cairo Conference: the slogans about overpopulation, about the necessity to limit population growth because soon there will be too many of us, and that the Earth will not be able either to hold or to feed all of us. Both meetings, the one in Cairo and the one in Lublin, despite the big difference in scale and publicity, at least in part had the same topic, namely how to "control" the birth rate. Yet, it seems that the Conference in Cairo was organized to

discuss strategies of defence against new people, to decide what to do in order to prevent them from coming into the world, and if they, unwanted, are by chance conceived – how to get rid of them. In Lublin, in turn, people were concerned about how to live so that a new human being could be suitably welcomed, as an awaited guest, despite the scarcity of resources.

The Lublin Congress, especially as an alternative, or rather an “antithesis” to Cairo, confronted us with the question of to what measure the choice of natural family planning – the choice made by individuals and communities, states and international organizations, and manifested in supporting one method and ignoring or fighting the other – is, on the one hand, an expression of the state of mind of contemporary society, while on

the other hand, a choice decisive for the future. Do we live now – and will continue to live – in a society of solidarity, with a sense of communion with others, or – isolated from one another – will we fight against each other?

In the opening speech, Alfredo Perez, President of the IFFLP, formulated this more acutely: the choice is not between one or another life style, or a little better or worse society; the choice is: God or nothingness.

When meetings like the Sixth World IFFLP Congress are successful, one remembers them not only as scientific events, but also as an important human experience: an experience of communication and community. This Congress merits such a memory – as an expression of solidarity with every human being.

Wojciech CHUDY

THE QUESTION ABOUT THE POPE'S DIVISIONS RENEWED

When Churchill met Stalin in Moscow in 1945, they talked about the distribution of allies and adversaries in the context of the approaching end of the war. Apparently, when Churchill mentioned the name of Pius XII, Stalin is reported to have pouted his lips and asked: "The Pope? And how many divisions has he?" The question has passed into history as momentous.

In 1994 this question seems to have become again thematic with the approach the Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. It suddenly seems to keep recurring, posed in the various languages of the world.

Here are some examples.

In its issue No. 37 the Austrian weekly "Profile" places on the cover an unfriendly caricature of John Paul II, hovering over the globe and accompanied by a question: "How mighty is the Pope?" Inside the issue there is a bloc of texts critical of the activities of the Holy Father in the contemporary world. In its list of contents the bloc carries the title: "The Pope's Divisions."

In a dispatch from Cairo the Polish daily "Gazeta Wyborcza" of 9 September 1994 (No. 210) on page 1 quotes the words of the Egyptian Minister of Population and Social Security, Maher Mahran: "Does the Vatican rule the world? We have not come here to yield to dictates. We represent over 5 billion people rather than the 190 persons living in the Vatican." The title given to this dispatch by "Gazeta Wyborcza" is: "5 Billion against 190."

The Polish weekly "Forum" reprints news and articles from foreign press. In issue No. 39, on pages 6-8, several comments about the Cairo Conference are covered by a common title: "The Pope's Divisions." The article by Stephen S. Rosenfeld about the position of the majority in the United Nations Conference proposing the legalization of abortion, reprinted from "The Washington Post," contains the following sentence: "The practical realization of this proposal demands circumspection but there is no need to excuse ourselves."

These are merely examples that are at hand; and they are by no means the result of a comprehensive survey of the press.

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The principle formulated by the ancients — *Plus ratio quam vis* ("Reason is more important than force") — determines a norm which regulates inter-human relations. Usually it referred to social relations. In this context it says that the social relations which create a harmonious society must acknowledge reason as their foundation. Translated into the language of philosophy, one should say that these relations are then ratified by the good of man and the community. This is a reason for all social relations in general. In the international domain as well, the principle which demands that reason stand as the ground of all mutual relations between states and nations first of all on reason, that is, grounding this relation in values, is the same norm: *Plus ratio quam vis*.

The wisdom of the ancients is by no means a sign of idealism. The above principle does not call for the exclusive governance of ideas over social life. It does not say "Only reason, never force." The principle *Plus ratio quam vis* implies a realistic knowledge of the society in which an element of force (for instance to defend social order) must also be present. However, reason is to precede force; it must always justify it and motivate its necessary application.

The principle *Plus ratio quam vis* determines the border between two constant attitudes continually clashing in the history of man and humanity. On the other side of this border there rules the principle: "Power is more important than reason" (*Plus vis quam ratio*).

The fight continues. Two armies are involved in it. One of them consists of those who believe that community, politics, and, ultimately, all history, have meaning only in so far as they are rooted in values; or, putting it differently, in so far as they have their good reasons. The other army consists of those who, strictly speaking, believe that history has no sense, while social relations, including political life, are determined by force; the force of the military, of money, of the majority, etc.

It is not difficult to guess which army is more numerous. History seems to show that the primacy of force usually prevails. This bloc had its leaders; they included Genghis Khan, Tiberius, Hitler and Stalin. It also had — and still has — its theorists; Machiavelli, Lenin and Mao are the greatest of them. It also has its victims. This attitude is not a purely intellectual construct. Its aftermath is to be seen in battlefields, concentration camps and gynaecological clinics — a hecatomb of annihilated human beings.

The fight is going on, and to express it thus is not mere rhetoric. The battle for real meaning, real values and real human life continues.

On the stage of "great history" there are few victories for the "army" fighting against force on behalf of the primacy of reason. Nevertheless, some instances of such examples can be indicated. One of them is the episode (mentioned in the editorial of the current issue of "Ethos") that occurred at the end of World War II, when the government of tiny Liechtenstein saved a captive group of Cossack soldiers who had fought in the ranks of the *Wehrmacht* during the war from repatriation and the revenge of the Soviet Union.

Another example of the primacy of reason over force in history is the Warsaw Uprising, whose fiftieth anniversary is celebrated by Poles this year. It may seem a shocking example, but it was a victory in spite of the defeat. Let me explain this by means of an anecdote. Władysław Bartoszewski, a historian of the Uprising, gave a lecture in the United States many decades after the war. After the lecture a young American asked him a question very well known in post-war Poland: What was the sense of starting the Uprising when in military terms it had no chance to succeed, was politically ineffective, and its easily predictable effects involved great losses of the population and a completely ruined city?

Bartoszewski answered: Yes, indeed, it was so. But, do you know, we were right then. Reason was on our side and we could not avoid starting the Uprising.

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Some ask about divisions, others — about reasons. The former are more numerous (especially lately). But the latter obstinately claim that, in spite of everything, reason will win.

Translated by *Leszek Kolek*

Maria FILIPIAK
Cezary RITTER

JOHN PAUL II ON EUROPE
Annotated Bibliography: 1978-1991
(Selection)

Abbreviations:

IGP – *Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II* [Città del Vaticano].

I (1978), 477 pp.	VIII (1985) vol. 2, 1683 pp.
II (1979) vol. 1, 1729 pp.	IX (1986) vol. 1, 2204 pp.
II (1979) vol. 2, 1574 pp.	IX (1986) vol. 2, 2242 pp.
III (1980) vol. 1, 1983 pp.	X (1987) vol. 1, 1482 pp.
III (1980) vol. 2, 1869 pp.	X (1987) vol. 2, 2582 pp.
IV (1981) vol. 1, 1292 pp.	X (1987) vol. 3, 1812 pp.
IV (1981) vol. 2, 1313 pp.	XI (1988) vol. 1, 1073 pp.
V (1982) vol. 1, 1376 pp.	XI (1988) vol. 2, 2625 pp.
V (1982) vol. 2, 2497 pp.	XI (1988) vol. 3, 1405 pp.
V (1982) vol. 3, 1751 pp.	XI (1988) vol. 4, 2317 pp.
VI (1983) vol. 1, 1730 pp.	XII (1989) vol. 1, 1945 pp.
VI (1983) vol. 2, 1496 pp.	XII (1989) vol. 2, 1783 pp.
VII (1984) vol. 1, 2016 pp.	XIII (1990) vol. 1, 1885 pp.
VII (1984) vol. 2, 1708 pp.	XIII (1990) vol. 2, 1888 pp.
VIII (1985) vol. 1, 2081 pp.	

1979

1. *Responsabilità e solidarietà nel cammino dell'Europa*, IGP II, 1, pp. 796-799.

European unity is being built by people – the inhabitants of Europe – in which process international institutions and bodies are its tools. Their activity must correspond with the real needs of countries shaped by history, regions, local communities and particular people; “the process is put to the test by its respect for the basic rights of the human person.”

2. *La missione della Chiesa per il progresso dei popoli*, IGP II, 1, pp. 1379-1384.

The state's *raison d'être* is society's, the nations's and homeland's sovereignty. Peace and *rapprochement* among nations must be based on the principle of respect for the rights of each nation to exist, freedom, their own culture and civilization. International alliances and covenants base their international value on this principle. The history of Poland makes

European nations sensitive to this principle. The Holy See and the Church wish to serve this unity; the Church is interested in the true good of every individual, irrespective of whatever presumptions from which it may stem.

3. *L'unità spirituale dell'Europa cristiana*, IGP II, 1, pp. 1399-1406.

Gniezno, along with St. Adalbert's relics deposited there, symbolizes the Polish Upper Room of the Last Supper; in this town is rooted the history of Poland and the Polish Church. This symbolical town reminds us of the origins of Christianity among the Slavonic nations, and at the same time of the contributions these nations have made to the history of Christianity in Europe. The unity of Europe is grounded on the two equal spiritual traditions: Western and Eastern.

4. *"Realizziamo insieme il Concilio"*, IGP II, 1, pp. 1582-1587.

Vatican II underlies the collegiate character of the bishop's office. Each bishop, while remaining in communion with his brother bishops, should – together with them – undertake their common tasks. In the case of Europe it is a matter of re-evangelization of the continent. The latter must take into account the Christian legacy in Europe, traditions and conditions of particular nations, as well as the present situation of profound secularization which is well under way in Europe.

5. *La Turchia: crogiolo di civiltà, cerniera tra Asia ed Europa*, IGP II, 2, pp. 1293-1295.

Since very ancient times Turkey has been the venue of the unifying encounter of cultures which originate from Europe and Asia. The unity of modern Turkey is based on supporting the common good which may be put into practice with a clear discrimination between citizens' and religions' spheres. The principle of the freedom of conscience, religion, cult and teaching serve this purpose. The well-formed consciences of citizens borrow the moral ideal from religious inspiration, an ideal which serves the development of nation and state.

1980

6. *L'unità morale e spirituale di tutti i popoli dell'Europa*, IGP III, 1, pp. 664-666.

St. Benedict, whose 1500th anniversary we celebrate, points to the possibility of building unity among nations with different histories, traditions and cultural levels. His work refers to the faith in God, the Father of all, which is common for all European nations. This is the actual challenge for Europe in which much has been done for the institutional creation of greater unity, but which, nonetheless, remains divided.

7. *La strada maestra per costruire un'Europa pacifica e veramente umana*, IGP III, 2, pp. 801-806.

The Christianization of Hungary is connected with the origin of its civilization. Many saints of this nation have set an example which still today shows the way to build a solid and truly human Europe, capable of overcoming any conflicts.

8. *L'unità europea in un orizzonte più vasto*, IGP III, 2, pp. 981-984.

Journalists are engaged in moulding the public opinion of European countries. This work bears great responsibility. Europe, which consists of many nations and communities of various traditions, is on the road to unity, which is expressed in respective political and economic initiatives. Without reference to spiritual values, however, they are doomed to failure. It is the task of journalists to show this most profound dimension of the changes under way.

9. *Attraverso la Commissione e la Corte la difesa europea dei diritti umani*, IGP III, 2, pp. 1113-1119.

At the base of "human Europe" there lies an image of man outlined in Christian Revelation, which the Church acknowledges and which she serves. The European Convention of Human Rights has contributed to this work. Much has been done in Europe regarding the respect for human rights as well as their institutional guarantee. Full respect for them is possible only then when each individual is guaranteed the right to life and religious freedom. The state's legal validity originates in the respect for these rights. The Church pays special attention to the significance of family rights.

10. *È necessario un clima favorevole allo sviluppo della collaborazione*, IGP III, 2, pp. 1146-1148.

The European Parliament as an institution must express unity in thinking about people on the basis of the value of civilization. This value is based on the value of each person, which should be guaranteed by law and respective institutions. In the name of thus understood civilization one should overcome the current drawbacks of Europe, such as the fall in the number of marriages and births, threat to life, drugs abuse, and egocentrism.

11. *Pace tra i popoli e unità dei cristiani*, IGP III, 2, pp. 1375-1380.

A visit to the Federal Republic of Germany became, among other things, an occasion to remind people of the importance of such great European figures as St. Adalbert the Great and St. Boniface, as well as such events as the act of the Augsburg crede.

12. *"Egregiae virtutis"*, IGP III, 2, pp. 1833-1839.

Proclaiming SS. Cyril and Methodius co-patrons of Europe emphasized all the more the universal character of the legacy of St. Benedict who was proclaimed the patron of Europe by Paul VI. The spiritual unity of Europe is being shaped by the two equally important traditions: Eastern (Greek) and Western (Roman, Latin).

1981

13. *L'evangelizzazione è l'identità più profonda della Chiesa*, IGP IV, 1, pp. 293-297.

SS. Cyril and Methodius, while conducting their missionary activity in conjunction with the Church of Constantinople, by which they were sent, and the Holy See, by which they were affirmed, are today a challenge for the entire Church to build unity. Their lives make us even more aware that evangelization is a grace and the proper vocation of the Church.

14. *Il contributo slavo alla costruzione dell'Europa*, IGP IV, 1, pp. 727-731.
 St. Benedict, working in times of cultural crisis and having in mind the transcendent value of man, infiltrated spiritual values into human work. A similar ideal was the working force for SS. Cyril and Methodius among the Slavonic nations. The identity of the Gospel message was a means of mutual cognition and collaboration among European nations and created their common spiritual and cultural legacy.
15. *Impegno delle comunicazioni sociali per una società più giusta, libera e unita*, IGP IV, 1, pp. 867-872.
 The Holy See appreciates the significance of the mass media, which has been expressed in the very fact that Vatican Radio is one of the founder-members of the European Radio Union. These means, however, may also be used against man. A singular "paradigm" of a well-carried function of the mass media is their concern for the proper development of children in each society.
16. *Possedere un'eredità preziosa comporta una grande responsabilità*, IGP IV, 2, pp. 5-11.
 The legacy of SS. Cyril and Methodius bears a call for the Church for fidelity towards the doctrine of the Apostles and to the preservation of unity in faith. It is particularly directed at those who are direct descendants of the Solun Brothers. This legacy and awareness of a painful division, which makes it impossible to share the table and Eucharistic chalice, have conduced to the so-called unionism, connected with Velehrad.
17. *Cristo per salvare l'Europa e il mondo da ulteriori catastrofi*, IGP IV, 2, pp. 566-571.
 The international colloquium organized by Lateran University and the Catholic University of Lublin is an occasion to recall the two trends, Eastern and Western, which constitute the legacy of Europe, and to bring home to mind that it is a burning need that Christ should be present in the face of the deep crisis of European culture. History finds its profoundly human sense in the history of salvation.
18. *L'importanza dell'eredità spirituale dell'Europa per il suo avvenire*, IGP IV, 2, pp. 610-613.
 A diagnosis of contemporary Europe reveals many threats faced by parliamentary democracies – threats which Europe has brought upon itself. The Christian message, which includes social, economic and political life, centres on man. It has shaped the tradition of human rights, present in many contemporary constitutions and declarations. One may hope that, as in the past, Christianity even today is able to impart new stimuli to Europe to bring about a spiritual and cultural awakening.

1982

19. *La crisi della cultura europea è la crisi della cultura cristiana*, IGP V, 3, pp. 689-696.

The Church, being far from sanctifying the current divisions, turns her attention to a total and one Europe. This does not mean abolishing the differences between nations,

cultures and traditions, but rather their mutual enrichment. The history of Christianity, of the Church and Europe, is so closely linked that the crisis of Europe is the crisis of Christianity in Europe. Intellectual currents which are counter or contradictory to the Gospel, being the outgrowth of European culture of the last few centuries, demand from Christians a more decisive return to the Gospel.

20. *La vocazione umana e cristiana delle nazioni del continente europeo*, IGP V, 3, pp. 1257-1263.

Over the centuries all Europe has been shaping its identity around the Gospel proclaimed by the great apostles, such as St. Jacob. It is still united today around such values rooted in the Gospel as the dignity of the human being, justice, freedom, respect for life, the spirit of initiative, and family life. At the same time, it is affected by the crisis of ideas whose one aspect is the negation of God, nihilism and economism. In view of this, a call for Europe to discover its roots is still valid. Christians therefore, should return to the profound reasons of their faith.

21. *Creare una cultura matrimoniale e familiare*, IGP V, 3, pp. 1456-1460.

The family as a foundation on which is grounded the work of the spiritual regeneration of Europe. It is in the family that culture is being handed-on to successive generations. Revealing the most profound motives of the Church's teaching on the Christian principles of life in marriage and family serves the regeneration of the family itself. The truth known and proclaimed should become the truth accepted and lived. In this sense one should create Christian familial culture and prepare it for all Europe.

1983

22. *Un'Europa unita dalla fede in Cristo*, IGP VI, 2, pp. 436-444.

The cultural fellowship of Europe is incomprehensible without the Gospel which, together with the legacy of ancient times, has influenced the development of art, knowledge, education and philosophy. Above all, it has moulded the vision of man and his dignity, which resulted in formulating and proclaiming common human rights. The tragic pages of the history of Europe, which stand in contradistinction to these rights, make us pay particular attention to the necessity for respecting them, especially the rights to religious freedom.

23. *Fidatevi di Cristo!*, IGP VI, 2, pp. 526-530.

It is faith that gives the right perspective from which to explain the Viennese victory, which saved the European Christianity. The victory helped the Polish king to take up a hazardous challenge. Nonetheless, the right measure for each man is the repentance of his heart.

24. *Nel segno della croce abbiamo meditato l'Europa*, IGP VI, 2, pp. 544-545.

The present time and future of Europe need a new stimulus flowing from the depths of Christian existence, which expresses the mystery of the Cross.

25. *Responsabilità dell'Europa nella ricerca della pace e della giustizia nel mondo*, IGP VI, 2, pp. 1026-1032.

The defence and development of authentic democracy is the right path which Christian politicians should follow. They are obliged on this path to constantly support the solutions which remain in accord with the profound humanistic and Christian values. Being aware of one's own sinfulness and being open to Christ's redemption is the best safeguard against the pressure politicians often have to face. Those politicians who work within European structures must be particularly sensitive to the need for solidarity among nations, a solidarity which goes far beyond Europe itself.

26. *Emigranti, migranti, rifugiati nel piano di evangelizzazione*, IGP VI, 2, pp. 1100-1105.

The de-Christianization of Europe's societies, in which many Christians live outside the Church, poses before the orders a task to ardently fulfill their evangelical mission. This may be achieved through a life in accord with an order's vocation, such as was accepted by the Church at the time of its official approval. Europe, similarly to other countries and far continents, is a missionary territory with many poor people.

1984

27. *Monte Cassino simbolo della volontà di costruire una Polonia sovrana e indipendente in un'Europa libera*, IGP VIII, 1, pp. 1420-1427.

World War II broke out due to an ideology which had replaced the tenets of the Gospel and promoted the myth of ascendance based on hatred toward man. The Polish nation paid an enormous blood sacrifice in this struggle for the future spiritual face of Europe and the world. It therefore has a special right to its correct place among the nations of Europe.

1985

28. *L'Europa sappia testimoniare la verità integrale dell'uomo*, IGP VIII, 1, pp. 1372-1378.

The role of the law is to safeguard the equal dignity of peoples and persons. The law established within the frameworks of the European community must go beyond particular interests and legal traditions. It is only on this foundation that one can speak about the preservation of the principle of justice. One of its essential applications is the sphere of economic life. A right to live calls for a just access to food.

29. *Gli uomini devono essere educati alla solidarietà perché possono affermare la dignità e la pace*, IGP VIII, 1, pp. 1570-1577.

The common good properly understood does not allow for particular countries to become wrapped-up in their own problems. The principle being international co-existence, expressive of authentic humanism, is the respect for human rights. It demands not only the spurning of violence, but also requires the adopting of a series of positive actions in social, political and economic spheres.

30. *Europa, fonda il tuo futuro sulla verità dell'uomo e spalanca le tue porte alla solidarietà universale*, IGP VIII, 1, pp. 1578-1588.

At the sources of Europe's culture and history, despite their accompanying contradictions, there lies the Christian experience which is being revealed especially in how man perceives himself. The founders of the European Community, while tending to the regeneration and development of Europe after the war, concentrated on economic affairs in which they noticed an opportunity to solve political and social problems. This is a correct perspective, however, only if it does not lose sight of the central position and good of man, which is contained in the principle of solidarity.

31. "*Slavorum apostoli*", IGP VIII, 2, pp. 3-33.

The work of the Solún Brothers has variously embraced many Slavonic peoples, hence they have been named the fathers of their Christianity and culture. They have brought a significant contribution to the formation of the common roots of Europe, openness to the two traditions of Christianity, Eastern and Western, discovery of various cultures and languages, and introducing into them the light of the Gospel; all this shows the profound unity of the Church and the way which the spiritual renewal of Europe should go.

32. *Comunione ecclesiale, testimonianza e fedeltà al Concilio*, IGP VIII, 2, pp. 910-924.

In view of the cultural transformation which characterizes contemporary Europe it is necessary to recognize its spiritual condition. The socio-economic development is accompanied by numerous contradictions and the crisis of values and institutions; legislators have accepted the right to abortion which is but one tragic aspect of this crisis. This results of the situation in which the leading role of culture has been replaced by the cult of power and affluence. In order to efficiently propagate the Gospel to such a Europe one needs the spirit of unity; only then will this be the propagation of "the Word which was made flesh."

33. *Non solo un ricordo ma una sfida per l'evangelizzazione dell'Europa*, IGP VIII, 2, pp. 948-953.

The activity of SS. Cyril and Methodius touches upon the current problem of *inculturation*, e.g. the infiltration of the Gospel into culture, and at the same time, openness to the dialogue with culture. This is an expression of pluralism, and at the same time, profound unity which new evangelization and Christianity will bring forth to divided Europe.

1986

34. *Le forze morali per una rifondazione dell'Europa*, IGP IX, 1, pp. 1373-1380.

All mankind is called to a new life in Christ; Christians are the servants of this vocation. Ravenna is a witness of the merging of many cultures through Christianity, which initiated the culture of the Middle Ages. Ravenna reminds us today of the need for a new evangelization of Europe. This evangelization will also be a chance to find the Christian identity of the continent.

35. *L'Europa costruisca una più solida unità sulla base dei comuni valori cristiani*, IGP IX, 2, pp. 558-561.

The peak of Mont Blanc, situated in the heart of Europe, is for its peoples a symbol of unity. To appeal from this spot for unity has a particular bearing. European civilization may again become a lighthouse for the nations of the world, on condition that it will return to the roots of classic humanism enlightened by Christian Revelation.

1987

36. *Nei luoghi silenziosi della preghiera mariana si scopre il fulcro autentico della storia dell'uomo*, IGP X, 2, pp. 1518-1525.

There is a relation between marina piety and the problem of peace, since it is Mary who calls upon everybody to follow Jesus. It is in Her sanctuaries that the representatives of hostile nations often meet. The old requirements of the Church, such as asceticism or resignation, become up to date in the face of some consequences of economic growth. Where people are bound by faith, hope and love, there is the germ of a united Europe.

37. *Superare i contrasti internazionali tra i Paesi e i blocchi per un'Europa unita dall'Atlantico agli Urali*, IGP X, 2, pp. 1593-1602.

With St. Paul Apostle's voyage to Macedonia the propagation of the Gospel commenced in Europe; it also started there the construction of a "spiritual home" – the Church of Christ. The only European safeguard against collapse is that it should abide by God's law, which is expressed, among other things, as guaranteeing man his basic rights, among which the most important is his right to freely profess his own religion.

1988

38. *Tornare ai valori originati dal cristianesimo per restituire all'Europa la sua fondamentale unità*, IGP XI, 1, pp. 661-663.

In order to meet the task which resulted from the obligations which bore heavily on Europe due to its historical destiny, it regained a sense of its own identity. The paradoxical political divisions all the more stress the spiritual unity of Europe which has its source in Christianity and its consequent humanitarism.

39. *Nella comune fede cristiana la forza per dar vita a un processo di rinnovamento creativo per un'Europa unita*, IGP XI, 2, pp. 2119-2123.

Freedom, properly taken is a right to do good. This is closely bound with a respect for the rights of each man. Europe needs a special "renewal" of man so that it could in this manner find its profound and authentic unity. Christian faith, which of its essence surpasses any limits, is the great ally of Europe.

40. *Se l'Europa vuole essere fedele a se stessa deve trovare nelle sue radici uno spirito comune*, IGP XI, 3, pp. 1070-1079.

The Christian message about God the Creator, and about man, has also allowed the revelation to nonbelievers the basic meaning of human dignity. It is all the good that democracy seeks to respect this dignity through respecting human rights. The Council of Europe and its affiliated institutions serve to this end. The Council, and all the states of Europe, should rise in protest against that which degrades man, they should serve his development, especially through safeguarding life at every stage, supporting the family, working people, youth and culture.

41. *L'Europa unita di domani dovrà riconciliare l'uomo con la creazione, con i suoi simili, con se stesso*, IGP XI, 3, pp. 1171-1179.

Sensitivity to human rights and the value of democracy belong to the contemporary signs of the time. This sensitivity and openness in European nations leads to the formation of a more integrated Europe. This process, however, is accompanied by two opposing visions of man: man who obeys God, and man who disobeys Him. The latter vision is often linked with making society absolute. After Christ had made a distinction between that which is "God's" and that which is "Caesar's" this absolutization of society is no longer possible.

1989

42. *"Pongo fiduciosamente ai piedi della «Santina» il progetto di un'Europa senza frontiere, che non rinneghi le radici cristiane"*, IGP XII, 2, pp. 324-330.

Mary – the leader in faith, the star of evangelization, the source of living water that is Christ – is the patroness of the vision of a Europe without borders, at which the new evangelization is aimed.

43. *"Tu m'as mis au trefonds"*, IGP XII, 2, p. 369-380.

The tragedy of World War II, itself being the fruit of an ideology which spurned any respect for Divine laws, and in consequence for human dignity, in turn resulted in an unjust geopolitical division of Europe which lasted for many years and deprived many nations of their sovereignty. It is this experience that has given rise to a programme based on the respect for the rights of nations, disarmament and interhuman solidarity.

1990

44. *Interi popoli hanno preso la parola: donne, giovani, uomini hanno vinto la paura*, IGP XIII, 1, pp. 69-83.

Recent events seem to point to the rebirth of the "Europe of Spirit." This process calls for continuation; international security to a large extent consists in citizens' trust in their own country, the foundation of this trust being human rights for which respect is possible only when man does not make himself the measure of all things, without reference to God. Europeans are called upon to find these spiritual roots; the time of solidarity has come for Europe.

45. *“Ecco, la notte è passata: il vostro pellegrinaggio verso la libertà deve tuttavia continuare”*, IGP XIII, 1, pp. 976-981.

The mission of SS. Cyril and Methodius is the beginning of “the Day of the Gospel” and the new cultural awareness of the Slavs. The two traditions of Europe – Greek and Latin – though different from one another, yet belong to each other – and the history of the Solun Brothers is an expression of this unity. To this tradition draws the contemporary Velehrad initiative of “unionistic assemblies.”

46. *Un reciproco scambio di doni e di esperienze tra le Chiese dell’Oriente e dell’Occidente per la nuova evangelizzazione dell’Europa*, IGP XIII, 1, pp. 1512-1523.

The Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian legacy created the foundation of Europe. Throughout the centuries it has contained the theocentric image of the world. It was then replaced by anthropocentrism, which was accompanied by an unusual development of science and technique. This in turn brought forth a conviction that the world serves man, and does not make him dependent on itself. The wars of the 20th century destroyed this image and opened man to freedom flowing from the Spirit, or else they led him to despair in God and in man. After the war, Europe was divided into the Europe of democracy and human rights, and the Europe subordinated to totalitarianism. At the moment, the living Church needs an exchange of experiences and gifts, while preserving the integrity of faith.

1991

47. *La Chiesa del terzo Millennio*, “La Traccia” 12 (1991) No. 5, pp. 523-526.

The Fatima visitations are a continual call to the new evangelization of Europe, addressed to a large extent to those who are baptized but live on the fringes of the Church; accordingly they are conducive to secularization and sects. Moreover, theoretical and practical atheism seeks always to build a materialistic civilization. In the face of these phenomena one must awake and enliven the missionary awareness of the people of God, drawing on the gifts of both the western and eastern part of the continent.

48. *Chiedo insistentemente la preghiera a tutti*, “La Traccia” 12 (1991) No. 5, pp. 532-533.

The Council of Bishops on Europe will be an opportunity for the first meeting of pastors from all over Europe, which has hitherto been divided into two political blocs. One should bring out the whole of the spiritual legacy of the continent which is embodied in its patron saints: Benedict, Cyril and Methodius. In this context, and thinking about evangelization in the perspective of the year 2000, it is important to stress economic cooperation.

49. *“Ricapitolare in Cristo tutte le cose”*, “La Traccia” 12 (1991) No. 5, pp. 579-582.

The transformations in Central-Eastern Europe have made the nominations of new bishops and the reorganization of the Church of the Latin and Byzantine rite possible, especially in the Ukraine and Rumania. Against this background, there is a tension between Catholics and Orthodox. The direct reason for these tensions are matters of property and the

use of places of cult. These debates should be settled in the spirit of dialogue, without Christians' losing their duty to strive toward a fuller unity, expressed, among other things, in the ecumenic dialogue.

50. *Occorre cercare vie efficaci per l'evangelizzazione*, "La Traccia" 12 (1991) No. 6, pp. 663-664.

The Diocesan Council of the local Church, while putting into practice the instructions of Vatican II and the Codex of the Canon Law, is a way to seek paths to bring the Gospel to contemporary man. Thus, the local Church joins in the work of the re-evangelization of Europe.

51. *L'Europa ha bisogno della redenzione*, "La Traccia" 12 (1991) No. 6, pp. 684-687.

It is man's vocation to live according to the spirit. This vocation bears the call not to submit to the power of that which is only sensuous, and which to a considerable extent has taken over contemporary culture, pretending, unlawfully though, to be called European. Culture is that which makes man to be more man. Poland, whose history and culture of their essence are Christian, does not have to "enter" Europe now, since it has co-created it at the cost of its own great sacrifices.

52. *Assicurare i diritti di ogni Nazione*, "La Traccia" 12 (1991) No. 6, pp. 703-706.

The time of totalitarianism in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe, hostile both to God and the Church, was the time of the Church's service in the defence of human rights and contacts with social movements. This has contributed to the increase of her maturity. The Church came to terms with the Yalta order, discerning in the tragic history of the enslaved nations the other side of one European culture. In the new situation she wants to be a witness of hope and indefatigable spokesman of these values which have moulded Europe as the "continent of culture", so that new divisions will not be substituted by new forms of isolation.

53. *La parola generata dal Verbo di Dio stesso*, "La Traccia" 12 (1991) No. 7-8, pp. 922-925.

The Greek and Latin word "theology" is translated by the Slavonic *boho-słowie* (God's word). This means the word about God and at the same time the Word of God. The theological truth is based on the authority of the Truth handed-down by witnesses. The first witness is Christ. He bound the freedom (liberation) of man with the truth and bore witness to it (martyrdom). The Church in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe, through her martyrdom, has worked out a particular form of liberation theology.

54. *La Chiesa cattolica riprende ora la sua attività alla luce del sole*, "La Traccia" 12 (1991) No. 7-8, pp. 943-945.

The nations of Central-Eastern Europe, which after the years of servitude, rebuild their sovereignty, face difficult tasks. One should approach them taking into consideration the rights which should be accorded to every man and nation, especially where there are ethnic conflicts. If we assume the principle of the inviolability of the borders of particular states, one should also accept that the rights of particular nations are inviolable.

55. *"Che egli rafforzi l'opera delle nostre mani"*, "La Traccia" 12 (1991) No. 9, pp. 1113-1115.

The activity of the Foundation should not be limited exclusively to the *Polonia milieus*, but should be open to show Christian values to other nations, especially the nations of Eastern Europe; cultural exchange with one's neighbours is deeply rooted in Polish tradition.

56. *"Se il Signore non costruisce la casa, invano vi faticano i costruttori,"* "La Traccia" 12 (1991) No. 10, pp. 1209-1210.

Before the Synod of Bishops devoted to Europe, the Church of the whole continent is called upon to cry for the power of the Holy Ghost and God's care for her. The ecumenical prayer assemblies in all dioceses will serve to this end. We are living in Europe through a good time which should be taken advantage of with the ardour of faithful servants who work at edifying the common home built on rock.

57. *Ricostruire la comunità europea in Cristo*, "La Traccia" 12 (1991) No. 10, pp. 1316-1318.

The culture of Europe is comprehensible through its reference to Christianity, from which it takes its power of development and rebirth after the years of crisis. At the moment, most attention is being paid to the Europe of politics and economy, but prior to this is the Europe of culture, along with a sense of human transcendence characteristic to Christianity. The main problem of the present age, which after separating the development of science and technique from their ethical foundation and from the ultimate destination of man, is the problem of "sense." The testimony of Christians from Central and Eastern Europe is particularly telling here. Living under external violence they discovered the power and meaning of inner freedom.

Translated by *Jan Kłós*

NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

Carl A. A n d e r s o n, professor, philosopher, lawyer. Born 1951, Torrington, Connecticut, USA. Studied at Seattle University and the University of Denver. Since 1988, Dean and Professor of the Pontifical John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family, Washington, DC; 1983-1994 Visiting Professor of Family Law at the Pontifical John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family, Vatican City State; since 1991 member of the Board of Directors of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars. Since 1987 Vice President for Public Policy, Knights of Columbus, Washington, DC July-September 1987 Acting Director, White House Office of Public Liaison, Executive Office of the President, Washington, DC Since 1990 Commissioner, United States Commission on Civil Rights. Recipient of the Linacre Award, National Federation of Catholic Physicians' Guilds (1992). Contributor to several magazines, including *Crisis*, *Anthropotes*, *The Human Life Review*, *Catholic World Report*.

Rocco B u t t i g l i o n e, professor, philosopher, lawyer. Born 1948, Gallipoli, Italy. Studied at the universities of Rome and Turin. Professor at the University in Teramo; Pro-rector of *Internationale Akademie für Philosophie*, Liechtenstein. Since 1994 member of the Papal Academy of the Social Sciences; Secretary General of the Christian Democratic Union. Contributor to several magazines, including: *La nuova Europa*, *Il nuovo Areopago*, *Aletheia*, *Ethos*. Main fields of research: philosophical anthropology, ethics, the thought of Karol Wojtyła, the philosophy of culture and politics, and law.

Main publications: *Diatettica e nostalgia* (1978); *La crisi dell'economia marxista* (1978); *Il pensiero di Karol Wojtyła* (1982); *L'uomo e il lavoro* (1892); *Metafisica della conoscenza e politica* (1986); *La crisi della morale* (1991); *L'uomo e la famiglia* (1991); *Augusto Del Noce. Biografia di un pensiero* (1991); *Il problema politico dei cattolici* (1993).

Rev. Stanislav Č e g o v n i k, doctor, philosopher and theologian. Born 1926, Miess, Mezica, Slovenia. Diocesan vicar (dioc. Gurk) for religious orders, academic pastor for Slovenian students, and headmaster of St. Ursula secondary school in Klagenfurt.

Main fields of interest: Christian Europe, SS. Cyril and Method. Author of papers on pedagogics.

Juan de D i o s V i a l C o r r e a, professor. Born 1925, Santiago, Chile. Studied medicine at Chile University. 1951, scholar at Washington University, Saint Louis, USA. Since 1952 professor at the *Pontificia Universidad Católica* in Santiago de Chile; since 1985 its rector. 1975-1977 member of *Sociedad de Biología de Chile*; *Sociedad Latinoamericana de Microscopia Electronica*, *Academia de Ciencias del Instituto de Chile*, *Academia Latinoamericana de Ciencias*, 1982-1983 Chairman of the *Consejo Superior de Ciencia*; member of the Papal Council to Health Care Workers, International Advisory Board of International Center for Cancer and Development Biology (ICC), 1992-1994 Chairman of the *Asociación Internacional de Escuelas de Medicina de Universidades Católicas*, 1993 member of the Papal Council for Culture; 1994 Chairman of the Pontifical Academy for Life.

Author of *La Teoría Celular en los Orígenes de la Biología Moderna* (1982), and a number of papers.

John C r o s b y, professor, philosopher. Born 1944, Washington, DC, USA. Studied philosophy at Georgetown University, USA, and at the University of Salzburg, Austria. 1970-1987 Professor of philosophy at the University of Dallas, USA; 1987-1990 the *Internationale Akademie für Philosophie*, Liechtenstein; 1990 – present Franciscan University of Steubenville, USA. Main areas of research: ethics, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of religion, thought of J. H. Newman.

Main publications: *The Idea of Value and the Reform of the Traditional Metaphysics of Bonum* (1978); *Essay on Personal Selfhood* (forthcoming).

Damian P. F e d o r y k a, professor, philosopher. Born 1940, Cracow, Poland. Studied philosophy at Fordham University, USA, and Salzburg University, Austria. After graduation, lecturer at the universities of Rhode Island and Dallas, and the International Academy of Philosophy, Dallas, USA. Since 1985 president of Christendom College in Front Royal, USA. At present, professor at the Franciscan University of Steubenville and the Bohoslovska Academy in Lvov. Co-founder and member of *Internationale Akademie für Philosophie*, Liechtenstein. Main fields of research: political sciences, the thought of Karol Wojtyła, defence of unborn life.

Main publications: *Abortion and the Ransom of the Sacred* (1991) and many papers on education, social justice, morality and family in various journals and periodicals.

Alicja G r z e ś k o w i a k, professor, lawyer. Born 1941, Świrz near Lvov. Studied at the Faculty of Law, Mikołaj Kopernik University (UMK), Toruń. 1963-1966 Credit Inspector at the National Bank of Poland, Toruń branch; since 1966 researcher at UMK, since 1990, also a research worker of the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL). 1989 Senator of the Polish Republic; 1989-1991 Chairperson of the Constitution Commission of the Polish Senate for the first term of office of the Polish Senate; 1991-1993 Vicepresident of the Polish Senate during second term of office; Vice-chairperson of the *Partie Populaire* faction of the Parliamentary Political Group (Christian Democrats) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; consultant of the Papal Council to the Family; member of the Administration Board of the John Paul II Foundation, member of the Research Board of the John Paul II Institute at KUL; member of the *Société Internationale de Défense Sociale*; member of the Polish branch of the *Association Internationale de Droit Pénal*; member of the Toruń Learned Society, and the Learned Society of Criminal Law. Main fields of research: penology, problems of death sentence, legal and penal defence of human rights (with particular emphasis on the right to live), Christian conception of criminal punishment, juvenile law.

Main publications: *Kara pozbawienia wolności względem nieletnich w prawie karnym europejskich państw socjalistycznych* (1976); *Kara śmierci w polskim prawie karnym* (1978); *Postępowanie w sprawach nieletnich* (1986); *Zagadnienie prawnokarnej ochrony dziecka poczętego w pracach Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 1990-1991* (1994).

Alphons H o r t e n, entrepreneur, politician. Born 1907, Metz, Lorraine. Studied at *Studium der Land- und Volkswirtschaft* at *Friedrich Wilhelm Universität*, Berlin. Founder of the Learned Board of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU); Co-founder of the *Bund der Katholischen Unternehmers*, active participant in political life, among others things, as assistant to Chancellor Erhard; 1965-1973 member of the *Bundestag*. Author of several papers on Catholic social thought.

Mieczysław Albert K r ą p i e c, OP, professor, philosopher. Born 1921, Berezowica Mała, near Zbaraż, Poland. Studied theology and philosophy at the Dominican Collegium in Cracow, and at KUL. Since 1946 philosophy lecturer at the Dominican Collegium in Cracow. 1951 researcher at KUL, 1970-1983 rector of KUL; retired. Member of the Papal Academy of St. Thomas in Rome, Polish Academy of Sciences, *Academia Scientiarum et Artium Europea*. Honorary Doctor

of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, Canada, and the Catholic University in Leuven, Belgium. Recipient of the Order of Academic Palms of the French Academy, and the Belgium Order of *Grand Officier Leopold II*, among others.

Main fields of research: metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of politics, and theory of cognition.

Main publications: *Teoria analogii bytu* (1959); *Metafizyka* (1966, 1978); *Ja – człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej* (1974); *Człowiek i prawo naturalne* (1975); *Język i świat realny* (1985); *O rozumienie filozofii* (1991); *U podstaw rozumienia kultury* (1991); *O ludzką politykę* (1993) and commentaries to the classical works of metaphysics.

Abp. Kazimierz M a j d a ń s k i, professor, theologian. Born 1916, Małgów, Poland. Studied at the Theological Seminary in Włocławek and at Freiburg University, Switzerland. During World War II imprisoned in Nazi concentration camps, mainly in Dachau. 1950-1963 Lecturer of Moral Theology at the Theological Seminary in Włocławek. Since 1969, Lecturer of Moral and Pastoral Theology at the Academy of Catholic Theology (ATK), Warsaw. 1975 Founder and director of the Institute of Studies of the Family in Warsaw-Łomianki (ATK). 1962 nominated auxiliary bishop in the Włocławek diocese 1979 ordinary bishop of the Szczecin-Kamień diocese; retired. Co-founder and long-time chairman of the Episcopal Commission to the Family Pastoral Care and of the Episcopal Commission to the Dialogue with Nonbelievers. Member of the Vatican Secretariat for Nonbelievers, on the Board of the Papal Council to the Family, and member of the Research Board of the John Paul II Institute (KUL). Honorary doctor of the Szczecin University.

Main areas of research: moral theology (with particular emphasis on the problems of marriage and family), pastoral care of families, martyrology of priests during World War II.

Main publications: *Wspólnota życia i miłości: zarys teologii małżeństwa i rodziny* (1979); *Antropologiczne kategorie trzeźwości* (ed., 1980); *Rozwój człowieka w rodzinie*, vol. 1 (ed., 1982); *Wychowanie do miłości* (ed., 1987); *Bądźcie moimi świadkami* (ed., 1987); *Teologia małżeństwa i rodziny*, vol. 1 (ed., 1980), vol. 2 (ed. 1990).

Jean-Marie M e y e r, professor, philosopher. Born 1955, Paris. Secondary school philosophy teacher and lecturer in the History of Modern Philosophy at the *Faculté de Philosophie Comparée*, Paris. Member (together with his wife) of the Papal Council to the Family. Main areas of research: bioethics, logic and medieval metaphysics, philosophy of Hegel.

Author of papers in the above areas, published mainly by the university magazine *Cahiers*.

Jacek S a l i j, OP, professor, theologian and publicist. Born 1942, Budy, near Dubno, Volhynia. Studied at the Academy of Catholic Theology (ATK), Warsaw. Researcher at ATK and the Dominican Philosophico-Theological Collegium, Cracow, member of the publishing board of *Studia Theologica Varsoviensa*. Author of numerous learned, religious and popular papers, translations and studies on the texts of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Main publications: *Królestwo Boże jest w nas. Wybór artykułów* (1980); *Szkającym drogi* (1982); *Rozmowy ze św. Augustynem* (1983); *Rozpacz pokonana* (1983); *Pytania nieobojętne* (1986); *Tajemnica Emmanuela dzisiaj* (1989); *Poszukiwania w wierze* (1991).

Rev. Michel S c h o o y a n s, professor, philosopher. Born 1930. 1959-1969 research worker at the University of São Paulo, Brazil. Since 1964, professor at the Catholic University, Louvain-la Neuve, Belgium. Main areas of research: theology of politics, philosophy of morality.

Author of many books, including: *Destin du Brésil. La technocratie militaire et son idéologie* (1973); *Demain, le Brésil* (1977); *L'avortement: enjeux politiques* (1990); *La dérive totalitaire du libéralisme* (1991).

Josef S e i f e r t, professor, philosopher. Born 1945, Salzburg, Austria. Studied philosophy in Salzburg and Munich. 1969-1973 researcher at Dallas University, USA. At present rector and professor at the *Internationale Akademie für Philosophie*, Liechtenstein. Editor-in-chief of the philosophical journal *Aletheia*, the series *Studies in Phenomenological and Classical Realism*, *Akademie-Reden* and *Philosophie und realistische Phänomenologie*. Main areas of research: theory of cognition, metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, and ethics.

Main publications: *Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit. Die Transzendenz des Menschen in der Erkenntnis* (1972); *Leib und Seele. Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen Anthropologie* (1973); *Was ist und was motiviert eine sittliche Handlung?* (1976); *Back to "Things in Themselves". A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism* (1987); *Essere e persona. Verso una fondazione fenomenologica di una metafisica classica e personalistica* (1989); *Schachphilosophie* (1989).

Robert A. S i r i c o, CSP, theologian, pastor, economist, and journalist. Studied at the University of South California, London University, and the Catholic University of America. After a fifteen-year period of public activity he founded in 1990 The Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty. Pastor to AIDS sufferers at the National Institute of Health, Minister for Reconciliation at the Catholic Information Center, Grand Rapids, Michigan. His writings have been published in a variety of journals, including: *The Wall Street Journal*, *Forbes* (for which he is a regular columnist), *The Washington Times*, *First Things*, *Crisis* and *The London Financial Times*. Member of the Prestige Mont Pèlerin Society, The Mackinac Center in Midland, MI, American Academy of Religion, Philadelphia Society, Michigan Civil Rights Commission. Member of the Board of Advisors of the Civic Institute in Prague. Associated with the *Internationale Akademie für Philosophie*, Liechtenstein. Main areas of research: religion, politics, and economy.

Contributor to many books on religious, economic and social matters, including: *Man and Marxism*, ed. M. Bauman (Hillsdale, MI: Hillsdale College Press, 1992), *A Century of Catholic Social Thought*, eds. G. Weigel and R. Royal (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991); *Catholicism's Developing Social Teaching* (Acton Institute 1992).

Tadeusz S t y c z e ń, SDS, professor, philosopher and ethician. Born 1931, Wołowice, near Cracow, Poland. Studied theology at the Jagiellonian University, Cracow, and philosophy at KUL. Since 1963, researcher at KUL. At present, head of the Chair of Ethics, member of the Research Board of the John Paul II Institute, editor-in-chief of the quarterly *Ethos*. Professor of the John Paul II Institute of Studies on Marriage and Family, Lateran University, Rome; co-founder of the *Internationale Akademie für Philosophie*, Liechtenstein, member of the *Societas Ethica*, Learned Society of KUL, Consultant to the Papal Commission to the Family, member of the Steering Committee of the Pontifical Academy for Life. Honorary doctor at the University of Navarra, Pamplona, Spain. Main areas of research: ethics, meta-ethics, philosophical and theological anthropology, the thought of John Paul II.

Main publications: *Problem możliwości etyki jako empirycznie uprawomocnionej i ogólnie ważnej teorii moralności. Studium metaetyczne* (1972); *Zarys etyki. Część I: Metaetyka* (1974); *Der Streit um den Menschen* (coauthor, 1979); *Etyka niezależna?* (1980); *ABC etyki* (1981); *W drodze do etyki* (1984); *Wprowadzenie do etyki* (1993); *Urodzić się, by kochać* (1993); *Solidarność wyzwala* (1993).

Andrzej S z o s t e k, MIC, professor, ethician. Born 1945, Grudziądz, Poland. Studied philosophy and theology at KUL. Since 1971 researcher at KUL, since 1992 Vicerector, since 1993 professor of Applied Ethics. Deputy head and member of the Research Board of the John Paul II Institute at KUL; member of the *Internationale Akademie für Philosophie*, Liechtenstein, International Theological Commission and the Learned Society of KUL. Member of the editorial

board of the quarterly *Ethos*. Main areas of research: ethics, meta-ethics, and the thought of Karol Wojtyła.

Main publications: *Der Streit um den Menschen* (coauthor, 1979), *Normy i wyjątki* (1979); *Sein und Handeln in Christus* (coauthor, 1986); *Natura, rozum, wolność* (1989, 1990; German edition: *Natur-Vernunft-Freiheit*, 1992); *Pogadanki z etyki* (1993).

Wolfgang Waldstein, professor, lawyer. Born 1928, Hangö, Finland. Studied law at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. After graduation, researcher at Innsbruck. 1965 professor at the University of Salzburg, Austria; in the years 1968-69 rector at Salzburg; retired 1992. Member of the *Internationale Vereinigung für Rechtsphilosophie*, *Österreichische Juristenkommission*, *Deutscher Rechtshistorikertag*. Honorary doctor at the University of Miskolc, Hungary; awarded the Silver and Gold Cross of Merit of the Austrian Republic, Gold Cross of Merit of the *Land Salzburg*, and the Leopold Kunschak award. Main areas of research: Roman law, history of Roman legal sciences, human rights, and the philosophy of law.

Main publications: *Untersuchungen zum römischen Begnadigungsrecht* (1964); *Römische Rechtsgeschichte* (1976); *Das Menschenrecht zum Leben* (1982); *Operae libertorum. Untersuchungen zur Dienstpflicht freigelassener Sklaven* (1986).

Rev. Stanisław Wielgus, professor, historian of philosophy. Born 1939, Wierzchowiska, near Janów Lubelski, Poland. Studied theology and philosophy at KUL; also studied philosophy at Munich University. Since 1969, researcher at KUL. At present, professor of the History of Philosophy in Poland at the Interfaculty Institute of the History of Culture in the Middle Ages and Interfaculty of Lexicographic Institute. 1988-1989 vicerector, and since 1989 rector of KUL. 1990-1993 vicepresident of the Conference of Rectors of Polish Universities, 1992-1993 Chairman of the Collegium of Rectors of the Lublin Region. Member of *Société Internationale pour L'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale*, *Associazione degli Storici Europei*, Polish Philosophical Society, Learned Society of KUL (General Secretary 1985-1988), *Academia Scientiarum et Artium Europea*, *Societas Humboldtiana Polonorum*, and the Lublin Learned Society. Recipient of the Ministry of National Education Award for his achievements in running a university. Main areas of research: history of medieval philosophy (especially Polish), and the natural sciences, medieval theology and law.

Author of numerous treatises, critical editions and papers.

Mirosława Chuda

Translated by Jan Kłós

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THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF PHILOSOPHY in Schaan, Liechtenstein is a philosophical research centre and institution of higher learning. The Academy, which was founded in 1986, offers a range of philosophical studies, terminating in the degree of Master of Arts or Doctor of Philosophy. The degrees awarded by the Academy are recognized by the countries of the European Community, Switzerland and other European countries via conventions of the Council of Europe and by Austria via bilateral treaties governing the equivalence of university studies and academic degrees. The President of the Board of trustees of the Academy is Prince Nicolaus von und zu Liechtenstein, and the founding Rector Professor Josef Seifert. Classes are offered both in English and German.

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